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ABSTRACT
It can be said that for Plato theory of man and 
political philosophy are tautologous. This study of 
Plato's theory of man points to the fact that a key concept 
in understanding Plato's political philosophy and man comes 
from the same source, that is , the concept of metaxy. The 
idea of metaxy is derived from the appreciation of the 
dialectic movement of arguments, speeches in the dialogues. 
The oscillation is argued to have been designed by the 
author of the dialogues in order to guide the reader to 
experience the existential moment with regard to the nature 
of the soul. The investigation of the Statesman, the 
Republic, the Phaedrus, the Symposium, and the Lysis, shows 
that the nature of man lies in the soul whose nature is 
metaxy. As regards the Platonic theory of the tripartite 
soul in the Republic, self-knowledge and the art of 
statesmanship are inseparable in the same way that the 
study of the soul and the city are intertwined. The 
philosopher must become king or statesman. As regards the 
idea of the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony in 
human nature in the Laws, dialectic and language of the 
philosopher-king are educational and political at the same 
time. The interplay of Dionysiac and Apollonian effects 
play an important role in understanding the metaxy of human 
nature and politics, or man and the city. However, the 
metaxy of politics entails the politics of metaxy, which 
renders a hermeneutic freedom to the reader, that is, he is 
free to choose or decide what kind of interpretation he is 
about to take or leave. Besides, the thesis claims a 
solution, which results from its study of human nature in 
the dialogues, to the enigmatic geometric riddles in the 
Statesman and the Republic.
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5CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. One is to 
render a study of Plato's theory of man in relation to his 
political philosophy. The idea with regard to the relation 
between the concept of human nature and politics in this 
thesis is a traditional one. It is based on the assumption 
that a political thinker derives his political ideas from 
his conception of human nature.1 The title of the thesis 
has been anticipated by John Wild's Plato's Theory of Man 
which was published in 1946.2
According to Strauss, Wild is said to be moved by the 
historicist and teleological spirit of Marx and Heidegger 
rather than Plato as his work seems to present 'systematic 
anticipation of the future' and the 'historic nature of 
(the) transcendental inversion1.3 Moreover, he 'has not 
merely grossly failed to give a not too grossly misleading 
picture of Plato's views, and especially of his political 
views, ' but 'has also supplied the numerous enemies of 
Plato and of Platonic studies with the strongest weapon for 
which they could wish'.4
Wild renders a too rational and rigid interpretation
1 This idea has been put forward by Forbes and Smith. See, 
I. Forbes and S. Smith (eds.), Politics and Human Nature, 
London, 1983.
2 John Wild, Plato's Theory of Man: An Introduction to the 
Realistic Philosophy of Culture, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
1946.
3 Leo Strauss, 'On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political 
Philosophy', Social Research, 13, No. 3 (September), 1946, 
p. 356.
4 Strauss, ibid., p. 367.
6of Plato1 s political philosophy. His interpretation of 
the ideal city turns to support what Popper and other 
critics accused Plato of being totalitarian.5 Like Marx,
5 Consider, for example, 'The Structure of the State1, in 
Wild, Plato's Theory of Man, o p c i t pp. 102-102: 'The
legislative process cannot endure in a community threatened 
by general illiteracy, internal revolution, or external 
invasion. Hence the nature society demands first of all, 
the conserving agencies of tradition and education to 
maintain the plan. These have a preventive and a corrective 
aspect. The schools and mimetic arts, by means of 
admonition and images, protect the law against the inborn 
confusion and ignorance of succeeding generations, while 
the judges and the courts protect it against violations 
which arise in spite of such precautions. If possible they 
correct the malformation of soul in the offender. If this 
is not possible, they seclude him from the rest of society, 
and thus attempt to avoid contagion.1 Many scholars have 
attacked Plato in a variety of ways in connection with 
anti-democratic and illiberal attitudes. In his well-known 
Plato Today, R.D.S. Crossman castigates Plato by saying: 
'Plato's philosophy is the most savage and most profound 
attack upon liberal ideas which history can show' 
(Crossman, 1937, p. 32). The second, after Crossman, and 
most successful criticism ever made comes from Karl Popper. 
Experiencing the totalitarianism of the Nazi political 
programme during the Second World War, Popper finished his 
magnum opus on the sociology of politics, the Open Society 
and its Enemies to welcome the end of the war. He accused 
Plato's political programme of inspiring prototype of 
totalitarianism and utopianism: Plato is the ideologue of 
totalitarianism. Regarding Plato as an enemy of the open 
society or democracy, Popper interpreted Plato's dialogues 
as the political propaganda of an Old Oligarch arguing 
'(m)en must be taught that justice is inequality' (Popper, 
1945, p. 195) . A.D. Winspear read Plato from a once- 
fashionable Marxist socio-historical approach and concluded 
that Plato was one of the leisured class (Winspear, 1956) . 
Following Winspear with a refining and profound integration 
of the method in history of political thought, Wood and 
Wood considered Plato in the light of his social context or 
social class and established it as the origin of his 
political theory from which they argued that Plato was an 
apologist, a rationalizer of the declining aristocracy 
against the polis whose 'important component of the 
ideology shared by the Socratics with many aristocrats was 
a deep-rooted hatred of democracy' (Wood and Wood, 1978, p. 
3). Similarly, Plato was portrayed by G.E.M. de Ste. 
Croix, a Marxist social and economic historian, as 'an 
arch-enemy of democracy, anti-democratic in the highest 
degree,..one of the most determined and dangerous enemies 
that freedom has ever had who sneers at democracy as 
involving an excess of freedom for everyone' (de Ste.
7he seems to regard social factors to be the cause of evil.
Croix, 1981, pp. 71, 412, 284). Plato's account of
democracy and the democratic man in the Republic, far from 
portraying democracy, represents only a 'grotesque 
caricature of at any rate the one fourth-century democracy- 
-that of Athens'; moreover, de Ste. Croix argues that 
democracy in fact 'was particularly stable and showed 
nothing of the tendency to transform itself into tyranny 
which Plato represents as a typical feature of democracy' 
(ibid., pp. 70-71, 412). George Klosko agrees that 'to
some extent Plato's hostility to democracy can be 
attributed to his economic and social background.. 
(t)hroughout his writings Plato reveals many of his class's 
attitudes and biases..(m)any of his criticism of the 
Athenian system— and of democracy in general— were common 
to his class, and it should be realized that much of what 
he says along these lines is coloured by an almost inbred 
hatred of these features of his state' (Klosko, 1986, 
p.10). With the rise of post-structuralism and linguistic 
turn, Plato's dialogues have been lately understood by 
those of the oralist approach as evincing his preference 
for an abstract ethics, attempted in literal discourse 
which is 'sparse, abstract, immobile', in contrast to the 
'copious, warmly human, participatory character of its oral 
counterpart' (Ong, 1982, p. 166). In defense of the
practical, situation-ethics of the Greek oral tradition, 
E.A. Havelock criticises Plato's dialogues as the founder 
of 'an abstract of moral absolutes' (Quoted in Gentili, 
1988, p. xvii). Although this criticism from the oralists 
is aimed at the revolutionary impact of Plato's writings 
rather than the man himself, nevertheless the consequence 
of this kind of interpretation is far more serious. 
Psychologically, it supports and enlivens the preceding 
attacks on Plato's authoritarian and totalitarian mentality 
which have been regarded as revealing a grotesque attitude 
towards the Athenians. Finally, all these comments and 
criticism above can be concluded precisely in L.B. Carter's 
words that 'Plato, in his way of life and thought, was 
absolutely untypical of Greek life,..he would have been 
regarded by the man in the street..as a "layabout", and a 
"crank" ' (Carter, 1986, p. 186). See R.H.S. Crossman, 
Plato Today, London, 1937; Karl Popper, The Open Society 
and Its Enemies, Vol. One: The Spell of Platof 1945; A.D. 
Winspear, The Genesis of Plato's Thought, New York, 1956; 
Ellen Meiskin Wood and Neal Wood, Class Ideology and 
Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in 
Social Context, Oxford, 1978; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The 
Class Struggle in Ancient Greek World, London, 1981; George 
Klosko, The Development of Plato's Political Theory, 
London, 1986; W.J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The
Technologizing of the Word, London, 1982; Bruno Gentili, 
Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the 
Fifth Century, trans. A. Thomas Cole, Baltimore, 1988; L.B. 
Carter, The Quiet Athenian, Oxford, 1986.
So controlled socialisation can cleanse the canvass of the 
city. When Glaucon joins Socrates in constructing the 
ideal city, he reflects what he himself regards to be 
desirable. Likewise, Wild, who believes that Man is a 
rational animal, anticipates in his ideal city only the 
citizens who are similar to himself, that is, a rational 
man.6 Wild is accurate in portraying what the life of a 
rational soul would be like. However, the rational soul is 
not complete with regard to the Platonic tripartite soul. 
He argues that all men are philosophers and sophists while 
in the dialogues the philosopher and the sophist are of 
different natures.7 For Plato, the philosopher-king rules 
for the sake of the happiness of all classes. For Wild, it 
seems that the philosopher-king rules for the sake of his 
rational and ascetic way of life. He seems to believe that 
society in reality can be free from change if a well- 
planned political ideal has been implemented. He seems to 
forget that Socrates said that no existing cities are 
suitable for a philosophic nature.8 He is not aware that 
he himself might be accused of what he accused the 
historian of philosophy. He accused them of uselessly 
consuming 'the precious time and energies of the community 
in consciously trying to demonstrate that this task 
(history of philosophy), committed to their charge, is non­
existent or impossible'.9 His case is probably worse since 
he 'unconsciously' argued that his task was a practical and 
realistic one.10
6 Wild, op. cit., p. 102.
7 Wild, op. cit., p. 275.
8 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 497a-b). The translations
Plato's dialogues and letters referred to in this thesis 
will be taken from Plato in Twelve Volumes, Loeb Classical 
Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
9 Wild, op. cit., p. 130.
10 He regards his work as 'an introduction to the realistic 
philosophy of culture'. Wild, op. cit.
For Strauss, writing about Plato's theory of man is 
already antithetical to Platonic understanding11, since 
Plato never wrote a book on other people's 'theories of 
man'.12 It is an ironic remark about anyone who claims to 
write a book on Plato's man. With regard to his criticism, 
Strauss might have recourse to the fact that Plato never 
wrote or said anything about this important subject on his 
own but 'what are now called his are the work of a Socrates 
embellished and modernized'.13 While Plato is anonymous, 
Socrates never puts forward any definite view. Reading 
between the lines of Strauss' commentary, the purpose of 
the dialogues is to inspire the reader to search for self- 
knowledge. With regard to Strauss' judgement, Wild's work 
fails to fulfil this task.
Like its predecessor, this thesis cannot escape from 
such criticism as regards 'writing about other people's 
theories of man'. If writing a book on Plato's or anyone's 
theories of Man implies self-ignorance, then, self- 
knowledge would have emerged from 'writing about one's own 
understanding of man'. This thesis originated in the 
problem of self-ignorance. It is concerned with writing 
about the view of Man of Plato. In search for Plato's man, 
one becomes blind; one never sees Plato. The view of the 
man one pursues is the view of the anonymous. As Plato is 
anonymous and Socrates does not answer but only questions, 
one is left with the anonymous; one is left with the 
transparent; one is left alone with oneself; one is left 
with a mirror.14 The paradox is inevitable for when one
11 Strauss, op. cit., pp. 326-367.
12 Strauss, op. cit., p. 333.
13 Plato, Epistle II, (314c).
14 Cf. Plato, Alcibiades J, (132d-133b):
Socrates:'Consider in your turn: suppose that, 
instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye
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writes about Plato's man, one just writes about one's own 
understanding of Man. The difference lies between the 
author who realises this situation and the author who does 
not.
That is, the second purpose of the thesis is to render 
a work on Plato's man from a different authorial stance to 
its predecessor. That is, the author realises that to 
write about Plato's man is to write about his own self- 
understanding. That is why a chief argument in the thesis 
is that the theme of the dialogues is the search for self- 
knowledge . There are two movements with regard to the 
search for self-knowledge: one is Socratic inspiration;
the other is Platonic inspiration. The former is the 
search for self-knowledge in the dialogues in a literal
of one of us, as a piece of advice— "See 
thyself,"— how should we apprehend the meaning of 
the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye 
should look at something in looking at which it 
would see itself?.. .Then let us think what object 
there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see 
both it and ourselves.'
Alcibiades:'Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and 
things of that sort.'
Socrates:'Quite right. And there is also 
something of that sort in the eye that we see 
with?...And have you observed that face of the 
person who looks into another's eye is shown in 
the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we 
call this the pupil, for in a sort it is an image 
of the person looking?...Then an eye viewing 
another eye, and looking at the most perfect part 
of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see 
itself...But if it looks at any other thing in 
man or at anything in nature but what resembles 
this, it will not see itself..Then if an eye is 
to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at 
that region of the eye in which the virtue of an 
eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is 
sight.. .And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, 
is to know herself, she must surely look at a 
soul, and especially at that region of it in 
which occurs the virtue of a soul— wisdom, and at 
any other part of a soul which resembles this?'
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sense, namely, a textual self-knowledge. The latter is the 
search for self-knowledge of the author in relation to the 
dialogues.
With regard to the nature of the relation of the 
concept of man and the construction of political theory, 
it is believed that the former assists one in understanding 
any political ideas set forth in the dialogues. Plato's 
concept of man has been differently understood. Sextus 
derives a funny picture of Plato's man from the enigmatic 
passage in the Statesman by saying that Plato's man is 'a 
wingless animal, with two feet and broad nails, receptive 
of political science, epistemes politikes'.15 Sextus 
intentionally interpreted Plato literally because he 
intended to discredit the useless seriousness of 
philosophy, since the task of the Sceptic is 'to expose the 
folly of every form of positive doctrine'.16
Sextus also gives another sceptical remark with regard 
to the description of man as a rational animal. He said 
that 'that "man is a rational animal" does not give a sound 
description of the notion of "man" because "god" also is a 
rational animal'.17 It would be a very useful remark for 
Wild if he had a view about the gods like the Greeks. A 
modern man who seems to disbelieve or not to believe at all 
the existence of the gods in the same way as the Greeks 
did, that is, 'god' is zoon logikon, would easily ascribe 
'being rational1 to himself and mankind.18
15 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, trans. R.G. 
Bury, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1935, (Book I 281).
16 Sextus, ibid., 'Introduction', p. vii.
17 Sextus, op. cit., (Book I 238).
18 A modern man calls himself Homo sapiens. However, some 
argue against that ascription that 'in the course of time 
we have come to realize that we are not so reasonable after 
all as the Eighteenth Century, with its worship of reason
12
The interpretation of Plato's man affects the 
interpretation of his political philosophy. Popper who 
regards Plato's political philosophy as an inspiring 
prototype of totalitarianism and utopianism is convinced 
that Plato possesses no concept of humanity or mankind.19 
He believes that Plato intends to universally apply his 
political ideal to all mankind. Popper not unlike Wild 
never thought that the Republic of Plato is strangely 
pedagogic and therefore un-Socratic.20 The difference 
lies in that they have opposite tastes of the same view 
which they similarly derived from their interpretation.
With regard to this kind of accusation, there is a 
point to be noticed as regards the Greeks and their 
attitudes to mankind. There is some evidence that the 
Greeks possessed the idea of humanity.21 However, the 
ancient Greek ethnocentrism is also evident.22 The Greeks 
thought they were superior to the barbarians.23 Plato 
might not possess the concept of humanity as Popper has 
accused. Alien to his contemporaries, he is not 
ethnocentric. In the Republic, Socrates told Glaucon that
and its naive optimism thought us'. J. Huizinga, Homo 
Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture, London, 
1980, 'Foreword'.
19 Popper, op. cit., pp. 86-119.
20 See Barrie A. Wilson, 'Plato: Some Inconsistencies', in 
Hermeneutical Studies: Dilthey, Sophocles and Plato, 
Lewiston and Lampeter, 1990, p. 125
21 Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt, 
Harmondsworth, 1986, (Book III 35-38, 97-98), pp.218-219, 
245-246).
22 See Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self 
-definition through Tragedy, Oxford, 1991.
23 Edith Hall points to some exceptions with regard to the 
political situation between the states. From this, the 
ideas of 'Barbaric Greeks' and 'Noble Barbarians' are 
regarded to be a political use. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 
201-223.
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until philosophers become kings or kings become 
philosophers, 'there can be no cessation of troubles, for 
our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either1.24 
From this, it can be inferred that Plato either possesses 
some idea of humanity or does not have any at all. He 
might, as Popper understood, possess only the picture of 
the just man and the city which his political ideal is 
founded on and presupposed.25 If the picture of the just 
man is regarded as only Platofs idea of man, then, how can 
the passage 588c-d in Book Nine of the Republic be 
accounted for? In the passage, the picture of man has been 
described:
'Mould, then, a single shape of a 
manifold and many-headed beast that has 
a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts 
and can change them and cause to spring 
forth from itself all such 
growths..Then fashion one other form of 
a lion and one of a man and let the 
first be far the largest and the second 
second in size..Join the three in one, 
then, so as in some sort to grow 
together. .Then mould about them outside 
the likeness of one, look within but 
who can see only the external sheath it 
appears to be one living creature, the 
man.,26
This portrayal of man as such has been regarded as the 
task of a cunning artist.27 From the passage, man seems 
to be rather beastly. The picture of man in the dialogues 
then turns out to be twofold, that is, good and bad, just
24 Plato, the Republic, (Book V 473d), trans. Paul Shorey, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969. See also the Republic, 
(Book V 471b-c): 'I agree that our citizens ought to deal 
with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating 
barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks.'
25 Popper, op. cit., pp. 86-119.
26 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 588c-d).
27 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 588c).
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and unjust.
In this regard, the problem of man in political theory 
can be deemed a dilemma. Saying that man is good by his 
nature, tabula rasa, seems to imply that the good nature 
means spotlessness or blank in a new born child. A new 
born child is like a white cloth. He or she is incapable 
of doing evil things. To be sure, at that age, he or she 
is incapable of almost everything. Here, there is perhaps 
a confusion between the good and incapability. A different 
view argues for similarity between man and animals with 
regard to their common expression of aggression, 
territorial protection etc. From this view, it can lead 
to the fact that man differs from animals in degree not in 
kind.
In order to resolve the problem of the dilemma of 
dualism, Simone Weil has derived from Plato's dialogues the 
concept of man as a being in 'between the human and the 
divine1.28 Weil has recourse to metaxy in Plato's 
dialogues. For Weil, ' "the metaxy form the region of good 
and evil"; they ' "are the relative and mixed blessings" of 
home, country, tradition, and culture "which warm and 
nourish the soul",..(i)n short, they are those human things 
that mediate our existence "in-between" the Great Beast and 
God'.29 So 'the human' in the phrase is referred to 
Plato's the Great Beast as portrayed in the image of many­
headed beasts. With regard to Weil's biography, she had 
been oscillating between the spiritual world of 
Christianity and the materialistic version of the world of 
Marxism.30 Undoubtedly, she identifies Christianity with 
the divine and Marxism with the Great Beast. In her escape
28 Mary G. Dietz, Between the Human and the Divine: The 
Political Thought of Simone Weil, Totowa, New Jersey, 1988.
29 Dietz, ibid., p. 111. See also, Simone Weil,
Gravity and Grace, London, 1952, p. 133.
30 Dietz, op. cit., 'The Dilemma of Worldliness', pp.
3-20.
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from the dilemma, she found that the truth of the Platonic 
doctrine rejects 'earthly illusion and a Christian love of 
God1.31 The Platonic metaxy is the answer to the dilemma 
of thought. This thesis studies thoroughly the Platonic 
notion of metaxy from which the understanding of Plato*s 
theory of man and political philosophy is essentially 
derived. In general, the metaxy in this thesis is similar 
to what is conceived in Weil's works. However, it is not 
identical.
The study of the problem of Man at this time can be 
regarded as a return to a prejudiced question.32 Since 
modernity has been identified with the progress of 
scientific and technological advances over the past, its 
disillusion and disenchantment with the sacred world had 
been regarded as its distinct enlightenment. Indeed, 
modern science has found its own Man. The man of modern 
science is no longer a fallen creature of sin. Man is no 
longer a mystery, since, thanks to Charles Darwin, it was 
declared that mankind had evolved from apes, and also, 
according to Friedrich Nietzsche, God was declared dead. 
To be sure, Man is dead as well, to the extent that human 
nature has been deemed a precarious concept, a myth of 
metaphysical and religious tradition. Man has no essence. 
He can be anything and also nothing. Man paints himself in 
the image he creates, putting on masks made by himself or 
others.33
31 Dietz, op. cit., p. 109.
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to 
a Philosophy of the Future, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 
Walter Kaufmann (trans. and ed.), New York, 1968, 'On the 
Prejudice of Philosophers', p. 199.
33 With regard to this point, Rorty advocates: 'We ironists 
hope, by this continual redescription, to make the best 
selves for ourselves that we can.' Richard Rorty, 
Contingency, irony, and solidarity, Cambridge, 1989, p. 80.
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Scientific explanations have been taken for granted as 
the sole legitimate discourse on the human being. No 
matter what kind of discipline it is, it would be regarded 
as groundless if it did not associate itself with the 
scientific method. Even philosophy itself, here in the 
case of Nietzsche, also bases itself, albeit partly, on 
scientism.34
34 Scientism in social and political sciences is the Kantian 
legacy. Kant thought that all questions can be answered if 
a fundamental question has been solved, namely, 'What is 
Man?' . Kant hoped that this could be done in his 
'anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*. However, 
the Kantian attempt to combine and unify diverse knowledge 
about human beings in conjunction with his distinction of 
phenomena from noumena entails the separation and 
reconciliation between philosophy and science. Kantian 
transcendental philosophy yields the impossibility of all 
metaphysics. Ironically, empirical science becomes 
philosophical and philosophy becomes empirical. Moreover, 
his attempt to secure a firm ground for any future 
metaphysics effects the reverse since noumena are 
inaccessible; therefore the only sensible and practical 
methodology of human understanding is positivism and 
empirical science whose object of study are phenomena. In 
this respect, metaphysical philosophy must either crumble 
down or transform itself into a philosophy of empiricism. 
Kant's anthropology fails to achieve what he demanded of a 
philosophical anthropology. Whether the interpretation of 
Kant's philosophy be right or wrong, however, his legacy 
bequeathed to Western philosophy comes to opposing results 
which Kant himself never anticipated before. Philosophy was 
going to lose its metaphysical ground. In response to 
Kantian enigmatic dichotomy of noumena and phenomena, 
Hegelian idealism and Schopenhauerean existentialism 
emerged. Hegelian philosophy in its extreme form, swung 
towards the realm of the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer was 
well aware of the one-sidedness of both materialism and 
idealism. He argued that each position cannot make its 
argument plausible by dispensing with the other. 
Subjective and objective do not form a continuum. 
According to him, the answer to the problem of subject- 
object dichotomy lies in man himself. Human will as thing- 
in-itself is metaphysical and man himself is only 
phenomenon of this will. This is how Schopenhauer extended 
Kant's teaching about the phenomena of man and his actions 
by interpreting that all phenomena in nature are founded 
upon the will.
Also, if nature consists of natura naturata and natura 
naturans, then man is nature herself , since the will of 
man here is the will-to-live that objectifies itself in the 
phenomenon of the body. And through the objectification of
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the will, the life of the whole of mankind is likewise to 
be found in it both as regards its empirical and its 
transcendental significance. With regard to the will-to- 
live, man differs from other animals only in degree not in 
kind.
In consequence, Schopenhauer distinguishes what is so 
unique in man, namely self-consciousness and consciousness 
of the existence of other beings. This kind of wonder 
which Schopenhauer traced back to the Platonic-Aristotelian 
tradition as a very philosophical emotion presupposed in 
everyone was generalised as a universal aspect of mankind. 
From this, Schopenhauer visualised man as an animal 
metaphysicum who has 'a predominantly strong metaphysical 
need*. Although there are two kinds of metaphysics, 
namely, one for the philosopher, and the other for the 
mass, that does not matter insofar as the wise and the 
ignorant are different from each other in degree. Man is 
an animal metaphysicum, in other words, man is the person 
who wonders at himself and the world; given that, he cannot 
dispense with some kind of explanation to console his 
metaphysical insecurity and this cannot be anything other 
than a metaphysical explanation purporting to lead to 
metaphysical truth.
For Schopenhauer, the way to truth is no longer 
impossible, like that of Kant, but man has to know himself. 
Schopenhauer's Will as ultimate self-knowledge has rendered 
not new knowledge but tautology. Nietzsche resented 
Schopenhauer's thesis of the will as the ultimate truth in 
the world. To argue that truth is realised when the will 
itself has become known by man indicates to Nietzsche that 
'Schopenhauer only did what philosophers are in the habit
of doing he adopted a popular prejudice and exaggerated
it' ('On the Prejudice.', opcit., p. 215). 'How can man 
know himself?', this question was posed by Nietzsche to 
challenge all previous attempts at understanding the being 
of man. Particularly, his aim was directed against those 
thinkers who believed that metaphysical and cosmological 
truth could be revealed once the answer to the question of 
human nature had been revealed: 'All philosophers have the
common failing of starting out from man as he is now and 
thinking they can reach their goal through an analysis of 
him' (Human all too Human, pp. 12-13) . Nietzsche 
criticises that kind of view regarding man as an aeterna 
veritas which originates with Descartes' searching for 
certainty in ego cogito ergo sum (Heidegger, 'The 
Cartesian.1, pp. 102-103) has obsessively influenced many 
past thinkers to 'involuntarily think of man as something 
constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of 
things' (Human., p. 103).
As regards the interpretation of Kant's philosophy, 
see Herbert Schnadelbach, Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, 
translated by Eric Matthew, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 219, 220, 
66-108, 218, 221-222. For the influence of Kant upon the 
merging of empiricism and positivism in modern social
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The results of recent scientific researches appear to 
indicate that man and animals differ in degree not in 
kind.35 Paradoxically, the research on human behaviour
scientific theory, see Jeffrey T. Bergner, The Origins of 
Formalism in Social Science, Chicago, 1981, pp. 11, 19.
Also see Arthur Schopenhauer1s criticism of Kantian 
philosophy in The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 
One, translated by E.F.J. Payne, New York, 1958, pp. 418- 
419, 415, 425, 434-437, 417-417 'On the Fundamental View of 
Idealism1, in The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 
Two, translated E.F.J. Payne, New York, 1958, pp. 12-13; 
Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, 
translated by Raymond Meyer, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 42; Peter 
Langford, Modern Philosophies of Human Nature: Their
emergence from Christian Thought, The Hague, 1986, p. 75. 
See Immanuel Kant, Introduction to Logic: An Essay on the 
Mistaken Subtility of the Four figures, translated by 
Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, 1963, @ 186, 184, 185;
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, translated by 
M.J. Gregor, The Hague, 1974, pp. xiii, xi; Metaphysical 
First Principles of Natural Science, translated by E.B. 
Bax, London, 1883, A 382; Critique of Pure Reason, 
translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, 1929, B2-10;
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, translated by Lewis 
White Beck, Indianapolis, 1950, @ 265-266. For the idea of 
Schopenhauerean Man, see Arthur Schopenhauer, 'On Man's 
need for Metaphysics', in The World as Will. Vol. Two, op. 
cit., pp. 179, 177, 173, 174-175, 172, 160, 171, 164, On
the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
translated by K. Hillebrand, London, 1888,pp. 180, 183, 'On 
the Fundamental View of Idealism', op. cit., pp. 10, 13, 
16, 'The World as Will: First Aspect', in The World as 
Will, Vol. One, op. cit., p. 125, 'The World as Will: 
Second Aspect', in The World as Will. Vol. One, op. cit., 
pp. 289, 124, 276, 'On Religion', in Essays and Aphorisms, 
selected and translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, 
1970, p. 344; Langford, op. cit., p. 88. Concerning 
Nietzsche, see Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the Prejudice of 
Philosophers', op. cit.; Martin Heidegger, 'The Cartesian 
Cogito as Cogito Me Cog it are', in Nietzsche, Vol. 4, 
translated by J. Stambaugh, D.F. Krell, and F.A. Capuzzi, 
New York, 1982, pp. 102-110.
35 Stephen R.L. Clark observes that 'the unity of mankind 
(the biological taxon) does not rest in the possession of 
a common nature, but in being a breeding population such 
that my ancestors and my descendants alike may be yours as 
well' (Clark, pp. 17-33). ' "being human," " Clark
emphasises, 'remains a concept of folk taxonomy' (ibid., p. 
28). Tim Ingold, a social anthropologist, remarks 
similarly that if humanity were defined as Homo loquens, 'a 
natural kind including all animals with language and 
speech, we could have to admit the possibility both of
19
turns out to be an attempt to discover what is inhuman in 
human. It is difficult to draw a demarcation line between 
human and non-human. It seems that the more advanced our 
scientific knowledge is, the less natural our species is 
put forward. Human nature is conceived as only a myth or 
an egoistic prejudice of the species.36 Man differs from
individuals of human parentage "dropping out" of human 
kind, and of individuals of non-human parentage "coming in" 
1 (Ingold, 1988, p. 6). Balaji Mundkur, a molecular and 
cell biologist, argues that the explanation of religiosity 
in human behaviour lies not in the sociocultural aspects of 
human nature (such as cultural diversity, as many social 
and cultural anthropologists believe), but that in fact it 
is just a phenomenon of physiological sensitivity to 
specific environmental stimuli innate in individuals of 
even the lowest animal species (Mundkur, p. 151). He 
summarises that 'explanations (of religiosity) rooted in 
biochemical genetics, organic evolution and the 
neurophysiology of subconscious (and sometimes conscious) 
behavioural tendencies take priority, but acquire meaning 
only against a background of interpretations derived from 
sociocultural anthropology' {ibid., p. 178). See T. Ingold 
(ed.), What is an Animal?, Manchester, 1988; Stephen R.L. 
Clark, 'Is Humanity a natural kind?1, Ingold (ed.), ibid.; 
Balaji Mandkur, 'Human animality, the mental imagery of 
fear, and religiosity1, in Ingold (ed.), opcit.
36 The rise of sociobiology refutes the idea of human nature 
as a unique species. Sociobiology is properly viewed as an 
excellent adjunct to evolutionary theory. Its theoretical 
and empirical base is almost exclusively that of neo- 
Darwinian evolutionary theory and research. Edward 0. 
Wilson, the founder of this new science of man, argues that 
'human nature is just one hodgepodge out of many 
conceivable' (Wilson, 1978, p. 23). Although it is true 
that human behaviour is controlled by our species' 
biological inheritance the gene-pool that constitutes a 
shared human nature— yet ecological factors interact with 
that biological characteristic and influence the evolution 
and changes of living animals, including human beings. Not 
only do we need to take into account innate nature (i.e. 
genetic traits) in understanding living beings but also the 
external nature of the social context in which they live 
and interact. The difference between man and animals is in 
degree not in kind. Wilson reinforces his argument by 
showing that the brightest chimpanzees, by means of 
American sign language, 'can learn vocaburaries of two- 
hundred English words and elementary rules of syntax, 
allowing them to invent such sentences as "Mary gives me 
apple" '{ibid., pp. 25-26). So the symbolic behaviour once 
claimed to be one of the exclusively human traits must be
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animals in degree not in kind.
Plato's dialogue which deals with the division between 
man and animals is the Statesman. The discussion of the 
Statesman in this thesis shows that the division between 
man and animals has to be made by having recourse to the 
geometric square root which conveys a meaning of dynamism. 
Also, the argument of the Eleatic Stranger with regard to 
the fallacy of the criterion of a rational animal, zoon 
logikon, which does not distinguish between a crane and 
man37 would call attention to those sociobiologists whose
dismissed. Also, the label of man as Homo faber is no 
longer justified since 'maps of chimpanzee tool- 
making. .might be placed without notice into a chapter on 
primitive culture in an anthropology textbook1 (ibid., p. 
31). Nancy M. Tanner's research supports that of Wilson 
that humankind is identified with the biological taxon, 
connected synchronically in a complex web of ecological 
interdependencies, and diachronically in the all- 
encompassing genealogy of phylogenetic evolution. She is 
convinced that though culture is the human adaption towards 
outside nature, it was not a movement out of animality but 
an extension of its frontiers: modern humans are no less 
"animal" than Australopithecines or chimpanzees (Tanner, 
pp. 127-140). Arguing along the same lines as Wilson that 
humankind is in degree not in kind different from other 
non-humans, the inability of speech of chimpanzees 
originating in the size of their brains, which are only 
one-third as large as our own (Wilson, op. cit., p. 25) in 
order to stipulate our indissoluble connection with our 
pre-human past Tanner refers to Clifford Geertz 'as the 
Homo sapiens brain is about three times as large as that of 
the Australopithecines, the greater part of human cortical 
expansion has followed, not preceded, the "beginning of our 
culture1 (Tanner, op. cit., p. 136). See Edward O. Wilson, 
On Human Nature, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978; Nancy M. 
Tanner, 'On Becoming Human, Our Links with our Past', in 
Ingold (ed.), op . cit. Sociobiology enormously attracts the 
attention of all kinds of academics and non-academics. See 
John Bonner, 'A New Synthesis of Principles that underlies 
all animal societies', Scientific American, 233 (October) 
1975, pp. 129-131; Pierre L. Van den Berghe, 'Review of 
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis', Contemporary Sociology, 
5 (6) 1976, pp. 593-600; Nicholas Petryszak, 'The
Biosociology of the Social Self', Sociological Quaterly, 20 
(Spring) 1979, pp. 291-303; John Baldwin and Janice 
Baldwin, 'Sociobiology: A Balanced Biosocial Theory',
Pacific Sociological Review, 23 (January) 1980, pp. 3-27.
37 Plato, Statesman, (263d-e).
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argument has been supported by their behaviourial research 
of the brightest chimpanzees.
While science keeps on proving that the nature of 
human is animal, philosophy under Nietzschean influence
keeps announcing the end of everything including the
question of Man. Nietzsche's view of man has been strongly 
influenced by Darwinism and the rise of biologism as a 
rigorous science.38 He argues that man cannot be totally 
understood since 'man is the animal that is not yet
established, as it were an embryo of the man of the future. 
Man cannot be 'a sure measure of things1. In fact, what 
has been regarded as human nature by the philosopher is 'at 
bottom no more than a testimony as to the man of a very 
limited period of time'.39 It is their lack of historical 
sense that makes them fail to be aware that 'man has
become1.40
With the exhaustion of metaphysics resulting from 
Kantian legacy, the concept of human nature has been 
regarded as obsolete. Aiken comments about the present
38 Schnadelbach, opcit., p. 100. See also, Nietzsche, 'Anti 
-Darwinism' in The Will to Power, translated by Walter 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, edited by Walter Kaufmann, 
New York, 1967, p. 364.
39 Nietzsche, Human all too Human, op. cit.f p. 13.
40 Op. cit. For Nietzsche, the problem of man can be 
propounded in the following way: 'Everything essential in 
the development of mankind took place in primeval times, 
long before the four thousand years we more or less know 
about; during these years mankind may well not have altered 
very much. But the philosopher here sees "instincts" in man 
as he now is and assumes that these belong to the 
unalterable facts of mankind and to that extent could 
provide a key to the understanding of the world in general: 
the whole teleology is constructed by speaking of man of 
the last four millennia as of an eternal man towards whom 
all things in the world have had a natural relationship 
from the time he began. But everything has become: there 
are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute 
truths.'
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situation of philosophy that 'above all, it seems, the 
anti-metaphysical age1.41 Under Nietzsche's influence, 
Heidegger argues against any metaphysical question as a 
prejudiced question. The efforts made to determine 'the 
essence of man1 are metaphysical.42 That kind of 
metaphysical question concerning human essence Heidegger 
calls ' "Humanism": for this is humanism: to reflect and to 
care that man be human and not un-human, "inhuman", i.e. 
outside of his essence1.43 Neither Marxism nor
Christianity escapes Heidegger's attack on the metaphysical 
foundations.44 Heidegger as well as Nietzsche declines 
the question of human nature as such insofar as there is 
something more than man. For Nietzsche said that man 
cannot be the measure of things since he is an 
unestablished animal. Michel Foucault, in his essay on 
Nietzsche, argues in the same light that 'nothing in man—  
not even his body— is suffificiently stable to serve as the 
basis for self-recognition or for understanding other 
men'.45 Jacques Derrida proposes that now it is time for 
'the Ends of Man' or, in fact, the end of metaphysical man. 
Mankind has come to an end since from now on man has no 
goal, no ends to achieve as he used to struggle in the 
past.46
41 H.D. Aiken, 'Introduction', in Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century Vol Three: Contemporary European Thought, 
op. cit., p. 4.
42 Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', in Philosophy in 
the Twentieth Century Vol. Three, op. cit., p. 198.
43 Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', op. cit., p. 196.
44 Op. cit., p. 197.
45 Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected essays and 
interviewed, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry 
Simon, Oxford, 1977, p. 153.
46 See Jacques Derrida, 'The Ends of Man', in Margins of 
Philosophy, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, 1982, pp. 109- 
136.
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Consequently, humankind is not as 'essential' as one 
had understood, but has become what it is by a transition 
from a non or pre-human stage, then logically from the
evolutionary point of view Stephen R.L. Clark summarizes
that the 'notional barrier between human and post-human (so 
to speak) is just as porous'.47 Man is not a being but a 
becoming, always in transition. Then we seem to be 
convinced of what Clark put so well:
'If humankind (biological taxon) is at 
most only an accidental unity, and if 
humanity (the normal essence which 
serves us well enough at the level of 
liberal political theory) is only a 
collection of those traits which we 
expect to see in those whom we choose 
to judge according to human standards, 
then the UNESCO insistence on "the 
unity of mankind" can only be a moral 
and political programme, not a report 
upon a relatively unknown species.'48
The concept of human nature becomes a hollow 
proclamation. Not unlike other political concepts such as 
liberty, equality, sovereignty, the state, etc., human 
nature becomes a term not of science but of ideology—  'a 
phrase that men use to legitimize institutions and 
practices that preserve the privileges of a given class, 
race, or sex at the expense of the rest of mankind'.49 
The problem of Man which has been taken so seriously for 
ages is no longer a philosophia perennis. Hence, it 
implies that if any obsession with the problem remains 
someone's grave concern, his presupposition would be 
regarded as anachronistic and also a prejudice, alien to 
his contemporaries. A question might be posed to him; Why
47 Clark, op. cit., p. 25.
48 Op. cit., pp. 28-9.
49 David J. Levy, Political Order: Philosophical 
Anthropology, Modernity, and the Challenge of Ideology, 
Baton Rouge, 1987, p. 2.
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is he so seriously concerned with the problem of Man which 
is now regarded as obsolete in the modern age?
Indeed Nietzsche's immense nihilistic impact upon the 
thinkers of our time is a phenomenon. In the conclusion of 
this thesis, Nietzschean influence is accounted with regard 
to the music of Dionysus, the god of wine, the disguised 
stranger whose song and dance seems discordant, irritating, 
and unbearable to the Apollonians who possess the opposite 
kind of music. Nietzschean music once rendered a Dionysiac 
effect. Cups of wine which intoxicated drinkers was once 
a kind of pharmakon. However, it is argued that a 
pharmakon can become poisonous. The philosopher-king whose 
art of statesmanship is derived from the understanding of 
the nature of the soul and the city would determine when 
'Dionysus and wine-drinking' is useful and when it is not. 
When the music of Dionysus turns out to be poisonous, the 
philosopher-king will call for the music of Apollo. The 
demise of the question of man as a philosophia perennis 
originated in the Dionsysiac effect of Nietzschean music. 
The return of the question of man here can be regarded as 
a Dionysiac effect to an Apollonian and an Apollonian 
effect to a Dionysian. The return of Man is regarded as 
situated in the politics of metaxy.
With regard to the problem of Socrates in Plato's 
dialogues, this thesis bases itself on the assumption that 
Socrates becomes a famous figure in the history of 
philosophy because of Plato's literary genius. The attempt 
to separate a historical Socrates from a Platonic Socrates 
cannot be successful with regard to our meagre historical 
evidence. Recently, Burnyeat's criticism of I.F. Stone's 
The Trial of Socrates is a good witness to this point.50
50 M.L. Burnyeat, 'Did Stone Solve the Socrates Case?', The 
New York Review of Books, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, March 31, 1988, 
p. 18. I.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates, London, 1988. 
See also, John Burnet, 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul', 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 1916, p 243; David
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Whatever effect the dialogues have on the reader in the 
direction of questioning, this is the impulsive element in 
Platonic inspiration. Under his literary genius and 
incisive understanding of the nature of oral and literate 
discourse in relation to the nature of man resulting in the 
peculiar form of the dialogues in the interplay between 
jest and earnest, Plato creates a work that embraces major 
possible explanations given by Plato scholars to the 
problem 'why did Plato write the dialogues?'51 First, as 
some scholars believed, they were written in an intriguing 
way that would allow their author to present unorthodox 
points of view and to exonerate himself from the fate of 
Socrates or Protagoras.52 Secondly and significantly, it 
is intended to effectively inspire and guide potential 
philosophic nature to the good. Thirdly, if the Platonic 
writings are regarded as a work of a philosopher-king, 
then, it is intended not only to inspire philosophic nature 
but also to deter the rise of undesirable ones. The 
Platonic writings are regarded as engaging in the politics 
of the soul.
The next two chapters discuss the meaning of the 
'Socratic Mission1. They are a general discussion of the 
dialogues as a whole. They demonstrate the Socratic 
ignorance is Socrates' irony. It is a part of the Socratic 
elenchus which is aimed at 'making shame' of the 
interlocutor. Shame is related to acknowledgment of self-
Grene, Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in
Thucydides and Plato, Chicago, 1950, p. 103; W.K.C. 
Guthrie, Socrates, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 5-6; C.D.C. Reeve, 
Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato's Apology of 
Socrates, Cambridge, 1989, p. xiii.
51 Charles L. Griswold, Jr., 'Introduction', Platonic 
Writings Platonic Readings, New York, 1988, p. 2.
52 Protagoras was put on trial and expelled from Athens 
because of his outrageous writing on the gods. He died by 
drowning on a sea voyage after leaving Athens. Griswold, 
Jr., 'Plato's Metaphilosophy: Why Plato wrote Dialogues', 
in Griswold, Jr., ibid., p. 143.
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ignorance which is a point of departure in pursuit of self- 
knowledge. The Socratic mission is concerned with the care 
of the soul. Chapter Three ends with Socrates' claim that 
he was one of the few in Athens who practised the art of 
statesmanship. The metaxy begins to conceive itself in 
Chapter Four. It analyses the search for the chief concern 
of the statesman which has been done in quite a circuitous 
way. The analysis of the dialectic division and geometric 
finishing in the process of searching for man as the 
statesman1s chief concern answers the problematic use of 
the geometric square root in the dialogue. Human beings 
are potentially animal. The discussion continues to 
investigate the essence of man which separates him from 
other animals. The Cratylus is brought into the discussion 
as regards its discussion of the name of Man. The theory 
of the correctness of names plays an important role with 
regard to the name of Hector and Astyanax whose names 
ironically do not correspond to their nature. In the
dialogue, the discussion reveals the oscillating movement 
between the realm of the human and the realm of the divine. 
There is an analysis of Socrates1 ironic claim of
Euthyphro's divine possession in the Cratylus. The 
Euthyphro and some related dialogues are discussed as
regards the epistemological condition of the poets and the 
sophists.
Chapter Five renders the interpretation of the name of 
Man, anthropos, against the context which results from the 
discussion in the previous chapter. The interpretation of 
the name of Man has to be done with regard to the rhythmic 
movement between the human and the divine and the analysis 
of the name of Orestes' lineage in association with 
Hesiod's myth of the races. What results from the
interpretation is that man differs from animals because he 
partakes of divine quality, that is, anathrei, 'being able 
to look up at'. However, the problem arises when Socrates 
gave his linguistic analysis of soma and psuche as
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Hermogenes raised immediately after the name of Man had 
been explained. The soul which Socrates explained is 
incompatible with his analysis of the name of man. This 
chapter concludes with a chimerical picture of man and the 
request to return to the examination of the nature of the 
soul.
Chapter Six elaborates Book One and Two of the 
Republic with regard to the origin of the theme of the 
study of justice in the soul in the image of the city. 
Chapter Seven discusses the image of justice in the city as 
the enlargement of the justice in the soul. The city 
consists of three classes in the same way that the soul is 
tripartite. All three classes and their counterparts are 
indispensable to the existence of the city and the soul. 
The second half of the chapter starts with the discussion 
of Book Eight of the Republic in which Socrates in the 
spirit of the Muses narrated the four major types of the 
imperfect polities. The beginning passage of Socrates1 
speech is interpreted in relation to Diotima's speech in 
the Symposium. The concept of 'procreation' is significant 
with regard to the account of the generation of the 
imperfect souls and cities. The analytic description of 
Socrates's speech on the imperfect polities and souls 
begins Chapter Eight. The discussion moves from the 
decline of an aristocracy and aristocratic man to timarchy, 
oligarchy, democracy and then tragically ends when the 
tyrannical life emerges. Man and the city are considered 
to be in the either/or state, that is, if they are not 
just, they are unjust. The description of the decline of 
a polity and a man casts light on the cause of their 
decline which lies in the love of the immortality of what 
they regard to be the good.
Chapter Nine starts by examining whether the nature of 
the soul is discord or harmony. It turns to the Phaedo and 
the Phaedrus. Both are generally understood to contain a
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major discussion of the nature of the soul. The nature of 
the soul is not harmony since it is self-motion. The soul 
is moved by love. Love is the essence of the tripartite 
soul. Each part of the soul has different objects of love. 
With regard to the soul as a whole, there are two kinds of 
love which are likened to the image of a pair of winged 
horses and the charioteer. The nature of the soul is 
proved to be metaxy. Section Four of the chapter can be 
regarded as the essence of the thesis. It gives a 
comprehensive picture of the meaning of metaxy as the 
understanding of the nature of the soul which is regarded 
as the idea of the good when the soul understands itself 
and apprehends the cause of all things. The elaboration of 
this includes the discussion of the allegory of the Cave 
and the Divided Line. The interpretation in this section 
also renders a key answer to understanding the geometric 
riddle of the perfect number in the beginning of Socrates' 
speech on the imperfect polities in Book Eight of the 
Republic.
Chapter Ten returns to discuss the notion that the 
Socratic mission is political. It explains the
relationship between man and politics by having recourse to 
what has been discussed with regard to the just and unjust 
city and man in previous chapters with reference to 
Averroes's commentary on Socrates' speech of the unjust 
polities. Man and the city are self-motion. They are 
moved by the power of love of each element and each class. 
The dynamism in man and the city is political. The idea of 
the pleasurable perception of rhythms and harmony of man 
which is introduced in the Laws is taken into account as 
regards the understanding of the movement of politics in 
the soul and the city. It leads to the discussion of the 
signification of the twofold meaning of theatre in relation 
to Dionysus and Apollo, and the chorus. The idea of 
mimetic action and 'sympathetic magic' are brought to 
assist the understanding of human perception of harmony and
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rhythm.
Chapters Eleven and Twelve are concerned with the 
unity of the art of statesmanship and philosophy. As the 
art of statesmanship originates from self-knowledge, it 
returns to meticulously discuss the Statesman as in itself 
a practice of the art of statesmanship. The knowledge of 
the art of statesmanship, the statesman, the philosopher, 
and its practice is inseparable.
Apart from formally summarising what has been said, 
the concluding part turns to the Platonic inspiration and 
reminds the reader of the ironic situation of the Platonic 
dialogues. Irony comes to the fore. It points to the 
metaxy of man and politics which entails the politics of 
metaxy.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Pursuit of the Socratic Mission:
What are the questions presupposes?
The Aeschylean tragedy tells its audience that there 
never exists a straightforward solution to any kind of 
conflict, whether it be ideas or persons, human and divine, 
since 'no one, no idea, is ever wholly good or bad; the 
most that can be said is that there may be a preponderance 
of good on a particular side at a particular time'.1 For 
Aeschylus only the democratic polls, 'where freedom of 
argument and voting allows all sides of the truth to be 
brought to light', could end a long suffering of the 
'irreconcilable blood-feud of the House of Atreus’.2 
Although a final decision of the democratic polis seems to 
be the key to individual and communal salvation, however, 
Sophocles1 'tragic hero1 whose 'unconquerable will and 
unquenchable pride..carries his refusal to bend either to 
Fate or to circumstances to the extent of resisting both 
the gods and the polis' reflects 'the clash of individual 
personality with the claims of the polis'.3 His plays 
portray a conflicting nature between man and the city, 
between a reason of man and raison d'etat. Compared with 
Aeschylus, the Sophoclean tragedy is understood to have 
'shifted to reliance on individual heroism rather than 
civic solidarity as the only final bulwark against an 
incomprehensible, perhaps hostile, universal order, the 
Aeschylean bond between individual, city and cosmos has
1 John B. Morrall, 'Political Ideas in Greek Tragedy1, 
Polis, 1979, p. 8.
2 Ibid.
3 Op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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been though perhaps reluctantly, snapped'.4 For Sophocles, 
like Aeschylus, there is no simple solution to the problem 
of human life, individual and communal. Unlike Aeschylus' 
faith in the democratic polis, Sophoclean tragedy tells us 
that individual heroism instead of the polis is the answer. 
For Aeschylus and Sophocles, the problem can be said to lie 
in a dilemma between good and good, that is between an 
individual's and the others'. However, it becomes a 
conflict between bad and bad in Euripides. Euripidean 
tragedy regards the human condition as being one of 
inevitable suffering. Moreover, the polis 'accentuates 
rather than relieves' it.5 It seems that tragedy ends 
itself tragically in Euripides' pessimism where 'the tragic 
and democratic visions collapsed together'.6
The search for the good then starts where tragedy ends 
itself tragically. The problem of human life exists 
because man regards what satisfies him as desirable, and 
its opposite as undesirable. What is desirable is regarded 
as good, agathos, and its opposite, bad, kakia. There are 
three possibilities which can be said to put an end to 
human problems. First, when what is undesirable has been 
completely abolished from human life. If that is not 
possible, then, the second alternative is that human 
problems would no longer exist when man finds no difference 
between what is desirable and what is not desirable, or 
'what is and what is not'. Again, if that is not possible, 
the final solution offers that human problems would 
discontinue if human life no longer exists. But if there 
is a possibility that the problems still continue somewhere 
beyond, then, the other, yet unknown, alternative must be 
looked for.
However, whatever the solution might be, it is
4 Op. cit., p. 12.
5 Op. cit., p. 13.
6 Op. cit., p. 15.
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undeniable that the search as such is necessarily derived 
from the fact that man desires what is good. And what is 
good makes him happy because it fulfils his desire. It is 
the care of the self that makes man desire what is good and 
avoid what is bad. Man has his self-interest to take care 
of. So it seems that self-love is a natural human 
activity. Colts or calves are to be looked after by a 
horse-trainer or a husbandman for their welfare. For the 
care of human beings, Socrates is said to have been 
searching for the one 'who has knowledge of that kind of 
excellence, aretes, that of a man and of a citizen?'7 
Socrates investigates the problem and situation concerning 
the education and the perfection of man as a man and as a 
citizen. Of course, virtue and the good are what man 
regards as desirable. But what are those things called the 
good, agathon, and virtue, arete? Socrates asks for the 
explanation of them from those people who are supposed to 
know the answer.
I
Arete and agathon are said to be 'the most powerful 
words of commendation used of a man both in Homer and in 
later Greek,1 implying 'the possession by anyone to whom 
they are applied of all qualities most highly valued at any 
time by Greek society1.8 For example, agathos and arete in 
Homeric usage are closely associated with qualities and 
skills mostly conducive towards success in war and in 
protection of one's families and dependants in peace. Such 
qualities are military prowess and craftiness which Adkins
7 Plato, Apology, (20a-b).
8 A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in 
Greek Values, Chicago and London, 1975, pp. 30, also pp. 
31, 156.
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calls competitive excellences.9 Also, in Homeric society, 
one can see that the agathos and arete of men evidently 
differs from that of women.10 Following this, it can be 
said that their usage varies with the context to which they 
belong.11 According to Homeric values, what are regarded 
as the quiet qualities such as moderation, sophrosyne, 
justice, dikaiosyne, prudent, pepnumenos or pinutos, 
beauty, kalon, are necessary for men to possess in order to 
be agathos.12 However, after the seventh century B.C., 
the demand for these quieter qualities as virtues 
increases.
As regards moderation, sophrosyne 13, Helen North
9 Ibid., p. 7.
10 Adkins concludes that in Homeric society 'to be 
agathos, one must be brave, skilful, and successful in war 
and in peace; and one must possess the wealth and (in 
peace) the leisure which are at once the necessary 
conditions for the development of these skills and the 
natural reward of their successful employment1. With 
regard to the different requirements in men and women, 
'Homeric women may be effectively censured for actions 
which Homeric heroes have a strong claim to be allowed to 
perform1. See Adkins, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
11 As Alasdair MacIntyre argues following Adkins's study 
that as the word agathos is ancestor for our good, '(s)o
in our ordinary English use of good, "good, but not kingly, 
courageous, or cunning" makes perfectly good sense; but in 
Homer, "agathos, but not kingly, courageous, or clever" 
would not even be a morally eccentric form of judgement, 
but as it stands simply an unintelligible contradiction.1 
See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A
History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric age to the 
Twentieth Century, London, Melbourne and Henley, 1986, p. 
6, and especially Chapter II: 'The Prephilosophical History 
of "Good" and the Transition to Philosophy1.
12 Adkins, op. cit., pp. 37-38, 43-46, 61. To be sure, 
these quiet values are not completely valued but they are 
just less valued with regard to Homeric society.
13 Hugh Lloyd-Jones agrees with Helen North that the term 
sophron which is rare in Homer and absent from early lyric 
really acquires importance in Theognis. He comments that 
sophron should be understood as 'safe-thinking' not 
'prudence' or 'moderation'. Sophron, as Lloyd-Jones
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shows that 'by the middle of the sixth century, it had been 
recognized as the characteristic excellence of the Athenian 
citizen in time of peace, celebrated in epitaphs together 
with arete, the corresponding virtue in time of war1.14 
Also, justice, dikaiosyne is identified with arete in 
Theognis1 Elegies whose date is assumed to be around the 
sixth and fifth centuries.15 However, the term sophia, 
wisdom, is still regarded as a desirable quality. But, 
like agathos and arete, the meaning of sophia is viewed 
differently with regard to the changing context of agathos 
and arete. Of Homeric arete, sophia is regarded as one of
perceives, is 'the kind of thinking that protects one from 
hybris..(w)hen one bears in mind the ineradicable tendency 
of the Greeks, once they have tasted wealth or success, to 
become intoxicated by it, the practical value of this moral 
concept becomes obvious' (p. 53). He also warns that it 
might not be as North argued for the increased importance 
of the concept during the seventh and sixth centuries since 
one 'cannot really be sure that changes of fortune (in 700- 
600) were commoner then than, say, during the ninth and 
eighth centuries; the occurrence in Homer of terms like 
pinytos, pepnymenos, echephron, should warn us against too 
easy an acceptance of such an explanation1 (p. 177). See 
Hugh Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, Berkeley and London, 
1971; Helen North, Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Self-
restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca, New York, 1966.
14 North, ibid., p. 150.
15 Adkins, op. cit., p. 78. At 145-48 in Theognis' Elegies 
runs like this:
'It's better, Kurnos, to be poor and 
good Than rich and crooked, if you have 
to choose. All excellence, arete, 
amounts to being just, dikaios, and 
real gentlemen, agathos, obey the 
rules.'
Hesiod and Theognis, translated by Dorethea Wender, London, 
1985. Helen North argues 'the poems of Hesiod, the 
product of a nonheroic, peasant culture, set up a new 
standard of arete, in which the value of measure, restraint 
and self-control is enormously enhanced...(t)he life of the 
peasant is supportable only by the exercise of the cautions 
and prudent virtues, just as the life of the little Boetian 
community is tolerable only when justice and eunomia (good 
order) exists.' North, op. cit., p. 9.
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the qualities of agathos as it refers to a skilled 
counsellor.16 In this sense Odysseus is a good example. 
He is understood to be a favourite of Homer since he is 
both brave and sagacious. His sophia lies in his prudent 
counsel and craftiness with which lying and deception are 
indispensable.17
This quality of sophia is still highly valued even in 
the fifth century.18 As North points it out in Euripides* 
fragments. Contrary to its traditional values, this sophia 
is no longer aimed at assisting the agathos to defeat his 
enemy in war. Through one's speech, his sophia is expected 
to 'ward(s) off evil deeds, preventing battles and civil 
strife, since such actions are fair both for the entire 
city and for all the Hellenes1.19 So it seems that the 
development of a new system or assessment of human 
excellences after Homer has culminated in the emergence of 
a set of key ideas around the sixth to fifth century.20 
It is generally regarded later as a canon of cardinal 
virtues. Superficially, it is a mixture of the traditional 
and the new values. Courage, andreia, and wisdom, sophia
16 Adkins, op. cit., p. 159.
17 Homer, Iliad (19.154), translated by E.V. Rieu, 
Harmondsworth, 1978, p. 358. See Herbert Jennings Rose and 
Charles Martin Robertson, 'Odysseus', in The Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard, 
Oxford, Second Edition, 1989, pp. 746-747.
18 Adkins compares Aeschylus' use of the term sophos in 
the fifth century with the Homeric usage. See Adkins, op. 
cit., p. 159.
19 North, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
20 North states that the earliest recorded reference to 
this canon of cardinal virtues can be found in Pindar's 
eighth Isthmian Odes which is dated 478 B.C. It was later 
canonized by Plato. See North, op. cit., p. 25. Gadamer 
also agrees that these are not Platonic but traditional 
virtues. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in 
Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, New Haven and London, 
1986, 'The Polis and Knowledge of the Good', p. 64.
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prevails along with the pioneering values, namely, 
temperance, sophrosyne, and justice, dikaiosyne.21
II
As has been said above, the requirement of human 
values varies according to its context, that is to say, its 
social and political conditions. The supposedly new values 
such as sophrosyne are quite a case. Sophrosyne is said to
21 According to this view, it seems that justice had no 
significant parts in terms of human excellences before this 
period. To be sure, Arlene W. Saxonhouse remarks that the 
scholars are divided into two camps with regard to the view 
of Justice in Homer and later Greeks. She said that 'the 
debate perhaps reached its peak with Hugh Lloyd-Jones1s 
claims that the Justice of Zeus was there from the 
beginning of Greek literature, rejecting the views of such 
scholars as E.R. Dodds and A.W.H. Adkins1 (p. 44ff). E.A. 
Havelock also argued for the rarity of the abstract noun 
dikaiosyne before Plato. Lloyd-Jones criticised Adkins1 
method of study as a 'lexical-anthropological approach1. 
In his criticism, he says '(i)nstead of starting with the 
assumption that the early Greeks were rational men whose 
processes of thought were like their own, scholars began to 
approach them as anthropologists may approach the primitive 
peoples whom they study, tending to consider them as beings 
whose feelings and thoughts were radically different from 
those of modern men1 (p. 157) . To judge the early Greek 
culture as primitive 'is a mistake...the Homeric 
poems...were the product of a long tradition,..had in most 
respects evolved far beyond the primitive stage, (t)he 
thought world of the early Greeks was indeed different from 
our own; but like ourselves they were reasonable human 
beings, and were able to take account of the basic factors 
that determine the condition of human life in a way 
different from, but not necessarily in every way less 
rational than ours1 (p. 157). To be sure, whatever the
truth may be, it is indisputable that the problem of 
justice emerged before the time of Plato. See Arlene W. 
Saxonhouse 'Thymos, Justice, and Moderation of Anger', in 
Catherine H. Zuckert (ed.) Understanding the Political 
Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to
Nietzsche, New Haven and London, 1988; Hugh Lloyd-Jones, 
opcit.; E.A. Havelock, The Greek Concept of Justice, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, 1978.
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have developed itself beyond its Homeric beginnings and the 
first great expansion of its meaning 'coincided with..the 
flowering of the Athenian polis and the birth of 
tragedy1.22 Tragedy partly originated from that context 
of Athenian polis which in turn gives rise to sophrosyne. 
Likewise, the formation of the idea of justice as arete in 
the polis is attributable to the birth of Greek tragedy.23
The birth of tragedy in Greece partly results from the 
fact that the traditional heroic values from Homeric 
society fail to respond to the new requirements of the 
Athenian polis. Also it is derived from the conflict 
between the values.24 The conflict arises from the 
confrontation between the old values and the new demands 
when 'the heroic individual encountered the restrictions
imposed by the world order whether manifested in religion
or in the framework of the polis1.25 In other words, the 
emergence of political life followed by the birth of 
tragedy26 in Athens gives birth to a new requirement with
22 North, op. cit., p. 150, and see also Chapter II 
'Tragedy', pp. 32-84.
23 J. Peter Euben, The Tragedy of Political Theory: The 
Road not Taken, New Jersey, 1990, pp. 67-68.
24 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck 
and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge, 
1986, 'Part Is Fragility and Ambition', pp. 23-83.
25 North, op. cit., pp. 32, 150.
25 With regard to the interplay between tragedy and 
politics, Morrall suggested that: 'Tragedy reached its
classically mature development,..as an artistic reflection 
of this political and social isegoria....The theatre rather 
than the hill of the assembly was the arena on which the 
ideology of the democratic polis was formulated, explored 
and subjected to criticism and revision,..Athenian tragedy 
itself is an integral expression, and probably the most 
comprehensive and profound one, of Greek Democracy 
examining itself and its place in the whole universal 
order. It is the earliest of such attempts at political 
self-analysis by and for a community in the history of
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regard to what is good and desirable for the city and for 
men as her citizens. Against this is the traditional epic 
hero whose purpose is individual, self-interested, personal 
honour or glory. According to this new context of 
political life, the epic hero is regarded as being 
politically irresponsible. A Homeric heroic warrior, 
agathos, then has to be politicised in response to his new 
environment.27 At this stage, some said that it is the 
origins of political theory in ancient Greece.28
According to its new context, the substance of old 
Odyssean craftiness which was once regarded as a usual 
thing in a Homeric Greek 29 was to be transformed. The
political thought, and it was to remain one of the most
unique'. Morrall, opcit., p. 3.
27 For the essay on the inadequacy of the epic hero the
epic hero as being politically irresponsible regarding
the rise of new values of political aspects in classical 
Greece and the politicisation of the epic hero and the 
heroicisation of politics, see Blair Campbell, 'The Epic 
Hero as Politico', History of Political Thought, Vol. XI, 
Issue 2 Summer 1990, pp. 189-195.
28 See J. Peter Euben, 'The Battles of Salamis and the 
Origins of Political Theory', Political Theory, Vol. 14 No. 
3 August 1986, pp. 359-390. With regard to the theme of 
the relationship of Greek tragedy and politics, after Helen 
North who first conceived the importance of their 
relationship, this idea has been affirmed later on by many 
studies. For example, David K. Nichols said '(t)ragedy 
illuminates man's precarious position..(i)t show the limits 
within which his actions must fall, and that includes his 
highest act, political philosophy...(m)an's thought may 
take him to these limits, but, in a sense, only tragedy can 
indicate what lies beyond'. David K. Nichols, 'Aeschylus' 
Oresteia and the Origins of Political Life', 
Interpretation, August 1980, Vol. 9 No. I, p. 89. See 
also, John A. Wettergreen, 'On the End of Thucydides's
Narrative', Interpretation, Vol. 9 No. I August 1980, pp.
93-110; J. Peter Euben (ed.), Greek Tragedy and
Political Theory, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1986.
29 Some classicists argue that qualities of craftiness 
such as lying are not an unusual thing in a Homeric Greek. 
See Herbert Jennings Rose and Charles Martin Robertson, 
'Achilles' in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, op. cit., 
pp. 4-5.
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art of rhetoric and eloquence seem to take the place of 
those heroic competitive values, namely, military prowess 
and craftiness.30 Moreover, it was sometimes included in 
the canon of cardinal virtues.31 However, the idea of 
context is just a paradigmatic unit of historical analysis. 
A boundary of a context is in fact hard to determine. 
There is always an enclave between two contexts or more.32
30 'Martial virtue, then, no longer had anything to do
with thymos, but consisted in sophrosyne a complete
mastery of the self, a constant striving to submit oneself 
to a common discipline, the coolness necessary to restrain 
those instinctive pressures that would risk upsetting the 
discipline of the formation as a whole1. Jean-Pierre 
Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, London, 1962, p. 63.
31 North, op. cit,, pp. 72,73. She writes '(i)t is 
remarkable for being the only passage in Euripides in which 
all four of the cardinal virtues are mentioned, and is even 
more remarkable for adding as a fifth, not eusebeia, but 
eloquence...(t)he addition of eloquence to the canon is 
peculiarly fitting for the spokesman of sophistic rhetoric, 
but for us the greatest significance attaches to the choice 
of sophrosyne as a quality in the man who can best lead the 
polis1.
32 The criticism of the contextual fallacy is perceptively 
made by Ben-Ami Scharfstein. See Ben-Ami Scharfstein, 'The 
Contextual Fallacy1, in Gerald James Larson and Eliot 
Deutsch (ed.), Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays 
in Comparative Philosophy, New Jersey, 1988, pp. 84-93. 
Also, the dilemma of context in philosophical hermeneutic 
suggests two possibilities that either the interpreter who 
can never find an absolute agreement or understanding of 
the past must understand himself as a tolerant intellectual 
adventurist or he who can attain a certain understanding of 
the past though it will never be an impartial one, must be 
aware of and appreciably value his own prejudices formed by 
his own contextual tradition as a bridge between the 
horizon of the present and that otherness of the past. The 
former position belongs to Ben-Ami Scharfstein whose 
position can be comprehensively understood in his latest 
book, The Dilemma of Context, New York, 1989. See 
especially pp. 62-66 with regard to the problem in 
distinguishing different levels of context. As to the 
latter, it is the idea of the fusion of the horizons of 
history put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Scharfstein 
regards Gadamer's position as 'humane optimism1 whose 
'decision to go hermeneutic is only the beginning of wisdom 
and of probably renewed misunderstanding1 (Scharfstein, The 
Dilemma of Context, opcit., pp. 165-166). Concluding his 
own argument, Scharfstein ends his book as follows: 'To
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Thus there cannot be absolute separation between a Homeric 
Greek and a fifth century Athenian. The persistence of 
traditional values such as the qualities of daring, 
strength and success can be found among the works of some 
fifth century poets. But in peace such qualities are 
valuably expressed not in the battlefield but in the 
games.33
With regard to the inculcation of these Homeric and 
new values in the ancient Greek society, the role of the 
poet as the educator is eminent and influential.34 The
put it metaphorically, we and they see each other through 
different eyes and are shadows of another, in the sense 
that each is a distorted semblance of the other...We cannot 
see one another in the round or believe in one another fs 
full reality, but we cannot cut ourselves loose from one 
another. But if the shadows are ever joined, maybe these 
doubles can be multiplied into something more like a full 
humanity; or maybe this too is an impossible dream, though 
we seem to see something like it happening in front of our 
eyes' (Scharfstein, opcit., p. 193). With regard to the 
understanding of the past and the present in accordance 
with the operation of one's prejudices, Gadamer explains 
that '(w)hatever is being distinguished must be 
distinguished from something which, in turn, must be 
distinguished from it...(t)hus all distinguishing also 
makes visible that from which something is 
distinguished...(w)e have described this as the operation 
of prejudices..(w)e have started by saying that a 
hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices 
that we bring with us....the horizon of the present is 
being continually formed, in that we have continually to 
test all our prejudices. . (a)n important part of this 
testing is the encounter with the past and the 
understanding of the tradition from which we 
come....(h)ence the horizon of the present cannot be formed 
without the past...(t)here is no more an isolated horizon 
of the present than there are historical horizons'. Hans- 
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, 1981, pp. 272-273.
33 Adkins, op, cit., p. 159. Adkins refers to Pindar's 
Pythian Odes, 11. 49: 'Any man becomes happy, eudaimon, and 
a theme for poets who conquers (in the games) by means of 
his hands or the arete of his feet, and wins the greatest 
of prizes by his daring and strength'.
34 E.A. Havelock has shown that poetry regarded as preserved 
communication in ancient Greece functions as an 
encyclopedia and a source of the Hellenic intelligence. 
See E.A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Oxford, 1963,
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conflict between these overlapping values arises among the 
works of poets who interpret and modify Homeric epics 
according to their self-understanding in relation to their 
social and political context.35 Then the Homeric heroes 
such as Achilles and Odysseus have been called into 
question and re-interpretation with regard to the terms 
'agathos and arete1. As some say, in some of the later 
legends after Homer Odysseus is considered to be 'a 
cowardly rascal' though originally he is undoubtedly 
supposed to be 'a real local chieftain'.36 It indicates 
that lying becomes unacceptable— if it really was ever 
acceptable, as some scholars argue, that it was once an 
unusual thing in a Homeric Greek.37 Although Achilles' 
detestation of lying is evident in Homeric epic, however, 
his prowess and his furious and ungovernable passion, on 
which the whole plot of the Iliad turns, are regarded as 
'politically irresponsible and too self-interested' 
according to the sixth and fifth centuries context.
Both an Odysseus and an Achilles could possibly cause 
hubris in a social and political context other than their 
own. To be sure, originally the characteristics of each of 
them, Achilles and Odesseus, are already opposed to each 
other. Apart from the problem of parachronism of these 
Homeric values, the values per se are self-contradicting
especially Part I, 'The Image-Thinkers', pp. 3-193. See 
also the Republic, Book II, 337e-379a, and especially Book 
X at 598e: '...since some people tell us that these poets 
know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue 
and vice, and all things divine...'; Protagoras, 339a.
35 See Morrall, op. cit., and also, Herbert Jennings Rose 
and Charles Martin Robertson, op. cit.
36 For example, see Nichols, 'Aeschylus' Oresteia and the 
Origins of Political Life', op. cit.
37 Herbert Jennings Rose and Charles Martin Robertson, 
'Achilles', op. cit. Consider Euripides' famous passage in 
Hippolytus, 612: 'The tongue hath sworn; but the soul is 
unsworn yet'. It has been often referred to in the 
dialogues. For example, see Symposium, 199a.
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with regard to whether Achilles' arete or Odysseus' arete 
makes a person become a real kalos agathos. Who really is 
a kalos agathos, Achilles or Odysseus?38
Ill
However, as just stated, the boundaries of contexts 
can never be definite. In a particular context, in some 
situations, the values of other contexts which are 
different either in time or in place or both are possibly 
called for. At least, it can be argued that 'Homeric 
values retained their hold as late as the fourth 
century...'.39 Though it also might be the case that such 
values would continue to exist and affect human minds and 
actions longer than one could imagine.40 To quote Adkins 
again, if in Homeric society 'to be agathos one must be 
brave, skilful, and successful in war and in peace; and one 
must possess the wealth and (in peace) the leisure which 
are at once the necessary conditions for the development of 
these skills and the natural reward of their successful 
employment', then, the persistence of these values in the 
fifth and fourth centuries is evident as K.J. Dover argues 
from his study of Greek popular morality in that period 
that 'in ordinary Greek usage agatha, "good thing", and 
kaka, "bad thing", often denote respectively material
38 As this question is posed by Socrates in Plato's Lesser 
Hippias,
39 Blair Campbell, 'Paradigms Lost: Classical Athenian 
Politics in Modern Myth', History of Political Thought, 
Vol. X Issue 2 Summer 1989, p. 199.
40 Given the fact that the emergence of heroic values are 
not universal but historical, virtually, such values still 
prevail in the twentieth century modern society. Machismo 
and heroism can be found everywhere. Films, literature, 
and art of that kind have been produced to serve their 
audience.
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comforts and discomforts'.41
In this respect, the terms do not seem to connote any 
moral sanction at all. They convey the meaning of what is 
just regarded to be beneficial. In truth, Adkins has given 
some explanation of the general usage of these terms as 
regards their moral and amoral functions since Homer:
'Agathos, kakos, and their synonyms are 
relevant to this discussion in the 
masculine and feminine forms, since, as 
they comment on the excellence of human 
beings, they may claim to be moral 
terms. The neuter forms agathon and 
kakon have no such claim to say of an 
action "it is agathon (kakon) to do x" 
is simply to say that it is beneficial 
(harmful) to do x, without passing any 
moral judgement on the rightness or 
wrongness of x.|42
With this regard, from our point of view, the term 
agathos or the good seems to have possessed since then a 
double standard in itself regarding the moral good; if it 
is deemed as a problem, then, it seems to exist since the 
earliest records of Greek history. However, one cannot be 
certain that it really had ever been a problem at all in 
Homeric society. On the contrary, it is likely a case that 
any conflicts deriving from the problem of a double 
standard of the good never occurred since 'Homeric values, 
however, suit Homeric society, inasmuch as they commend 
those qualities which most evidently secure its 
existence,...when the protection of oneself and one's
41 Dover gives some examples from Aristophanes: 
Ecclesiazusae 893, '"experience something agathos" = "have 
an enjoyable sexual experience" (an old woman is boasting 
of her skill), Frogs 600, "if there's anything khrestosn = 
"if anything nice turns up", GVI 320.2 (Eretria, s. VI/V) 
"He has given few agatha to his soul" = "He worked hard and 
lived frugally" '. K.J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in 
the Time of Plato and Aristotle, Oxford, 1974, p. 52.
42 Adkins, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
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associates is in question, moral error and mistake are not 
and cannot be distinguished in many cases, while 
competitive excellences completely override the quieter 
moral virtues in cases where they can..'43 But one can be 
assured that around the fifth century such a problem 
emerged as a result of the persistence of Homeric systems 
of values against the emergence of other systems of values 
deriving from the development of its society. Clearly, it 
is this problem of the good, the conflicting moral values 
which Socrates perceived and then set forth his mission in 
life to examine it. It is thus discernible that Socrates 
has wittingly centred all his questions around the problem, 
that is, the problem of human life.
IV
With regard to his serious concern for the problem of 
human life, a century later, Socrates was considered by 
Aristotle to be a man who 'was busying himself about
ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a 
whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, 
and fixed thought for the first time on definitions’.44 
Later on, looked back on as a historical and influential 
figure in the history of the development of Greek 
knowledge, he was deemed the 'hinge for most subsequent 
thinkers’45, as Cicero wrote in 45 B.C.:
43 Adkins, opcit,, pp. 53, 54. He is convinced that 
'moral responsibility’ has no place in Homeric society. Cf. 
p. 52.
44 Aristotle, Metaphysics, (Book I 987bl-5), The Complete 
Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 
Princeton, 1984, p. 1561.
45 I.G. Kidd, 'Socrates’ in The Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. VII and VIII, ed. Paul Edwards, New York, 
1972, p. 480.
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'....from the ancient days down to the 
time of Socrates, who had listened to 
Archelaus the pupil of Anaxagoras, 
philosophy dealt with numbers and 
movements, with the problem whence all 
things came, or whither they returned, 
and zealously inquired into the size of 
the stars, the spaces that divided 
them, their courses and all celestial 
phenomena; Socrates on the other hand 
was the first to call philosophy down 
from the heavens and set her in the 
cities of men and bring her also into 
their homes and compel her to ask 
questions about life and morality and 
things good and evil.|46
It is evident that, concerning the problem of arete 
and agathos, Socrates asks what the good is, what virtue is 
and whether it can be taught.47 These principal questions 
permeate almost all of the dialogues.48
Whatever the meaning of arete and agathos might be, 
according to the traditional values, arete was believed to 
be an endowment in a nature, phusis, of man.49 And in the 
fifth century such an idea still persisted in the works of
46 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, (V.iv. 10), Cambridge 
Massachusetts, Loeb Classical Library, 1966, p. 435.
47 It can be said to be a kind of hermeneutic problem of 
the good which is derived from the changing contexts. See 
Gadamer, Truth and Method, op. cit., pp. 146-147.
48 The introduction of this kind of question in the 
dialogues, particularly in the Republic, has been regarded 
by Adi Ophir as a Platonic politics of power-knowledge 
play. He criticises that it is just a trick of the author 
to ask these questions in order to lead his audience to 
'higher questions, which ultimately lead to the question of 
the good, at the dialogue's centre1. Other dialogues also 
imply the same intention. But the question of the good has 
not been answered and is always suspended. See Adi Ophir, 
Plato’s Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the 
Republic, London, 1991, pp. 8 and also 6, 147-148.
49 See A.W.H. Adkins, From the Many to the One: A study of 
Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of 
ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs, London, 1970, p. 
79, see also Chapter IV.
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poets such as Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, and 
Aristophanes.50 For instance, as regards the origin of 
the idea of self-control, sophrosyne, the latest among the 
three great Athenian tragic poets, 'Euripides is firmly of 
opinion that phusis plays the chief role1.51 For example, 
sophrosyne is seen as the gift of the gods which a man is 
naturally endowed with.52 To be sure, the term phusis 
used by the poets in the fifth century refers to 'the 
parentage from which an individual has sprung1.53 
Therefore, a nature, phusis, of one man can differ from the 
others. A nature of a man possibly comprises his physical 
characteristics, social class, social and ethical
qualities, and virtues. To talk about a man's nature
always implies a reference to the lineage of his family. 
According to this view, if a man is said to possess a 
quality, that quality is believed to be passed on from his 
parents to him.54
50 Adkins, From the Many to the One, ibid., pp. 79-81. 
However, in Aeschylus, one can also find new values in 
support of the democratic ideas. See Cynthia Farrar, The 
Origins of Democratic Thinking, Cambridge and New York, 
1988, pp. 30-31, 35.
51 North, op. cit., pp. 73, 74-75. However, some evidence 
in Euripides' works indicate inconsistency in his 
application of the term to the Greeks and the barbarians. 
Edith Hall has shown in her work that it reflects the 
political situation of the relationship between Athens and 
other Greek and non-Greek cities. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 
213-222.
52 Consider 'May sophrosyne, the fairest gift of the gods, 
cherish me1, in Euripides'Medea, (635-636). See Adkins, 
From Many to the One, op. cit., p. 80.
53 Adkins, From the Many., op. cit.
54 For example, the passage at 1259 in Sophocles' Ajax, 
Adkins remarks 'Agamemnon brusquely tells Teucer to 
remember who he is by phusis, the illegitimate son of a 
Greek nobleman and a foreigner; to which he replies (1301) 
that his mother may have been a foreigner, but that she was 
phusei a queen1, and '... an individual may by cowardly by 
phusis'; 'in Euripides' Nauch, Alcmaeon concludes that it 
is true that from esthlos fathers esthlos children spring, 
and from kakos fathers children who are like the phusis of
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Contrary to the traditional values found in the works 
of the poets, there also exists the idea that virtues can 
be taught, which is advocated by the sophists. Surely, the 
sophists purport themselves to be able to impart virtues to 
people.
As mentioned above, in response to the development of 
social and political condition, a change of values system 
must be called for. The development of democratic 
institutions at Athens from the time of Solon to Periclean 
democracy was responsible for the development of the 
sophistic movement.55 With regard the rise of Athenian 
democracy in the sixth and fifth centuries, 'the sophists,' 
said Kerferd, 'were supplying a social and political 
need1.56 The possibility of the invention of the politics 
of democracy of classical Athens lies in the emergence of 
the humanistic tradition which originated in the idea of 
freedom and equality, importantly, the ideas of autonomous 
self, the theory of historical understanding of human 
nature, and the theory of measuring man.57
The development of Athenian political constitution was 
intertwined with the humanisation and the democratic
their father,1 and 'a barbarian has a barbarian phusis'. 
See Adkins, From Many to the One, op. cit., p. 80. As 
regards the inconsistent application of the term nature and 
its positive and negative connotations to the Greeks and 
the non-Greeks, see Hall, op. cit., Chapter V, 'Epilogue: 
The Polarity Deconstructed, Section I and II, Barbaric 
Greeks and Noble Barbarians1, pp. 201-223.
55 G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge, 1981, 
pp. 15-17.
56 Kerferd, op. cit., p. 17.
57 Cynthia Farrar, op. cit., cf. Anaxagoras's cosmic 
autonomy, pp. 41-43; Democritus' autonomous self, pp. 237- 
239; Thucydides' history and human understanding, pp. 135- 
137, 151, 127-131, 136; Protagoras' theory of 'man as a
measure', pp. 44-106. See also Kerferd, op. cit., pp. 18- 
20; and also, E.A. Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek 
Politics, New Haven, 1957.
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politicisation of power and knowledge. This results in the 
ascendancy of the place of man in the cosmos. Man is no 
longer just a puppet of the Olympian gods, as the idea of 
man as a self-willed being is proposed in the work of 
Thucydides. His work points out that man can understand 
what happened in the past and what will happen in the 
future by understanding himself, namely, human nature. 
Historical understanding reveals human nature and vice 
versa. Historical impetus does not originate from divine 
power. It lies in human nature. Man can understand 
himself through history, the continuum of past, present, 
and future. As it has been expressed in Thucydides* well 
known passage: 'It will be enough for me, however, if
these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to 
understand clearly the events which happened in the past 
and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some 
time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the 
future'.58 This can be viewed from the modern point of 
view as the attempt of man in supplanting divine power as 
regards the latter's supposed omniscience and omnipotence. 
To be omniscient and omnipotent, man searches for something 
which is equivalent to the eye of the gods.59
V
58 Thucydides, The History of Peloponesian War, (Book I 
22) , translated by Rex Werner with an Introduction and 
Notes by M.I. Finley, Penguin Classics, London, 1983, p. 
48.
59 History and other human sciences can be regarded as 
the attempt of human power towards divine knowledge and 
power as in the myth of Panoptes. See Michel Serres, 
'Panoptic Theory', in Thomas M. Kavanagh (ed.), The Limits 
of Theory, Stanford, 1989, pp. 25-47.
By and large, the Greeks in the fifth century were 
fermented in this atmosphere. It was conducive to the rise 
of adventurous spirit. With this spirit, those whom we 
might have called 'philosophers, scientists, historians, 
or thinkers1 by our standard have contributed to the 
development and broadening of the scope of human knowledge 
and experience. The more the scope of knowledge is 
broadened, the more they realise that what they thought to 
be nature, phusis, is just the norm or convention, nomos.
For instance, around the sixth century, Xenophanes of 
Kolophon reacted 'against the view of the gods which the 
poets had made familiar1 by denying the anthropomorphic 
gods.60 What men understood to be the nature and image of 
the gods were just the reflection of themselves. In the 
Satires, Xenophanes says:
'Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the 
gods all things that are a shame and 
disgrace among mortals, stealings and 
adulteries and deceivings of one 
another. But mortals deem that the 
gods are begotten as they are, and have 
clothes like theirs, and voice and 
form. Yes, and if oxen and horses or 
lions had hands, and could paint with 
their hands, and produce works of art, 
as men do, horses would paint the forms 
of the gods like horses, and oxen like 
oxen, and make their bodies in the 
image of their several kinds. The 
Ethiopians make their gods black and 
snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs 
have blue eyes and red hair.1®1
In the fifth century, the understanding of the 
importance of the idea of nomos became more vivid in 
Herodotus when he experienced those practices and behaviour
60 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th edition, London, 
1930, p. 112.
61 Xenophanes, Satires (11-16), in Burnet, 'Early Greek 
Philosophy1, ibid.
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of other tribes which would never be permitted in his own. 
With regard to what an anthropologist might call 'cultural 
diversity1, Herodotus explains:
'In view of all this, I have no doubt 
whatever that Cambyses was completely 
out of his mind; it is the only 
possible explanation of his assault 
upon, and mockery of, everything which 
ancient law and custom have made sacred 
in Egypt. For if anyone, no matter 
who, were given the opportunity of 
choosing from amongst all the nations 
in the world the set of beliefs which 
he thought best, he would inevitably, 
after careful consideration of their 
relative merits, choose that of his own 
country. Everyone without exception 
believes his own native customs, and 
the religion he was brought up in, to 
be the best; and that being so, it is 
unlikely that anyone but a madman would 
mock at such things. There is abundant 
evidence that this is the universal 
feeling about the ancient customs of 
one's country.'62
Herodotus realised how important custom, nomos, is and 
what it can do, as he said he agreed with Pindar's 
statement regarding nomos as 'king of all'.63 He 
expresses the view that whatever one understands to be a 
universal truth or nature, phusis, of things is probably 
merely a custom of one's country. To be sure, it does not 
mean that Xenophanes and Herodotus believe that all things 
are just set of beliefs or convention. For Xenophanes, the 
gods or divinity do exist. But divine nature is not 
understandable for men since it is 'neither in form like 
unto mortals nor in thought'.64 Although Herodotus showed 
that men distinctly differ from one another with regard to 
custom and physical appearance; men behave very
62 Herodotus, The Histories (Book III 37-38), p. 219.
63 Herodotus, The Histories (Book III 39), p. 220.
64 Xenophanes, Satires (23), in John Burnet, op. cit.
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differently, and some are believed to be even biologically 
different as Herodotus himself believed though wrongly that 
semen of the Indians and the Ethiopians 'is not white like 
other peoples, but black like their own skins1.65 Despite 
differences among these tribes, he still regarded them as 
human beings.66 To be sure, this presupposes some idea or 
preconception which he possessed concerning a common 
characteristic of a being called man, that is to say, the 
nature of man. But, whatever view of human nature he took, 
unfortunately, he did not state it in his work.
To be sure, it seems that the more the Greek thinkers 
in the sixth and fifth century realised that what they 
thought was nature was convention, the more they were 
determined to discover what nature was, and the harder they 
found it to achieve that goal. Conceivably, it can be said 
that this is a departure of an endless project of man's 
will-power over nature or, in other words, divine power. 
Also, at this point, it is understandable that the 
situation gives birth to what is called the nomos-phusis 
controversy in the fifth century.67
Generally, the debate involves a number of different
65 Herodotus, The Histories (Book III 101,2), p. 246.
66 The difference between the Greeks and some Indian 
tribe is quite distinct. As some Indians ate their 
parents' corpses while this practice was impossible for the 
Greeks. Despite this, Herodotus still respected them as 
human beings. See Herodotus, The Histories (Book III 38) , 
p. 219.
67 G.E.R. Lloyd states that '(i)n Greece, one distinction 
that was certainly drawn by the end of the fifth century, 
at least, was that between what is "natural" (phusis) and 
what is "customary" or "conventional" (nomos)...1. Also 
Kerferd remarks that '(i)t has long been recognised that 
two terms, nomos and phusis, were of great importance in 
much of the thinking and arguments in the second half of 
the fifth century B.C.'. See G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and 
Analogy: Two types of argumentation in early Greek Thought, 
Bristol, 1966, p. 211; G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic 
Movement, op. cit., p. 111.
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areas such as ethics, the origins of civilisation, the 
origins of language etc.68 With regard to the topic of 
virtue in the nomos-phusis controversy, the sophists 
espoused the idea contrary to that of the poets that 
virtues or human excellences, arete, is not inherent in 
human nature. In fact, man can acquire it through 
conventional education. Anyone regardless of his 
background can become a kalos agathos by learning 'the art 
of success' from the sophists. Also, it has been suggested 
that 'success' should be understood in political terms.69 
Since with freedom in the political context of Athenian 
democracy, through political power any citizen can achieve 
fame, time, and glory, kleon which are what people regarded 
as desirable. That confirms the interwoven relationship of 
the rise of democratic thinking and the rise of the 
sophistic humanism.
From above, it can be inferred that both complemented 
each other and espoused at least the idea of equality of 
man in social and political terms in conjunction with the 
idea of the teachability of virtue. With regard to the 
principle of equality, isonomia, Jean-Pierre Vernant states 
'(t)he democratic current went further when it defined all 
citizens, without regard to fortune or quality, as "equals" 
having precisely the same rights to take part in all 
aspects of public life'.70 In sum, democratic thinking 
pronounces that all citizens are equal into which the 
sophistic humanism weaves the idea regarding virtue that 
they are indiscriminately teachable.
The problem of virtue, arete, in the phusis-nomos
68 Lloyd, op. cit.
69 See C.J. Rowe, 'Plato on the Sophists as Teachers of 
Virtue', History of Political Thought, Vol. IV No.3 
Winter 1983, pp. 409-410, 7n.
70 Vernant, op. cit., p. 97.
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controversy in the fifth and fourth centuries can be said 
to be attributable to the conflict between the traditional 
Homeric values and the later values in the fifth century. 
It is clear that those who had been regarded as wise men, 
sophoi, in the fifth century 'reflect the great debate 
over the relation of phusis to nomos ("convention")'.71 
It seems that this conflict can be generally understood to 
be between the sophists who held the view that virtue is 
teachable and the poets and others who contended that 
virtue must be naturally endowed.72 In contradistinction 
to Euripides' view on the origin of sophrosyne, one of the 
most famous sophists Protagoras, who closely associated 
with Pericles and had for sometime gained popularity from 
the majority of the Athenian people, claimed that 
sophrosyne is 'a part of what he call(ed) politike
techne....not a gift of nature but is acquired and
therefore accessible to all’.73 With regard to the 
acquisition of virtue, the sophists insisted that men can 
acquire virtue through education which the sophists claimed 
to possess and also the ability to teach such human
excellences, paideuein anthropous eis areten; they set 
themselves up as paideuseos kai aretes didaskaloi'.74 
But, for the poets, virtue which comes from nature can only 
be inspired by divine power and of course like the
sophists' self-claimed quality purported themselves only to 
possess such divine inspiration.75
71 North, op. cit., p. 74.
72 To be sure, apart from the poets, there were also 
others such as soothsayer, prophet who argued for divine 
power in this respect. See the Apology (22c) and Euthyphro 
(3d-e).
73 North, op. cit., p. 87. See Protagoras (319a).
74 Rowe, op. cit., p. 399.
75 See the Apology (22c); Ion (533d-535a, 542a-b); 
Euthyphro (3d-e); Cratylus (385e, 391c-d, 396d-e, 407d,
409d); also consider Cratylus, 425d-e in relation to Jon, 
542a-b: '....unless you think we had better follow the
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VI
Hence, as a contextualist would argue, it can be said 
that the question and answer with regard to Socrates and 
the dialogues resulted from the social and political 
context which has been described.76 The problem of virtue 
derived from the conflict of the changing contexts bears 
upon Socrates* mission. Possibly, his problems of virtue 
should not have been related to the similar problems of men 
in different contexts. Then his answer, if there is any, 
probably should not be regarded as the right answer to the 
questions posed in the twentieth century. In the same 
respect, our proposition cannot be an answer, or at any 
rate could not be the right answer, to Socrates* problems 
which might have been answered otherwise.77 However, the 
contextualist' s argument is infallible only if the 
boundaries of contexts can be precisely delineated.
Against the sixth and fifth century Athenian social 
and political background, a modern reader can probably 
understand Socrates better than Socrates might have 
understood himself, provided that he himself had never been 
aware of such problems of virtue which originated from the
example of the tragic poets, who, when they are in a 
dilemma, have recourse to the introduction of gods on 
machines.'
76 Cf. R.G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, Oxford, 1978, 
p. 31: 'I began by observing that you cannot find out what 
a man means by simply studying his spoken or written 
statements, even though he has spoken or written with 
perfect command of language and perfectly truthful 
intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also 
know what the question was (a question in his own mind, 
and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he 
has said or written was meant as an answer'.
77 Op. cit., pp. 31-32: 'It must be understood that question 
and answer, as I conceived them, were strictly correlative. 
A proposition was not an answer, or at any rate could not 
be the right answer, to any question which might have been 
answered otherwise.'
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discrepancy between two or more value systems of his own 
city, that is, Athens and her citizens. Different systems 
of ideas or value systems are attributable to different 
characters of men and to different histories. That is to 
say, as Neal Wood points out that 'since Plato, however, 
we have labored under the delusion that the philosopher is 
completely dispassionate1, then his contextualistic 
approach which he has taken to study John Locke, 'seems to 
be true of other philosophic greats beginning with 
Socrates, every past thinker was a philosophic partisan and 
a partisan philosopher, not a detached, disinterested, and 
transcendent truth-seeker1.78 Necessarily, to understand 
Socrates, one must take into account his social and
78 Neal Wood is one of the historians of ideas who argues 
for scholarship of the contextualistic approach in the 
study of social and political thought. His view and
position with regard to philosophy and philosophers 
indicate that:
'Philosophers, however, are far from 
being neutral spectators of the "games” 
of human life. As participants in that 
life, the meaning of their philosophy 
and its implications for action can 
only be fully grasped by establishing 
its links with the social context. Any 
attempt to divorce philosophy from
social life, to lift it from its social 
setting as if it were wholly 
transhistorical , is an attempt to 
transform it from a living human 
creation into a sterile and scholastic 
exercise. Thus, my social analysis of 
Locke's Essay is in effect a case study 
designed to show something of the 
relationship between political and 
philosophic commitment1.
See Neal Wood, The Politics of Locke's Philosophy: A Social 
Study of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Berkeley, 
1983, pp. 3-4, and also his article, 'The Social History of
Political Theory1 in Political Theory, 6 (August 1978),
pp. 345-67. And cf. Richard Rorty, J.B.S. Schneewind and 
Quentin Skinner (ed.), Philosophy in History: Essays on the 
Historiography of philosophy, Cambridge, 1984, 
'Introduction', pp. 1-14.
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political background in relation to those of others in 
society.
Socrates' concern for the problems of virtue 
inevitably involves the problem of education, paideia. 
Among others, the role of educator in Socrates' time is 
eminently in the hands of the sophists and the poets. 
Therefore, concerning the problem of education some of the 
main figures in the dialogues are the sophists and the 
poets.79 The whole dialogues can be considered as 
Socrates' mission. It is not only concerned with the 
sophists and the poets but also all 'the wise, or those who 
know' what the good and virtue are. Those who know what 
the good and virtue are must possess the knowledge of the 
good and virtue. But there is confusion and disagreement 
regarding what the good and virtue truly are, who really is 
a wise man.
It is a serious concern for a serious man to know what 
the good and virtue are and who is a wise man. But if a 
man knows what the good and virtue are and what a wise man 
is, then, he must possess the wisdom, the knowledge of the 
good and becomes a wise man himself. Then the possession 
of the wisdom is presumably regarded to be good and 
excellent in itself. That is why Socrates kept asking such 
questions, in order to search for the ultimate answer and 
to make himself wise and better. Probably this is partly 
the origin of the preconception that wisdom or knowledge is 
the good and vice versa. From this aspect, Socrates can in 
practice be deemed not so different from the sophists with 
regard to his search for the good through learning,
79 Socrates discusses about the ideas of the sophists or 
converses with the sophists in the Apology, the Lesser 
Hippias, Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthydemus, Cratylus, the 
Republic, Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Greater Hippias. 
Equally, the poets and the question of their knowledge are 
dealt with in the Apology, Ion, Cratylus, Phaedrus, the 
Symposium, and the Republic.
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paideia. But like the poets, he claims that what reminds 
him of his self-ignorance and inspires him to search for 
wisdom comes from the divine power of his daemonic voice.
In the dialogues, Socrates always brings the nomos- 
phusis debate into his discussion of the problem of virtue. 
The Cratylus clearly reflects Socrates' apprehension of the 
situation with which these two popular beliefs play an 
important role with regard to the theory of knowledge. One 
of them can be said to be the alternative of the other. 
Discussing the origin of names with Hermogenes and 
Cratylus, Socrates first introduced Protagoras' theory of 
man as the measure of all things. Right after the 
refutation of Protagoras' theory, Socrates then had 
recourse to Homer and the other poets as an alternative 
authority to the sophistic theory.80 If one does not like 
the way the sophist taught about names, then one 'ought to 
learn from Homer and the other poets'.81 Also, it is more 
often than not that one refers to divine power as the 
origin of his knowledge or ability when he could not find 
any other justified explanation for his acquisition of such 
knowledge.82
In all the dialogues, Socrates' cross-examination 
concerning the origin of virtue centres around these two 
main positions. Apart from the problem of the origin of 
virtue, the crisis of the interpretation of the meaning of 
virtue itself which occurs in the city of Athens with an 
enclave of Homeric values and a rise of new system of 
values, has come to light. From this, one can understand 
why Socrates has to pose such questions to those particular 
people.
80 Plato, Cratylus, (385e-386a, 391c-d).
81 Plato, Cratylus, (391c-e, 393c-394a).
82 Plato, Ion, (541e-542b).
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In the Charmides, Socrates' interlocutors are 
Charmides and Critias. Charmides is a very handsome young 
man who has been considered to excel his friends not only 
in appearance but also in his virtue, that is, temperance, 
sophrosyne 83, and Critias is an experienced man, who 
claimed that he knew perfectly well the meaning of 
sophrosyne,84 With regard to courage, andreia, as a 
virtue for young men, Socrates discusses this problem with 
Laches and Nicias who are supposed to know better than 
anyone else what courage is since both of them are eminent 
Athenian generals.85 In the Lysis, Lysis and Menexenus 
are very fond of each other. So Socrates examines the 
nature of love and friendship, philia, with both of them 
because they are in love with each other.86
In the Euthyphro, Socrates met the prophet Euthyphro 
who purported that his knowledge of the nature of piety, 
eusebeia, surpassed everyone.87 Hippias, a renowned 
sophist, has his reputation for teaching and orating 
numerous subjects such as mathematics, astronomy, grammar, 
poetry, music, and the history of the heroic age etc.88 
Moreover, he boasted that he was able to impart virtue to 
any young man.89 In the Greater Hippias, Socrates 
requests him to tell about the beauty, kalon, since he 
claimed he knows and can teach young men what noble or
83 Plato, Charmides, (157d).
84 Plato, Charmides, (162c-e).
85 Plato, Laches, (189c).
86 Plato, Lysis, (206d, 207c).
87 Plato, Euthyphro, (4e-5a).
88 Plato, Greater Hippias,, (366c, 367d, 367e, 368b);
Lesser Minor, (285c, 282e, 283c, 284a-b, 285c, 286a, 287b, 
291a); Protagoras, (318e).
89 Plato, Greater Hippias,, (283c).
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beautiful pursuits are.90 Again, in the Lesser Hippias, 
with regard to the topic of the hero in Homer's epics, 
Socrates asked Hippias to explain to him why and in what 
respect Achilles, the hero of the Iliad, is considered to 
be finer and better than Odysseus of the Odyssey.91
Besides Hippias, Socrates also met Ion, the rhapsode, 
who also professed his expertise in Homer. Ion told 
Socrates that he understood every single topic in Homer 
better than anyone.92 But none can compare with Gorgias 
of Leontini and Protagoras of Abdera who attracted 
Socrates' lengthy conversations. Gorgias, one of the most 
influential of the sophists, teaches rhetoric, the art of 
persuasion, which by virtue of its power can make other 
people do anything for you.93 Protagoras seems to be more 
highly regarded than Gorgias, particularly at Athens. He 
was Pericles' friend and had been appointed to draw up a 
code of laws for Thurii, a new colony of Athens in 444 B.C. 
In the Protagoras, its beginning scene is made to show how 
special and popular Protagoras, 'the wisest of Socrates1 
generation', is in the eyes of the Athenians.94 He was 
regarded as one of the earliest and most successful of the 
sophists. Moreover, he was strongly confident in his 
sophistry and, unlike other sophists, never refrained from 
calling himself a sophist. He even ascribed sophism to 
Homer and other poets.95 Distinguishing himself from 
other men of the same trade, he claimed that virtue was 
teachable and the most important of all virtues that he 
taught was the art of politics which consisted of 'good
90 Plato, Greater Hippias,, (286a, 287b).
91 Plato, Lesser Hippias, (363b, 364b).
92 Plato, Ion, (530c, 536e).
93 Plato, Gorgias, (452e).
94 Plato, Protagoras, (3 09a-311a).
95 Plato, Protagoras, (316c-317c).
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judgement in one's own affairs, showing how best to order 
one's own home; and in the affairs of one's city, showing 
how one may have most influence on public affairs both in 
speech and in action'.96
In the Euthydemus, Socrates argued with Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus, the sophists from Chios, who claimed to teach 
virtue 'in a pre-eminently excellent and speedy manner', 
and that virtue is the art of disputation, eristikos.97 
Hermogenes and Cratylus disagree on the theory of name in 
the Cratylus. They argue for their own positions which in 
a sense represent as stated above the nomos-phusis 
controversy and also the ideas of the prominent thinkers of 
their time, namely, Parmenides and Heraclitus as regards to 
the theory of names as the source of knowledge of 
things.98 Socrates was asked to join the discussion.99 
In the Republic, Socrates and Cephalus started the fire of 
debate on the meaning of justice, dikaiosyne, and then 
passed it on to the others. Socrates said he respected 
Cephalus because one can learn from an elderly man who had 
experienced many things in life.100 Also, in that 
dialogue, Socrates discussed the problem of justice with 
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. In the 
Theaetetus, Socrates examined the problem of knowledge 
itself with his resemblance, the young Theaetetus who had 
been highly praised by his teacher, Theodorus for his 
'marvellously fine qualities'.101 In this dialogue, 
Socrates meticulously discussed Protagoras's theory of 
knowledge, namely, man as the measure of all things. In
96 Plato, Protagoras, (318e).
97 Plato, Euthydemus, (271c-272b, 428d).
98 Plato, Cratylus, (402a-c, 440c-d, 428d).
99 Plato, Cratylus, (383a).
100 Plato, the Republic, (328d-e).
101 Plato, Theaetetus, (144a-b).
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the Parmenides, Socrates had a chance to discuss the 
doctrine of ideas and the doctrine of being with 
Parmenides, the great Eleatic philosopher to whom such 
doctrines belong. In search of the meaning of the sophist, 
the statesman, and the philosopher, Socrates met the Elean 
Stranger who, as a follower of Parmenides and Zeno, was 
supposed to be a philosopher102 to discuss with his
102 Plato, the Sophist, (216). When Theodorus told 
Socrates that the Elean Stranger was a follower of 
Parmenides and Zeno and he was a real philosopher. He was 
likely to regard the Elean Stranger as a philosopher in the 
same sense as Parmenides and Zeno. But the way the Elean 
Stranger undertook and conducted his philosophical topic 
and investigation was quite different from Parmenides. If 
the Elean stranger is a philosopher, he must be a 
philosopher of different kind, or probably not a 
philosopher at all. Parmenides, Zeno, and the Elean 
Stranger have been called philosopher who as the lover of 
wisdom searches for knowledge and wisdom. Those who are 
called philosopher are not necessarily philosophers. One 
should not forget that it is Theodorus not Socrates who 
assumed that the Elean stranger as a follower of the 
philosopher, Parmenides and Zeno, was also a philosopher. 
Stanley Rosen rightly comments that '(e)ven if we are to 
take Theodorus's identification as valid, we still do not 
know what it means to be a philosopher.. (i) f we did, of 
course, there would be no need to enter into conversations 
on the nature of the sophist, and thus, of the philosopher 
as well..(t)here is no reason to doubt Socrates' high 
regard for Parmenides, but a companion of a philosopher is 
not himself a philosopher, even assuming that we know what 
a philosopher is' (Rosen, 1983, p. 62). While John G. 
Gunnell suggests that the Elean Stranger is 'Plato or true 
philosopher described in the Theaetetus who moves like a 
stranger in Athens' (Gunnell, 1968, p. 160). Against this, 
Rosen argues that if what the Stranger was to say is just 
a repetition of the Eleatic doctrine, and not of a doctrine 
originated by the Stranger, then '(t)hose who regard the 
Stranger as Plato's "mouthpiece," while at the same time 
expressing confidence in Plato's scrupulous honesty, are 
surely faced with a problem here: How can the Stranger be 
Plato's as well as the Eleatic mouthpiece?...(i)f we say 
that Plato is here indulging in dramatic license, what is 
the exact extent of that license? How do we know the 
contexts in which the license may be applied and in which 
it is invalid?..(i)t seems to me fairly evident that the 
Stranger's doctrines, as we are about to hear them, are not 
attributable to any known Eleatic school...(i)t is equally 
evident that we do not know, and cannot prove conclusively, 
to what extent, or in what sense, the Stranger is a lightly 
disguised Plato' (Rosen, opcit., p. 67). To be sure, the
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problem of identification actually exists. The chaotic 
confusion of the terms sophist-sophistes, wise man-sophos, 
and particularly philosopher-philosophos employed before 
and after the time of Socrates and Plato, in the 
transitional period of the sixth-fourth century is evident. 
In the Protagoras 337d, Hippias who is generally understood 
to be a sophist calls Protagoras, Prodicus, Socrates, and 
himself wisest men, sophotatous. While Socrates and young 
Hippocrates know exactly that Protagoras whom he is going 
to meet is a sophist (Plato, Protagoras 312a). Of course 
Socrates believes that he himself is not a sophist. The 
sophists themselves have been easy, perhaps too much, to be 
identified. But to distinguish a non-sophist from a 
sophist is another matter. For instance, an ordinary 
person, Callias1 door-keeper, could not discriminate 
between who is a sophist and who is not (Plato, Protagoras 
314c-d). Those who are in the intellectual circle itself 
perhaps could identify who is who. For instance, 
Theodorus, who himself is a sophist in mathematics, 
regarded Parmenides and Zeno as philosophers in the Sophist 
216a. While talking to Socrates, Protagoras openly 
regarded himself as a sophist and also was able to point 
out others, past and present, who were the sophists despite 
their disguises (Plato, Protagoras 316d-317b). At 152e in 
the Theaetetus, conversing with Theaetetus, Socrates also 
classifies Parmenides together with Protagoras, Heraclitus, 
Empedocles, Epicharmus and Homer under the general name of 
sophoi or wise men. It is possible that Socrates when 
talking to young Theaetetus might have been called 
Parmenides and others by the term which is generally 
employed by ordinary people to refer to those wise men whom 
they could not distinguish between. To be sure, the term 
sophist can refer to a wide variety of specialists. As in 
G.E.R. Lloyd's study, the term sophist itself is originally 
used non-pejoratively and even in Plato, too, when it 
refers to other professions such as geometers, doctors, 
sculptors, painters etc. And the sophists of professions 
as such accept money for instruction which from this it is 
often used as 'the defining characteristic of a sophist1 
(Lloyd, 1989, pp. 93-4ff). Lloyd does not entirely agree. 
He argues that '(i)t is, rather, fee-taking for teaching 
such subjects as "virtue" or excellence, arete, for which 
Plato reserves his bitterest attacks. Then Lloyd concludes 
that an odium of the term sophist in Plato's day 'owed much 
to Plato himself' (Lloyd, opcit., pp. 92, 94). Surely,
this kind of confusion and indecision with regard to the 
use of the terms must be the problem for the Athenians. 
Despite the actuality of the problem, the Athenian people 
might not have taken it as seriously as Socrates or Plato 
whose grave concern is the education and welfare of young 
men. This is hardly a problem at all for the sophists 
themselves whose main concern is to compete with one 
another and gain fame and fortune. On the contrary, the 
problem generates the atmosphere congenial to their
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profession (Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, opcit., pp. 
15-17; also, Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek 
Politics, opcit.). To be sure, this kind of atmosphere and 
democracy intertwine and complement one another. However, 
it is so serious a problem that Plato should have composed 
the trilogy of the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the 
Statesman in order to remind the reader of the existence of 
this problem and to open a forum of discussion on it. It 
can be also argued that those who think themselves as real 
philosophers might be upset and badly affected by such a 
situation and then need to justify and clarify their own 
position against the sophists as, before Socrates and 
Plato, Heraclitus criticised Pythagoras for claiming 
himself as a philosopher, and Zeno is believed to have 
written a book Against the Philosophers which is aimed at 
Pythagoras (W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 
Vol.I, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 417, 204). To that extent, to 
discriminate between a philosopher and a sophist, Plato can 
be understood to do that in the Sophist and perhaps in the 
dialogues as a whole starting from the Apology. They might 
be deemed as the apology of a philosopher. This is quite 
plausible with regard to the confusion of the meaning 
between the sophist and the philosopher. Then, what can 
we say about the Statesman? Does it also imply that a real 
philosopher must be simultaneously a true statesman, and to 
defend his position as a true statesman, the author needs 
a dialogue on the matter? That may be the reason that 
another dialogue in which the Elean Stranger is expected to 
discuss on the meaning of true philosopher is unnecessary 
since after the Sophist and the Statesman the reader should 
be able to point out what a sophist is and what a true 
statesman is, and by that reason, he will be able to 
identify a true philosopher and a true statesman, or, in 
other words, a philosopher-king. Whether this hypothesis 
is true or not, it depends on what role the Elean Stranger 
is supposed to play in the Sophist and the Statesman. To 
identify what the Elean Stranger is, Plato leaves it as
kind of riddle to be solved by the reader. However, at
this stage our concern is to argue that the Elean Stranger 
is a wise man, sophos, because to say that the Elean 
Stranger is a wise man is one thing, but to specify him as 
a sophist or a philosopher is another matter which requires 
a further discussion. What one can be certain here is that 
among other things he should have been generally understood 
to be a wise man. To judge what he is and to interpret
what he argues is our later concern. Here the point is
just that Socrates meets the Elean Stranger as a wise man 
from whom he expected to learn something as he has stated 
his mission in the Apology. See Stanley Rosen, Plato’s 
Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image, New Haven, 1983; 
John G. Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and 
the Origins of Political Vision, Chicago, 1987; G.E.R. 
Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and 
Practice of Ancient Greek Science, Berkeley, 1987. As
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look-alike, Theaetetus, and his namesake, young Socrates in 
the Sophist and the Statesman.
Philebus represents the hedonistic interpretation of 
the good in the Philebus in which Socrates discussed the 
problem of the good with Protarchus, a protagonist of the 
position. Finally, in the Laws, three elderly persons from 
three cities, namely, the stranger from Athens, Clinias 
from Crete, and Megillus from Sparta, discussed the nature 
of the laws, nomoi. In Hellas, Crete and Sparta were
highly regarded on account of their laws and customs.103 
Clinias and Megillius who had been living all their life 
under such admirable nomos were expected to be able to 
relate what the good laws were. They claimed their own 
laws originated from the divine lawgivers, that is, Zeus in 
the case of Crete, and Apollo in the case of Sparta.104 
Both polities were believed to be in Socrates* favourite 
model of good government.105 The Athenian Stranger seems 
to play the part of Socrates in the dialogue by examining 
Clinias and Megillius.106
regards the argument that the Sophist and the Statesman 
have been written as the answer to the problems, 'Who is 
the sophist? Who is the statesman? and Who is the 
philosopher?1, which are originated in the Apology, see 
Mitchell H. Miller, Jr., The Philosopher in Plato1s 
Statesman, The Hague, 1980, pp. 1-3.
103 Plato, the Republic, (544c); Laws, (631b, 683a).
104 Plato, Laws, (624a).
105 Plato, Crito, (52e-53a).
106 Many scholars suggest that the Athenian Stranger is 
Plato or his mouthpiece. Theodor Gomperz argues that Plato 
himself takes part in the colloquy behind the transparent 
mask of the Athenian Stranger (Gomperz, 1969, pp. 229-230). 
Ernest Barker seems to believe that the Athenian Stranger 
is Plato's mouthpiece (Barker, 1947, pp. 339-340). A.E. 
Taylor suggests that the Athenian Stranger might be Plato 
himself (Taylor, 1978, p. 465). Also, Shorey has the same 
opinion (Shorey, 1965, p. 310) . W.K.C. Guthrie said that 
the character of the Athenian Stranger is remarkably un- 
Socratic. He also takes him as Plato's mouthpiece
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(Guthrie, 1978, pp. 323-324). Robert W. Hall regards the 
Athenian Stranger as Plato's spokesman (Hall, 1981, p. 90). 
A different view can be found in the other group of Plato 
commentators who believe that the signification of the 
characters in the Laws is intended to be symbolic. Werner 
Jaeger perceives that Plato's choice of the characters in 
the Laws is symbolic in order to join the Dorian and the 
Athenians natures in a higher unity (Jaeger, 1986, p. 218). 
David Grene's opinion does not differ from Jaeger as he 
argues that when a Spartan, a Cretan, and an Athenian are 
confronted with the task of constructing a system of laws 
for a new state, a political question is to be raised 
outside the drama (Grene, 1965, p. 158). Although older 
men from three cities are also considered to be symbolic 
figures, Eric Voegelin in regard to the myths of cosmic 
cycles in the Statesman and the Timaeus regarded them to 
reflect the end and the beginning of the course of the 
Hellenic history (Voegelin, 1957, pp. 228-230). George 
Klosko said as much the same as Jaeger when he writes 'the 
choice of interlocutors is, as always symbolic, as the 
political principles espoused are based on combining 
features from the Athenian and Doric (i.e. Spartan and 
Cretan) polities' (Klosko, 1986, p. 198). Only Leo Strauss 
comments that 'the Athenian Stranger occupies the place 
ordinarily occupied in the Platonic dialogues by Socrates' 
(Strauss, 1972, p. 52). Strauss is convinced that the Laws 
gvies an opportunity to the reader to see 'what he 
(Socrates) would have done in Crete after his arrival,' 
since 'we are entitled to infer that if Socrates had fled 
(from Athens), he would have gone to Crete' (Strauss, 1988, 
p. 33) . Thomas L. Pangle follows Strauss and gives the 
reason that in the Laws the reader is able to learn 'what 
Socrates would have said and done if his quest for self- 
knowledge, and his friendships, had ever allowed him the 
leisure to engage in giving advice to political reformers—  
and if he had ever found himself in the appropriate 
circumstances' (Pangle, 1980, pp. 378-379). Theodor 
Gomperz, The Greek Thinkers, Vol. Ill, Plato, London, 1969; 
Ernest Barker, Greek Politcal Theory: Plato and His
Predecessors, London, 1947; A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and 
his Work, London, 1978; Paul Shorey, What Plato Said, 
Chicago, 1965; W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol. V, Cambridge, 1978; Robert W. Hall, Plato, 
London, 1981; Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek 
Culture, Vol. Ill, The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the 
Age of Plato, New York and Oxford, 1986; Grene, Greek 
Political Theory: The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato, 
op. cit.} Eric Voegelin, Plato, Baton Rouge, 1966; Klosko, 
The Development of Plato's Political Theory, op. cit.} Leo 
Strauss, 'Plato: The Laws' in Leo Strauss and Joseph
Cropsey (ed.), History of Political Philosophy, Chicago and 
London, 1972, What is Political Philosophy? and Other 
Studies, Chicago, 1988; Thomas L. Pangle (trans.), The Laws 
of Plato, Chicago and London, 1980.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Question of Self-Knowledge: Know Thyself
Clearly, Socrates' crucial target is those whom people 
called 'the wise1. The sophists claimed that under their 
supervision, young men would become better and more 
successful by learning virtues or human excellences from 
their teaching. The possession of such knowledge of human 
excellences is believed to enable its possessor to achieve 
whatever he desires in his life.1 The sophists are 
convinced of their own art, techne, that it is the most 
important of all regarding human excellences. But, which 
one of them is actually the desirable virtue with regard to 
the most happiest life of man, whether it be the art of 
persuasion of Gorgias, or Protagoras' political art, or 
Hippias' all-round skills, or Euthydemus' art of 
disputation? And if it is really a kind of knowledge and 
also teachable, why 'our best and wisest citizens are 
unable to impart this excellence of theirs to others'.2
1 See Plato, Laws, (686e-687c). That is to say, it
is political power. In particular, the new political 
values in the context of Athenian democracy which have been 
set forth by Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthydemus emphasise 
rhetoric rather than the art of generalship as once 
believed to be the highest quality in Homeric society. To 
a certain extent, Socrates himself seems to be endorsing 
the changing characteristics of the values when he 
appropriated the sixth century Hesiod's myth of the races 
that the heroic race (of the fifth century) is wise and 
clever orators and dialectician, being 'able to ask 
question'. Therefore, the heroic race 'proves to be a race 
of orators and sophists'. Cf. Plato, Cratylus, (398d).
2 Plato, Protagoras, (319e-320a). Here, Socrates refers 
to Pericles' unsuccessful training of his young son. Also, 
at the Laches 179c-d, Lysimachus and Melesias are highly 
concerned with their son's education. Though their fathers 
are renowed for their noble deeds, but they do not know how 
and what to educate their own children. See the Meno, 
(93c-94e).
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Against this, Socrates asks whether virtue is really 
teachable.3 Possibly, virtue is no knowledge and not 
teachable. Furthermore, it could have been what the poets 
took for granted that virtue is a quality inherent in human 
nature; but it is not human nature in general. Virtue is 
inherited through a lineage of one's family like physical 
characteristics. If one follows the way the poets 
understood the nature of man, he must believe that ' (a) 
king's son will probably be a king, a good man's good, a 
handsome man's handsome and so forth; the offspring of each 
class will be of the same class'.4 But those who are 
familiar with Homer cannot overlook a fallacy of this 
poetic stance. In the case of Hector and his son Astyanax, 
a king's son does not become a king. However, there was 
also a case that a king's son becomes a king. The poets' 
idea of human nature is fallible. It can only be 
contingent on chance, tuche. As regards Socrates' response 
to this idea of inherent virtue of man, at the Republic 
502a-b, arguing for the possibility of the philosopher- 
king, he asks:
'Will anyone contend that there is no 
chance, tuchoien, that the offspring of 
kings and rulers should be born with 
the philosophic nature?'5
From this, it can be said that Socrates shares a 
similar view with that of the poets, since he seems to 
argue that the offspring of kings or rulers should have 
possessed the quality or virtue which enabled its ancestors 
to be what they were. Moreover, the philosophic quality is 
said to be endowed by nature. However, following a
3 Plato, Protagoras, (319b-320b); Meno, (70a).
4 This is what Socrates claims to be a poetic theory of 
the correctness of names which belongs to Homer. Plato, 
Cratylus, (393c-394a).
5 Plato, the Republic, (502a).
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possibility of a birth of philosophic-kingly nature, 
Socrates then puts further:
'And can anyone prove that if so born 
they must necessarily be corrupted? The 
difficulty of their salvation we too 
concede; but that in all the course of 
time not one of all could be saved, 
will anyone maintain that?*6
Apparently, this passage implies the emphasis of the 
influence of nurture over the nature of man. Good nature 
can be corrupted by bad nurture.7 Human nature alone is 
not self-sufficient. It needs a good and suitable care to 
develop itself towards perfection. On the one hand, 
Socrates leaves the matter to nature, phusis, and luck or 
chance, tuche, for a man to be endowed with virtue. On the 
other, he seems also to call for a right nurture or 
education, paideia. It is not a work of Nature but human 
design. This design can be largely implemented through 
laws and convention, nomos. In the Laws, the Athenian 
Stranger states that there are three principal forces which 
control human affairs, namely, chances and accidents of all 
kinds, tuchai de kai symphorai, God and art, techne. The 
point in concern for the Athenian Stranger is that like the 
art of the pilot, the physician, or the general, human life 
would be better with the art of life co-operating with the 
other two factors.8 Hence, with regard to the manner of 
his search for virtue, Socrates' position is neither 
sophistic nor poetic. It seems to be an in-between 
position. As it has been observed by Barrie A. Wilson that 
with regard to the intellectual battle of the time, 
Socrates 1 position is quite perplexing whether he is taking 
'a stand...between the new humanism (expressed in the
6 Plato, the Republic, (502a-b).
7 Plato, the Republic, (490d, 491e-492a, 500d); Laws, 
(747d) .
8 Plato, Laws, (709a-c).
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thinking of atomists, Protagoras, and the new art and 
medicine) versus the old Olympian religion with its rites 
and rituals, ' o r  'he is striking out in a different 
direction, sure to anger both sides in this debate1.9
I
The ambiguity of his position is illuminated in the 
Meno. Particularly concerning the problem of teachability 
of virtue, the discussion in the dialogue results in an 
ambiguous character. At the first stage, Socrates proposed 
what Pindar and other poets said about virtue and other 
things which implied that virtue cannot be learnt or sought 
but only recalled by nature.10 Also what Socrates arrived 
at in the first half of the dialogue is his proof to Meno 
that the learning of the truth of all things is really a 
matter of recollection, anamnesis.11 Anyhow, concerning 
virtue itself, it has been proved to be wisdom, phronesis, 
if it is really good, agathoi. But if virtue is wisdom, 
then, it must be knowledge, episteme, since there is 
nothing good that has not been embraced by knowledge.12 
It is at this second stage that Socrates transposed the 
nature of virtue to the sophist's position.
If virtue is knowledge, then, 'good men cannot be good
9 Wilson, Hermeneutical Studies: Dilthey,Sophocles and 
Plato, op. cit., p. 120.
10 Plato, Meno, (8Id).
11 Plato, Meno, 82a-86b).
12 Plato, Meno, (89a, 87d).
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by nature1.13 To be good, a man must be educated. 
Therefore, what is inferred at this stage contradicts the 
earlier result. Virtue is now proved to be knowledge and 
therefore teachable.14 But this hypothesis could not go 
further. It is stuck when it seems that there never exist 
such teachers of virtue.15 If it cannot be taught, then, 
it is not to be regarded as knowledge.16 Then the
position of the argument reverts to what Socrates has taken 
before, that is, that of soothsayers and prophets and all 
of the poetic stance.17
If 'virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught,1 
and it seems that no one can explain how one can get
virtue, then, Socrates concludes that it must be 'imparted
to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in 
those who receive it,1 as the Spartans rightly praised a 
good man by calling him a divine person.18 The problem 
still remains. The contradiction exists though with regard 
to the earlier premiss that virtue is good and the good is 
always embraced by knowledge. Unless virtue by divine
dispensation is not good, the contradiction still remains. 
But virtue cannot be virtue if it is not good. Then what 
really is virtue? Hence it is necessary to return to the 
fundamental problem before asking in what way virtue comes 
to mankind, namely, the quest for the meaning of virtue. 
In this respect, the argument has come full circle as it 
happens in most of the dialogues.
The virtue that Socrates intends to investigate is the
13 Plato, Meno, (89b).
14 Plato, Meno, (89c).
15 Plato, Meno, (89e-94d).
15 Plato, Meno, (99a).
17 Plato, Meno, (99d).
18 Plato, Meno, (99e, 99d).
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virtue of man qua man regardless of sex, age and social 
status. It seems that Socrates attempts to search for the 
virtue that goes beyond its context, whether it be Homeric 
or of Socrates' time.19 After listening to Meno's 
enumeration of the virtue of a man, a woman, a young and an 
elderly, Socrates said:
'Well now, there is this that I want 
you to tell me, Meno: what do you call 
the quality by which they do not 
differ, but are all alike?...Is it only 
in the case of virtue, do you think 
Meno, that one can say there is one 
kind belonging to a man, another to a 
woman, and so on with the rest, or is 
it just the same, too, in the case of 
health and size and strength? Do you 
consider that there is one health. . .Or, 
wherever we find health, is it of the 
same character universally, in a man or 
in anyone else?'20
Following this in the Meno, temperance and justice are 
supposedly presented as virtues necessary to anyone's 
success in managing anything.21 To be sure, after
Socrates' examination, it appears to Meno that other 
virtues such as courage, wisdom etc. are indispensable as 
well.22 Each of them is just a part of virtue. What 
Socrates wants is to search for virtue that 'runs through 
them all' since he is looking for virtue qua virtue of man 
qua man. It is proved to be quite an enigmatic task. Each 
virtue can sometimes complement and sometimes conflict with
19 Nussbaum suggests that Plato searches for goodness 
without fragility through techne. Nussbaum, The Fragility 
of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy, op, cit,, pp. 83-233.
20 Plato, Meno, (72c, 72d).
21 Plato, Meno, (73a-c).
22 Plato, Meno, (73d-e).
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another.23 Moreover, it contradicts itself as the meaning 
of each virtue is differently interpreted by different 
people. It cannot even be flawlessly defined by any single 
interpretation.
For example, with regard to the search for the meaning 
of sophrosyne, whether it is natural or taught, both 
Charmides, a young man who is believed to have a good 
nature, and Critias, a man of experience, could not answer 
Socrates without ambiguity what sophrosyne is. From the 
discussion in the Charmides, sophrosyne might have been 
understood to be a kind of quietness ; but cleverness is a 
quickness of the soul not a quietness. Since quiet life 
will not be more temperate than the unquiet, therefore, 
sophrosyne, cannot be quietness , because quietness is 
good and not good. But as a virtue, sophrosyne has to be 
always good. Then sophrosyne might be modesty. But 
according to the great poet, Homer, modesty is not good for 
a needy man. This statement has been quoted by Socrates 
again in his discussion on courage in the Laches, 201a-b.
Therefore, sophrosyne cannot be modesty since it 
effects sometimes a good result and sometimes bad. It has 
been generally understood that doing our own business is 
temperance. But in a well-ordered state, a person should 
not weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, 
and his own flask and scraper, and so on. Then it cannot 
be sophrosyne. A good citizen of Athens must attend the 
assembly and care for public affairs. However, one might 
argue that the meaning of sophrosyne must be understood in 
the sense that only doing good and honourable things of 
one's own business is to be taken into account. But the 
good is found to be too loose a terminology. A temperate 
man can be ignorant of his sophrosyne. He cannot be sure
23 Cf. Chapter Twelve, the task of the statesman or the 
philosopher-king is to weave together and harmonise these 
virtues.
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of the result of his action whether it is good or bad to 
himself and others. His work might be good in its nature. 
But its consequence is uncertain. Though his intention 
might be good. Then a man can be temperate or wise but 
does not know himself. Hence, self-knowledge has to be the 
essence of sophrosyne. Accordingly, sophrosyne should be 
'Know thyself*. If so, it must be a kind of knowledge, 
episteme. It differs from other knowledge in that its 
concerned object is itself. Sophrosyne alone is an 
episteme of other and episteme of itself. Given its 
existence, the question is 'what good can this knowledge do 
to us?’ In the end, the argument has been led round a 
circle with regard to the problem of the good.
In the Laches, Socrates said that the art of fighting 
is generally supposed to be courage.24 Since Homer, it 
has been actually regarded as one of the virtues. But 
people like Laches and Nicias who are the genrerals are 
themselves at a loss to give Socrates the meaning of 
courage. What Socrates wants to know about courage is not 
just what has been exercised in the battle field. He needs 
to arrive at a general understanding of courage which 
embraces all kinds of business i.e. politics, disease, 
poverty etc. Such courage is supposed to be not only 
something against pain or fear, but also mighty to contend 
against desires and pleasures.25 Accordingly, it is 
sensible to say that courage is a sort of endurance of the 
soul. However, not every kind of endurance is courage , 
since as a virtue, courage must be a very notable quality. 
Endurance of the soul can be either wise or foolish. The 
foolish one is evil and hurtful. Only the wise one is good 
and noble. Hence courage must be wise endurance of the 
soul. But what is the wise endurance? The person who is 
deemed to have such wise endurance should be he who knows
24 Plato, Laches, (190d).
25 Plato, Laches, (19Id).
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how to be safe and profitable in his activities i.e. 
spending money in a way that he will acquire more in the 
end. Since one who has knowledge or skill of anything in 
which he is engaging is not so courageous as the other who 
lacks it. But this kind of endurance can yield an 
undesirable consequence ; it might be a foolish endurance.
To continue the discussion, Socrates lets courage be 
defined as wise endurance. If so, courage must be a kind 
of wisdom, sophia. Should it be a kind of wisdom it could 
have been the knowledge of that which inspires fear or
confidence in war, or in anything. The doctor knows what
is to be dreaded in diseases. But no one calls him by that 
a brave man. So this definition must be further explained. 
It is not only to tell what is healthy and what is diseased 
but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by 
anyone rather than sickness, and in some case, to decide 
whether some sick men should never arise from their beds 
whilst some others are better to live. Precisely, courage 
is the knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is to be 
dared. However, this knowledge seems to belong to some god 
rather than human beings.
Return to the definition of courage as the knowledge 
of what is to be dreaded and what is to be dared. It can
be argued that wild beasts and other animals can be
included under the title of courage if they possess such 
knowledge as well. But the fearless and thoughtless and 
the courageous are not the same thing. Following this, 
courage must also be the prudent acts. Also, it can be 
inferred from above that courage is wisdom, temperance, 
justice etc. And what is to be dreaded must be future 
evils, and what to be dared must be future goods. This 
knowledge must have comprehension of the same things, 
whether or not it is in future, past or present. The 
argument is returned to the beginning again as it arrives 
at the meaning that courage is wisdom, temperance, justice
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etc. which are virtue as a whole. And courage is 
eventually a kind of knowledge concerning all goods and 
evils at every stage.
II
Similarly, with regard to the discussion on the 
problem of traditional virtues, all 'those who know1 whom 
Socrates conversed with have been confused by Socratic 
investigation. Mostly, the arguments put forward have gone 
round in a circle, always defeated by self-contradiction, 
and ended up with same problem they started with, namely 
the ontological problem of the good and the virtue. Also, 
apart from the traditional virtues such as courage, wisdom, 
justice, temperance, piety, new kinds of virtue which the 
sophists purported have been investigated. The new virtue 
is publicly pronounced to be the kind of skills or art 
which can be taught. Generally speaking, these new virtues 
can be encapsulated under the same title of the art of 
rhetoric and politics. Gorgias and Protagoras are the 
protagonists of this new theory. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that the same problem is still unanswerable.
In the Gorgias, Gorgias claims that his art of 
rhetoric dealt with the greatest of human affairs and the 
best.26 Since anyone who possesses this ability can make 
other people do anything for him.27 In other words, his 
art renders its possessor the power of governing 
mankind.28 Gorgias said that those who learn his art will
26 Plato, Gorgias, (451d).
27 Plato, Gorgias, (452e).
28 Plato, Meno, (73c).
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become like himself, that is, the rhetorician. If the art 
of rhetoric is virtue, it must be good and just. Those who 
possess the good and the just must be good and just 
himself.29 But as it happened to other arts, there are 
those who wrongly used the art of rhetoric. Then Gorgias 
is made to contradict himself. First, since he stated that 
he was not responsible for his students* wrong use of the 
art. At the same time, he argued that his art dealt with 
the greatest good and he can make his students become good 
and just. Secondly, the art of rhetoric cannot be virtue 
for man since it is incoherent for a child or a slave to 
possess the power of ruling. Socrates refutes Gorgias and 
his supporters * view of the good and proves that the art of 
rhetoric like politics is base and is not an art but just 
a habit of producing a kind of gratification and 
pleasure.30
Protagoras' theory is that virtue is teachable and the 
virtue he can impart is the art of politics. According to 
his theory, man is endowed by nature with political virtue, 
politikes aretes, which is comprised of particular parts 
such as justice, courage, temperance, and piety. This 
civic virtue enables man to 'band themselves together and 
secure their lives by founding cities1.31 Although men 
believed that everybody partook of the virtue, he did not 
regard it as natural or spontaneous, 'but as something 
taught and acquired after careful preparation by those who 
acquire it1.32 HHe supports his argument by stating the 
fact that the Athenians did punish or sanction the wrong­
29 Plato, Gorgias, (460a-b).
30 Plato, Gorgias, (462c-d, 463d). From 463d onwards, 
Socrates undertakes to refute Gorgias1 hedonistic view of 
the good and proves that to suffer wrong is better than to 
do wrong.
31 Plato, Protagoras, (322b).
32 Plato, Protagoras, (324c).
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doers not for the sake of their crimes but for the 
prevention of any wrong-doing in the future. It is because 
the Athenians shared the view that virtue is procured and 
taught. Protagoras points to the fact of the process of 
socialisation of the society from early childhood till the 
last day of one's life. Punishment for any trangression 
beyond the boundaries of laws is a correction, euthunai, 
for man. He argued that society will do otherwise if it 
has no belief in the teachability of virtue. And the body 
of the polis itself or everyone in the society is a teacher 
of virtue to the extent of his powers since every man is 
endowed with such nature. Furthermore, the reason why many 
sons of good fathers turned out so meanly lies in the fact 
that society did not make enough zealous and ungrudging 
effort to instruct each other. If the society does so 
well, the good will not be more likely than the bad to have 
sons who are good. Everyone will all be good. However, 
those who have been regarded as the most unjust person in 
the society will be more just than those who have never 
been reared or educated among human laws and society. For 
this reason, the society needs someone who excels others in 
showing the way to virtue to assist people to become good. 
Socrates said he is convinced by Protagoras' speech that 
there is human treatment by which the good is made good.
However, he poses the same question which he does in 
other dialogues that whether Protagoras deemed that virtue 
is a single thing and the qualities such as justice, 
temperance and so on were parts of it. Protagoras answered 
that those qualities are like the parts of the whole face 
not the parts of gold. And it is possible that some 
partake of justice but not of wisdom which means that 
someone could be brave but unjust and some just but unwise. 
Socrates uses the same reasoning in making knowledge 
indispensable to all good qualities i.e. temperance, 
wisdom. What is good must be embraced by what is opposite 
to folly or ignorance, namely, knowledge. Meanwhile,
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Protagoras argued that each quality differs from one 
another. The discussion has been led to the point that 
wisdom, justice, temperance, and holiness are one thing. 
If a person partakes of one quality of virtue, it means 
that he has partaken of virtue as a whole. Possessing such 
civic virtue in perfection by nature, a man needs no 
education. Protagoras could not agree to this because it 
would damage his theory that man has some part of virtue 
which can be complemented by his teaching. But in denying 
the unity of virtue, Protagoras commits altogether to the 
negation of the idea that virtue is knowledge, which in 
fact makes virtue unteachable. In silence, he admitted the 
fallacy of his argument in the end of the dialogue. 
Strangely, resulting from Socrates' cross-examination, his 
position and that of Protagoras interchanges in the end of 
the dialogue.
Even when Socrates himself has to meticulously discuss 
the problem of justice in the Republic, it is well known 
that the dialogue ends itself at the ambiguous position in 
which Socrates' defence of his definition of justice is too 
problematic to render any straigthforward conclusion. 
Also, the discussion on the problem of the good itself as 
being conversed in the Philebus returns to its starting 
point after the lengthy discussion.33
In sum, it can be argued that in most of the 
discussions in the dialogues Socrates makes things 
ambiguous.34 The argument always comes full circle.35
33 Plato, Philebus, (66d-e).
34 Such dialogues are the Charmides, the Laches, the 
Lysis, the Euthyphro, the Lesser Hippias, the Major 
Hippias, the Ion, the Gorgias, the Protagoras, the Meno, 
the Cratylus, the Republic, the Parmenides.
35 Apart from what have been stated, one can find this 
situation in most of the dialogues, for instance, see the 
Laws, (688b); Lysis, (213c); Philebus, (19a).
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Socrates cross-examines and defeats his respondents by 
'making weaker arguments appear to be stronger1.36 Also 
his position is obscure. It seems to incessantly oscillate 
between the polarity of the arguments. Mainly, it is 
between the sophists and the poets. In other words, it 
moves between the realm of man and the realm of the gods. 
Virtually, he attacks both positions which belong to those 
whom people mostly and generally regarded as 'those who 
know'.
II
Socrates defeats and debunks 'those who know'. His 
force of interrogation, elenchus, brings them to an 
impasse. The dialogues portray different kinds of 
characters of man with regard to their reactions to what 
they have been brought into.37 Among other things, there 
is one thing in common in their experience. The effect of 
Socratic elenchus or Socratic docta ignorantia in disguise 
has been described as the flat torpedo sea-fish or the 
Daedalus which bewitches and benumbs anyone who experiences 
it.38
To be sure, it is probable that someone might argue
36 Plato, Apology, (18b-c).
37 The dramatic element of the dialogues is essential in 
which each character such as Charmides, Critias, 
Thrasymachus, Anytus, Crito, Meno, Cephalus, Polemarchus, 
Phaedrus, Adeimantus, Glaucon etc. has his personality and 
has different kinds of response to Socratic elenchus. See 
also Michael C. Stokes, Plato's Socratic Conversations: 
Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues, London, 1986, 
'Introduction: Platonic questions', pp. 1-35.
38 Plato, Meno, (80a); Euthyphro, (lid).
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for a close affinity of Socrates and Euthydemus. However, 
in spite of its resemblance to Euthydemus1 art of 
refutation, eristike, which conveys the meaning 'contest, 
fond of wrangling or arguing', Socratic elenchus 
essentially differs from it. One of the functions of the 
Euthydemus, is to clarify this matter. The reader cannot 
help telling himself that what he experiences from the 
exhibition of Euthydemus' art of refutation is immensely 
reminiscent of Socratic elenchus. Plato lets the reader 
know Euthydemus1 intention in practising his art.39 It is 
aimed at winning the argument and displaying its power. 
Also, the reader has been openly and generally informed 
that Socratic elenchus originated in his ignorance and his 
search for wisdom. Perhaps, it is Socratic irony. But we 
know that the sophists aim at gaining fame and glory to 
which Socrates is not attracted. Therefore, Socrates must 
aim at something different from that of the sophists which 
indeed distinguishes Socratic elenchus from the sophist's 
eristic. Eristic is just a little game 'because if one 
learned many such things or even all of them, one would be 
no nearer knowing what the things really are, but would be 
able to play with people because of the different sense of 
the words, tripping them up and turning them upside down, 
just as someone pulls a stool away when someone else is 
going to sit down, and then people roar with joy when they 
see him lying on his back'.40 Therefore, Socrates raises 
the question that what good the art of refutation brings 
about:
'Find it, my good fellow, No, we were 
in a most ridiculous state; like 
children who run after crested larks, 
we kept on believing each moment we 
were just going to catch this or that 
one of the knowledges, while they as
39 Plato has Dionysodorus inform Socrates of what 
Euthydemus' intent is. See Plato, Euthydemus, (275d-276e).
40 Plato, Euthydemus, (278b-c).
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often slipped from our grasps. What 
need to tell you the story at length? 
When we reached the kingly art, and 
were examining it to see if we had here 
what provides and produces happiness, 
at this point we were involved in a 
labyrinth: when we supposed we had
arrived at the end, we twisted about 
again and found ourselves practically 
at the beginning of our search, and 
just as sorely in want as when we first 
started on it.|41
In appearance, it is difficult to differentiate 
Socratic elenchus from Euthydemus's eristic. The
difference lies in the intention of the master of the art. 
And the possession of the knowledge of how to use the art 
and what good the art can make is the decisive factor in 
distinguishing Socrates from Euthydemus. As one would 
never 'get advantage from all other knowledge, whether of 
money-making or medicine or any other that knows how to 
make things, without knowing how to use the thing made1.42 
Similarly, the art of refutation can be made useful only 
when its practitioner knows how to use it. How did 
Socrates use his elenchus?
Socratic ignorance reduces his audience to perplexity 
and also makes them similar to itself, that is, being 
ignorant.43 Socratic elenchus compels them to acknowledge 
the inadequacy of their knowledge. They are forced to 
submit to something which is beyond their putative
41 Plato, Euthydemus, (291b-c). See also the Republic, 
(453d): 'What a grand thing, Glaucon,1 said Socrates, 'is 
the power of the art of contradiction!...many appear to me 
to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose 
that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their 
inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to 
the subject under condsideration...They pursue purely 
verbal oppositions, practising eristic, not dialectic on 
one another.1
42 Plato, Euthydemus, (289b).
43 Plato, Meno, (80a).
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knowledge. What is more important is that it seriously 
affects their self-understanding or self-interpretation. 
Their previous self-images are proved to be fictitious. 
Apart from having been perplexed about the truth of the 
things concerned, they become puzzled about the being of 
their own selves when they just found out that they happen 
to be not what they understood themselves to be, that is, 
not being wise but ignorant. This effect is shame, 
aischune. It is a feeling which one has when one thinks of 
himself as being deteriorated. To feel ashamed is to be or 
to do what one would not like to be or to do. If everyone 
desires good as it has been generally stipulated in the 
dialogues.44 Then one feels ashamed when one does or 
becomes what is opposite to what he regarded as good.
Regarding the meaning of shame, in one of the scenes 
in the Phaedrus, Socrates has to wrap up his head while he 
renders a speech in praise of a non-lover to Phaedrus since 
it will be shameful or embarassing, aischune, for him for 
two reasons: first, to give such a blasphemous speech that 
denigrated the divine power of love of Aphrodite and Eros; 
second, to render a more beautiful, wiser, and better 
speech than he is normally capable to do.45 He is ashamed 
to be what he himself is not. He satirised those who are 
not what themselves really are but think they are.
44 Plato, Euthydemus, (278e): 'Do all we human beings 
wish to prosper? Or is this question one of the absurdities 
I was afraid of just now? For I suppose it is stupid 
merely to ask such things, since every man must wish to 
prosper.' See also Plato, Protagoras, (358b); Philebus, 
(20d), Meno, (77c), Gorgias, (468).
45 Plato, Phaedrus, 237a. However, Socrates' irony has
to be taken into consideration in order to interpret this 
dramatic situation. Claiming his ignorance as usual 
(235d), Socrates ironically replies to Phaedrus that the 
speech he is to give is not his own but it belongs to 
someone else whom he forgot because of his stupidity. 
Therefore, if the speech happens to be better or 
blasphemous, Socrates is not to be praised or blamed. As 
it is well known of his irony that he never intends to be 
either sacrilegious or wise.
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Socratic elenchus is intended to induce shame. With regard 
to this, Robert E. Cushman, in the end of his book, has 
summarily emphasised the signification of elenchus in 
Socratic method by evoking the original meaning of the 
term:
'The primary meaning of the verb 
elegcho seems to have been "put to 
shame". In Plato's usage the original 
meaning is retained, but discourse, or 
cross-questioning, becomes the 
instrument for inducing shame. If the 
elenchos "confutes," it does so by 
convicting of error through putting 
respondents to shame— shame over 
contradiction among their own confessed 
opinions. We have endeavoured to show 
that the genius of dialectic lies in 
its power, first, to win acknowledgment 
of self-contradiction, then to procure 
consent to the "leading," not merely of 
the argument, but to deep-lying and 
obscured convictions. Thus, in the 
case of Polus and Gorgias, Socrates' 
fundamental aim was to arouse from 
slumber true opinions which each 
feigned to disavow but really believed 
(Gorgias, 474b, 482b-c). His purpose
was to exhume truth buried under 
rationalisaton so that men would 
acknowledge it, if for no other reason 
than "for very shame" (Republic, 501e; 
Gorgias, 508b). Because the elenchos 
has the power, of revealing a man's 
disagreement with himself....|46
A man's disagreement with himself is possible if only 
the other self within him emerges. In the situation, a man 
feels frustrated since he is like being in-between two 
selves. The self that he used to be unconsciously proud of 
has crumbled whilst the other which newly emerges is
46 Robert S. Cushman, Therapeia: Plato’s Conception of 
Philosophy, Westport, 1958, pp. 308-3 09. Consider also the 
Laws, 647a: 'And often we fear reputation, when we think we 
shall gain a bad repute for doing or saying something base; 
and this fear we (like everybody else) , I imagine, call 
shame.'
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shamefully incapable, aischros, kakos. Nobody can relate 
the experience under Socratic influence better than 
Alcibiades in his praise of Socrates in the encomium of 
love in the Symposium. As it is generally understood that 
Alcibiades was highly renowed not only for his tremendous 
brillance but also his physical beauty. The Athenians 
considered nobody to have a better and more promising 
future than he. Alcibiades was the most remarkable young 
man in terms of qualities or virtues. However, under the 
spell of Socrates, he confesses:
'For when I hear him I am worse than 
any wild fanatic; I find my heart 
leaping and my tears gushing for that 
the sound of his speech, and I see 
great numbers of other people having 
the same experience... .the influence of 
our Marsyas here has often thrown me 
into such a state that I thought my 
life not worth living that you can call 
untrue. Even now I am still conscious 
that if I consented to lend him my ear, 
I could not resist him, but would have 
the same feeling again. For he compels 
me to admit that, sorely deficient as 
I am, I neglect myself while I attend 
to the affairs of Athens. ..And there 
is one experience I have in presence of 
this man alone, such as nobody would
expect in me, to be made to feel
ashamed, aischunesthai, by anyone; he 
alone can make me feel it.|47
With regard to shame and its effect of self- 
contradiction, Cushman comments that Socratic elenchus 
makes Alcibiades confess his 'profound "shame" and 
confronts him with the question "whether he could continue 
in his divided existence'.48 Socrates has been compared 
to a mythical Marsyas, a guardian deity who is also
47 Plato, the Symposium, (215e-216c). Cf. Cicero, 
Disputations, (III. xxxii.77 - xxxiii.79). See also David 
Grene, Greek Political Theory, op. cit., pp. 103-104.
48 Cushman, op. cit., p. 194.
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musical. In the same manner that his daemonic voice, his 
personal guardian deity, forbids him to do or to think in 
a certain way, Socrates drew his interlocutors back from 
the slumber of their illiberal self-understanding of the 
good. They could no longer be assured of what they thought 
to be virtuous and good.
With his philosophical discourse as a Marsyasic 
musical gift, he casts spell on them. With his 
interrogation, Socrates brings the respondents with him 
through the journey of thought. Starting with the state of 
ignorance of Socrates and the state of knowing of his 
respondents, the dialectic discussion comes round a circle, 
arriving at the point of beginning. But what is called the 
point of beginning is not the same point where they 
started. It is not a return. It is an arrival. They 
arrive at the state of ignorance.49 Those who used to 
think they knew something realise that they do not know or 
could not take for granted their knowledge. It is a point 
of beginning of another journey of thought which the 
travellers would depart again with a different kind of 
presupposition and also a different kind of question. The 
emergence of a new presupposition is intertwined with the 
emergence of a new question.
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As stated above, Socratic elenchus is not aimed at 
merely refuting his respondents. It is not the art of
49 Julia Annas states in her introduction of the 
Republic that the Socrates interrogation shakes one's 
complacency and leaves a void which is all too plausibly 
filled by scepticism. See Julia Annas, An Introduction to 
Plato's Republic, Oxford, 1985, p. 21.
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disputation like Euthydemus' eristic which is aimed at 
victory rather than truth. Socratic elenchus is dialectic 
method. It is conducted in regard to the search for the 
nature of the things in question. It is understood that 
Socrates regards the dialectician as 'a man who can take 
account of the essential nature of each thing1.50 
Dialectic is 'asking and answering questions with the 
highest degree of understanding' which by its procedure 
'proceeds by the destruction of assumptions to the very 
first principles'.51 Dialectic corresponds to the method 
of investigation that Plato states in the Seventh Epistle 
that the nature of the first principle can be acquired by 
the way of up and down asking and questioning on the 
subject.52 Therefore, in his investigation, one of 
Socrates' intentions is to evoke a return to the 
examination of the account of the essential nature of 
things, 'to give great care and great attention to the 
beginning of any undertaking, to see whether one's 
foundation is right or not'.53
Since the first principle of a thing renders itself a 
firm base.54 That is why prior to the question of the 
teachability of virtue, the nature of virtue or its being 
itself has to be investigated.55 The virtue in concern is 
human excellence. Furthermore, it is not subject to any 
particular person. It is the virtue of man qua man.
This is the reason why he has been regarded as the 
first who directs the philosophical examination towards the
50 Plato, the Republic, (534b).
51 Plato, the Republic, (534d, 533c).
52 Plato, Seventh Epistle, (343d-344a)
53 Plato, Cratylus, (436d-e).
54 Plato, the Republic, (511b).
55 Plato, Meno, (100b); Protagoras, (361d).
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problem of human life. According to Socratic dialectic 
method, the notion of the good cannot be separated from the 
notion of the self. When the notion of the good has been 
challenged, it also affects the notion of the self to which 
it has emerged from and pertained. It is inevitable that 
the question of the good is dialectically led to the 
question of the self. As regards the effect of the 
dialectic of Socratic investigation, Edward G. Ballard 
comments that 'Socrates suggested that "one will come to 
know himself by investigating the relations among notions 
such as knowledge, virtue, pleasure, the good" '.56 To 
this point, Helen North as well agreed that with regard to 
the problem of the origin of virtue is involved in at least 
two aspects of this debate: first, 'whether it comes from 
nature or education,1 which inevitably links itself to 'the 
equally fundamental question of what human nature is really 
like when it is revealed by suffering or ill treatment1.57
It can be inferred that Socratic elenchus in the form 
of dialectic investigation effects shame to his repondents 
in order to lead them to self-examination. In other words, 
Socrates1 search for the knowledge of the good necessarily 
presupposes the search for self-knowledge. The search for 
self-knowledge emerges only from the emerging uncertainty 
of the notion of one's self.58 The previous self which 
claimed the knowledge of the good is succeeded by the self 
which confesses its ignorance.59 From this, a new
56 Edward G. Ballard, Socratic Ignorance: An Essay on 
Platonic Self-knowledge, The Hague, 1965, p. 48.
57 North, Sophrosyne, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
58 A further discussion of this point can be found in 
Chapter Ten.
59 Derek Parfit has argued for the fallibity or self- 
defeating of the Self-interest Theory. However, this 
thesis argues that the human self exists in its own right. 
The care of the self is quite essential. But the nature of 
the self is found in metaxy. Only the dialectic self which 
is derived from the logic of metaxy can render a prudent
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presupposition now arises with the search not yet for the 
good but first for self-knowledge. In this way, other 
kinds of knowledge must come after self-knowledge. Since 
that whether those other knowledges are proved to be 
wholesome or not depends on the knowledge of the self to 
which they pertain. Socrates in the Phaedrus expresses his 
overriding concern for the understanding of self-knowledge. 
When asked whether he believed in the myth of Boreas and 
Oreithyia, he replies that although he heard also of the 
rational or scientific explanation of the incident, he has 
no leisure for that kind of thing. He states that reason 
that since 'I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription 
has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when 
I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant 
things'.60
As we know, what can be drawn from Socrates' 
discussion is that he aimed at a general concept of virtue 
rather than a virtue. Of course, this presupposes a 
general concept of man. In the discussion on the problem 
of the abstract idea of the one and the particular many 
with Parmenides in the dialogue of his namesake, Socrates 
remarked that he would be amazed 'if anyone could show in 
the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, 
this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which 
you described in visible objects1.61 Of course, as 
regards the Eleatic doctrine, Parmenides and Zeno praised
care of the self. I argue that as regards Parfit's thesis, 
in order to arrive at its so-called non-religious ethics, 
one has to start from or take his momentarily existential 
self as a point of departure. In other words, he has to 
start from his self-love, desires, or the care of his self- 
interest. As it can be put in Platonic statement at the 
Republic, 511b: 'Taking one’s right opinion as a
springboard in search for the good'. See Derek Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984.
60 Plato, Phaedjrus, (229b-230a) .
61 Plato, Parmenides, (129a-130a).
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Socrates for his argument in quest of such abstract ideas. 
Parmenides asked Socrates again whether he really believed 
that there were such things. Socrates replied that 'I have 
been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether 
there are ideas of such things, or not'.62 It seems that 
Socrates was in pursuit of such conception although he was 
yet indecisive whether there existed such abstract ideas of 
man or other things. Also, Socrates had not yet abandoned 
Heraclitus' theory of motion and not-being, that is, 
everything is in flux. In essence, he discussed the 
strength and weakness of both theories of Parmenides and 
Heraclitus.63
The debate between these two positions is 
inconclusive. The Cratylus conceivably represents the 
debate between Parmenidean and Heraclitean accounts of the 
origin of names. The discussion comes a full circle as 
usual. But it seems that Socrates left to Cratylus and 
Hermogenes, and perhaps the reader, to continue further 
discussion on their own and to decide themselves whether 
either theory was true.64 Similarly, the Parmenides 
inconclusively ends itself in the condition that 'if the 
one is not, nothing is' and 'whether the one is or is not, 
the one and the others in relation to themselves and to 
each other all in every way are and are not and appear and 
do not appear'.65 However, we know that Socrates said
62 Plato, Parmenides, (13 0b-c).
63 Plato, Cratylus, Hermogenes seems to represent 
Heraclitean view whilst Cratylus takes a Parmenidean 
position.
64 At the Cratylus, 440c-d, Socrates concludes the 
discussion that with regard to Heraclitean position: 
'Perhaps, Cratylus, this theory is true, but perhaps is 
not. Therefore you must consider courageously and 
thoroughly and not accept anything carelessly..'
65 Plato, Parmenides, (166c).
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that he often dreams that there are such absolute ideas.66 
The search for self-knowledge situates itselfin such a 
bewildering state. It incites wonder which caused 
Theaetetus dizziness.67 In the Meno, wonder, thaumazein, 
as the effect of the Socratic elenchus or the torpedo's 
shock reduces a person who experiences it 'to the 
perplexity of realising that he did not know, and had left 
a craving to know'.68 It is the only beginning of 
philosophy, a sign of being a philosopher.69
IV
The situation mentioned above is a starting point to 
which Socrates guides his audience. It is a right or true 
opinion, orthe doxa, which is not inferior to knowledge. 
A right opinion as well as knolwedge could guide a man to 
the good.70 Although one is ignorant of what he is going 
to search for, it does not mean that if he does not know 
what he is searching he would not be able to recognise it 
if he has found it. Since he 'who does not know about any 
matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions, aletheis 
doxai, on such matters, about which he knows nothing?'71 
As the only alternative to knowledge, a right opinion 
emanates from what
66 Plato, Cratylus, (439c).
67 Plato, Theaetetus, (155c).
68 Plato, Meno, (84c). Cf. Diotima's speech in the 
Symposium, 207d.
69 Plato, Theaetetus, (155d).
70 Plato, Meno, (98b).
71 Plato, Meno, (85c).
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'the reason itself lays hold of by the 
power of dialectics, treating its 
assumptions not as absolute beginnings 
but literally as hypotheses, 
underpinnings, footholds, and 
springboards so to speak, to enable it 
to rise to that which requires no 
assumption and is the starting-point of 
all...172
Socrates* mission is to go about the city to cross- 
examine people, especially those who know. In his mission, 
he makes others become like himself, namely, ignorant and 
wondering about their own self-knowledge. Then the 
embarkation on the search for self-knowledge results from 
Socratic encounter. Meno said to Socrates that his
ignorance has made others become ignorant like himself. In 
making others like himself reminds one of what Socrates 
said to Meno at the end of the same dialogue that '... if 
through all this discussion our queries and statements have 
been correct, virtue, arete, is found to be neither 
natural, phusei, nor taught, didakton, but is imparted to 
us by a divine dispensation, theia moira, without 
understanding in those who receive it, unless there should 
be somebody among the statesman, toioutos ton politikon 
andron, capable of making a statesman of another1.73 
Also, consider further in the Gorgias, in his debate with 
Callicles on the meaning of justice and the true statesman, 
Socrates remarks that 'I think I am one of the few, not to 
say the only one in Athens who attempts the true art of 
statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who 
manages affairs of state, alethos politike techne kai 
prattein ta politika monos ton nun’.74
72 Plato, the Republic, (511b); See also the Meno, 99c 
where Socrates said 'And if not by knowledge, as the only 
alternative it must have been by good opinion.1
73 Plato, Meno, 99e.
74 Plato, Gorgias, (52Id).
92
Moreover, insofar as the above discussion is 
concerned, what emerges as the effect of Socratic elenchus 
is a right opinion. Again, Socrates at the end of the Meno 
informs the reader that 'the statesman perhaps concerns 
himself only with good opinion, eudoxia de to loipon 
gignetai,' since it is the only means which statesmen 
employ for their direction of states...'75 Apparently, it 
seems that the mission of Socrates is political. In doing 
so, Socrates practices the art of statesmanship, politike 
techne.
Hence, it can be concluded here that to make one feel 
ashamed of oneself and to perplex him about his own self in 
order to search out oneself is to practice the art of 
politics or statesmanship. This illuminates the statements 
often made elsewhere in the dialogues that politics is the 
affair which concerns itself mostly with the self or the 
soul.75 From this, Socrates' mission is more
comprehensible. It helps one understand his statement in 
the Apology in a meaningful way particularly when he says:
'For know that the god commands me to 
do this, and I believe that no greater 
good ever came to pass in the city than 
my service to the god. For I go about 
doing nothing else than urging you, 
young and old, not to care for your 
persons or your property more than for 
the perfection of your souls, chrematon 
proteron mede outo sphodra os tes 
psuches, or even so much; and I tell 
you that virtue, arete, does not come 
from money, but from virtue comes money 
and all other good things to man, both 
to the individual and to the state,'
and, in the Euthyphro,
75 Plato, Meno, (99c).
76 Plato, Gorgias, (464b). In the Statesman, its 
argument confirms that the object in concern of the 
statesman is man. This is explained in Chapter Four. See 
also, the Laws, 650b.
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'(f)or the Athenians, I fancy, are not 
much concerned, if they think a man is 
clever, provided he does not impart his 
clever notions to others; but when they 
think he makes others to be like 
himself, they are angry with him..'77
No one is wiser than Socrates. He knows something 
which others do not bother to know, that is, that the 
unexamined life is not worth living.78 That is the reason 
why he is a gadfly for Athens and her people. Also, from 
this, Alcibiades* regarding Socrates to be Marsyas comes to 
light. Marsyas is regarded as a guardian deity. Likewise, 
Socrates is a divine gift in a form of a gadfly to the 
city. Marsyas was musical because he was a musician. 
Likewise, Socrates is musical in regard to his 
philosophical discourse. Marsyas challenges Apollo to a 
contest in music. But Socrates challenges the slumber of 
the Athenian people. In conclusion, the search for self- 
knowledge is now understood as an aim of Socratic 
'political' mission. Significantly, the findings of our 
discussion evolves itself into the following discussion 
incident to the study of the concept of man in the 
dialogues, namely, the examination of the knowledge of the 
statesman.
77 Plato, Apology, (30a); Euthyphro, (3c).
78 Plato, Apology, (38a).
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Man and Animals
The Statesman is concerned with the search for the 
nature of statesman, politicus. It is a sequel of the 
Sophist in which the search for the sophist has been 
launched. The Stranger1 who undertook the leading role in 
conducting the discussion, as he did before in the Sophist, 
cross-examined the young Socrates, who, in this dialogue 
had his turn after Theaetetus to give answers. The Stranger 
carried on the investigation in a dialectic manner, namely, 
making division in two classes in equal proportion. After 
they had arrived at the art of statesmanship as a 
commanding art, they continued to discuss the kind of 
object the art of statesmanship would be concerned. To be 
sure, at this point, it is surprising that such a long 
discussion was needed in order to point out what the object 
of the statesman is.2 It is evident that chief concern of 
the art of statesmanship could not have been anything else 
but man.
I
Actually, the Stranger was aware of this point.3 
He knew ab initio that there were two ways to achieve what
1 John Gunnell suggested that the Stranger represents 
Plato himself. John Gunnell, Political Philosophy and 
Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision, op, cit,,
p. 160.
2 This is the point where diaeresis begins. The 
diaeresis takes place in order to meticulously treat the 
art of statesmanship. See Harvey Ronald Scodel, Diaeresis 
and Myth in Plato’s Statesman, Gottingen, 1987.
3 Ibid,, p. 71.
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their discussion was aimed at, namely the shorter or the 
longer ways.
The Stranger first directed the discussion in the 
longer way which 'is more in accord with what we said a 
while ago about the need of making the division as nearly 
in the middle as we can, 1 that is to say, the dialectic 
division.4 Although the audience can easily conceive what 
the final division was going to be since the statesman's 
chief concern must be man. However, the point of departure 
began with the most general and simple, but irrefutable, of 
all facts that 'of the whole class, some have life and 
others have no life.'5 Of course, the part of the living 
objects had been chosen as being related to the statesman's 
art. The Stranger went on dividing the living beings into 
the breeding and nurture of 'a single animal and the common 
care of creature in droves, ' and let the young Socrates
consider which group the statesman should supervise. Of
course, the statesman had more resemblance to a man who 
tended a herd of cattle or a drove of horses.5 Then the 
Stranger proposed to call the art of caring for the many 
living creatures 'the art of tending a herd or something 
like community management1.7 The young Socrates did not 
oppose this. The Stranger said he was very pleased with 
the young Socrates' consent and he also stated further that 
if the young man could preserve this impartial attitude 
towards names, he would turn out richer in wisdom when he 
was older.8 Furthermore, the Stranger further asked him 
whether he could see that the art of herding was twofold. 
Bearing in mind all the time that the subject in question 
was a human being, the young Socrates did not hesitate to
4 Plato, Statesman, (261b).
5 Plato, Statesman, (2 61b).
5 Plato, Statesman, (2 61d).
7 Ibid.
8 Plato, Statesman, (2 61e).
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answer at that moment that 'one kind is the care of man, 
the other that of beasts1.9
Although the Stranger praised the young Socrates' 
willingness and courage in giving that answer, he pointed 
out that the young man had made a mistake in dividing 
things in the following way. The Stranger explained his 
method that since when a class is divided into its 
subdivisions, each subdivision must necessarily also be a 
portion of the total class of which it is declared a 
subdivision; but a portion is not necessarily a true 
subdivision of a class.10 That the class of man was a 
single small part of the many larger ones of the herds of 
living beings had been set off by the young Socrates 
against all the important sections which he had left out. 
The cause of error originated in the desperate hurry and 
the presupposition wrongly fixed only on man as the whole 
class against other living beings. As the Stranger said to 
the young Socrates 'you hurried the discussion along, 
because you saw that it was leading towards man,..you 
removed a part and then thought that the remainder was one 
class because you were able to call them all by the same 
name of beasts.'11 The Stranger also gave another example 
of a wrong division that most Greeks made. That is to say, 
instead of dividing the human race into male and female,
'they separated the Hellenic race from 
all the rest as one, and to all the 
other races, which are countless to one 
another, they give the single name 
barbarian, because of this single name, 
they think it is a single species.'12
9 Plato, Statesman, (2 62a).
10 Plato, Statesman, (263b).
11 Plato, Statesman, (262b, 263c).
12 Plato, Statesman, (262d).
97
In fact, the division of man into male and female is more 
accurate in the same way that numbers can be divided into 
odd and even numbers. Also, this method of division 
presupposes the Stranger's idea. To separate so soon the 
class of man from the other species of animals is rather 
anthropocentric13 since other animals capable of thought 
such as the crane or any other like creatures would give 
names in the same way as the young Socrates did:
'It might in its pride of self oppose 
crane to all other animals, and group 
the rest, men included, under one head, 
calling them by one name, which might 
very well be that of beasts.'14
Here, the young Socrates adapted his method of division 
with reference to names, since the Stranger had once warned 
him not to be too much restricted by the principle of names 
if he intended to attain the truth of the matter.
II
Thus the Stranger urged his interlocutor to adhere to 
the longer path of division because 'it is safer to proceed 
by cutting through the middle, and in that way one is more 
likely to find classes, this makes all the difference in 
the conduct of research.'15 The Stranger then continued 
by dividing of all animals into tame and wild.16 Of 
course, with men as the object in mind, he chose to start 
with the tame animals. Then the herds of tame animals then
13 Scodel argued that this discrimination reflects the 
egocentricity of the Greeks and perhaps of human beings 
themselves. See Scodel, op. cit., p. 52.
14 Plato, Statesman, (263d).
15 Plato, Statesman, (2 62b).
16 Plato, Statesman, (263e).
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were again divided into land-herding and aquatic-herding. 
Instead of the latter, the art of land-herding surely 
belongs to the art of statesmanship. Once again, it had 
been subdivided into the tending of flying and walking 
animals. The statesmanship must be sought in connection 
with walking animals. At this stage, the Stranger 
disclosed that there were two paths heading the same 
direction: the longer and the quicker. Then he allowed the 
young Socrates to choose whichever of the two he wanted, 
since they had nearly arrived at the final stage, whereas 
it had been difficult to go by the shorter way at the 
beginning or at the middle of the search as the young 
Socrates had attempted to do. The young Socrates said 
absurdly that he wanted to carry on using both ways. This 
point can be explained. He understood that the search 
needed a right way of division, whilst he himself was 
rather hasty and knew what the final answer must be. The 
Stranger replied that the divisions could be only be made 
one at a time. Then the longer way was taken up again this 
time as the first of two choices given to the young 
Socrates.17
The tame walking animals had been divided into the 
ones with horns and the hornless.18 With regard to man, 
the art of statesmanship must concern the tame hornless 
walking animals. Then the Stranger made a further 
division; the mixing and non-mixing breed.19 The mixing 
breed consisted of animals such as horses and asses. 
Certainly, it had to be the non-mixing breed that was under 
the care of the statesman. Up to this point, the 
conclusion of the discussion was that the statesman should
17 See Scodel's comments on this point, op. cit., pp. 62-3.
18 Plato, Statesman, (2 65b).
19 Compare this to the argument concerning the theory of 
names in the Cratylus, 394a-b that the offspring of a
species must be named after its parents.
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care for the tame gregarious non-mixing breeding animals. 
Before reaching the proposed object, namely man, the final 
division was more peculiar than the previous ones. The 
Stranger asked for the authority on geometry in making this 
last division, since both his interlocutors, the young 
Socrates and Theaetetus, were students of geometry. This 
ultimate separation was intricately made in terms of 
geometrical construction. To be sure, the Stranger had in 
mind the division between the two-footed and the four- 
footed animals. Although he should have proposed right 
away as he did before, nevertheless, he created an intrigue 
in his division by resorting to geometrical knowledge. He 
said that it could be divided 'by the diameter,..and again 
by the diameter of the square of the diameter. '20 At 
first, the young Socrates could not understand what this 
technical division was about; then the Stranger asked him: 
'Is the nature which our human race possesses related to 
walking in any other way than as the diameter which is the 
square root of two feet?'21 Indeed, man is a two-footed 
animal. And the nature of the remaining species is the 
diameter of the square of the side of the square root of 
two feet, which is the square root of four feet.
Why did the Stranger need to have recourse to the 
analogy of the square root of two and four feet in his 
dividing man from animals?22 The clue was in the next 
passage when the Stranger said that a famous joke had
20 Plato, Statesman, (266a-b). This is the well-known 
enigmatic passage in the Statesman. It has been long
argued
and remains controversial. See Malcolm Brown, 'Plato on 
doubling the Cube: Politicus 266AB, in Plato, Time and 
Education: Essays in Honor of Robert S. Brumbaugh, Brian P. 
Hendley (ed.), New York and London, 1989, pp. 43-60.
21 Plato, Statesman, (266b).
I 22 It is possible that this is a kind of riddle which was
I commonly practised or played in the fifth and fourth
centuries. See Lloyd, The Revolution of Wisdom., op. cit.,
p. 280.
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arisen from the division that 'our human race shares the 
same lot and runs in the same heat as the most excellent 
and at the same time most easy-going race of creatures.'23 
Along the line of these divisions, man also has his share 
in all larger parts of living beings, from the largest 
class of animals, walking-flying, tame-wild, single­
collective. The Stranger seemed to use this geometrical 
division in half-jest and half-earnest which means that 
sometimes it can be taken seriously and sometimes not. 
Regarding this as a playful element in the author of the 
dialogue, many scholars believe that the geometric analogy 
signals the similarity between man and pigs.24 It can be 
also true that this might be a tease to Theodorus, the 
geometrician, and his disciples, the young Socrates and 
Theaetetus; for the Stranger seemed to pretend to resort to 
geometrical knowledge in order to reach the final division. 
To be sure, that final division did not seem to be 
difficult at all. Geometrical knowledge seemed to be rather 
redundant. It should have been used just to tease the 
geometricians.25 However, if the final division was not
23 Plato, Statesman, (266c).
24 See J.B. Skemp, Plato's Statesman: A Translation of the 
Politicus of Plato with introductory essays and footnotes, 
London, 1961, p. 139; Scodel, op. cit., pp. 65-6; G.R.F. 
Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's 
Phaedrus, Cambridge, 1990, p.19.
25 Jacob Klein argued that the reader could not ignore 
the fact that 'the stranger does two things while 
performing this last division, [h]e is immensely playful in 
referring to the geometrical skills of Young Socrates and 
Theaetetus (glancing smilingly at Theodorus, perhaps) by 
identifying the walking power of human beings with the 
diagonal of a square of two feet and the walking power of 
the four-footed tame and gregarious animals, namely, pigs, 
with the diagonal four feet..1 However, Klein leads his 
argument to the point that the geometrical skills indicated 
that the art of statesmanship exists in all levels no 
matter it is King Odysseus or the swineherd Eumaeus. His 
interpretation is however compatible to what is argued in 
this thesis. See Jacob Klein, Plato's Trilogy, Theaetetus, 
the Sophist, and the Statesman, Chicago and London, 1977, 
pp. 152-3.
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as easy as it appeared to be, the introduction of 
geometrical knowledge into this final stage must be taken 
more seriously than many people would have thought. When 
geometry has to be taken seriously, no one can do it better 
than a geometrician. If Theodorus and those young
geometricians failed to understand the reason for having 
recourse to geometrical knowledge in the final division, 
then the Stranger's teasing would mean a serious 
humiliation to them as regards their claimed authority on 
geometry.
Ill
The correlation of the square root of two feet and 
four feet is quite significant. One square foot which is 
a square having its sides all equal to the length of one 
foot, has its diagonal of the square root of two feet. 
That square can possibly by its potential in terms of 
geometrical power generate another square on its diagonal, 
which results in having its diagonal of the square root of 
four feet. This means that despite the final separation of 
man and the rest of animals, man still has an inherent 
nature of the potential animality.26 The human-animal
bond is indissoluble with regard to the geometrical 
dynamic.27 Moreover, this potential has an enormous
26 This point will be discussed further with regard to 
the concept of metaxy of human nature. Cf. the Republic, 
(Book VI 511d-e).
27 The ancient Greeks had no specific term for square 
root. In stead, they used dunamis1 to convey the same 
meaning. In general, dunamis means power, might, strength 
which associate with body or outward influence. Also, it 
has been used to connote 'any natural gift that may be 
improved, and may be used for good or ill1 and 'a 
capability of existing or acting, virtual existence or 
action, as opposite to actual1. As Paul Shorey remarked 
that from the study of its history, the mean of dunamis is 
various 'from potentiality to active power discriminated'.
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impact. If man as a two-footed animal has the inherent 
nature of a four-footed one, then the demarcation line 
between man and animal would never be clear. If this 
reasoning is reversed, then man and four-footed animals 
then still belong to the undivided class of tame gregarious 
animals. That is why the Stranger said, following his 
final division, that the 'human race shares the same lot 
and runs the same heat as the most excellent and at the 
same time most easy-going race of creatures.’ There exists 
in human beings both nobleness and base. Therefore, 'it 
is not unreasonable that they arrive last, who are the 
slowest.*28 The use of geometrical skills helps to 
explain this peculiar condition, something which normal 
language cannot do.29
By making a division in this way, man is regarded as 
a part of the whole class of living beings.30 Considered 
from this point of view, the anthropocentric self-deception 
and pride become less intense. As the Stranger said that 
the discussion in making the division in the Statesman 
'have shown more clearly the truth of that which we said 
yesterday in our search for the sophist.’31 The dialectic 
method of argument 'pays no more heed to the noble than to
See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English 
Lexicon, ninth edition, 1989; Plato, The Republic, 
translated by Paul Shorey., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969, 
(Book V 477c).
28 Plato, Statesman, (266c).
29 Consider the Republic, (Book VII 527b): 'Their language 
[geometry] is most ludicrous..for they speak as if they 
were doing something and as if all their words were 
directed towards action,...whereas in fact the real object 
of the entire study is pure knowledge,1 and also 'That it 
is the knowledge of that which always is and not of a 
something which at some time comes into being and passed 
away’.
30 See the Gorgias, 516b-c.
31 Plato, Sophist, (227b).
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the ignoble, and no less to the small than to the great, 
but always goes on its own way to the most perfect 
truth.|32 However, there is a limit which has been stated 
in the Republic. The knowledge of geometry is one of those 
that the philosophic nature requires in order to be able to 
contemplate the essence of beings. But it is not suitable 
for understanding the genesis or becoming.33 Geometry is 
intended to be used to understand the being of man not his 
becoming. This means that one cannot apply geometric 
reasoning to understand the genesis of mankind, since its 
logic possibly entails that mankind used to be what it is 
not at the moment, and is also becoming something which 
will be totally different from what he is now. In other 
words, mankind is in motion and flux. We might have been 
evolved from beasts and might be becoming something else 
other than man.
With regard to this philosophic interpretation of 
geometric application, it seems that despite his renowned 
title of geometrician, Theodorus could not comprehend this 
seemingly playful riddle; neither could his disciples.34
Following this, the Stranger illustrated the other, 
shorter way to reach the final stage. Before the Stranger
32 See the Statesman, 266d and the Sophist, 227b.
33 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 526e-527b). At 526e, it 
runs as follows: 'Then if it compels the soul to 
contemplate essence, it is suitable; if genesis, it is 
not. 1 With regard to somewhat similar point, Michael Davis 
also argued that 'Platonic philosophy is for the sake of 
recognition, not prediction; it is eidetic and not 
genetic.1 See Michael Davis, Ancient Tragedy and the 
Origins of Modern Science, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 
1988, p. 157.
34 Mitchell H. Miller, Jr. points out that without 
philosophical review of geometric assumption, Theodorus and 
the young Socrates could never understand this meaningful 
final division. Miller, Jr., The Philosopher in Plato's 
Statesman, op. c i t p. 4.
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pointed out to the young Socrates these two approaches
towards the same direction, the result of the division had
been the walking animals. Now, he just divided them right
away into biped and quadruped. However, the human race had
not yet come to the fore since it still fell into the same
division as the feathered animals. It required another
division between the featherless and the feathered biped
classes. Then, at last, the same conclusion has been
reached i.e., that the object of the statesmanfs concern is 
35man. 3
Though leading in the same direction, namely man, it 
does not mean, as the Stranger stated in advance, that both 
paths do not make a difference in the conduct of research. 
Regarding the shorter way of division, the walking animals 
were divided into biped and quadruped. It actually needed 
one more division before it could arrive at human beings. 
If, at this stage, in the shorter way, the Stranger used 
the same analogy as he did at the final division in the 
longer path, namely the diagonal of the square root of two 
and four feet, to divide the walking animals, then the 
result would be that the class of the feathered and 
featherless walking animals which includes such diverse 
animals as chicken and man. Also, if the same explanation 
concerning the dynamic of the two-footed animals towards 
the four-footed ones is to be applied to this class, then 
it is not only man but also chickens that possess this 
special potentiality. However, the Stranger who conducted 
the examination in both paths, could follow the shorter way 
only after his longer and significantly more meaningful 
method had been satisfactorily accomplished.
35 Plato, Statesman, (266e).
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IV
According to the use of the square root at 2 66a-b in 
the Statesman, its implication of the tie between human 
beings and animals is intriguing. With his potentiality, 
dunamis, it can be said that man simultaneously shares and 
yet does not share a common characteristic with animals. 
However, in the Theaetetus, with regard to knowledge and 
sensations, Socrates pointed out a nature which is shared 
by man and animals. It is understood that by nature, from 
the moment of birth, man and animals have sensory 
perception through sensory organs.36 It is a kind of 
bodily experience that they partake of. Therefore, should 
there be any difference between them in terms of that 
experience, and should the difference between them be 
counted only on physical terms, then the difference must be 
understood in terms of degree, not in kind.
In the dialogues, the essence of all living beings 
does not lie in the body. Their essence originates with 
psyche.37 This basic view of psyche in relation to the
35 Plato, Theaetetus, (186c).
37 the Phaedo, 105c; the Timaeus, 34c; the Laws, Book X, 
892a, 892b, 985c, 896d, 899c, Book XII, 959a, 967b, 967d; 
the Epinimis, 988d. Cf. the Republic, Book III, 403d: 'I 
do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes 
the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its 
virtue renders the body the best that is possible. ' 
However, Adkins propounds some problems of inconsistency 
regarding the use of the term psyche in the dialogues. As 
in the Apology, Socrates is said to be quite agnostic about 
life after death whilst his eschatology is evident in the 
later dialogues. With regard to this point, I understand 
that Adkins' interpretation of the dialogues seems to be of 
what E.N. Tigerstedt called 'genetic approach'. This kind 
of interpretation inevitably leads Adkins to take Plato's 
fully developed view of the psyche as its culmination in 
his eschatology. Moreover, as a man in the age of 
scientific reason, Adkins does not have a stomach for the 
use of myth in conjunction with logos as Plato practised 
the interplay of mythos and logos in his earnest-playful
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body has been regarded to be a general one among the 
Greeks.38
In the Phaedrus, Socrates stated in his palinode that 
'every body which derives motion from without is without
genre of writing. Plato always has his Socrates be aware 
of this incredulity of the tales or myth he was going to 
employ. Also, Socrates, before he was about to relate that 
kind of story, always gave his excuse that the tales were 
not his own but came from some other sources such as divine 
inspiration, the Muses, and wise men or women. His excuse 
is that myth is used for the sake of the good purpose. For 
instance, in the Gorgias, 527a, he said that the old wife's 
tale of the afterlife should be acceptable so long as there 
is no better explanation than this with regard to the good 
life. What should be noticed is that in the Gorgias, 
Socrates stated his pretext for the introduction of the 
tale or such a mythical speech whilst the dialogue itself 
concerns the examination of rhetoric or the art of 
persuasive discourse. Also, to be sure, in the Phaedrus 
229b-e, Socrates reiterated his agnostic position when he 
was asked whether he believed in the existence of the 
monsters or nymphs, or he rather accepted the scientific 
explanation from those sophists and natural philosophers. 
As it has been shown, neither would be in his concern 
unless it helps him to understand himself, namely, it helps 
him to achieve self-knowledge. Moreover, according to 
Adkins'logic of interpretation , Plato's position must be 
'either this or that' with regard to given opposing 
arguments. Apart from this, in the Crito, 47e, Adkins 
found that Socrates was not as accustomed to the use of the 
term psyche as he had in Xenophon's Memorabilia which he 
believes that its author should have acquired the 
linguistic usage direct from Socrates himself. This could 
be a sound problem for anyone who tries to figure out a 
historical Socrates from Plato's Socrates. See Adkins, 
From the Many to the One, op. cit.; E.N. Tigersted, 
Interpreting Plato, Uppsala, 1977.
38 See E. Rohde, Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the Belief 
in Immortality among the Greeks, W.B. Hillis (trans.), 
eighth edition, New York and London, 1966: David B. Claus, 
Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of 'psuche* 
before Plato, New Haven and London, 1981; Adkins, From the 
Many to the One, op. cit. Adkins remarks that the view 
that psyche is the essence of life, mankind and animals, 
had been firmly held by people from all walks of life since 
the time of Homer. It can be said that 'doctors, nature- 
philosopher, ordinary Greeks..be one Pythagoras, atomist or 
man in the street' shared this view.[Adkins, op. cit., pp. 
128-9, 14]
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psyche, but that which has its motion within itself has 
psyche'.39 To be sure, for the Greeks the presence of 
psyche was ascribed not only to mankind and animals but 
also plants.40 In the dialogues, with regard to psyche, 
the concern for human psyche dominates the concern for the 
psyche of animals or plants. However, there are many 
passages in the dialogues which discuss animal 
behaviour.41 The only reason one can think of should lie 
in what has been discussed in the Statesman namely that 
'our human race shares the same lot and runs in the same 
heat as the most excellent and at the same time most easy­
going race of creatures'. Thus, it can be argued that by 
virtue of the use of the square root in locating the place 
of human beings among other living beings, any knowledge of 
animal behaviour conducive to the understanding of human 
nature must be taken into account.42
The difference between man and animals is mentioned 
three times in three different dialogues: the Phaedrus, the 
Cratylus, and the Laws.43 In the Phaedrus, particularly 
in one of the passages in the palinode, the discussion 
about psyche plays a preliminary role with regard to the 
understanding of human nature. It is at this point that 
the knowledge of human psyche distinguishes man from 
animals. Indeed, with regard to human psyche, man has 
distanced himself from animals. The distance between man 
and animals constitutes an illumination of the position in
39 Plato, Phaedrus, (245c, 245e).
40 Adkins, From the Many to the One, op. cit., p. 128.
41 It is evident in the Republic, the Statesman, and the 
Laws.
42 As Paul Shorey stated in his commentary on the 
Republic with regard to the discussion about animal 
behaviour that '[f]or the use of analogies drawn from 
animals..Plato is only pretending to deduce his conclusions 
from his imagery'. Paul Shorey, the Republic of Plato, Vol. 
I, op. cit., p. 433ff.
43 Plato, Phaedrus, 249b; Cratylus, 399c, the Laws, 653e.
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nature where each of them belongs. The human position can 
be measured in relation to the position of the animals.
According to the understanding of man in relation to 
animals, it is said that 'a human psyche may pass into the 
life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass 
again from a beast into a man. |44 The characteristics of 
human psyche lie in its experience of truth. With this 
distinctiveness, a demarcation line between man and animals 
comes to light: 'For the soul which has never seen the
truth can never pass into human form. |45 To be sure, 
another passage which is pertinent to this point appears in 
the Cratylus. The Cratylus is thematic in the
investigation of the theories of names. Undoubtedly, the 
Cratylus contains, among other things, the passage with 
regard to the name of man, anthropos. However, the passage 
in question is quite enigmatic with regard to its context. 
To make this point comprehensible, it is necessary to 
meticulously examine the nature of the context in question.
V
Prior to his account of the name of man— anthropos—  
Socrates made an excuse for the source of his knowledge of 
the etymological development of these names. He said that 
it was derived from divine inspiration.46 It was because 
he had spent all that morning with Euthyphro before he met
44 Plato, Phaedrus, (249b).
45 Ibid.
46 With regard to the position of Socrates in the 
Cratylus, Friedrich Schleiermacher remarks '[t]he Cratylus 
has at all time given much trouble to the good and sturdy 
friends of Plato1 as regards both playful and serious 
elements of Plato/Socrates. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, translated by 
William Dobson, New York, 1973, p. 228.
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Hermogenes and Cratylus. He claimed that divine
inspiration caused by Euthyphro's speech drove him to 
eloquence, and cleverness. Moreover, if he was careless, 
before the day was over, he would become wiser than he 
ought to be.47 The name Euthyphro mentioned in the 
Cratylus should be connected to Euthyphro, the character in 
the dialogue of its namesake.48
In the Euthyphro, Euthyphro is said to be a 
soothsayer. He claimed that he possessed knowledge of 
divine law.49 In the Cratylus, his superhuman wisdom is 
said to be caused in turn by divine inspiration.50 In 
effect, it is a chain of divine inspiration, a Euripides' 
magnet or Heraclea stone.51 Actually, under divine 
inspiration, Socrates should have been out of his mind when 
giving a speech of any kind.
Socrates' condition under divine madness reminds the 
reader of what he himself first stated in the Apology that 
'what the poets composed they composed not by wisdom but by 
nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets
47 Plato, Cratylus, (396c, 399a).
48 Someone gives a hypothesis that Euthyphro mentioned in 
the Cratylus should be the same person in the dialogue 
bearing his name. H.N. Fowler suggests: '[o]f Euthyphro 
nothing further is known. He might be identical with the 
Euthyphro who appears in the Cratylus as a philologian 
addicted to fanciful etymologies.' Also, with regard to 
the fact that both dialogues were written by the same 
author, there should not be any reason to deny a possible 
connection between the mention of Euthyphro in a dialogue 
and the actual character in another. Plato, Phaedrus, 
translated by H.N. Fowler, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, 
p. 4.
49 Plato, Euthyphro, (3e, 4e).
50 Plato, Cratylus, (396e, 399a).
51 See the Ion, 533d.
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and givers of oracles1.52 Particularly, this criticism 
has been elaborated in the Ion. In that dialogue, Ion's 
expertise on Homeric epics was revealed during his 
discussion with Socrates. Ion, who was boastful about his 
poetic art purported that he was the best rhapsode on 
Homer. But it has been shown that he did not understand 
what he recited since he seemed to have 'taken away his 
mind1 and been 'not in his sense1.53 Without this divine 
possession, he 'is powerless to incite a verse or chant an 
oracle'.54 Of course, he never thought before that he 
himself did not really understand the subject on which he 
claimed to be an expert. At the end of the dialogue, given 
the choice between 'dishonest and divine', he abandoned his 
boastful claim of being an artist, technikos, and did not 
hesitate to choose to call his knowledge divine.55 He did 
not hesitate to be regarded as a person who had lost his 
senses and did not actually understand what he was doing or 
performing. Moreover, he regarded this position as being 
far nobler than being an artist. It seemed to be better 
for him to be possessed by an external force, namely divine 
power, than to confess that he himself had been claimed to 
possess what he did not actually possess and had been 
purported to know what he did not actually know. In other 
words, he preferred self-deception to self-knowledge.
With regard to a similar situation, Socrates differs 
from Ion in the Cratylus. He ostensibly confessed that the 
speech he was about to give was inspired by divine power. 
Unlike Ion, he must have had something in his mind as 
regards his setting up the scene. The reason is that in 
the case of divine madness like that of Ion, his impressive
52 Plato, Apology, (22c).
53 Plato, Ion, (534a-c).
54 Plato, Ion, (534b).
55 Plato, Ion, (542a).
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speech had not originated from his own knowledge but from 
divine power. Then, of course, he is not responsible for 
what he has not done consciously and intentionally. Also, 
he could not understand why the speech had to be made in 
that way. When he was questioned, he could not answer what 
he really meant to say. Moreover, it is unlikely that he 
who himself disowns his professional art can impart to 
others what he does not possess. So, it seems that he just 
let babbling sounds flow from his mouth.56 However, for 
a person like Socrates, who is said to always express his 
own awareness of divine influence, it renders the opposite 
effect, since no one under divine madness as such would be 
able to remind other people mindfully. Throughout the 
conversation, Socrates kept telling Hermogenes about the 
parts of his speeches which were or were not from human but 
divine knowledge.57 Hence, he should be fully responsible 
for all what he said.
At the beginning of his discourse about names, the 
names of sophists, that is Protagoras and Euthydemus, were 
introduced. Protogoras1 theory that 'man is the measure of 
all things1 and Euthydemus' 'all things belong equally to 
all men at the same time and perpetually1 were brought in 
order to conceptualise Hermogenes1 hypothesis of theory of 
names.58 Despite the compatibility of the sophists' 
theories and Hermogenes' hypothesis, they were however 
abandoned because they contradicted Hermogenes' basic
56 Cf. the Charmides, 162e:'..because he who does not 
understand the meaning of the meaning of the definition of 
temperance himself then thinks that the author likewise did 
not understand the meaning of his own words' . In the 
Charmides, Critias was described by Socrates 'just as a 
poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in 
reciting them'.
57 Plato, Cratylus, (392b, 396d-e, 397c, 399a, 401a, 407c-e, 
409d, 410e, 411b, 413d, 415a, 415e-416a, 418a, 420d, 420e).
58 Plato, Cratylus, (384d, 385e).
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conviction.59 For Hermogenes could not deny that he
himself firmly believed that very few good men existed 
whilst the bad were many.60 Then, concerning the 
investigation of the correctness of names, the Protagorean 
method of investigation was again proposed by Socrates. 
However, Hermogenes refused to accept it since he rejected 
the teaching of Protagoras.61 Notably, to replace the 
sophist, Socrates then suggested the poets, Homer in 
particular.62 Homer was regarded as the greatest poet of 
all, who was believed to have given his work 'great and 
wonderful information about the correctness of names1.63 
From this, Socrates stated that it was more appropriate for 
him and his interlocutors to be concerned only with the 
names given by human beings64; especially since Hermogenes 
preferred the poet's authority to the sophists', that is he 
preferred Homer to Protagoras. With regard to the 
investigation of names, there were two kinds of name in 
Homer, namely of the same things one called by the gods and 
the other called by men. Strangely, Socrates started with 
a scene of the war between the gods which he regarded as an 
example of name-giving:
'the river in Troyland which had the
59 Plato, Cratylus, (386e).
60 Plato, Cratylus, (389a-390e, 391b).
61 Plato, Cratylus, (391c).
62 The sources of knowledge in the Cratylus can be said
to be thematic in the physis-nomos controversy. The 
sophistic movement is regarded to be the origin of Greek 
humanism whose source of knowledge is claimed to be derived 
from art, techne, and knowledge or virtues can be taught. 
The poets represent the opposite idea that knowledge or 
wisdom is divine and endowed naturally not to everyone and 
it cannot be transferred. In the Cratylus, Protagoras and 
Euthydemus represent the former, and Homer and Hesiod the 
latter.
63 Plato, Cratylus, (391d).
64 Plato, Cratylus, (392b).
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single combat with Hephaestus [the 
god of fire], whom the gods call 
Xanthus, but men call Scamander1.65
The gods-given names were said by Socrates to be 'too high 
for us to understand1. Only those of men could be 
understood. Socrates specifically started with the names 
Scamander and Astyanax as the names given by human beings. 
It was the name of the same person who was the son of 
Hector and Andromache. For 'it is more within human power 
to investigate' and to understand what kind of correctness 
a name-giver ascribed to the object.66 In distancing 
human beings from what is beyond human knowledge and then 
being restricted to what really belongs to the mortals, it 
just drops a hint that man should know himself as regards 
his place in the universe.67
Accordingly, what had been discussed were the names of 
the human characters in Homer.68 However, the course was 
changed when Socrates came to names of Atreus, Pelops, and 
Tantalus.69 It is from this point on that Socrates 
becomes involved with the names of the gods which were 
supposed to be beyond human understanding. Not the god- 
given names but the names of the gods themselves had been 
brought into the discussion.70 So it seems that the 
discussion appeared to be so arbitrary that the speaker was 
led to concern himself with the gods. On the other hand, 
as it will be revealed below, it was intentional since,
65 Plato, Cratylus, (391e).
66 Plato, Cratylus, (392b, 401a, 425c).
67 Cf. 'Know thyself as know his place as a mortal1 in 
Eliza Gregory Wilkins, Know thyself in Greek and Latin 
Literature, New York and London, 1979.
68 Plato, Cratylus, (392c-395d).
69 Plato, Cratylus, (395b-c).
70 Plato, Cratylus, (395e-396c).
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after this, the discussion once again descended from divine 
to human names. However, at this stage, it seems that the 
speaker unknowingly concerned himself with the examination 
of the names of the gods. Also, his speech about the gods 
appears to be very eloquent and impressive. Of course, as 
it had been chosen earlier by Hermogenes, the eloquent and 
beautiful speech had a poetic effect, that is the effect of 
divine madness. Socrates1 speech fascinated and impressed 
his interlocutors, as if the whole situation of this 
engagement and eloquent discourse on the story of the gods 
had been inspired by divine power.71 Being well aware of 
this situation, Socrates told Hermogenes:
AI am convinced that the inspiration 
came to me from Euthyphro the
Prospaltian. For I was with him and 
listening to him a long time early this
morning. So he must have been
inspired, and he not only filled my 
ears but took possession of my soul
with his superhuman wisdom. So I think 
this is our duty: we ought to-day to 
make use of this wisdom and finish the 
investigation of names, but to-morrow, 
if the rest of you agree, we will 
conjure it away and purify ourselves, 
when we have found some one, whether 
priest or sophist, who is skilled in 
that kind of purifying.'72
In contradistinction to Ion, Socrates never boasted 
that he possessed the art of interpretation, techne, or 
that he was an expert on Homer, as Ion regarded himself to 
be.73 In contradistinction to Socrates, Ion, at his 
impasse, switched to claim divine madness at the end of the 
dialogue since he could not accept that he was dishonest 
having purported to possess virtue concerning his authority
71 Plato, Cratylus, (395d).
72 Plato, Cratylus, (396d-e).
73 Plato, Ion, (530c-d, 539e, 541b).
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on the divine poet, Homer. Had he accepted that he knew 
something he actually did not know, it would have saved him 
from the self-deception that he pretended to be wiser than 
he actually was. However, Ion preferred not to appear 
ignorant than to be ignorant but honest with himself. For 
he was unable to accept his ignorance. When one applies 
this situation to Socrates, Socrates is said to have 
claimed ignorance. Thus, in this regard, it might be true 
that Socrates really is ignorant as he claimed himself to 
be. On the other hand, it might be possible that his self- 
claimed ignorance is just playful or ironical.
Following this, Socrates made a strange remark about 
divine influence; at that moment he thought he had had a 
clever thought, and, if he was not careful, before the end 
of the day he would likely be wiser than he himself ought 
to be. With regard to this point, if divine power could 
make him wiser than he was, he should have preferred to be 
careless otherwise it would not be able to make him wiser. 
There is a point to be noticed in that statement. Socrates 
said that divine power would make him wiser than he 'ought 
to be1. This just implies that he preferred to be what he 
was. Otherwise he would not emphasise 'ought to be', eti 
temeron sophoteros tou deontos genesthai. To be sure, he 
had stated earlier that he must have a purge or 
purification the day after. But, as he said, he might 
become wiser if he was not careful on the day the 
conversation took place. Of course, if he really did not 
want to become wiser than he ought to be, he should have 
been purified before the end of the day. If there really 
was a need for such purification of divine power. As it 
appeared later, it was unnecessary. Divine influence 
deserted Socrates not a long while after.74 Accordingly, 
it is evident that Socrates had not become wiser than he 
ought to be. In fact, being unable to solve the problem of
74 Plato, Cratylus, (409d).
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names, that divinely inspired Socrates is said at times to 
turn himself to resort to the power of human knowledge. 
That is, he turned to his own contrivance.75 At this 
point, some scholars argued that Socrates even ridiculed 
the power of divine madness as a source of wisdom for human 
beings.76 Perhaps the whole discourse was his own 
contrivance. Without any purification taken, the fact that 
Socrates was able to remain what he was, namely, not wiser 
than he ought to be, lies in his self-knowledge and 
carefulness. However, since he was well aware of his 
ironic claim of divine possession on that day, therefore, 
he must have a particular message. Also, if there was to 
be any purification at all, it must be done with his own 
skills or knowledge. However, if there was any divine 
power at all, it must be the daemonic voice which he always 
referred to. The daemonic voice urged him to 'know 
himself1.
With regard to divine inspiration, Socrates and Ion 
had different attitudes. Ion thought that it was far 
nobler to be called divine.77 Socrates, under his excuse 
of divine possession, thought of having his soul purified 
of such divine power: 'but tomorrow, if the rest of you
agree, we will conjure it away and purify, katharoumethai. 
ourselves*. Also, a priest or sophist had been summoned to 
purify the soul. Usually, a priest, ieres, who was 
believed to have special communication with the gods, 
should of course be expected to be capable of conjuring
75 Plato, Cratylus, (409d, 416a).
76 Schleiermacher said that Socrates regarded 'this 
species of wisdom [divine power] as an inspiration
quite foreign to him, 1 and it was abrogated when he 'educed 
a similar sense out of opposite words,..and appealed in one 
place to barbarian origin or the destructive effects of 
time, and subsequently declared this himself to be excuse 
of one who would avoid giving any regular account1. See 
Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 232.
77 Plato, Jon, (542b).
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divine possession.
Also, a request for a sophist has a significant 
implication. Sophists were understood to derive their 
knowledge from teachable skills, techne, not divine power. 
It is human knowledge which sophists purported to be able 
to impart to their students.78 In asking for a sophist, 
Socrates should have meant that the speech inspired by 
divine power could be replaced or conjured away by its 
opposite power, that is human skills or knowledge, if there 
is really a sophist 'who is skilled in that kind of 
purifying' as regards the investigation of names.
Indeed, after that, against a diviner such as the 
inspired poets, the name of Anaxagoras was brought into 
their discussion on three significant occasions in order to 
give an account of some names which became problematic79; 
and it should have been quite well known to the Greeks in 
Socrates' time that Anaxagoras, with special regard to his 
natural philosophy of the sun and the moon, was regarded as 
an atheist and later had been sentenced for blasphemy 
against the gods of Athens. Nevertheless, as regards 
Socrates' calling for the sophist, one should not forget 
that he had just stopped resorting to one of sophistic 
authority, that is, Protagoras.
VI
78 As it has been clearly shown in the Protagoras. 
Protagoras argued for teachability of virtue. After 
listening to Protagoaras' speech, Socrates ironically said 
'I used formerly to think that there was no human treatment 
by which the good were made good, but now I am convinced 
that there is'. See the Protagoras, 320d-328d, 328e, also 
Cf. the treatment of similar subject-matter in the Meno.
79 Plato, Cratylus, (400a, 409a-b, 413c) .
In the Protagoras, it is said that Protagoras proudly 
announced that he was a sophist. He claimed that others 
were afraid to be called sophists because of their fear of 
the prejudice against the title.80 Protagoras regarded 
sophistry as an ancient art which famous wise men in
various subjects had practised for a long time, for example 
Homer, Hesiod, Simonides in poetry, Orpheus, Musaeus in
mystic rites and soothsaying, Agathocles and Pythocleides
in music81 but his own skills were quite extraordinary
compared with those of others. He claimed to excel others 
in 'the gift of assisting people to become good and
true*.82 He taught men to be better.83 Precisely 
speaking, he taught them to be good citizens, agathous 
politas, by imparting virtue or the art of politics, 
politiken technen, to them.84 Moreover, he assured his 
customers that every drachma they paid him could be
guaranteed to produce a successful and excellent result.85
It is generally understood that Socrates was not 
convinced by such sophistic claims. In fact, he stood up 
against sophistry.86 Hence, it can be inferred that
80 Plato, Protagoras, (317b).
81 Plato, Protagoras, (316d-e).
82 Plato, Protagoras, (328b).
83 Plato, Protagoras, (317b).
84 Plato, Protagoras, (317b, 318e, 328a-b).
85 Plato, Protagoras, (328b).
86 To be sure, Socrates did not oppose all
Protagoras regarded as one of the sophists. It seems that 
for Socrates some professional sophists were legitimate to 
charge fee. As from his discussion on 'Sophia and the 
Sophistic Debate' G.E.R. Lloyd argued that 'the acceptance 
of money for instruction hardly provides a satisfactory 
criterion1. [Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom, op. cit., p 
93ff.] The historical evidence Lloyd referred to comes 
from the Protagoras 311b. There, Socrates seemed to be
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Socrates did not actually intend to have the sophist 
purify divine possession. In truth, he symbolically used 
sophistic humanism at that particular moment to counteract 
the effect of divine madness from which the poet claimed 
his knowledge to have originated; and this counteraction
concordant with the convention that some professionals such 
as doctors or sculptors should earn money from their 
wisdom, skills or craftsmanship as in the case of 
Hippocrates, Polyclitus, or Pheidias. [See Protagoras, 
311b] 'Acceptance of money for instruction in such technai 
as medicine or sculpture,1 said Lloyd, 'was a well- 
established and uncontroversial practice.1 [Lloyd, op. 
cit., p.92] Thus Socrates1 anti-sophism does not fall in 
the criterion of charging fee. If one studied with 
Hippocrates or Polyclitus or Homer, certainly, he was
likely to become a doctor or a sculptor or a poet. There 
is nothing wrong with that. But when Socrates asked young 
Hippocrates what he would become after studying with 
Protagoras who purported to teach virtue in the art of 
politics. The answer was he would become a sophist.
Perhaps, this implies that it requires one to be a 
sophist in order to be a good citizen, kalos kai aqathos. 
Of course, if to be a sophist, one is required to attain a 
true wisdom, then, it should be quite plausible. But it is 
not acceptable if one becomes good and wise only by paying 
money for the instruction of virtue and the good, arete, 
agathon. [Cf. Alcibiades I, 119a: 'as I can tell you that 
Pythodorus son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, 
became wise through that of Zeno; each of them has paid 
Zeno a hundred minae, and has become both wise, sophos, and 
distinguished.] Then the point of criticism with regard to 
sophistry is rather that 'fee-taking for teaching such 
subjects as "virtue" or excellence, arete1. [Lloyd, op, 
cit., p. 92ff.] At this point, someone might argue that
there is a problem of values caused by the overlap between 
the use of the terms arete and agathon employed in Homeric 
society and that of the fifth century and after. [See 
Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, op. cit.] However, if 
there really exist such a problem, it is not inaccurate to 
follow Lloyd's study that 'not the only the verb
sophizesthai originally used non-pejoratively...but the 
same is true of the noun sophistes.1 [Lloyd, op. cit., p. 
93] But he argued that 'it is to the author of the 
dialogues that the odium of the term sophist, by which 
Protagoras is made to concede that most people of his 
profession did not risk to call themselves, owned much1. 
[Lloyd, op. cit., p. 94ff.] Indeed, before meeting
Protagoras, Socrates is said to have warned young 
Hippocrates by describing the sophist as 'really a sort of 
merchant or dealer'. [See Protagoras, 313c-e.]
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between the two is vice versa. To be sure, he was against 
both the sophist and the poet.87
Socrates ostensibly and symbolically resorted to 
sophistic humanism in order to descend from the divine tide 
to a human level. In the human realm, human wisdom came 
into play. Seemingly, it is a kind of sophistry the 
sophist practised; but, in depth, it is not. It must be 
that 'human wisdom1, in which Socrates said he had 
confidence. In the meantime, to be sure, elsewhere 
Socrates has been said to have alluded to his 'daemonic 
voice* as his guidance.88
87 In the Protagoras, it is not only the sophists
who were mainly attacked by Socrates but also the poets. 
As well as the sophists, Socrates criticised the lack of 
responsibility of the poets with regard to their reference 
to divine inspiration that 'one cannot question on the 
sense of what they say; when they are adduced in discussion 
we are generally told by some that the poetry thought so 
and so, and by others, something different, and they go on 
arguing about a matter which they are powerless to 
determine1. [Protagoras, 347e-348a] Divine inspiration is 
just a self-effacing means. Socrates urged his
interlocutors to search for his own position with reference 
to his own self-conscious, that is, 'it is the sort of 
person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate: 
putting the poets aside, let us hold our discussion 
together in our own persons, making trial of the truth and 
of ourselves.1 [Ibid.]
88 See the Apology, 30e, 3Id; Euthyphro, 3b. From the 
Apology, 30e, 3Id, he claimed a posteriori that since he 
believed in spiritual activities therefore he believed in 
spirits or daemons: 'If I believe in spiritual beings, it 
is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits.1 [the 
Apology, 27c] To be sure, his line of reasoning is based 
on the premise that 'there is no human being who believes 
that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no 
human beings.1 [the Apology, 27b] It is fascinating that 
Socrates in defence of his theism had to give the 
underpinning premise stipulating the existence of human 
being as the basis of the existence of the gods. The 
interplay between man and the gods plays an important role 
in the dialogues. In reverse, if Socrates did not believe 
in spiritual activities, that is, he denied the existence 
of the gods, then, his atheism entails the non-existence of 
human beings as well. Essentially, according to Socrates, 
the belief in the existence of man and the belief in
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From above, it can be inferred that Socrates* 
discourse of names was intentional and well-planned.89 It 
was planned to move his interlocutors and the reader up and 
down between the two ends of the continuum, that is, 
between divine and human. It is evident from the beginning 
of the Cratylus that the discussion started by having 
recourse to the sophist and then shifted to the divine
authority of the poet, namely from Protagoras, Euthydemus,
Anaxagoras to Homer and Hesiod. Protagoras can be regarded 
as a symbol of the power of humanism whilst Homer 
represents divine power.90 Meanwhile, the whole
discussion of the names in regard to a poetic method of 
investigation, though initially mentioning first the names 
of the god of fire, Hephaestus, and the god of water, 
Xanthus or Scamander, is said to depart formally from the 
names given by men, that is, Scamandrius and Astyanax. 
Then, it oscillates up and down between the divine and 
human realms. Finally, it seems to stop intriguingly where 
it started, but in a different form. That is, it 
terminates at the terms pur and udor which were the human 
versions of fire and water in contradistinction to the 
beginning, which departed with Hephaestus and Scamander,
the names of the gods of fire and water.91 Of course, the
meaning of this transition should be significant.
Moreover, if the reader is careless enough, he would 
easily fail to notice some very important points with
spirits appears to be mutually inclusive.
89 This point has been argued before by Schleiermacher.
See Schleiermacher, op. cit., p. 232.
90 To be sure, Heraclitus was also mentioned. But he 
was not used to counterbalance divine power of the poets. 
On the contrary, it is said that Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus 
in regard to the names of the essence of things and the 
lineage of the gods 'agree with each other and all tend
toward the doctrine of Heraclitus1. [Cratylus, 401d-402c]
91 Plato, Cratylus, (392a-409d).
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regard to these names: Hephaestus, Xanthus or Scamander, 
and Astyanax or Scamandrius. Socrates might have chosen 
these names under double divine possession, that is under 
the influence of Euthyphro's divinely inspired speech. If 
so, he should not be able to give the reason for his own 
action or speech; but that is not the case. What Socrates 
did is ironical. He knew very well what he did. To be 
sure, there can be various grounds for his choice of the 
names. The names Astyanax or Scamandrius might have been 
chosen because they both are the names of the same person, 
and, perhaps, Scamandrius is related to Scamander. 
Scamander was chosen because it had two names, one of 
divine origin and other of human. Hephaestus might be 
chosen because of no other good reason than that it 
happened to be in the same passage when Homer narrated the 
names of Xanthus.
The better and resourceful context for understanding 
Socrates can be found if the reader is not forgetful of the 
context that is correlative to the speech of his in 
question. In regard to the names of the gods, as he 
claimed that he took the poet as his guide and also later 
he was possessed by Eythyphro's divine speech. Then we 
should turn to the Euthyphro in order to find any possible 
related clue to explain why Socrates chose those names. 
First, Hephaestus was chosen from the context in which he 
was in battle with Xanthus. Moreover, the context of the 
war between Hephaestus and Xanthus was just a sub-context 
in its greater one in Homer's Iliad. And the context is 
Chapter XX whose subject-matter is about 'the Gods go to 
War'.92
VII
92 Homer, The Iliad, translated by E.V. Rieu, Harmondsworth, 
1978, Book XX.
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In the Euthyphro, Euthyphro claimed that he knew what 
was the meaning of holiness, piety, and divinity. Being 
asked by Socrates to explain it, he answered that holiness 
and piety was 'what is dear to the gods1.93 It is in 
this regard that he thought he was pious with regard to his 
prosecution of his father for murder in the same way that 
Zeus had slain his father, Cronus.94 For Euthyphro 
believed that 'there was really war between the gods’ as 
it was told by the poets. Here, one of them was Homer.95 
The other was Hesiod whose genealogy of the gods depicted 
their vices and crimes, infanticide and parricide in 
particular, and Euthyphro tried to follow this divine 
path.96 On the other hand, Socrates could not accept such 
a description of the gods.97 However, he said that he 
would be able to accept it if Euthyphro persuaded him to 
agree to his theory of holiness, since holiness was said to 
be 'what is dear to the gods’. The gods were also believed 
to be in conflict and to make war against one another. 
Then it was possible that what was loved by one god was 
despised by another. Therefore, it was inevitable for one 
to 'perform an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful 
to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but 
hateful to Hero, and so forth in respect to the other gods, 
if any disagrees with any other about it’.98 In 
consequence, such a definition of holiness could not be
93 Plato, Euthyphro, (7a).
94 Plato, Euthyphro, (5e-6a).
95 In the Republic, Book X, 598e, Socrates said: 'have we 
not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer, since 
some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and 
all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all 
things divine?.1
96 Cf. Republic, (Book II 379b-378a).
97 Plato, Euthyphro, (6b); the Republic, (Book II 377c-d,
378a-b).
98 Plato, Euthyphro, (8a-b).
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valid so long as the relationship between the gods remained 
in such condition. In the end, it shows that Euthyphro 
could not find a satisfactory definition of holiness for 
Socrates. Actually, Socrates found that the 'definition 
has come round to the point from which it started'.99 So 
no one knew what holiness really was.
In the Cratylus, as regards Socrates' claim of being 
under Euthyphro's divine inspiration, the gods in concern 
must be the gods which were described by Euthyphro in the 
Euthyphro. Moreover, it can be supported by a signal given 
to the reader when Socrates took Hephaestus and Xanthus in 
the battle scene as his point of departure. It means that, 
from the beginning Socrates intended the reader to perceive 
that even the gods in Homer could not be taken for granted 
with regard to their principle of name-giving since they 
were always in a state of war with one another.100
With regard to names given by man in Homer, Socrates 
intended the same consequence. This is understandable with 
no reference to Euthyphro, since Socrates stated that it 
was within human power to investigate those kind of names. 
What is needed is the relevant background of the Iliad 
which Socrates referred to in his analysis of the names. 
Astyanax or Scamandrius were the names of Hector's son. 
Regarding the search for the correctness of names, Socrates 
asked Hermogenes which of the boys' names Homer thought was 
the right one.101 Hermogenes could not answer. Then he 
asked again whether men or women, with regard to a class in 
general, were wiser. Hermogenes answered that men were
99 Plato, Euthyphro, (14e).
100 Cf. Republic, (Book II 378d): '..and the battles of the 
gods in Homer' s verse are things that we must not admit 
into our city either wrought in allegory or without 
allegory.'
101 Plato, Cratylus, (392b-c).
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wiser.102 Socrates stated further that Homer narrated 
that the child of Hector was called Astyanax by the men of 
Troy. Also, Homer regarded the Trojan men to be wiser than 
the women.103 From this, he conjectured that the other 
name could have been used by women. Then he asked 
Hermogenes again whether Homer shared the same opinion that 
the Trojan men were wiser than the women. Hermogenes said 
it was so. Socrates then inferred from this that Homer 
should have thought too that 'Astyanax was more rightly 
the boy's name than Scamandrius1 .104 He explained the 
reason by referring to what Homer said as regards the name 
Astyanax, that 'he alone defended their city and long 
walls1.105 From this, he concluded that '...as it seems, 
it is right to call the son of the defender Astyanax, Lord 
of the city, ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, 
defended. ,106 This reason seems to be very clear to 
everyone, including Hermogenes.
However, it was still very obscure for Socrates, as he 
stated that he could hardly comprehend it. He asked
102 With regard to this matter, cf. Republic, (Book V 451e- 
453b, 455d-e. Glaucon believed that men were stronger than 
women. Socrates did not deny that there was by nature a 
great difference betwen men and women. However, with 
regard to the nature of human soul, men and women had equal 
chance to become the philosopher-ruler. As the Republic 
455d-e runs as follows: 'Then there is no pursuit of the 
administrators of a state that belongs to a women because 
she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the 
natural capacities are distributed alike among both 
creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and
men in all yet for all the woman is weaker than the man. 1
And also at 456a: 'The women and the men, then, have the
same nature in respect to the guardianships of the state, 
save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger.1
103 Plato, Cratylus, (392c); Homer, the Iliad, XXII, 506.
104 Plato, Cratylus, (392d).
105 Plato, Cratylus, (392d); Homer, the Iliad, XXII, 507.
106 Plato, Cratylus, (392e).
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Hermogenes again whether the young man himself really 
understood what had been explained with regard to the name 
of Astyanax. This time, Hermogenes withdrew his previous 
answer. Socrates then pointed out the fact that Homer also 
gave the name to Hector. At this point, one seems to
understand what Socrates actually wanted to understand. He 
wanted to investigate Homer's principle of the correctness 
of names.107 He said he had found a clue for the reason 
why Homer gave the names of Hector and Astyanax to that 
father and son. As regards the terms Hector and Astyanax, 
both were Greek names and had a similar meaning. That anax 
in Astyanax means lord and ektor in Hector means holder, 
conveyed nearly the same message. They were names of 
kings: 'for surely a man is holder of that of which he is 
lord; for it is clear that he rules it and possesses it and 
holds it.'108 Therefore, what Socrates discovered in 
Homer's theory of names was that the correctness of names 
given to anything must correspond with the nature of the 
object to be named. Then Socrates seemed to support this 
theory by referring to some natural event. He stated that 
with regard to lions, and horses, one would definitely 
'call a lion's offspring a lion and a horse's offspring a 
horse'.109 From this, he inferred that similarly 'the 
same reasoning applies to a king; a king's son will 
probably be a king, a good man's good, a handsome's 
handsome, and so forth'.110 This is what Socrates 
regarded as a clue. It is a clue to the principle of names 
that 'the offspring of each class will be of the same 
class, unless some unnatural birth takes place; so they 
should be called by the same names1.111 And it is by
107 Plato, Cratylus, (393b).
108 Plato, Cratylus , (393b).
109 Plato, Cratylus, (393c).
110 Plato, Cratylus, (394a).
111 Plato, Cratylus, (394a).
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this principle that Hector and his son had been given their 
names.
In truth, it is hardly the case that Socrates' message 
to the reader is that the poet was a reliable source in 
regard to the correctness of names. Taking into account 
Hector and Astyanax in its original context and what 
Socrates had warned at 393c, the hidden message can then be 
brought to light. Hector and Astyanax were said to be 
names of kings, but, according to the Iliad, their fatal 
destiny was so well known. It was regarded as the most 
tragic scene that drew the great epic to its end. Prince 
Hector, the eldest son of King Priam of Troy, could not 
live long enough to be enthroned as his father's successor. 
He was disgracefully killed in the battle. Also his body 
was subjected to shameful outrage as Achilles dragged his 
mutilated body behind his chariot round the walls of Troy 
and back to the Greek ships. A similar fate was suffered 
by his son, as the name Astyanax means a king. Moreover, 
as Andromache lamented, the name was understood literally 
by the Trojans who saw in him as the one defence of their 
city and long walls. Ironically, he became an orphaned 
child 'cut off from his playmates, beaten, jeered, and 
driven from the feast'.112 In archaic and classical ages 
the fall of Hector and his son was regarded as the symbol 
of the Sack of Troy.113 Indeed, it is very ironical for 
Hector and Astyanax to bear such names. And Socrates 
pointed out that Homer must be responsible for such ironic 
name-giving. It is evident that what happened to Hector 
and Astyanax was contrary to Homer's own principle of the 
correctness of names, because, in this case, a king's son 
was not a king and a king was not a king.
112 Homer, Iliad, XXII, 489-498.
113 See 'Hector' and 'Astyanax', Oxford Classical 
Dictionary, op. cit.
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VIII
From above, it can be inferred that Socrates intended 
to conspire against the theory of names of Homer and the 
poets who followed him. In fact, in the Iliad, Astyanax 
was the name which had been used by most people except 
Hector, since he had given the name Scamandrius to his 
son.114 Socrates told us that men who were believed to 
be wiser than women also called the son of Hector by the 
name Astyanax.115 To be sure, it was true, as Homer said 
in the Iliad, XXII, 506, that the Trojan men called him by 
that name. However, it was Socrates who concluded on his 
own accord that women would call the boy Scamandrius. 
Actually, Andromache, the mother of the boy, also called 
her son 'little Astyanax1.116 It was Hector who called 
his son Scamandrius. Whether other Trojan women called the 
boy differently from what the men called him, this point of 
course is beyond reasonable doubt. Socrates actually 
intended to ascribe this intentional preference of the name 
Astyanax to Homer. It was the target of Socrates1 latent 
attack. Moreover, at 393c, he gave a hint to Hermogenes 
who nevertheless could not understand it. The hint was 
given after Socrates stated that the offspring of animals, 
including man, should be named after their natural parents, 
or they must be named after their own class in cases of 
unnatural birth as 'a horse brings forth a calf, the 
natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not 
a colt1.117 After this, he then warned:
114 Homer, Iliad, VI, 401.
115 The logical fallacy of the division between men and 
women in terms of intelligence should be intentional. What 
use is it for? It is employed in order to lead the 
argument to the point that Astyanax was a more correct name 
than other name.
116 Homer, Iliad, XXII, 500 and 506.
117 Plato, Cratylus, (393c).
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'. . .keep watch of me, and do not let me 
trick you; for by the same argument any 
offspring of a king should be called a 
king; and whether the same meaning is 
expressed in one set of syllables or 
another makes no difference; and if a 
letter is added or substracted, that 
does not matter either, so long as the 
essence of the thing named remains in 
force and is made plain in the 
name.'118
Homer should not have given such names to Hector and 
Astyanax if he really had that measure as his correctness 
of names as Hermogenes believed that he did. Of course, 
this would remind the reader of the beginning of the 
dialogue where the conversation began when Hermogenes asked 
Socrates to join the discussion with him and Cratylus since 
he himself did not understand why Cratylus said that his 
name could not be Hermogenes, even if mankind called him by 
that name.119 The name Hermogenes means 'son of 
Hermes', who had traditionally been regarded as the patron 
deity of traders, bankers, and the like. However, 
Hermogenes the man hardly corresponded with Hermogenes the 
name. He was not successful as a money-maker; neither was 
he a good contriver of speech as regards the meaning of 
Hermes as 'he who contrived speech1.120 With regard to 
the correctness of names, Hermogenes should not have 
acquired such a name in the same way that Hector and 
Astyanax should not have been given their names, which do 
not correspond to their real nature.121
According to the principle of name with reference to 
natural birth, Hector and Astyanax were found to be
118 Plato, Cratylus, (393c).
119 Plato, Cratylus, (383a-b).
120 Plato, Cratylus, (4 08b).
121 To be sure, it transpires later that the name of 
Cratylus is also ironical to his real nature.
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unnatural to the nature of their ancestor, King Priam. 
They could not become kings— but that is not the point. 
The trick that Socrates intended a careful reader to be on 
guard against is his application of the principle of name 
with reference to natural birth and to qualities such as 
kingship, basileia, beauty, to kalon, and the good, to 
agathoi. The problem is whether such qualities and status 
can be transmitted from one generation to another in the 
same way that a lion's offspring is a lion, and a human 
being's offspring is human.122 The question of whether 
Homer really had this principle of name as Socrates 
ascribed to him can be kept aside. To ask whether the work 
of Homer and his followers pointed to the direction that 
these endowments were intrinsically transferable is rather 
the concern of our study.
Socrates uses the term nature, phusis, as a key
concept which underlies his logic of application of the
principle of name.123 Nevertheless, it cannot be proved 
that Homer really took that position with regard to the
principle of name. However, the implication in his work in
the case of Hector and Astyanax might have directed the 
audience to be convinced that what had been reported in 
Homer was true; or, perhaps, it was even directed to say 
that even Homer himself might have possessed that point of 
view. However, such an interpretation of the concept of 
nature can be said to be crystallized as the traditional 
values in the fifth century. As it can be found in the 
works of renowned poets such as Sophocles, Euripides,
122 See Plato, Cratylus, (394c-e, 397b).
123 Plato, Cratylus, (393c). With regard to the term 
nature, it is said that Homer used it once in the related 
term, that is, phue which means 'growth, stature'. That 
the term is used 'especially of outstanding physical 
appearance, is more frequent'. However, the term had not 
been found in the majority of the writings of the seventh 
and sixth centuries until the fifth when it turned to be 
used more frequently and became important. See Adkins, 
From the Many to the One, op. cit.f p. 79.
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Aeschylus, and also Aristophanes.124
124 Adkins, From the Many to the One, op. cit., pp. 79-81. 
As he points that 'the word may also refer to the parentage 
from which an individual has sprung1 [ijbid.] With regard 
to the passage 1259 in Sophocles' Ajax, Adkins remarks
'Agamemnon brusquely tells Teucer to 
remember who he is by phusis, the 
illigitimate son of a Greek nobleman 
and a foreigner; to which he replies 
that his mother may have been a 
foreigner, but she was phusei a queen,1
and
'in Euripides1 , Alcmaeon concludes that 
it is true that from esthlos fathers 
esthlos children spring, and from kakos 
fathers children who are like the 
phusis of their father,1
and
in Sophocles, Ajax 472, '..an
individual may be cowardly by phusis,1 
or in Euripides, Nauck 139, 'a
barbarian has a barbarian phusis'.
Particularly, in Euripides, it has been said that 'the 
generalisation that human beings differ in their phusis is 
expressed1. This implies that a social class, noble or 
low, what had been regarded as social and ethical
qualities, virtues, and even barbarity, of a man are 
attributable to his parent's nature. This usage is closely 
connected with the root of its meaning, that is, 'birth, to 
be born', gennaios genos. In fact, all desirable qualities 
can be put under one category, that is, virtue. The 
meaning of virtue comprises 'all those qualities in a man
which made for success in Greek society and which could
confidently be expected to secure the admiration of a man's 
fellow-citizens, followed in many cases by substantial 
material rewards'. [Kerferd, the Sophistic Movement, op. 
cit., p. 131] This is why in the fifth century, the debate 
on the teachability of virtue under the controversial topic 
of phusis-nomos culminated when the rise of sophistic 
humanism confronted the existing traditional poetic values. 
Also, it is to be noticed that with regard to barbarity as 
a natural quality, the Stranger in the Statesman 262d, 
regarded this view as a prejudice among the Greeks in 
dividing men into Greeks and barbarians. Moreover, some 
qualities such as courage or prophetic power were regarded 
to be naturally endowed. These human qualities which had 
been understood to be inherent in human nature in the eye 
of some poets in the fifth century were invariably treated
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Socrates1 ironic scene of the tragedy of Hector and 
Astyanax helps to shed light upon the limit of his logical 
reasoning, when it was applied to such a very ambiguous 
subject, that is to say, to regard kingship, beauty, and 
the good, as transferable fixed inborn qualities, phusis. 
However, one cannot incontestably argue that Socrates was 
completely against that point of view of the poets. To be 
sure, he was also sceptical about the rise of its opposing 
view, namely the idea of nature in sophistic humanism.125
as being 'unchangeable, inescapable influence on behaviour, 
and hence outside the scope of praise and blame'. See, 
Adkins, From the Many to the One, op. cit., pp.79-82.
125 Adkins ascribed this view to what he called 'the 
New thought of the sophists' whose idea of nature, physis, 
is used to contrast what is real and basic with what is 
merely conventional [From the Many to the One, op. cit., 
pp. 80-81.] The sophists emphasised the possibility of 
nomos in developing human personality and excellence more 
than human nature. But there existed the ongoing debate 
upon the meaning of nomos and phusis. The problem is that 
nomos and phusis had been variably understood. As regards 
human excellence, arete, it is a grave concern for those 
who really cared about the welfare of human beings in 
general, and the youth in particular, to understand whether 
human excellence at its best should be understood with 
regard to nomos or phusis. Of course, the reader would 
easily recognise its influence in the dialogues as Kerferd 
said 'the discussion of the relationship between nature and 
arete, leads directly to what was one of the major themes 
of discussion both in the second half of the fifth century 
B.C. and in very nearly all of the earlier dialogues of 
Plato, namely the question whether arete or virtue can be 
taught' [Kerferd, op. cit., p. 13]. To be sure, I argue 
that actually it is not just the relationship between 
nature and arete. It is the interplay between the 
influence of phusis and nomos upon human excellence that 
have been taken into discussion in the dialogues. Whatever 
solution the dialogues offers with regard to this problem 
is inevitably connected to what kind of concept of man it 
envisages. It can be said that Socrates' position is 
neither sophistic nor poetic. For instance, in the 
Charmides, Socrates showed that he seemed to emphasise both 
nature and nurture as important factors with regard to 
development of human personality and excellence. At 157e, 
he told young Charmides that 'it is only right, Charmides, 
that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for 
I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could 
readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting 
together which would be likely to produce handsome or
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This should be the reason for this aspect of the scene with 
regard to the search for the correctness of names in the 
Cratylus. That is, Socrates incited the reader to be aware 
of and sceptical towards the matter of phusis-nomos with 
reference to human excellence. It transpires that neither 
the gods nor human beings in Homer can be regarded as a 
reliable authority with regard to the correctness of names. 
Moreover, it renders the account that Homer, as a divine 
poet, did not understand what he had composed. As regards 
our concern of the correctness of names, the names given in 
his work were inconsistent with the principle of names with 
reference to natural birth. Yet, despite this shortcoming 
in Homer's god-given and man-given names, the theory of
correctness of names that argues for a name to be given to
anything according to its own essence is unscathed, 
provided that two factors can be fulfilled. First, the 
essence of a thing to be named really exists, and,
secondly, the knowledge of its nature or essence is
accessible.125
To sum up, the interpretation of Socrates' irony in 
the Cratylus illuminates significant points in context as 
an indispensable prerequisite to understanding the passage 
in question. First, Socrates effaces himself behind divine 
power and then ostensibly takes sophistic humanism as an 
antidote to divine possession. Secondly, he again effaces 
himself behind the sophists in order to descend from divine 
to human realm, in which he in effect has recourse to his 
own contrivance, namely 'human wisdom', as it has always 
been referred to elsewhere. Thirdly, he does not actually 
need a priest or a sophist to purify himself, katharsis,
nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung, 
gegonas.' But then at 158b, he just cast his doubt to that 
view when he stated 'but if your nature is really 
rich.. .blessed is the son that your mother has borne in 
you. '
126 Plato, Cratylus, (439-440c).
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from divine possession, since he seems to be able to take 
care of himself so that he does not have to become 'wiser 
than he ought to be1. Fourthly, under ironic divine 
possession, Socrates' discourse departs from the divine 
names of Hephaestus and Scamandrius [fire and water] and 
terminates at the human terms of fire and water, pur and 
udor. As a consequence, the discourse seems to oscillate 
strangely between divine names and human names. That the 
realm swayed from divine to human signals an important 
aspect of seemingly mutually inclusive relationship between 
the realms. Fifthly, Homer has been proved to be an 
unreliable authority with regard to name-giving. Neither 
the gods nor men in the traditional belief can be taken for 
granted. Sixthly, Socrates brought into the reader's 
concern the problem of human excellence in relation to the 
physis-nomos controversy. The last point is that Socrates' 
use of irony and his exposition of fallibility in Homer and 
divine power should not be understood at its face value.127
127 The purpose of Socrates' irony is not just to expose 
the ignorance of others. As John Burnet remarks: 'Is it
only that Socrates'sole business in life was to expose the 
ignorance of others? If that had really been that all, it 
is surely hard to believe that he would have been ready to 
face death rather than relinquish his task' [Burnet, 'The 
Socratic Doctrine of the Soul1, op. cit., pp. 242-3]. Of 
course, the playful element with regard to his claim of 
divine possession is undeniable. Schleiermacher agreed 
that when Socrates said he was to follow Euthyphro's divine 
inspiration, he was in jest. [Scleiermacher, op. cit.,, p. 
233] However, he argued that in the Cratylus 'an ironical 
whole and a serious investigation are strangely interwoven 
with one another'[ibid.]. To be sure, Socrates himself 
after all expressed that he did not follow Euthyphro. He 
told Cratylus who asked whether what he had said was under 
Euthyphro's divine inspiration that
'I myself have been marvelling at my 
own wisdom all along, and I cannot 
believe in it, [s]o I think we ought to 
re-examine my utterances, [f]or the 
worst of all deceptions is self- 
deception'. [Cratylus, 428d]
Also, with regard to serious and playful element in the 
dialogues as a whole, the authorial stance points to the
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search for more serious meaning in playful gesture in the 
dialogues. Plato stated in Epistle VII that a serious man 
never treats the subject in his concern so seriously that 
he really means what he literally writes. He might have 
thought of something better otherwise ' 1 then surely" not 
the gods, but mortals "have utterly blasted his wits." 
1[Epistle VII, 344c-d] To be sure, mutatis mutandis this 
passage comes from Homer's Iliad in which, against 
Antenor's advise of surrendering Helen to the enemy, Paris 
retorted:
'I take exception to that speech of 
yours. You might have thought of some 
thing better. But if you mean what you 
say, and seriously propose this move, 
the gods themselves must have addled 
your brains1.[the Iliad VII 357-60, and 
XII, 231-4]
In the Seventh Epistle, Plato changed from the gods to 
mortals as the cause of this oversight. Perhaps, in the 
Cratylus, since Socrates pronounced that his speech had 
been under the spell of divine power, therefore, it should 
have been more appropriate to blame the gods rather than 
the mortals for the error and fallacy with regard to the 
correctness of names. As Socrates1 speech has been said to 
start with divine power and end with the term fire and
water because either Euthyphro's horses or his muse had
deserted Socrates, or the terms were too difficult 
[Cratylus, 407d, 409d]. Nonetheless, that is not the
point. Socrates did not believe in Homer's story of the 
gods as it had been believed by Euthyphro, namely the gods 
involved themselves with evils and crimes [Euthyphro, 6a-b] 
For Socrates, the gods must associate only with what was
good. Thus, divine power could not be responsible for
errors and mistakes which mortals committed. Man must be 
responsible for what he has done. With regard to Socrates' 
fallacy in the Cratylus, it must be intentional. Since 
what he had done had been well-planned. Furthermore, it is 
often stated elsewhere that 'no one errs voluntarily'. 
With this regard to Socrates, if there be such a man who 
errs voluntarily, he should be wiser and more powerful than 
other who are unintentional [Lesser Hippias, 376a-b].
Also, in the Republic, when one intentionally imitates 
someone who is unworthy of himself, 'he will not wish to 
liken himself in earnest..except in the few cases where he 
is doing something good,..[h]is mind disdains them, unless 
it be for jest' [Republic, Book III 396d]. With regard to 
similar view, Alexandre Koyre also argued that the reader 
'is right..in perceiving that Socrates is poking fun, [b]ut 
he is wrong if he believes that philosopher is making fun 
of him, [t]he modern reader is wrong, if he forgets that he 
is the reader of the dialogues, not Socrates' 
interlocutors, [f]or though Socrates often has his fun at
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the expense of his interlocutors, Plato never mocks his 
reader' [Alexandre Koyre, Discoverying Plato, New York and 
London, 1945, pp. 3-4]. Hence, there certainly exists a 
special motif for Socrates to use irony and fallacy. And 
it will be comprehensible when we retore this context to 
the passage which together they can become so mutually 
useful as to make its complete picture.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Human and The Divine
It is against the above discussion that the passage in 
question in the Cratylus, which has been said to be 
pertinent to the Phaedrus 249b, is to be interpreted. Both 
passages render the idea of the difference between man and 
animals.
After rendering the speech on the gods, demigods or 
heroes, then it was the turn for the discussion of the name 
of man, anthropos. Socrates gave his etymological analysis 
of the name as follows:
'the name "man", anthropos, indicates 
that the other animals do not examine, 
or consider, or look up at, anathrei, 
any of the things that they see, but
man has no sooner that is, opope 
than he looks up at and considers that 
which he has seen. Therefore of all 
the animals man alone is rightly called 
man, anthropos, because he looks up at, 
anathrei, what he has seen, opope.*1
Before this, Socrates had remarked that the term
'anthropos1 was more difficult than others2, but with his 
ironic 'divine inspiration1 he was able to render its 
account.3 It has been mentioned that this account is 
pertinent to the passage 249b in the Phaedrus. Indeed, the 
passage in the Phaedrus might help to shed light on its 
counterpart in the discussion of the name of man in the 
Cratylus. The Phaedrus 249b runs like this: 'For the soul 
which has never seen the truth can never pass into human
form'. In the Cratylus, the difference between man and
1 Plato, Cratylus, (399c).
2 Plato, Cratylus, (398e).
3 Plato, Cratylus, (399a).
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animals is said to be attributable to his peculiar quality, 
that is, anathrei— 'to look up at1. These two passages can 
be related to one another in the sense that the experience 
of truth in the human soul is relevant to 'anathrei' in 
human nature. In other words, man's capability of 
'anathrei1 and his exclusive experience of truth in the 
soul are interrelated. That is to say, man's capability of 
'anathrei1 is inherent in the nature of the human soul. 
However, it is not quite as simple as it seems to be, and 
as its relevant contextual interpretations have evidently 
shown. Thus, Socrates' explanation of the term 'man' under 
his self-claimed divine power needs a very careful 
interpretation in conjunction with its meticulously studied 
context.
It has been argued that Socrates' irony is aimed at 
something better than just to expose the ignorance of 
others. Divine inspiration is also his intentional 
fallacy. In fact, he said such suprahuman wisdom could be 
utilised. So, what had resulted from divine power must be 
carefully interpreted.
Under divine inspiration, the signification of the 
term anthropos is said to lie in a certain quality of man 
which is quite distinct from animals. Also, it was 
explained that the term had undergone 'a change of that 
sort'.4 It is the change of letters that made the name 
different, by sight and sound, from its original form.5 
However, earlier it had been argued that according to the 
principle of name with reference to the nature of things, 
the meaning of the term must be intact despite its various
4 Plato, Cratylus, (399b).
5 Plato, Cratylus, (399a-b): '..we often put in or take out 
letters, making the names different...and we change the 
accent.'
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changes6; but a person who possesses the knowledge of the 
correctness of names is not confused with such a change of 
letters. He would understand the true meaning of the name
'just as the physician's drugs, when 
prepared with various colours and 
perfumes, seem different to us, though 
they are the same, but to the 
physician, who considers only their 
medicinal values, they seem the same, 
and he is not confused by the 
additions.17
For instance, having no letters in common, the names 
Hector, Astyanax, and Archepolis simply meant the same 
thing, namely 'king1. In the same way, the names Agis, 
Polemachus, and Eupolemus conveyed the meaning of 
'general', or 'physician' in the case of Iatrocles and 
Acesimbrotus.8 Likewise, the same principle should be 
applicable to the term anthropos. That is, first, whatever 
different forms it had undergone, certainly, its original 
meaning cannot be missed by 'the one who knows about 
names'. Secondly, its original meaning can be regarded as 
being veracious, provided that it is derived from the true 
understanding of the nature of man. According to the 
empirical aspect of the nature of living beings, to a 
certain extent the law of nature makes no leap, natura non 
facit saltus, and 'the natural offspring of each species, 
genos, is after its kind'.9 It is from this that Socrates' 
line of reasoning has been drawn to underly the principle
6 Plato, Cratylus, (394a): '..variety in the syllables is 
admissible, so that names which are the same appear 
different to the uninitiated.'
7. Plato, Cratylus, (394a-b). As regard the matter of 
playful and jest element in authorial stance, Scleiermacher 
argued that Socrates' etymological examination of names had 
been carried out in jest. See Schleiermacher, op. cit., 
p. 231. But I regard it as a playful/jest mixture.
8 Plato, Cratylus, (394c).
9 Plato, Cratylus, (393c).
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of the correctness of names. No matter what a species is 
called, its nature remains what it is. If it is right to 
call a lion's offspring a lion and a horsefs offspring a 
horse, then any offspring that was born from a human being 
should be called a human being. And whatever names our 
species has been given, its essence would never be affected 
by just linguistic change.
Accordingly, Socrates applied this principle to the 
names of the characters in Homer's work; Astyanax was 
Hector's son; Hector was King Priam's prospective 
successor. With reference to certain social values in the 
fifth century, it was believed that Hector and Astyanax 
were by nature born to be kings. So the names had been 
given in accordance with their nature; but, as discussed 
above, it is disputable as to ascribe ambiguous qualities 
such as kingship, beauty, etc., to human nature. However, 
the other aspect of name which should be taken into 
consideration is their common name. They had been called 
by the common name 'man', anthropos. With regard to the 
principle of name, Astyanax must be named after his 
parents. If Hector was a human being, then Astyanax must 
acquire the same name in the same way that one's offspring 
is named after its kind, except when it is born contrary to 
its own nature, namely prodigies or decadence.
After discussing the names of Hector and Astyanax, 
Socrates concluded that, according to the principle of 
name, the denomination of the offspring of a kind should be 
after its kind; or it must be called after its own class 
if it was born differently from the class of its parents:
'For instance, when an impious son is 
born to a good and pious man, ought he 
not, as in our former example when a 
mare brought forth a calf, to have the 
designation of the class to which he
belongs, instead that of his 
parent?110
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Then he gave some more examples of the names in order 
to support that principle of name. He rendered the list of 
names by selecting the name of Orestes as his starting 
point. Why did it have to be Orestes?11 There are two 
possibilities: first, usually, any Greeks who were
familiar with the story of the Trojan War, might have 
expected to hear a similar discussion with regard to the 
names of the characters of the other party in the Iliad. 
Secondly, as regards the law of nature that the offspring 
should be named after its parents or should be named after 
its own class in the case of unnatural birth, Socrates' 
departure with Orestes would be quite interesting with 
regard to the investigation of the name of Orestes and his 
lineage of family. Since although Orestes was human, 
however, it had been said that he descended from divine 
ancestors.
I
The name of Orestes was regarded as a correct 
denomination. Its meaning of 'mountain man' correctly
10 Plato, Cratylus, (394d). To be sure, this analogy 
is fallible.
11 Different views have been given for this. David K. 
Nichols gives the reason for the birth of political wisdom 
as the terminator of the conflicts in family life 
concerning parricide and infanticide in Orestes' lineage 
which was originated in his divine ancestors' evils and 
crimes. The story of Orestes signifies the descending 
decadence from divine to human realm. And the chain of 
evils stopped when political wisdom emerged in the human 
realm. See David K. Nichols, 'Aeschylus's Oresteia and the 
Origins of Political Life', op. cit.
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corresponded to the nature of Orestes himself.12 Then, 
the name of Agamemnon, the father of Orestes, was 
discussed, since the investigation had been conducted in 
accordance with the principle of name with reference to the 
nature of things. Therefore, each name was to be traced 
using its lineage. Following this, Socrates traced up and 
examined the names of Orestes' ancestors, namely from 
Agamemnon to Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus, Zeus, Cronus, and 
Uranus. Agamemnon signified 'admirable for remaining1, 
Atreus for 'stubbornness, fearlessness, and ruinous acts1, 
Pelops for 'one who sees only what is near1, Tantalus for 
'the most wretched and balancing', Zeus for 'the author of 
life, ruler and king of all, through whom all living beings 
have the gifts of life', Cronus for 'the purity and 
unblemished nature of mind', and Uranus for 'looking at the 
things above'.13
Remarkably, Socrates' explanation of the names and the 
nature of the divine name-holders was contrary to what had 
been regarded as the traditional account, which was 
originated in Hesiod's Theogony. According to the 
Theogony, Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus committed infanticide, 
parricide, and other evil crimes. However, Socrates 
regarded his own contrivance of the account of the names as 
being appropriate to their individual natures.
To be sure, the significance of the name of Orestes in 
the context of the ancient Greek theatre has to be taken 
into account. As Jean-Pierre Vernant comments 'the story 
of Orestes expresses in the form of tragedy the conflicts 
that disrupt family life, particularly those which set man 
and woman against each other within the home: the conflicts 
between man and wife, son and mother, the paternal and
12 Plato, Cratylus, (394e).
13 Plato, Cratylus, (394b-396d).
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maternal lines'.14 Therefore, the reader of the Cratylus 
should have expected from Socrates a reference to Orestes 
and his lineage of family in this notorious aspect with 
regard to the innate evil of the family. However, the 
meaning of each name had been explained; but, in regard to 
the common nature shared by the parents and offspring of 
the same class in relation to the principle of name, 
nothing had been mentioned in the course of the 
investigation. Moreover, it seems that all of the members 
of Orestes' lineage were either prodigies or decadence with 
regard to the nature of their parents. For their 
Individual natures differed from one another although they 
were from the same family. Viewed from the aspect of 
natural inheritance with regard to the individual nature of 
its members, it should have been said that each belonged 
to a different class from their parents; each possessed 
his own individual nature. However, to a certain extent, 
Orestes' lineage can be divided into two categories: one is 
Orestes' human ancestors, whose nature in a way can be said 
to be of the same kind, namely an evil nature; the other 
is Orestes' divine origin. The nature of Oretes' divine 
ancestors obviously differed from their human descendants. 
It is because Socrates interpreted nature of divinity in 
such a purified way. Such interpretation has caused doubt 
in the reader's mind. Since Socrates did not give any 
comments concerning the result of his application of the 
principle of name to Orestes' family. Of course, giving 
the example and investigation of the names of Orestes' 
lineage of family in such manner seems to be unreasonably
14 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks, 
London, 1983, p. 138, see also pp. 134-5. In the 
Statesman, 268e, in his discussion on the search for 
statesmanship, the Stranger gave the example of the 
statesmanship in the myth of the revolution of the universe 
which he said came from the story of the quarrel between 
Atreus and Thyestes. And this story was said to be well 
known among the Greeks. Also, the story of decadence of 
the human race is to be discussed in Chapter Eleven with 
regard to the free will of man in the age of Zeus since he 
has freedom to rule and take care of himself.
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wasteful and aimless. What he stated after this was
'if I remember the genealogy of Hesiod 
and the still earlier ancestors of the 
gods he mentions, I would have gone on 
examining the correctness of their 
names until I had made a complete trial 
whether this wisdom which has suddenly 
come to me, I know not whence, will 
fail or not1.15
However, if we take an alternative, as mentioned 
above, in regard to the name 'anthropos', and apply and 
subject it to the similar method, then the meaning of the 
analysis of the correctness of the names of Orestes1 family 
would come to light. In the same way that the names of 
Hector and Astyanax had been investigated, apart from the 
name 'Orestes', the son of Agamemnon was called by the 
common name of 'man1. According to the principle of name 
in concern, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus, Zeus, 
Cronus, and Uranus should be understood to be human; but we 
know that Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus were divine beings not 
human. Then the trace of the names from the human to the 
divine realm renders significant interpretative effects.
First, there is a metamorphosis in the lineage of the 
family; Tantalus, who was human, anthropos, was the 
offspring of Zeus and Pluto, the divine. This transitional 
point was began with Tantalus. Although he was born a 
human being, he later became immortalised by his crime. 
Secondly, as regards the ancestral lineage, man, anthropos, 
can be said to descend from the divine realm. This 
descendant should be regarded as a decadence not a 
pedigree. Thirdly, it nevertheless hints at a relationship 
between man and the gods. To be sure, most of the 
prominent characters in Homer can be said to be in one way 
or another related to the gods.
When Socrates rendered his account of the names of the
15 Plato, Cratylus, (396c-d).
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gods, namely Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus, it is exactly at 
this point that he pointed out to others that his speech 
was inspired by divine power. He ironically admitted that 
the speech was possible because of divine power, since he, 
who was just a mortal, was ignorant of that divine 
knowledge with regard to the account of the names. 
Whatever he said about the names and nature of the gods 
resulted from divine inspiration. In fact, as once stated, 
it was divine power, according to Euthyphro's account, that 
took over Socrates; but we know that Socrates effaced 
himself behind his ironic divine possession. With regard 
to the names of the gods, Hephaestus and Xanthus, in the 
Cratylus 391e, Socrates' irony enables the reader to 
interpret the gods with regard to Euthyphro's account of 
the nature of the gods. Euthyphro believed in the story, 
as told by the poets, that the gods were in a state of war. 
As discussed before, one of the poets is Homer whose epic 
distinctly portrayed the war between the gods. The other 
poet well known for his genealogy of the gods is Hesiod. 
His genealogy depicts particularly the aspect of crimes and 
vices of the gods, parricide and infanticide in 
particular.16
II
In analyzing the names of the divine ancestors of 
Orestes, Euthyphro's gods had led Socrates to explain their 
names with reference to their evil nature, in the same way 
that the nature of Orestes, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops, and 
Tantalus had been explained. In contradistinction to 
Hesiod's account of the evils of the gods, Socrates'
16 Adkins believed that with regard to the ancient 
Greeks, the story of the gods as such was originated with 
Hesiod. And, also, the creation of mankind would be better 
known to a Hesiodic than a Homeric audience. See Adkins, 
From the Many to the One, o p . c i t . . p. 50.
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interpretation turned out to render quite a sublime essence 
to the nature of the gods. It is highly possible that 
Socrates intended to contrast his own understanding of 
divine nature with that of Hesiod. For a moment later, 
Hesiod's name was introduced into the discussion.17 Also, 
it affirms that Socrates would never unintentionally commit 
blasphemy by subscribing to such a hideous account of 
divine nature. Socrates was ironic with regard to his 
excuse of divine power. Again, if he would ever be 
possessed by any divine power, it must be his daemonic 
voice. Since these daemonic spirits were regarded as his 
guardians, the account of the names of the gods had been 
interpreted accordingly. That is, divine nature associated 
only with the good.
After discussing the names of the gods, Socrates then 
began to investigate the term 'god', theos, which means 
that he wanted to examine the common name for the gods not 
their proper name.18 In the same way that Hector, 
Astyanax, Orestes, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops were called 
man, Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus were called god. Socrates 
gave the reason for the change from the proper name to the 
common or generic name: since the proper names discussed 
earlier were quite inappropriate and proved deceptive. The 
given names had not corresponded to the nature of the name- 
holders. The names were given as if they were 'names of 
ancestors or they were the expression of a prayer1.19 
Therefore, it was better to disregard it and then
'find the correct names in the nature 
of the eternal and absolute; for there 
the names ought to have been given with 
the greatest care, and perhaps some of 
them were given by a power more divine
17 Plato, Cratylus, (397e).
18 Plato, Cratylus, (397d).
19 Plato, Cratylus, (397b).
than that of man.|2°
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In speaking of the names of the eternal and absolute 
nature, Socrates should have meant the generic term which 
represents the class or species of things. That is, it is 
the search for the understanding of the being itself.21
As said before, Socrates' etymological analysis of the 
nature of the correctness of names can be said to have been 
made in jest. This investigation might not be taken 
seriously in terms of philological values.22 It must be 
taken as Socrates' contrivance in pursuit of something more 
important than just the exposition of the ignorance of 
others or a philological contribution.
Unexpectedly, despite given under divine power, the 
term 'god' had quite a scientific explanation. The term 
was said to have originated from the term 'thein' which 
meant 'running' since the Greeks originally worshipped sun, 
moon, earth, stars, and sky. They observed the nature of 
the movement of the universe. That is why they had called 
them 'theous', gods, ever since, though afterwards they 
gained the knowledge of other kinds of gods.23 However, 
following this, Socrates pretended that he did not know 
what to consider, following his analysis of the term god. 
It is from this point that the term suggested by Hermogenes 
seemed to be in accordance with the descending order in
20 Ibid.
21 In other words, it resembles the meaning of 'concept' 
or ennoia, or forms as thoughts, noeton, of God or Man.
22 See Scleiermacher, op. cit., pp. 228-9, 233.
23 Plato, Cratylus, (397d). Paul Shorey suggested that the 
Greeks called sun, moon, and so forth 'god' after the 
barbarians. See Paul Shorey, the Republic of Plato, op. 
cit., p. 100.
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Hesiod's myth of the races.24
This reference to Hesiod is not arbitrary. Since 
Socrates himself had mentioned his name twice; the first 
time immediately after his discussion of the names of 
Orestes' family, and the other after Hermogenes told him to 
consider the term 'daimones' following the term 'god'.25 
Though Hermogenes in turn seemed unaware of the source 
which enabled him to answer Socrates, what was to be 
considered next to the term 'god' was spirits, daimones. 
He said confidently that he knew very well that the story
24 It should be added here that, according to Vernant's 
study of Hesiod's myth, the sequence of the races of man in 
the myth should be understood with regard to a cyclical 
pattern rather than the usual interpretation of 
chronological order. He argued for the substitution of 
structural pattern for chronological one. He said
'[t]he ages succeed one another to form 
a complete cycle, which, once 
completed, starts all over again, 
either in the same order, or, more 
probably, as in the Platonic myth in 
the "Politicus", in reverse order, so 
that cosmic time is unfolded 
alternately, first in one direction and 
then in the other. Hesiod laments the 
fact that he himself belongs to the 
fifth and last race, the race of iron, 
and at that point expresses the regret 
that he has not died earlier or been 
born later. This remark is
incomprehensible in the context of 
human time that is continuously 
degenerating, but it makes perfect 
sense if we accept that the series of 
ages is a recurring renewable cycle, 
just like the sequence of the 
seasons.'[Vernant, Myth and Thought 
among the Greeks, op, cit., p. 6]
Vernant argued that Hesiod's myth of the races contains 
instructive purpose. To be sure, with regard to Platonic 
myths in the Republic, the Statesman, and elsewhere, their 
purpose is also instructive. See further discussion with 
regard to the myth of the revolution of the universe in the 
Statesman in Chapter Eleven.
25 Plato, Cratylus, (396c, 397e).
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of the golden race or spirits was the first race of men to 
be born as regards the first in the chronological order of 
the myth of the races.26 It is possible that the 
influence of Hesiod's myth had permeated the minds of the 
Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., as an 
ordinary young man like Hermogenes could easily recall it 
despite the lack of exact knowledge of its origin.27
However, neither way affects Socrates' investigation, 
since he took into account the myth with regard to its 
structural order in order to render some interpretative 
effects. He mentioned Hesiod's name in order to remind his 
interlocutor and also the reader of the further content of 
Hesiod's myth, which he was to examine. Also, it is quite 
probable that he intended his reader to think of the
genealogy of man in the myth in comparison to his
investigation of the names of things with regard to the 
nature of their essence, since all five races narrated in 
the myth were the class of mortal men. Hesiod also 
employed the word 'mortal man', meropon anthropon, to
represent each one among all five races; each race was man
in succession to one another. Respectively, they were the 
race of the gold, the silver, the bronze, the hero, and, 
finally, the iron which was regarded as the contemporary
26 Plato, Cratylus, (397e).
27 H.D.F. Kitto said that Hesiod's myth of Prometheus 
'offered ample material' to the fifth century poet viz., 
Aeschylus. See H.D.F Kitto, Greek Tragedy: A Literary 
Study, London, 1961, p. 104. It is most likely that the 
myth of the races had been equally regarded. However, in 
saying that Hesiod's myth was well-known to the Greeks, it 
does not necessarily mean that everyone or most of them had 
to seriously take the story of the myth. To a certain 
extent, the situation with regard to the belief in the myth 
perhaps is not unlike the belief in the story of Eden or 
the Bible of people in modern time. In the most extreme 
case, some might argue that this kind of myth in the fifth 
century can hardly be taken seriously by the Greeks, 
particularly the Athenians. See John Burnet, 'The Socratic 
Doctrine of the Soul', op. cit., p., 249.
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III
Hesiod intended his Works and Days to be an 
instructive discourse which offered a practical ethos for 
anyone in society. The myth of the races forms a part of 
the Works and Days. Therefore, it must be understood with 
regard to the author*s intention. Hesiod said that the 
myth delineated 'how the gods and mortal men sprang from 
one source'.29 According to the myth, daimones or spirits 
were regarded as the golden race, which is the first race 
of men to be born. They were believed, as Hesiod narrated:
'to live in the time of Cronos 
and.. .lived like gods without sorrow of 
heart, remote and free from toil and 
grief...and [they were] kindly, 
delivering from harm, and guardians of 
mortal men; for they roam everywhere 
over the earth, clothed in mist and 
keep watch on judgements and cruel 
deeds, givers of wealth; for this royal 
right also they received.|30
It is this context which Hermogenes said he could not 
recall. He remembered only that the spirits were the first 
race of men. However, Socrates assisted his memory by 
citing what Hesiod said about the spirits. Following this, 
Socrates' interpretation of this passage must be taken into 
careful consideration, since it contains quite a 
significant message.
28 Hesiod, 'Works and Days' in Hesiod and Theognis, 
translated by Dorothea Wender, Harmondsworth, 1985, 110- 
175.
29 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 108.
30 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 113-5, 123-7.
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To be sure, before proceeding further, one has to take 
into consideration Socrates' interpretative position in 
relation to the text and its authorial intention. 
Socrates1 interpretation has to be regarded as an
appropriation of the myth for his specific purpose.31
31 Among other dialogues, this interpretative position is 
developed in the Lesser Hippias. The dialogue concerns the 
discussion on the judgement on the personality of Achilles 
and Odysseus in Homer. Imposing on self-understanding and 
self-responsibility, Socrates asked Hippias to stop 
imputing to Homer any criticism which he himself as the 
interpreter of, or the authority on Homer put forward with 
regard to Achilles and Odysseus. What Socrates asked more 
is that an interpreter should merge in one his own position 
and the authorial position of the text in concern. As he 
urged Hippias that
'Let us drop Homer, since it is 
impossible to ask him what he meant 
when he made those verses; but since 
you come forward to take up his cause, 
and agree in this which you say is his 
meaning, do you answer for Homer and 
yourself in common'.[ Lesser Hippias,
365c-d]
This interpretative practice entails a conflation of speech 
and truth of the interpreter. Also, it invokes from him 
courage, self-responsibility, and self-commitment. Courage 
is quite essential since a particular text and its author 
might at one time or another be regarded [by the society] 
to be authoritative, incontestable, and even infallible. 
Confronting such a text, the courageous interpreter would 
be able to break through the prejudice of the society and 
penetrate into the text without any prejudice. In course 
of his study of the text, conflicts between himself and the 
text might occur. He then has to take into his careful and 
critical consideration what the text says to him. He will 
defy some points of the text to which he himself cannot 
agree. But when he finds what is congenial to his own 
nature, he will endorse or reenact it at all costs. After 
all this, there arrives his own interpretaton of the text, 
in other words, his textual appropriation. With regard to 
Homer and Hesiod, the poets were respected by the Greeks as 
the authority on many important aspects and the divine 
source of knowledge. In particular, Homer's Iliad and 
Odyssey were taken as the source of traditional values, 
laws, ethos, eschatology, and social knowledge. It is from 
this point that Socrates imposed this interpretative 
practice. In this regard, I regard Socrates' position in 
the Lesser Hippias as being applicable to his 
interpretation of Hesiod in the Cratylus.
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According to his interpretation, the golden race was not 
made of gold. Actually, it was made of goodness and 
beauty. In a similar regard, the iron race was not made of 
iron. The iron race was identifiable to the men of our 
time with regard to the pattern of birth and mortality.32 
To be sure, Socrates1 point of argument in saying that the 
golden race was not made of gold is derived from the fact 
that the iron race or our race was not made of iron either. 
From this point, he argued that Hesiod*s myth could not be 
interpreted literally.
Socrates said further that since the good and the wise 
were mutually inclusive, so the spirits which were good 
must also be wise and knowing, daemones. It is precisely 
from the term 'knowing* or in Greek 'daemones' which the 
name of spirits or daimones was originated. However, in 
the myth, Hesiod had his golden race share several 
qualities with the gods. Such common qualities enabled the 
golden race to live its life 'without sorrow of heart, 
remote and free from toil and grief, miserable age rested 
not on them'. Socrates interpreted that such a divine 
quality which generated such a quality of life was in fact 
the quality of being good and beautiful. Hence, in this 
regard, the connection between the gods and the spirits is 
their participation in the goodness and beauty. To be 
sure, it was the Olympian gods who had been said to beget 
and make the golden race.33 The spirits can be said to be 
the offspring of the gods.
Then, if the investigation of the name of the eternal 
and the absolute really followed Hesiod's original pattern, 
the next thing to be considered had to be the race of 
silver. However, the dialogue shows that Hermogenes
32 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 175-195. See also 
Vernant, Myth and Thought, op. cit., pp. 8, 18.
33 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 110.
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skipped over to the fourth in the order. He jumped to the 
heroic race without any mention of its two preceding ages, 
namely the races of silver and bronze.34 Of course, 
anyone familiar with Hesiod's myth should be wondering 
about the absence of the other two. Generally speaking, 
with regard to the grounds for the spirits being taken up 
after the gods, one can speculate that, first, as regards 
the hierarchical order in the general attitude of the 
ancient Greeks, the ontological status of spiritual beings 
is sequential to the gods which were regarded as to the 
ultimate, highest authority. Secondly, according to the 
myth, the fact that Hesiod made the golden race or the 
spirits the first race of mortal men which was created by 
the gods, means that chronologically speaking the spirits 
can be regarded as the second race, genos, next after the 
gods.
To be sure, it is apparent that the omission of the 
silver and the bronze can be taken into account in the same 
line of reasoning as regards both the hierarchical and 
chronological orders.35 Hesiod said that all these four 
races, namely, golden, silver, bronze, and hero were 
regarded as the predecessors of mankind, that is to say his 
own generation.36 Therefore, apart from the common name 
'anthropos' which underlies all five generations or kinds 
of man, they had also individually been called by other 
names according to their individual natures.
34 Plato, Cratylus, (398c).
35 Superficially, the interpretation in that line seems 
plausible. But Vernant has proved it to be inadequate and 
incomprehensible with regard to Hesiod's instructive 
intention in the Works and Days. See Jean-Pierre Vernant, 
Myth and Thought., op. cit., Chapter I and II. At this 
stage, I give an interpretation with regard to its 
traditional viewpoint. However, later, I will apply 
Vernant's interpretation to understanding Platonic myths of 
the races and the revolution of the universe in the 
Republic and the Statesman respectively.
36 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 175.
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IV
The golden race, which was the first generation had 
been described as 'pure spirits dwelling on the earth1, 
Since they were said to become 'spirits* and guardians of 
man in their afterlife. In this regard, they were honoured 
as a royal right, geras basileion.37 The race of silver 
which came second had some similar and different aspects 
with regard to its predecessor. With regard to the life of 
the silver race, it could never be equal to that of the 
golden race with regard to both body and spirit. They did 
not live in the age of Cronos but in the age of Zeus who 
annihilated them out of anger, which had been aroused by 
impiety and misdeeds. For they had been 'sinning and 
wronging one another, and not serving the immortals1.38 
Thus they lived life in sorrow because of such evils which 
had originated in immoderation. Nevertheless, after Zeus 
destroyed them, they were later named 'blessed spirits* of 
the underworld and 'yet honour attended them also'.39
The race of bronze which had also been omitted in the 
discussion was said to be terrible and strong because of 
their propensity to 'the lamentable works of Ares and deeds 
of violence*.40 Despite their invulnerability, they 
destroyed one another with their own seemingly 
unconquerable strength. Their life then passed to Hades, 
and 'left no name'.41 According to the myth, nothing had 
been said about whether they had been honoured at all.
37 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 121-127.
38 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 135-139.
39 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 140-142.
40 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 145.
41 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 152-3.
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At this point, the interpretation to be derived from 
what has been discussed above will cast light upon the 
reason for the omission of the two races from the 
discussion. As the gods and the spirits had already been 
examined, then we know that the golden and the silver had 
some common qualities. That is, both were called 
'daimones1 in their afterlife. The difference lies only in 
their destination, that is, the golden spirits1 abode was 
on the earth whilst the silver dwelled in the underworld. 
It is in this regard that one was called 'epichthonian 
daemons' and the other 'hupochthonian daemons'.
Nevertheless, they had been commonly called by the 
name 'spirits*. The term was regarded as the name of the 
eternal and absolute. Also, the term 'spirits' had been 
analyzed in the discussion of the golden race. So there 
was no need to discuss this common name again in the case 
of the silver. For the silver shared the common quality of 
being 'spirits' with the golden and bore the same common 
name, since the chief concern in the latest investigation 
of names is the examination of the nature of the name as 
such. Therefore, it can be said that the term 'spirits' in 
the eye of Socrates has the nature of the eternal and 
absolute as it is evident in the description of the term 
itself. However, with regard to the race of bronze, it had 
been said that the life of such a race left no name after 
they had passed away. They had not been honoured or 
respected. Their name had not been remembered or 
immortalised.42 Therefore, the name of the race of bronze 
had been omitted because its essence was not eternal and 
absolute. In this regard, the above interpretation 
explains why Hermogenes selected the term 'hero' to 
consider next after the 'spirits' and omitted the silver 
and the bronze.
42 Compare this to the love of immortality in Diotima's 
speech in the Symposium, 207d-208b.
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With regard to the dramatic situation in the Cratylus, 
Hermogenes1 action in this particular scene, namely raising 
the quest for the examination of the term 'hero' in line 
after the spirits, was quite independent of Socrates1 
influence; although it is true that it was Socrates who 
drew Hermogenes towards Hesiod's myth as he should have 
conceived very well the young man's presupposition with 
regard to the story of the myth. Socrates might have 
rightly speculated that after his examination of the term 
'god' Hermogenes would regard the term 'spirits' to be 
considered next after 'god'; but his optional turn for the 
heroic race was not under Socrates' influence. It can 
hardly be derived from anything but the own decision of the 
young man himself, and a possible account for such a 
decision has already been discussed above.
With regard to the dialogue as a dramatic 
construction, Hermogenes's role is as Socrates' 
interlocutor. In this role he can be made to assist 
Socrates in one way or another with regard to the 
advancement of the conversation or the movement of the 
dramatic scene in pursuit of the purpose of the author. 
All characters are constructed to guide the reader to 
arrive at something the author aims at. In this regard, 
Hermogenes was made to act or speak in accordance with the 
direction of the author.
He could also be made to act or speak differently from 
what he had been made. To be sure, following the original 
pattern in Hesiod's myth, Hermogenes could have been made 
to ask Socrates to consider the names of the silver and the 
bronze; and with regard to the name of the silver race, 
Socrates could have replied that it was unnecessary to 
repeat the discussion about the term 'spirits'. Also, with 
regard to the name of the bronze, he should have answered 
that it was impossible, since the bronze had no other name 
which could be put under the class of the name in concern,
namely the name of the eternal and absolute.
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Another possibility was that Socrates could have been 
made to react to the omission of the two races in 
Hermogenes1 suggestion. He could have asked Hermogenes to 
explain why he had left out those two races. Socrates 
could have done so if he would not have been able to 
complete his examination of the names without taking into 
consideration the two missing races. Also, Hermogenes 
could have been reminded of his omission, if their absence 
really upset Socrates' plan; but there had not been any 
reaction from Socrates with regard to this matter. Hence 
it can be inferred that Socrates' silence or non-reaction 
towards Hermogenes' omission implies Socrates' consent of 
the omission.
The consent, derived from the interpretation of 
Socrates' non-reaction towards Hermogenes' omission or non­
action with regard to the names of silver and bronze has of 
course been allowed by the author of the dialogue. As 
mentioned above, the cause of Hermogenes' action or non­
action had been left unexplained in the dialogue. Then the 
speculation for a possible reason has been made to serve 
this purpose. Here, the reader has discovered another 
level of intention in relation to Hermogenes' intention and 
Socrates' consent. With regard to the obvious absence of 
the explanation of this important matter, which is 
obviously not to be left unexplained, the non-action of the 
characters is evidently the action of the author.
The intention ascribed to Hermogenes' non-action can 
hardly be applied to the author's action, since at the end 
of Book Three of the Republic, the same author has his 
Socrates speak of the myth of the races which this time it 
did not leave out those two races.43 Contrariwise, the
43 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 414e-417b).
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race of heroes which came after the golden in the Cratylus 
had not been mentioned in Socrates' tale of the human race 
in the Republic. He clearly admitted that although his 
tale was a lie, it nevertheless was necessary as regards 
the education of the young and the welfare of the polis. 
To be sure, the discussion of such a matter of the polis 
and its citizens in the Republic was originally taken as an 
illustrative instrument to understanding justice in the 
human soul.44 Therefore, it could be that the omission of 
the heroic class serves that particular purpose with regard 
to the authorial intention in the Republic. Hence, the 
omission of the silver and the bronze should be regarded in 
a similar respect. That is, it must be intended to effect 
a particular interpretation.
V
It is generally understood that the Cratylus as a 
whole concerns the discussion about the problems of the 
principle of name. Two main theories have been taken under 
scrunity; one is the theory of the natural correctness of 
names; the other is based on the conventional agreement and 
the changes of the meaning of names. At the end of the 
dialogue, the conclusion is reached that neither one nor 
the other was justified. The result is that 'realities 
are to be learned or sought for, not from names but much 
better through themselves than through names'.45 In this
44 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 368c-369a).
45 Plato, Cratylus, (439b). If the search for the nature 
of things is carried on through names, then, it will face 
the problem of obscurum per obsuries. It means that the 
object in question has to be explained or understood with 
reference to different names or languages. Different names 
or languages are regarded as the example of what is being 
examined. It is inevitable that even the example itself 
needs a further example. The need for the example of the 
previous example will be infinitely endless. Compare this
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respect, our concern about the discussion of the term 
'anthropos1 with reference to the theory of the natural 
correctness of names might be useless since all theories 
discussed in the Cratylus have been said to be invalid. 
Also, the discovery of realities cannot be accomplished 
through the study of names. At this point, one recalls 
Schleiermacher1s comments that one cannot attempt to derive 
a serious interpretation from Socrates' etymological 
examination of names in the Cratylus. Schleiermacher 
believed that Plato intended to construct a playful 
Socrates to discredit any claim of linguistic 
representation of realities and truth.46
The argument for the playful element is evident but 
not totally convincing. As argued before, Socrates' irony 
and fallibility contain not only intrinsic value but also 
something beyond that. Again, the action and non-action of 
Socrates and Hermogenes resulted from the literary action 
of the author. Prior to the discussion of the name of the 
eternal and absolute nature, it has been argued that the 
author's literary action has rendered some remarkable 
points. The most outstanding points are the following: 
Socrates' self-effacement under divine possession, the 
underlying aspect of the oscillation between divine and 
human realms, and the lineage of the human race. It is 
under the divine-human oscillation that the discussion of 
the names of the gods, spirits, hero, and man, have been 
examined.
Under divine power, the proper names of the gods, 
namely Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus had been described 
differently from what Hesiod ascribed to the nature of the 
gods in the Theogony. Therefore, we should consider the
point to the Statesman, 277d-e.
46 See Schleiermacher, op. cit., pp. 228-9, 233.
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analyses of the terms such as gods, spirits, hero, and man, 
with regard to divine power as well. Considered under 
divine power, it comes to light why the spirits have been 
interpreted as being good, beautiful, and wise. It is for 
a similar reason that the silver race or the spirits of the 
underworld has been left out, since the good, beautiful, 
and wise could not live its life in such a foolish, 
immoderate, and impious way.47 Furthermore, we know that 
the name of the eternal and absolute nature, which Socrates 
was investigating, should be generated by divine power. 
Therefore, with regard to the search under divine power, 
the essential reason for the absence of the bronze race is 
not only because it had no other name, but also because the 
quality of the race itself is not qualified to be included 
in the class of the name given by divine power.
It is notable that both the silver and the bronze 
lacked the same virtue, namely self-temperance, since self- 
temperance, sophrosyne, is said elsewhere to be one of the 
essential composite virtues of justice. Without it, 
invididuals and the polis will come to self-destruction.48 
It is this point which disqualified them from the list of 
the name of the eternal and absolute nature. In other 
words, they had been excluded from what I hereafter call 
the 'divine circle1.49 Therefore, it seems that, with 
regard to the authorial intention, the reason for the
47 Hesiod, 'Works and Days1, op. cit., 135-140.
48 Without self-temperance, Socrates told Glaucon that 
both polis and psuche 'will not await their destruction at 
the hands of others, but will be first themselves in 
bringing it about1. See the Republic, Book II, 375c.
49 Of. the Republic, Book III, 416: 'Gold and silver, we 
will tell them, they have of the divine quality for the 
gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the 
metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and 
contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition 
of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done 
about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells 
within them is unsullied.'
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omission of those races involves the criterion of virtue 
rather than anything else.50
It is in this regard that Hermogenes was made to skip 
to the heroic race, to which Socrates gave consent by his 
silence. However, it seems quite unclear why this was 
done. The interpretative effect which the author aims at 
from this scene will come to light if we consider further 
how appropriate Socrates was in his anaylyses of the term 
'hero' and 'man'.
Originally in the Works and Days, Hesiod described 
this fourth race of men as follows:
'nobler and more righteous, a god-like 
race of hero-men who are called demi­
gods,... Grim war and dread battle 
destroyed a part of them, some in the 
land of Cadmus at seven-gated Thebe 
when they fought for the flocks of 
Oedipus, and, some, when it had brought 
them in ships over the great sea gulf 
to Troy for rich-haired Helen's 
sake, .they lived untouched by sorrow in
50 The order in Hesiod's myth of the races has been 
approached in the same manner that Vernant points out that
'[i]f the race of gold is called "the 
first", it is not because it arose one 
fine day, before the others, in the 
course of linear and irreversible time,
[o]n the contrary, if Hesiod describes 
it at the beginning of his account,
this is because it embodies virtues--
symbolized by gold— which are at the 
top of a scale of nontemporal values'.
See Vernant, op. cit., p. 6. Cf. also the Republic, Book 
III, 392a: 'we have declared the right way of speaking
about gods and daemons and heroes and the other world'; and 
with regard to the ideal city, see also Book IV, 427b: 'The 
founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of 
worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the 
burial of the dead and the services we must render to the 
dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious.'
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the islands of the blessed along the 
shore of deep swirling Ocean,. .far from 
the deathless gods, and Cronos ruled 
over them; for the father of men and 
gods released him from his bonds.'51
Socrates appropriated this by translating it into his own 
version. He said that the term 'eros' was originated from 
'eros' or love because 'a god fell in love with a mortal 
woman, or a mortal man with a goddess' to which the heroes 
were born.52 Socrates' hero is not a warrior who fights 
boldly in the battlefield as the Homeric or Hesiodic heroes 
had been.53 He argued that with his knowledge of the old 
Attic pronunciation, the term can be understood better 
because the heroes were 'wise and clever orators and 
dialecticians, able to ask questions, erotan, for eirein is 
the same as legein, speak'.54 For this reason, Socrates 
pointed out that when the term hero was pronounced in the 
Attic dialect, 'the heroes turn out to be orators and 
askers of questions'.55 Hence the heroic race instead of 
being brave and noble fighters, proved 'to be a race of 
orators and sophists'.56 For Socrates' hero, speech
51 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 158-169b.
52 Plato, Cratylus, (398c, 398d).
53 With regard to the changing values of human excellence 
from Homeric warring state to the fifth and fourth 
centuries polis, see North, op. c i t Adkins, Merit and 
Responsibility, o p c i t Morrall, 'Political Ideas in Greek 
Tragedy', opcit.; Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck 
and Ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy, op. cit.; Blair 
Campbell, 'Paradigms Lost: Classical Athenian Politics in 
Modern Myth', and 'The Epic Hero as Politico', History of 
Political Thought, Vol. X Issue 2 Summer 1989, and Vol. XI 
Issue 2 Summer 1990.
54 Plato, Cratylus, 398c, 398d. Cf. 390c-d. Socrates's 
hero is indeed a dialectic hero who is at once name-giver 
and law-giver since dialectic, language and laws are 
inseparable.
55 Ibid.
56 Plato, Cratylus, (398e).
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becomes his mighty sword, debate is his battlefield, and 
his victory is to successfully persuade his opponents.57
Following this, it was Socrates himself who introduced 
the term 'anthropos' for the next investigation. Again, he 
reminded others of his condition under divine possession. 
As we know, Socrates* account of this race is completely 
different from what had been told in Hesiod with regard to 
the iron race. However, as regards the order and pattern 
of his examination of these names, it is obvious that 
Socrates' 'anthropos' takes the place of the iron race in 
Hesiod's myth.
Hesiod said that the iron race was the present human 
race. It was undesirable since life was so miserable, 
although 'some good mingled with their evils1. The fatal 
annihilation of the race was pending, because all the evils 
which Hesiod regarded as a sign for Zeus to come to destroy 
them were not far-fecthed. Such evils were family feud, 
ingratitude, war, lying, injustice, etc. All these were 
evident in any society.58 It was Hesiod's instructive 
purpose in intending his work to be ethical canon or ethos 
of men in the society.
Although the iron race had no other name, however, we 
understand very well that the race was supposed to be our 
human race, namely mankind 'anthropos'. There are some 
misgivings with regard to the inclusion of this term in the 
divine circle. Firstly, if the silver and the bronze had 
been excluded from the discussion because of their lack of 
virtue, then the iron race should have been omitted as 
well, since it seemed to be far worse than the others.
57 Cf. 'Politicizing the Hero' and 'Heroicizing Politics: 
Adaptations' in Blair Campbell, 'The Epic Hero as 
Politico', op. cit., pp. 196-202. See also the love of 
immortality of the hero in the Symposium, 207d-208b.
58 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 180-195.
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Secondly, in explaining the term, Socrates is said to state 
strangely that 'anthropos1 was different from other animals 
because of its quality of being able to 'look up at 
things1, anathrei. Thirdly, despite our understanding of 
some particular purpose for his appropriation of Hesiod's 
myth, Socrates' interpretation of this human race did not 
leave any trace of the Hesiodian iron race at all. It 
differs from his interpretation of the golden and heroic 
races, which we could find some reference to in the 
original text. Fourthly, it seems that the investigation 
of names in relation to the divine circle ends with 
'anthropos1. For Socrates reverted to the discussion of 
the proper names after he finished his examination of the 
meaning of 'anthropos'.59
VI
Up to this point, after the long examination of the 
context of the discussion in the Cratylus, the particular 
passage on 'anthropos' can now be fully comprehended. This 
particular and whole with regard to the contextual 
precondition of the search for 'anthropos' can be 
understood to complement each other. Also, it can be 
argued that apart from what has been generally ascribed to 
the Cratylus as its main subject-matter, namely the 
discussion on the theory of names, its deeper motif, which 
underlies the dialogue as a whole, is the guidance for the 
search for self-knowledge: that is, the understanding of 
human nature. In particular, it is situated in Socrates' 
interpretation of the term 'anthropos'.
The oscillating movement between the divine and human 
realm is intended to indicate a certain connection between
59 Plato, Cratylus, (401b).
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human and divine. The theory of natural correctness of 
name entails a natural tie between the same species or 
class whose offspring are named after their parents. The 
name of Orestes was deliberately chosen to testify to the 
theory. Two significant factors with regard to 'Orestes* 
have to be taken into account: firstly, in the context of 
the ancient Greek theatre, Orestes was symbolic of the 
tragedy of family life which involved conflicts, 
infanticide and parricide in both lines of ancestors; 
secondly, Orestes' lineage was descended from the gods who 
had committed the first crimes. However, moving the trace 
of lineage upwards, it cannot be said that the name of 
Orestes and his families completely satisfied the aspect of 
the natural tie in the theory, although Orestes and his 
human ancestors seemed to share a similar nature. However, 
under divine inspiration, the analysis of the names of the 
gods had been given in a new light which differed from its 
original story in Hesiod's Theogony. Zeus, Cronos, and 
Uranus in Socrates' interpretation disrupted the innate 
characteristics of the lineage. Nevertheless, the fact 
that Orestes was a descendant of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus 
is intact. With regard to the theory of natural 
correctness of name, the examination of Orestes signifies 
the interrelatedness of human and divine. This point had 
been taken as a means to form a part of the oscillating 
movement between the two realms.
After the search arrived at Uranus, the top of 
Orestes' lineage, the investigation was shifted from the
proper name Zeus, Cronos, Uranus to the common name,
that is, 'god'. The term 'god' had been said to be the 
name of the eternal and absolute nature. Meanwhile, the 
name of Hesiod was introduced in order to invoke in 
Hermogenes or the audience a presupposition of the original 
account of the myth of the races. Taking for granted the 
presupposition of the myth, the order of the pattern in the 
myth was employed in order to descend from the divine to
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the human realm again. Swaying from divine to human this 
time, the common name or class of being was investigated, 
but under divine power, the class of being to be considered 
must only be those in the divine circle. The divine circle 
is assessed with regard to the criterion of virtue. The 
myth of the races had been appropriated by Socrates in 
order to induce these following interpretative effects.
First, the spirits were metaphorically called the 
golden race because they were good, beautiful, and wise. 
Secondly, the heroic race, which was also wise and clever, 
was proved to be 'a fighter with speech as his mighty 
sword*. Thirdly, man or anthropos possessed peculiar 
virtue, namely 'anathrei1, 'to look up at and consider what 
he has seen1. Fourthly, man was therefore included in the 
divine circle with regard to this virtue. Hitherto, in 
sum, Socrates1 use of irony, fallacy, and ludicrous, 
abnormal demonstration in this context led us to infer that 
humanity can be partly said to share a divine quality as 
regards his possession of the virtue.
However, this account is not without ambiguity, since 
it can be drawn from the investigation of Orestes and his 
lineage of family that the possible grounds for man's 
divine connection is deduced from the fact that Orestes was 
descended from divine ancestors. As said before, the name 
of Orestes was taken to testify to the theory of natural 
correctness of name. The theory itself was developed from 
a given example of the names of Hector and his son, 
Astyanax. Both names were taken as an example of the 
natural tie of the same class with regard to parents and 
their offspring. The natural birth produced an offspring 
of the same class as its parents. If the birth was 
contrary to nature, the offspring must be named after its 
own class not the class of its parents, for example a calf 
born to a horse should be called a calf not a colt since it 
was an unnatural offspring. In the same way, the first
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generation of Orestes' human ancestors should be regarded 
as the unnatural offspring of divine parents. Of course, 
they had to be named after their own class. Moreover, 
according to the myth of the races, the races had been 
created by the Olympian gods. The myth was intended, as 
Hesiod said, to show 'how the gods and mortal men sprung 
from one source1. Thus the myth could possibly in one way 
or another generate the belief that men were literally 
descended from the gods.60 With regard to this 
application of the theory of name to the story of Orestes 
in Homer in conjunction with Hesiod's myth, it is therefore 
possible to infer that the human race was divine because 
they were literally the children of the gods.
Nevertheless, a careful analysis holds the reader back 
from such a conclusion. First of all, it concerns logical 
fallacy of which we said Socrates had given a hint.61 It 
lies in the grounds of the theory against which Orestes' 
lineage was testified, and the analysis of Orestes was 
followed by the introduction of Hesiod's myth into the 
discussion. According to the theory of name, with regard 
to Orestesian context, Orestes and his human ancestors were 
regarded as 'unnatural descendants' of their divine 
ancestors, and so was 'anthropos' in the myth. Although he 
was included in the divine circle, man could not be said to 
be equated with the races of the hero and the gold, let 
alone the gods themselves.
To be accurate, the spirits, the hero, and man should 
be regarded only as subdivisions of divinity in the same 
way that man in the Statesman has been said to be a 
subdivision of animals.62 Particularly, with regard to 
the line of argument in the Statesman, human beings were
60 Hesiod, 'Works and Days', op. cit., 108.
61 Plato, Cratylus, (393c).
62 Plato, Statesman, (261b, 266c).
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regarded as the non-mixing breed. However, animals such as 
horses and asses were the opposite kind to human beings 
with regard to their cross-breeding. Therefore, an 
unnatural birth is possible only in certain kinds of 
animals. For human beings, it is not possible.
Concerning the theory of name, it is true that a 
natural offspring should be named after its parents and an 
unnatural one after its own nature. As a non-mixing breed, 
man will never experience an unnatural birth as such. 
Accordingly, the offspring and parents of human kind must 
be true to their own class, namely the human race. 
Socrates himself also stated elsewhere that he did not 
believe that man was born of an oak or a rock as it had 
been told in Homer, but of human parents only.63 
Therefore, it is a mistake to derive from this the idea of 
the possibility of the metamorphosis of the gods and man. 
In this regard, Homer's Orestes and Hesiod's myth cannot be 
taken literally into account in understanding Socrates' 
interpretation of 'anthropos'. In addition, Socrates' 
account of the term 'god' has to be regarded as a gesture 
to impede any undesirable interpretation. That is to say, 
if the reader had been intended by the author of the 
dialogue to interpret ' man's divine connection ' in such 
manner, then, as regards the term 'god', Socrates should 
not have been made to give quite an absurd analysis, which 
was completely alien to the situation of his divine 
possession. He should have interpreted the word in a 
religous context rather than in such a scientific
63 the Apology, 34d. Cf. Homer, Odyssey, 19, 163. Penelope 
asked Odsseus: 'However, I do press you still to give me an 
account of yourself, for you certainly did not spring from 
a tree or a rock, like the man in the old story.' It was 
believed that the gods or nymphs srpung from a rock or 
wind.
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fashion.64 As mentioned before, with this scientific 
version, the reader would be encumbered to make a 
straightforward connection between divine and human. So, 
in what way is man's divine connection to be understood?
VII
First of all, it is important that Socrates' meaning 
of 'divine' differs from Homer's and Hesiod's. As argued 
above, Homeric and Hesiodian understanding of the term had 
been appropriated by Socrates with regard to his study of 
Orestes and the myth of the races. However, the emergence 
of the Socratic divinity generates ambivalent 
interpretative effect.65 At any rate, it is certain that
64 Plato, Cratylus, (397d). In the Republic, Book VI, 508a 
-b, it shows that Socrates knew that what the Greeks 
regarded as their gods, the barbarians called them stars.
65 Compared to the traditional values, it can be 
understood as an innovation, a new kind or set of 
knowledge. With regard to the epistemological situation in 
the fifth and fourth centuries, G.E.R. Lloyd says 
'innovations are possible, occur, and are even inevitable 
within what is still conceived as an unaltered tradition'. 
[Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom, op. cit., p. 52] His
argument, which has referred to Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of 
science, is based on the fact that 'innovation with no 
tradition at all would produce unintelligibility'. [Lloyd,
op. cit., p. 50] This is perhaps the reason why Socrates
had to shelter his own interpretation behind Homeric and 
Hesiodian values. Viewed from this angle, his position 
therefore remains conservative in comparison with sophists 
and other thinkers such as Anaxagoras, Protagoras. On the 
other hand, it is undeniable that his version of 'divine' 
is obscure and rather wipes out the possibility of the 
concept of 'divine' itself. Since his idea of divine 
dispenses with anthropomorphism and personification. 
Instead, it has been mystically portrayed in terms of
qualities and virtues such as unity, good, beauty, wisdom 
etc. For Socrates' contemporary audience, this would have 
possibly incurred a loss of their long established 
polytheism. For the fundamentalist, Socrates might have 
appeared to be an atheist while the moderate and the 
rationalist would regard him as an agnostic. Hence, his
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with regard to Socrates' understanding man could not be 
connected to the divine in an Homeric and Hesiodian sense. 
The divine connection in Socrates is concerned with a 
certain quality or virtue. However, a new form of divinity 
cannot be easily understood without recourse to something 
that is familiar or akin to our usual understanding. The 
term 'god' had been scientifically explained, but the 
meaningful explanation began with the analysis of the term 
'spirits'. Then, the spirits dominantly played a decisive 
role in Socrates' divine circle. Next to this was the 
hero, which was said to possess virtue close to that of the
spirits. The spirits were said to be good, wise,--
agathon, phronimoi, kalon,—  and beautiful while the hero 
was wise, sophos, but man was said to possess the virtue of 
being able to ' look up at things', anathrei. It is not 
unreasonable to speculate about the connection between 
man's anathrei and the qualities of the spirits and the 
hero.
Socrates is said to assert that 'every good man, 
whether living or dead, is of spiritual nature, and is 
rightly called a spirit,' and 'the heroic race proved to 
be a race of orator and sophists' .65 Then it can be 
inferred that the succession of the races of the spirit, 
the hero, and man are not to be understood in chronological 
order as in the course of linear and irreversible time.67 
For a man who was good, is said to be of spiritual nature 
and therefore he was called a spirit. A man who was wise 
and clever at speech and was able to ask questions was 
called a hero. It has been argued that they had been all
mystic divinity casts its spell of indecision on the 
audience, past and present. To be sure, from this, the 
reader is reminded of the problem of the trial of Socrates.
66 Plato, Cratylus, (398c, 398e).
67 See Vernant's study of the myth in the Statesman as 
the example with regard to the unchronological order of the 
pattern in the myth. Vernant, op. cit.
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classified under the divine circle. The spirits and the 
hero have been said to be certain races, gene, of man, 
anthropos. An 'anthropos' was called a spirit or a hero if 
he was good or wise. Therefore, with regard to his place 
in the divine circle, man, with his essential nature, 
anathrei, could become a spirit or a hero. Anathrei then 
was the essential potential in human nature with regard to 
the other two in the divine circle.
However, it is not clear what this putative virtue 
means.68 It is remarkable that with regard to the divine-
68 The significance of the term has not been seriously-
attended. Recently, its importance has been taken into
account by a renowed medieval scholar, Umberto Eco. In his
latest book, the Limits of Interpretation, he states in
regard to the passage in concern that
xIn the light of this version of the
myth, we can understand better all the
arguments that Plato lists in the
Cratylus in order to support the theory 
of motivated origin of names. All the 
examples of motivation he gives concern 
the way in which words represent, not 
on things in itself, but the source or 
the result of an action. Take the 
example of Jupiter. Plato says that 
the curious difference between 
nominative and genitive in the name
Zeus Dios is due to the fact that the
original name was a syntagm expressing 
the usual action of the king of gods:
"di1 on zen," the one through whom 
life is given. Likewise man, anthropos, 
is seen as the corruption of a previous 
syntagm meaning the one who is able to 
reconsider what has been seen.
The difference between man and animals 
is that man not only perceives but also 
reasons, thinks about what has been 
perceived. We are tempted to take 
Plato's etymology seriously when we 
remember that Aquinas, facing the 
classical definition of man as a 
rational man, maintained that 
"rational", the differentia that 
distinguishes man from any other 
species of the mortal animals, is not 
an atomic accident, as it is usually 
believed. It is the name we give to a
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human connection, the highest and the lowest in the lineage 
seem to have some relationship with regard to the meaning 
of their names. At 396c, the name 'Uranus' was analysed:
'the upward gaze is rightly called by 
the name urania (ouranis), looking at 
things above (oro ta ano) , and the 
astronomers— philosophers— say, that
from this looking people acquire a pure 
mind, and Uranus is correctly named.'
It is evident that the essential quality of man, anthropos, 
seems to be related to the nature of its oldest divine 
ancestor, namely Uranus. It is quite reasonable that the 
divine quality which remains in the lowest race in divine 
circle is this quality of 'looking up at things1. If what 
the god does is called divine, then, when man imitates what 
the god did, what he has done can be called divine as well. 
Euthyphro imitated what he believed the gods had done, and 
he thought he was pious with regard to his own self- 
understanding or interpretation of the meaning of piety and 
divinity. Socrates might have understood this. With 
regard to this matter, Leo Strauss made this point in his 
comments on the Euthyphro:
sequence of actions or behaviors 
through which we infer that human 
beings have a sort of otherwise 
imperceptible and fundamentally unknown 
substantial form. We detect that 
humans are rational because we infer 
the existence of such a quality— in the 
same way in which a cause is inferred
through its usual symptom by
considering the human activity of 
knowing, thinking, and speaking (Summa 
th. I. 79.8). We know our human 
spiritual potencies "ex ipsorum actuum 
qualitate,11 through the quality of the 
actions of which they are the origin.'
See Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation, Bloomington,
1990, p. 200. However, he interprets 'anathrei1 as the
rational capability.
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'If we accept the current stories as 
such records, we learn that the oldest 
god is Uranos, the grandfather of Zeus. 
The only possible way of being pious in 
the sense of doing what the gods do, 
the only way of being safely pious 
along Euthyphro1s lines, is to do what 
Uranos did, or to imitate Uranos. But 
what did Uranos do? He hurt or damaged 
his children. He damaged the young. 
In Greek the saying is, he corrupted 
the young. That is to say, precisely 
by corrupting the young would Socrates 
be pious. Or the other way round, the 
pious Socrates chooses the only pious 
way, picking the oldest god as his 
model, and therefore corrupts the 
young. Yet Uranos is not only a 
personal god, he is also heaven. And 
we know from other personal dialogue 
that virtue can be identified with 
imitating heaven.'69
Strauss is right as regards the point that piety is in 
a sense 'to imitate what the gods do'. It can be argued 
that not only Euthyphro but also Socrates believed in this 
concept of piety, since Strauss said that one can find the 
support for this idea of virtue in relation to the 
imitation of heaven in some of the personal dialogues. 
However, Strauss seems to go too far in arguing that 
Socrates chose to be pious by 'corrupting' the young, since 
to imitate the gods' was 'damaging' to their children. To 
be sure, such an interpretation of the gods could never be 
Socratic. He never said that he agreed with the story 
that the gods committed crimes and associated themselves 
with such evils. He also said that if he ever wronged 
anyone, it was unintentional. If what Strauss argued is 
true with regard to Socrates' imitation of the gods in that 
sense, the way Socrates defended himself in the Apology 
would become meaningless. If he was ever blasphemous, it 
was against the gods who committed crimes and evil deeds.
69 Leo Strauss, 'On the Euthyphro', in The Rebirth of 
Classical Rationalism, Thomas Pangle (ed.), Chicago, 1989,
p. 201.
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That is the reason why he appropriated Homeric and 
Hesiodian versions of the gods.70 That is also the reason 
why he purified the Homeric and Hesiodian gods by analysing 
their names in such a manner. For Socrates, to be pious, 
man 'looks up at things and acquires a pure mind' so as to 
imitate the nature of his oldest divine father, Uranus, 
'the upward gaze1.71
VIII
In regarding 'anathrei1 as human potential in 
connection to a divine quality, such treatment of the term 
is reminiscent of the term 'dunamis1 used in the final 
division between man and animals in the Statesman.72 
Apart from power, might, and strength, the meaning of 
dunamis connotes 'any natural gift that may be improved, 
and may be used for good or ill1. It is necessary to turn 
to what was discussed at the beginning with regard to the 
connection between man and animals. In the Statesman, with 
no irony of divine inspiration, we have discovered a human 
nature which is related to animals. Here, in the Cratylus, 
it is with the spell of divine power that man is 
interpreted to be more akin to divinity than to animals. 
Hence, on the one hand, it has arrived at a picture of man 
with an animal tie and, on the other, man with a divine
70 At the same time, it seems that Strauss tries to 
appropriate what the Athenians accused Socrates of impiety.
71 If one would apply this to Socrates in this context,
then, it would be that Socrates imitated the gods by 
imitating them in this sense as he purified their names and 
'looked up at things1 in order to 'acquire a pure mind'.
72 Cf. the Menexenus, 237d.
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tie. It seems that the Statesman and the Cratylus 
contradict one another with regard to the account of the 
nature of man. But it is not so.
In the Statesman, apart from the portrayal of man in 
relation to animals, the Stranger also implied that man 
partook of not only animal but also divine connection. 
Employing the art of weaving as an analogy to explain the 
art of statesmanship with regard to the education of men, 
he said '[f]irst it binds the eternal part of their souls 
with a divine bond, to which the part is akin, and after 
the divine it binds the animal part of them with human 
bonds1.73
As regard the Cratylus, after it was explained that 
'anthropos' was different from any other species with 
reference to his divine potential, Hermogenes is made to 
raise an immediate question concerning the human soul and 
body.74 Here, Hermogenes represents the view of common 
sense. Since the fact that man has two essential parts, 
namely soul and body, is generally understood by the 
Greeks, Socrates had interpreted 'man' in such a peculiar 
style. Then, Hermogenes1 curiosity, regarding the way in 
which Socrates would explain the human soul and body with 
reference to the account he had given on 1anthropos*, is 
conceivable. However, what Socrates gave as the meaning of 
soul and body is far from compatible with what he had
discussed about man the contradiction is deliberate. The
account of the term 'psyche' had been given twice. First, 
it was said to be contained in the body as 'its cause of 
its living, giving it the power to breathe and reviving 
it'. The second, which is more scientific than the latter, 
is derived from the doctrine of Anaxagoras and is that the
73 Plato, Statesman, (3 09c).
74 Plato, Cratylus, (399d).
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soul of the mind carries or holds the nature of all 
things.75
It is quite evident that both accounts have been given 
in a scientific fashion which even Hermogenes himself could 
easily notice. Of course, this sort of explanation is 
hardly congenial to a diviner such as Euthyphro and his 
followers. With regard to this, Socrates ironically said 
that the first account would not please them as much as the 
second, although the second was more scientific than the 
first. As for the body or 'soma1, in the Orphic tradition, 
it had been described as 'an enclosure to keep the soul 
safe, like a prison1.76 Since the Orphics believed that 
'soul is undergoing punishment for something1.77
If the soul really was, as Socrates explained, the 
cause of living or the holder of the nature of all things, 
then it would damage his description of man, since his 
investigation of the term soul does not discriminate 
between the human soul and others. Meanwhile, the 
explanation of the body in the Orphic tradition cannot be 
said to be consistent with his interpretation of the soul. 
The Orphic tradition confines itself only to the story of 
man or anthropogony. Therefore, the Orphic body can be 
rightly understood only in the context of its particular 
purpose wit regard to the soul. Then, in mixing the 
Anaxagorean interpretation of the soul with the Orphic 
version of the body, Socrates has rendered a chimera to the 
reader. To be sure, the Orphic body might have agreed with 
Socrates' analysis of man, but it is not compatible with 
the Anaxagorean materialistic explanation of the soul.
75 Plato, Cratylus, (399e-400a).
76 Plato, Cratylus, (400c).
77 Burnet argued that Socrates' soul came from two 
sources, one is Anaxagoras, and the other is the Orphics. 
See John Burnet, 'The Soul in the Socratic doctrine', op. 
cit., p. 251.
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Indeed, Socrates himself said that 'it seems actually 
absurd that the name was given with such truth1, as 
Anaxagoras had argued.78
It is only to some extant that Socrates could agree 
with Anaxagoras1 thesis. As regards the doctrine of 
Anaxagoras, Socrates in the Phaedo told his friend, Cebes, 
in his discussion about the immortality of the soul, that 
at the time he first heard a man reading in Anaxagoras1 
book that 'the mind arranges and cause all things,' such 
an idea was quite appealing to him.79 However, after a 
careful examination of the text, he found that Anaxagoras 
'made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real 
causes of the ordering of things, but mentioned air, and 
ether, water and many other absurdities' as the causes.80 
He expected that if the doctrine was true, the mind, in 
arranging things, must arrange everything and establish 
each thing as it is best for it to be.81 The doctrine of 
Anaxagoras, then, was regarded as indequate with regard to 
the purpose which Socrates looked forward to.
There were two major explanations which he searched 
for. First, it was the reason for the things to be as they 
were. For instance, if the earth was flat or round, the 
cause and the necessity of it had to be explained. Second, 
in respect to the first, the explanation of the cause and 
the necessity of the generation or destruction of things 
had to be made in pursuit of a particular purpose which was 
the nature of the best or most excellent of the things 
themselves.82 In this respect, the doctrine of Anaxagoras
78 Plato, Cratylus, (400b).
79 Plato, Phaedo, (97c).
80 Plato, Phaedo, (98c).
81 Plato, Phaedo, (97c).
82 Plato, Phaedo, (97c-e).
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was inadequate. Moreover, it imposed a contingency on the 
nature of things.
The chimerical combination of the interpretations of 
the soul and the body certainly precipitates a change of 
the mood in the audience towards the recent analysis of 
'anthropos1 with a divine connection. For man has been 
interpreted as being different from other animals; but when 
the question of the soul and the body arises, the reader 
must think twice before subscribing to that description of 
man, since the soul and the body comprise the essential 
nature of all living beings.
If the reader is to pursue the description of man as 
such, of course he has to find the explanation of the human 
soul and body, which differs from that of other animals. 
If the soul was believed to be the cause of man's living as 
well as of other species', then there should have been an 
explanation as to why a human is said to differ from other 
animals because he possesses special potential, anathrei. 
However, Socrates intended the reader to be puzzled by 
proposing Anaxagorean explanation of the soul since it did 
not differentiate man from animals; nor did it contribute 
any answer to the problem concerning the purpose of the 
generation or destruction of beings. Instead of explaining 
the body in Anaxagorean or Democritean fashion, Socrates in 
reverse, adopted the Orphic tradition, which rendered quite 
a meaningful explanation of the term 'body' as regards its 
purposive existence of the soul. To a certain degree, this 
seems to be in accord with the description of man, if the 
reader conflates these two ideas together in his 
interpretation.
From this point, I therefore argue that it is from the 
effect that Socrates undertook to guide the reader up and 
down along the divine and human realms. When the reader 
seems to be able to grasp a certain message at a certain
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moment, Socrates just holds him back from a definite 
conclusion by presenting another interpretative effect as 
a counterbalance. This is the reason that the Cratylus 
cannot be said to render a definite description of human in 
relation to the divine. It also makes the reader cast 
doubt upon a provisional picture of man, which the text 
itself has rendered.
If the Statesman and the Cratylus do not contradict 
each other, then the reader is faced with a picture of man 
with a dichotomy of opposite natures, namely divine and 
animal. To be sure, in the Cratylus, in regarding man as 
being different from other animals with regard to his 
virtue, Socrates did not state the cause of this virtue. 
Also, in the Statesman, we know that man is a subdivision 
of other species. The Stranger employed dialectic method 
to differentiate man from other beings. The bond between 
man and animals is entailed by the application of the 
geometric square root to his final division. We do not 
know anything more than that. At this point, in order to 
proceed from this stage, we again turn to what has been 
stated earlier namely that the essence of all living bodies 
lies in their souls. Concerning the discussion of the 
soul, we will turn to the Phaedrus. According to Socrates' 
palinode, firstly he stipulated that self-motion was the 
essence of the soul. Secondly, as it has been referred to 
before, a soul which has never seen the truth can never 
pass into human form. Then, to investigate the meaning of 
divine and animal ties in human nature, it is necessary to 
examine the human soul as a source of this picture of man 
with seemingly contradicting natures. Indeed, the 
examination of the soul can be regarded as the search for 
self-knowledge.83
83 Charles L. Griswold, Jr. argued that the term psuche 
in ancient Greek functions 'as the noun corresponding to 
our self'. Charles L. Griswold, Self-Knowledge in Plato' 
Phaedrus, New Haven and London, 1986, p. 2.
180
CHAPTER SIX 
Introduction to the city and Han
Among the Platonic corpus, the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, 
and the Republic have been understood to contain major 
discussions on the human soul. The Phaedo can be regarded 
as one of the trilogy of Socrates1 apology; the other two 
are the Apology and the Crito.1 The Apology can be
regarded as his defence against the public accusation, 
namely from the Athenians as a whole, while the Crito and 
the Phaedo can be taken as his defence against any
misunderstanding from his friends, since he decided to
choose the death penalty against the will of his friends.2 
On the last day, he conversed in his usual way with friends 
while the final moment was approaching. What had been 
discussed was pertinent to what was happening. They 
discussed the life and death of the philosopher.3 Of 
course, the topic concerning the nature of the soul was 
inevitably brought into the discussion.
As regards the Phaedrus, its main theme is the
discourse of love. In fact, it can bifurcate into two 
equally important discussions: one is the subject of love; 
the other is about the nature of the discourse. Actually, 
the latter is a discourse about discourse or a discourse 
about itself. Therefore an argument in the Phaedrus points 
to the fact that to understand these two subjects, namely 
love and discourse, it is essential to understand the
1 The dialogues as a whole however can be regarded as 
Socrates' apology. Since all major problems which had 
been debated in the trial have been brought to meticulous 
examination in the dialogues.
2 Plato, Phaedo, (62b, 69e) .
3 Plato, Phaedo, (60b-c, 61c-e).
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nature of the soul.4
In the Republic, Politeia, it is generally understood 
that what it discussed and searched for is justice.5 
Generally speaking, the movement of the dialogue undulates 
in the way that the discussion of the problem of justice 
departs from the question of the nature of justice and 
injustice of a man6 to the question of the nature of 
justice and injustice of a polls7, and then returns to the 
justice and injustice of a man. The latter is finalised by 
the myth of Er.8 There is doubtless a connection between 
the polis and man in regard with justice and injustice. 
The relationship between the two emerges as the justice of 
a man can be more easily understood when one observes the 
justice of a polis as a whole.9 It is assumed that the 
nature of man in one way or another resembles the nature of 
the polis. What has been found or observed as a composite
4 Plato, Phaedrus, (245c, 276a, 271a-272b, 270c).
5 W.K.C. Guthrie argues regarding the title of the dialogue 
that 'the Greek title of the work (misleadingly represented 
for us the English form of the Latin Res publica) means 
"The State or On Justice", and its subject, not merely 
ostensibly but in reality, is the nature of justice and 
injustice and their consequences for the just and the 
unjust man.1 He also suggests that the double title 'On 
Justice1 or rather 'On the Just Man1 might possibly come 
from Plato himself. W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy, Vol. IV, Cambridge, 1987, p. 434, ff.
6 That is the conversation of Socrates and Cephalus, see the 
Republic, Book I, 328c-331e.
7 Plato, Republic, (Book II 369d-435a, Book V, 449a-457d, 
472d to Book VI, 503b, Book VIII and IX).
8 Plato, the Republic, (Book X). Guthrie comments that 
'[t]his is stated at an early stage, and despite 
digressions and subordinate themes (of which the
establishment of the imaginary state is the chief), Plato 
in this most skilfully constructed work is always bringing 
us back to it1. See Guthrie, op. cit.
9 Plato, the Republic, ( Book II 368d-369b).
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of elements of the polis is expected to be found in a man 
as well. It is expected to exist in the human soul.10
Therefore, Guthrie's comments on the title of the 
dialogue is convincing when he argued that it is 
ostensible.11 Certainly, the main concern of the dialogue 
is not the discussion about the State or Republic. To 
follow Guthrie, one must go beyond its title and regard 
justice and injustice as its theme. Undoubtedly, it is one 
of the composite of elements of the work itself. 
Nevertheless, its title still remains significant. It is 
not only ostensible but also ironical.12 Irony is never 
less Platonic than Socratic.
Politeia means 'civil polity, a constitution of 
state, form of government'13; if a study of the nature of 
a polis is equated with a study of the nature of a man, and 
the essence of man has been emphasised as being his soul, 
then, with regard to its title, the dialogue is actually 
gravely concerned with a man rather than a polis, which is 
comprised of many people. In other words, its title is 
ironical in the sense that instead of the many, the work 
itself just has its particular regard for the one. It 
concerns the study of forms or characters of man or his 
soul. Nevertheless, what constitutes a form or character
10 Plato, the Republic, (Book IV 434c-435c).
11 See footnote 5.
12 In her study of the politics of the soul in Nietzsche, 
Leslie Paul Thiele found that this aspect of Nietzsche's 
work has been adumbrated by Plato's Republic. She says 
'[i]ndeed, the manifestly political aspect of the Republic, 
that is, the theorization of the city, is ostensibly 
proposed as the attempt better to discover the justice of 
a man's soul'. See Leslie Paul Thiele, The Politics of the 
Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1990, p. 51.
13 Liddell, H.G. and Scott, R., A Greek-English Lexicon, 
op. cit.
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of a man is neither his individual nature nor his society. 
In fact, both are inseparable and indispensable. Then, a 
character of a man and a constitution of a polis are 
intertwined and interrelated.14 Therefore, the Republic 
or Politeia is the study of such an interrelationship. To 
be sure, this does not mean that we subordinate justice and 
injustice to our newly emerged concern as the theme of the 
dialogue. Rather, the pursuit of one is incident to the 
other, and vice versa, since the justice of a polis and the 
justice of a man are inseparable insofar as such 
interrelationship is concerned.
In this regard, the Republic, as the longest dialogue 
of all, can be considered in its own right the most 
valuable source for an examination of the human soul. 
Hence, it is to be taken as presiding over other dialogues 
with regard to the matter in concern. Meanwhile, since 
they contain more distinctive discussions about the soul 
than the rest, the Phaedo and the Phaedrus play a major 
supporting role in helping to illuminate the soul as 
portrayed in the Republic. Also, the relation and
application of the concept of the soul to other practical 
social, political and philosophical problems can be found 
in other dialogues.
I
Socrates related that Polemarchus caught sight of 
Glaucon and himself as they were starting for town after 
having worshipped the Goddess15 and seeing the procession
14 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329e-330a).
15 In his translation of the Republic, Shorey suggests that 
the goddess is presumably Bendis.
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of the citizens in the festival at the Piraeus.16 
Noticing Socrates and Glaucon from a distance, Polemarchus 
sent a boy to ask them to wait for him. When Polemarchus 
arrived, Socrates found that they were also accompanied by 
Adeimantus, Niceratus, and a few others who had been to 
the procession as well. What Polemarchus first said to 
Socrates was that he thought Socrates and Glaucon were 
heading towards the town and were about to leave 
Polemarchus and friends who resided near the Piraeus. 
Socrates confirmed what Polemarchus had said. Polemarchus 
was willing to have Socrates and others stay there 
overnight at his house, since he planned to converse with 
Socrates. His intention was evident, since, when arriving 
at Polemarchus* place, Socrates noticed that seats were set 
up ready for a discussion. The seats had been placed in a 
circle. Also, a group of people happened to be there 
already, like an audience awaiting an exhibition piece.17
This is the reason why Polemarchus was so determined 
to have them with him that evening. He said he would not 
let them go unless they were able to overpower him and his 
party. Though Socrates asked Polemarchus if persuasion 
could possibly be an alternative to the use of force he had 
just imposed. Apparently, it appears that so long as no 
one listened, the use of speech would inevitably turn out
15 The Piraeus was long walls which had been built by 
the instruction of Pericles as regards the Athenian 
imperialism in the sea territory. It was the joint between 
the port and the polis. The aliens like Cephalus who came 
to trade their business usually lived around the Piraeus.
See Oswyn Murray, 'Donald Kagan: Pericles of Athens and the 
Birth of Democracy1, The Times Literary Supplement, April 
12, 1991 No. 4593, p. 8.
17 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 328b-c). The term 
'exhibition piece* is borrowed from G.E.R. Lloyd as he 
translated from epideixeis as performances of any skills 
and knowledge which one performs and compete with one 
another in front of the public. Here, the torchlight race 
on horseback can be said to be an exhibition piece. See 
Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom, op. cit., pp. 61, 89 ff.
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to be useless. Gluacon understood this point very well as 
he was the one who admitted this to Polemarchus.18 
Unfortunately, it was impossible for Socrates and Glaucon 
to counterbalance Polemarchus in terms of physical force. 
To be sure, we know that Socrates would never have recourse 
to such force. Yet, neither could any such force ever 
subdue him. As a lover of discourse, it was only the power 
of speech that could be used with him or used by him.19 
However since he was so insistent about his demand, 
Polemarchus announced that he would never listen to 
anything. No one knows what would have happened if 
Adeimantus, brother of Glaucon, and Plato, who was 
accompanying Polemarchus, had not intervened at the right 
moment.20
Adeimantus also wanted Socrates to stay for a 
discussion. He had the same desire as Polemarchus did, 
But the way he approached Socrates was better than 
Polemarachus. What Adeimantus did was successful since he 
could get what he wanted without having recourse to the use 
of force. Moreover, from his intervention, each of them 
acquired what should be given to each other. In the 
situation, whether he knowingly did what he did or not, in 
practice he rendered to each his due. Polemarchus1 demand 
worked. As regards Socrates, persuasion had been employed
18 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 327c).
19 In the Phaedrus, Phaedrus is said to be a lover of 
discourse. Also Socrates confessed that he was a lover of 
discourse. As lovers of discourse, both used it in each 
turn to bargain with each other as regards their desires 
for the beautiful speech of love.
20 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329a). Socrates
said with regard to individual characters of the two 
brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, that they complemented 
one another and always assisted each other. See further 
discussion about the nature of high spirited element and 
the nature of rational element of the soul. These two 
elements require one another as regards the education of 
philosophic guardian.
186
instead of the force with which Polemarchus had initially 
threatened him.
Adeimantus persuaded Socrates that during that evening 
there would be a torchlight race on horseback in honour of 
the goddess. This was effective because Socrates seemed to 
be tempted by this new kind of exhibition. He asked 
whether the participants in the torchlight carried torches 
and passed them to one another as they raced with the 
horses. Polemarchus, who seemed to realise how effective 
Adeimantus' approach was, then joined in with Adeimantus' 
persuasive speech. He replied that what Socrates thought 
about it was correct, and he and Glaucon should stay there, 
since, apart from that, after dinner, they could go and see 
not only the torchlight race but also a night festival, 
where they could meet and talk with many young men.21 
Consequently, Glaucon was then inclined to stay as
Polemarchus requested. Socrates did not oppose the
suggestion of his companion. However, one may wonder 
whether Adeimantus actually knew Socrates well enough to 
know what should and what should not be applied to him; or 
it was just because he really thought the torchlight race 
could possibly attract Socrates to stay for it.
Polemarchus acted harshly towards Socrates and Glaucon
because he wanted them to stay. He said he would never 
listen to Socrates if he tried to persuade him to let them 
go. The reason that Polemarchus said he would not listen 
to Socrates at that moment was because he hoped to have a 
chance to listen to him later on if what he aimed at was 
successful. Therefore, his position seemed ironical as he 
refused to listen in order to listen. Also, one would be 
sceptical if Socrates had genuinely been attracted by the 
torchlight race in itself, as we know that after all none 
of them had any chance to go out to see it. Since that 
night they had been attached to a serious discussion about
21 Plato, the Republic, (BooK I 228b).
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justice and injustice, which, by the length of that
conversation, should have taken quite a long time.
The first conversation in the house was the one
between Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, Lysias,
Euthydemus, and Socrates. It appears that the topic of a
serious discussion about justice and injustice, which took
place later, was spontaneous. The problem of justice and 
injustice was generated in a short greeting conversation 
between Cephalus and Socrates.22 It became so ablaze with 
his conversation with Socrates that his son Polemarchus in 
exasperation broke in to join the argument. Suddenly 
Cephalus then said wittily that he bequeathed the whole 
argument to his son and excused himself for being unable to 
continue the discussion, since he had to attend the 
sacrifices.23 Socrates asked whether Polemarchus was the 
heir of everything that belonged to his father. Cephalus, 
during his strangely precipitate leaving replied with a 
laugh that it must be so.24 Accordingly, the discussion 
about the problem of justice had been passed on from 
Cephalus to Polemarchus as a bequest from a father to his 
son. Cephalus' witticism about his bequeathing does not 
seem to be serious at all. To be sure, the jest actually
contains a significant message.
22 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 328c-331d).
23 With regard to the timing and the sacrifices, Julia 
Annas argued that at the time Cephalus was about to set 
off, the sacrifices should have been over. She raised this 
point to indicate that Plato had contempt for the money- 
lover like Cephalus who was not serious to discuss the 
subject as such. The old man just tried to escape from it 
since he was insincere with regard to what he had said. 
See Annas, An Introduction to Plato's , op. cit., pp. 18- 
20.
24 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331d).
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II
Cephalus was known as a rich man25, and as a father 
of children, he said he would practice what his ancestors 
had done before, namely, he should leave the property to 
his children.26 His great grandfather bequeathed as much 
property to the grandfather of the present Cephalus as he 
now possessed. Then, Cephalus, the grandfather, had 
multiplied the property many times which Lysanias, 
Cephalus1 father, had received but had reduced below that 
which Cephalus had made so far. For he had added up the 
amount which was lately 'not less but some slight measure 
more than his inheritance1.27 Also, with that amount of 
property, he told Socrates that he was quite content if he 
could leave his sons just that. Hence, one can see that 
Cephalus' wealth did not start from scratch. As regards 
this, Socrates said that it could be the reason why most 
people were not convinced when Cephalus said that neither 
age nor money was the cause of true happiness.28
People who were concerned about money would have 
thought that a wealthy man like Cephalus could have many 
consolations for his old age.29 Moreover, for those who 
did not earn all their money from scratch but had inherited 
their property as capital like Cephalus, money would not be 
taken as seriously as those who were poor or had to 
struggle from nothing.30
25 Plato, the Republic, (Book I to to VO (D
26 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 330b).
27 Plato, the Republic, ibid.
28 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329d).
29 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329e).
30 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 330c).
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So it was hard to believe that Cephalus would hold 
fast to his saying if he was poor.31 In response to this, 
Cephalus replied that Socrates was right that those people 
would never accept what he said. Of course, he could not 
totally disagree with that criticism. He accepted that 
there was some truth in it. However, he alluded to
Themistocles' response to a man from Seriphus, that the 
fact that a man had made his name was not attributed either 
to the city or the place he came from, or to himself; it 
must be because of both the city and the man himself.32 
Similarly, according to Cephalus, this could be applicable 
to himself and other people:
'And the same principle applies...to 
those who not being rich take old age 
hard; for neither would the reasonable 
man find it altogether easy to endure 
old age conjoined with poverty, nor 
would the unreasonable man by the 
attainment of riches ever attain to 
self-contentment and a cheerful 
temper.|33
31 For example, Annas believed that according to Plato, 
Cephalus could not be happy without his money. A point 
has been made that the Republic was written later than the 
time it depicted. From this, she argued that
'Plato was writing for an audience that knew that 
the security based on wealth which Cephalus had 
spent his life building up, and which is so much 
stressed here, was wholly illusory: only a few 
years later, when Athens fell, the family was 
totally ruined, Polemarchus executed and Lysias 
driven into exile,...[m]oney cannot prove even 
the kind of security it promises, and a life 
devoted to the pursuit of money is a life whose 
highest priority is something which can be lost 
through the actions of other people,.. [t]hese are 
enough malicious touches in Plato's picture of 
Cephalus to show us that we are being presented 
with a limited and complacent man.1
See Annas, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
32 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329e-330a).
33 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 330a).
190
As regards old age, he said that some of his friends 
lamented their loss of vigorousness which deprived them of 
the pleasures of many things they used to enjoy. They 
regarded it as a loss of the greatest things in their 
life.34 On the contrary, there were also those who 
welcomed their declining years, thinking that this would 
release them from passions and bring them a really happy 
and peaceful life. He alluded to Sophocles, the famous 
poet of his time, who announced that old age was a good 
sign, since 'the fierce tensions of the passions and 
desires relax,..and we are rid of many and mad masters1.35 
With regard to this view, Cephalus said 'I thought it a 
good answer then and now I think so still more'.36
Therefore, for Cephalus, old age and wealthiness could 
not be the real cause of either happiness or suffering. In 
fact, according to Cephalus' experience, the final cause 
originated in the character of the man himself. As he told 
Socrates:
'But indeed in respect of these 
complaints and in the matter of our 
relations with kinsmen and friends
there is just one cause, Socrates not
old age, but the character of man, 
tropos ton anthropon. For if men are 
temperate and cheerful even old age is 
only moderately burdensome. But if the 
reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth 
are hard for such dispositions.|37
From this, Socrates asked Cephalus that if what he 
said was true, then, what benefit could the property give
34 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329a).
35 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329c-d); Phaedo, (86c, 94c); 
Philebus, (47a); the Laws, (645b, 644e).
36 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329c).
37 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329d).
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to its owner at all. In his reply, Cephalus talked about 
man's anxiety about death, and the tales of the 
underworld.38 When a man began to realise that he was 
going to die, he could not help thinking anxiously of the 
story of the underworld that 'the men who have done wrong 
here must pay the penalty there'.39 It was a story which 
he might once have laughed at. For those who had done many 
evil things, this anxiety would haunt him terribly for fear 
of what would happen to him after his death; but the good 
man who had been just and pious all his life would have, as 
Pindar said beautifully, a 'sweet companion with him, to 
cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanieth Hope, 
who chiefly ruleth the changeful mind of mortals'40; And 
it was only to the good man that Cephalus argued that the 
possession of wealth was of most value41, because, with 
his own property, the man would not by any means commit 
fraud or cheat others, and he would not be in debt to 'a 
god for some sacrifice or to a man for money'.42 Hence, 
being conscious of no wrongdoing, the good man had nothing 
to be afraid of with regard to his afterlife; and this was 
the great service of wealth to the good man who possessed
38 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 330d).
39 Plato, the Republic, ibid.
40 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331a).
41 Socrates should have agreed to this idea if a man is 
good because he is wise and vice versa. See the Euthydemus 
281b-c, Socrates says:
'Then in God's name, does any benefit come from 
the other possession, without intelligence and 
wisdom. Could a man get benefit, possessing 
plenty and doing much, if he had no sense— would 
he not benefit more by doing little, if he has 
sense? Just consider. If he did less he would 
make fewer mistakes, if he did less badly he 
would be less miserable.'
42 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331a-b). Annas criticised 
this idea for its discrimation against the poor as it 
implies that 'it is very hard for the poor to be just 
throughout his life'. See Annas, op. cit., p. 19.
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it.
Ill
At this point, with regard to what Cephalus just 
stated, Socrates took this chance to ask whether or not he 
could come to a conclusion with reference to what Simonides 
said that justice was 'truth-telling and paying back what 
one has received from anyone1.43 However, against that 
definition of justice, there was a case that one should not 
return weapons borrowed from a friend who was in his right 
mind but became mad later and demanded them back. He 
should not tell the truth to the mad man either.44 In 
response to the point Socrates raised, Cephalus agreed that 
no one would do such things. Thus, it seemed that such a 
definition of justice could not be true, since any action 
which was complied with it was sometimes just and sometimes 
unjust.
Before we had a chance to hear what Cephalus was going 
to reply, it was at this moment that Polemarchus broke in. 
It was this point which was the starting point for a long 
journey of the dialogue on justice and injustice. The 
argumentation started in the form of a legacy bequeathed by 
a father to his son.
The conversation between Socrates and Cephalus stopped 
there. It was the conversation which seemed to originate 
from certain intentions of both Cephalus and Socrates. In 
the beginning, Cephalus first stated that his desire for 
the pleasures of good talk and his delight in such 
pleasures increased in the same measure that his bodily 
pleasures declined.45 We know that he had just a brief
43 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331c).
44 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331d).
45 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 328d).
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moment conversing with Socrates. However, he transferred 
the whole argument to his son to continue. To be sure, as 
he initially asked Socrates not to refuse to be a companion 
to those young men in the house, it implies that Cephalus 
would be very pleased if Socrates stayed and conversed with 
these young men and his son in particular, to whom he was 
to bequeath all his possessions. At the same time, 
Socrates at first replied that he himself also enjoyed 
talking with the very aged, because he believed that 'we 
have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers who have 
preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some
time fare what it is like is it rough and hard going or
easy and pleasant to travel1.46 He then decided to learn 
from Cephalus what he experienced and what he felt at his 
old age. Cephalus was well aware that his view would 
hardly be convincing, particularly his story of the tale of 
the underworld which appeared in the final part of his 
conversation with Socrates. To be sure, they were also his 
last words to the reader since his role in the dialogue had 
just finished at this stage. Nevertheless, he was willing 
to relate to Socrates what he wished to hear. Strangely, 
one would notice the similar pattern with regard to 
Cephalus1 speech in Socrates' speech. As in the end of the 
dialogue, Socrates' last speech rendered the story of the 
myth of Er. He said he had to refer to such a story though 
he hesitated to do it. However, like Cephalus, Socrates' 
last words to his interlocutors and to the reader of the 
Republic was the story of the underworld. What Socrates 
learnt from Cephalus was that the final cause of happiness 
and unhappiness lay in the character of the man himself, 
not his age or wealth. The possession of property could be 
more valuable to the good man than the bad man. That is 
why Cephalus said it would be just to bequeath his wealth 
to his sons; but we know that it was not only money he was 
to bequeath to his son. He had already just bequeathed his
46 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 328e).
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uncompleted discussion with Socrates to Polemarchus. Such 
was the argument with regard to the problem of justice. 
The legacy of the argument, as it should be assumed, should 
have been another thing which Cephalus regarded as far 
better than the legacy of wealth, since wealth was not the 
true cause of happiness. Cephalus knew that there were 
other things superior to that. Then, would Cephalus as a 
father, not bequeath to his son what he regarded as the 
true cause of happiness, which should be the most desirable 
of all?
Therefore, it should be hidden in this legacy of the 
argument, which he left Polemachus to continue with 
Socrates, whom he requested earlier to be the companion to 
his son. Cephalus bequeathed the argument to his son 
before the property because wealth should be bequeathed 
after the knowledge of how one can make use of it. 
Cephalus said he bequeathed the argument to his son right 
after he saw that his son could no longer remain silent as 
he heard Socrates refuting what he thought to be the true 
definition of justice, which was derived from what his 
father had said. Also, it seemed that his father gave no 
sign of inconvenience with regard to Socrates' refutation. 
This of course caused anger in Polemarchus. The legacy of 
the argument about the problem of justice and injustice 
lies in the realm of deeds and words as Polemarchus was 
incited to anger by the conversation of his father and 
Socrates. It is not only a mere argument but also the 
state of emotion, namely anger, which arises in a person 
when he feels that there is something wrong or unjust. 
This is Cephalus' legacy to his son with regard to a 
father's care for his son's well-being. To be sure, the 
problem of justice originated from the problem of a good 
life, which Socrates first put to Cephalus in the beginning
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of their conversation.47 After Cephalus already had what 
he aimed at, we know that he departed them in a good mood. 
Also, Socrates did not object to or criticize Cephalus' 
urgent departure. As the final cause had been said to be 
attributable to the character of man, then the legacy of 
the argument must be in one way or another related to the 
understanding of the character of man.
IV
Socrates continued his discussion with Polemarchus 
with regard to the definition that justice was 'to render 
each his due'. This idea of justice was believed to belong 
to Simonides.48 Although the phrase looked simple and 
straightforward, however, its meaning could be ambiguous. 
Socrates ironically claimed ignorance and asked 
Polemarchus, as he was the defender of such a definition of 
justice, to explain the wisdom of Simonides.49 A wise and 
divinely inspired poet like Simonides should have meant 
something different from the idea that justice was 'to 
return weapons and tell the truth to a mad man because 
these things were due to him1. The phrase he used must 
have had a hidden message.50 Polemarchus was not 
successful; he could not defend his position against self- 
contradiction. One by one, Socrates cross-examined what
47 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 328e). Socrates said 'And 
so now I would fain learn of you of what you think of this 
thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that 
the poets call "the threshold of old age." Is it a hard 
part of life to bear or what report have you to make of 
it?'
48 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331e).
49 Socrates regarded Simonides as one of the sophists in 
the Protagoras, 316d.
50 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331e, 332a).
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Polemarchus proposed.51
Polemarchus1 solution to the problem of the mad man 
was that the application of this definition of justice had 
to be subject to two kinds of relationship between human 
beings, that is, the friend-foe relationship, since we 
would never be harmed by our friends and we would never 
harm anyone but our enemies.52 Therefore, it was just to 
render what was appropriate to men in regard to the friend- 
foe relationship. That is to say, the just man must 
benefit his friends and harm his enemies. If so, Socrates 
inferred that justice could be useless in peace time when 
there was no enemy. It would become useful in relation to 
the uselessness of the things it kept safely. The just man 
must be skilful in evil deeds as well as good ones. Also, 
it was still a question of how one knew who was his true 
friend and enemy, since 'men love those who seem to be 
good and dislike those who seem bad to them1. Also, it 
appears that when we harm our enemy whom we regard as bad, 
justice, as a human excellence in reverse, makes a man 
worse than other people by the standard of human 
excellence. In other words, justice makes a man unjust and 
goodness makes a man bad.
Therefore, Socrates concluded that what Polemarchus 
tried to explain could not be justice and the just. It was 
wrong to understand wise men by interpreting the meaning of 
justice in such a way. It was impossible for the wise men 
like Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or any other to say and 
bless such a thing. Otherwise, they should not be called
51 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 332b-336a).
52 Some scholars argue that Polemarchus presented Homeric 
view of justice. See Adi Ohir, Plato's Invisible Cities: 
Power and Discourse in the Republic, New York and London, 
1990, p. 52. See also Havelock, The Greek Concept of 
Justice, op. cit., pp. 189-92; Alan Bloom, The Republic of 
Plato, translation with notes and an interpretative Essay, 
New York, 1968, pp. 316-25.
197
wise men if they really meant what they said.53 Socrates 
suggested that others should continue the search for 
justice.54 However, one should understand that the 
definition of justice with reference to the friend-foe 
relationship is still intact if one does not mistake the 
fallacy of Polemarchus' interpretation for the conception 
of justice.
At this point, it was the turn of another character in 
the dialogue, namely Thrasymachus. He was said to be very 
much annoyed by the way Socrates refuted Polemarchus. He 
attempted several times to break in. Socrates described 
Thrasymachus1 reaction to his discussion with Polemarchus 
as 'gathering himself up like a wild beast Thrasymachus 
hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to 
pieces1.55 It was Socrates who approached and conducted 
the discussion which generated such a fierce resentment. 
Although Socrates and Polemarchus could not yet find an 
unqualified definition of justice, they could nevertheless 
at least repudiate what was not justice. Thus, it seems 
that they should have had a presupposition in their minds 
of what ideal justice should be. It was their presupposed 
idea of justice that violated Thrasymachus1 understanding 
of justice. Thrasymachus of course possessed his own idea 
of justice to the same extent that Polemarchus did. 
Otherwise, they would not be so angry when their ideas of 
justice were shaken.
Socrates said that he would have lost his voice if he 
had not looked at Thrasymachus before the man became so 
fierce. This means that if Socrates had not seen 
Thrasymachus in peace before, he would have been shocked by
53 As regards Socrates' perception of Simonides, see 
the Protagoras, 317d.
54 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 335e-336a).
55 Plato, the Republic, (Book I,336b).
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the revelation of such a bestial side to character. After 
that, Thrasymachus asked Socrates to stop playing his 
'Socratic docta ignorantia1 and express his own view of 
justice. Socrates insisted on claiming ignorance and gave 
another of his familiar excuses that he never wronged 
anyone intentionally.56 Thrasymachus said this was 
Socrates1 trick, his well-known irony. He ridiculed the 
fact that Socrates could ask the questions and refute 
others' answers but had no courage to give his own view. 
However, Socrates succeeded in persuading Thrasymachus to 
give his own view of justice with a rather paradoxical 
condition. The condition was that if his answer was better 
than and differed from what had been stated, then the 
ignoramus had to suffer by learning from the other who knew 
the true answer.57 Being so confident that he would win 
the argument himself, Thrasymachus mocked Socrates by 
saying that he must pay as a fine, of a sum of money to 
study the meaning of justice from him.58
Thrasymachus1 definition of justice was 'the just is
56 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 336e). This principle has 
been first inserted in the Apology. The reader usually 
found it in most of the dialogues, especially in the Lesser 
Hippias where it has been meticulously discussed.
57 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 337d).
58 Annas said that this can be an interpretation of the 
meaning of Simonides' justice as regard 'to render each his 
due'. Since Thrasymachus demanded that what was due to him 
with regard to his engagement with Socrates must be the 
payment of some money. While Socrates who was poor could 
not be just in this regard. This point is based on her 
argument which she once made in regard to the idea of 
justice proposed by Cephalus. Annas seems to try to point 
out the inadequacy of Cephalus' idea of justice. See 
Annas, op. cit., p. 19. However, it can be said that this 
points to the fact that Thraysmachus and Socrates differed 
with regard to what they desired. Thrasymachus aimed at 
materialistic reward. Socrates of course hoped to achieve 
the best result of the discussion. If he was ironical, 
then, he must aim at something better and of course he did 
not want to lose his argument to Thrasymachus whose 
definition of justice was unacceptable to Socrates.
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nothing than the advantage of the stronger1 .59 The power 
of this idea of justice of course had been shown in 
Thucydides' the Melian dialogue in his History of
Peloponesian War. It was pointless for the weak to appeal 
to any other law than the law of nature in which the 
stronger was always right and just.
What did Thrasymachus mean by 'the stronger1? It was 
a fact that a man could be regarded to be stronger than 
others in terms of body or of mind. Of course,
Thrasymachus should have been aiming at a person who was 
superior to others in both ways. With regard to such a 
person, he should have meant the ruler of a city. However, 
with regard to Thrasymachus1 statement, Socrates stated 
that he did not understand what Thrasymachus really meant 
when he used the term 'stronger'. In fact, there is a 
considerable discrepancy between Socrates and Thrasymachus 
with regard to their conceptions of the term which actually 
engenders and also underlies the whole argument between 
them.
V
The question Socrates put to Thrasymachus might have 
been taken as a jest when he asked Thrasymachus whether he 
aimed at the strength of the body to which the meat would
be advantageous as in the case of Polydamas the
pancratiast. If so, the flesh of beeves should be regarded 
as the object in question, namely justice. Also, to be 
sure, the flesh could not only be the interest of the 
stronger as Thrasymachus had posited since it was
59 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 338c). This position is 
also discussed in the Laws, 714b-715d.
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advantageous to the weaker body as well.60 In asking this 
kind of question, we understand that Socrates did not 
intend to make a joke. In fact, he intended to check 
whether or not Thrasymachus had meant it in the same way 
that he understood it as regards the use of the term 
'stronger1.
In our previous discussion, we have inferred that with 
regard to the body, man differs from other animals just in 
degree not in kind. What makes man distinct from other
living beings lies in the essence of the soul. Here, of
course, Socrates should have understood the meaning of the 
stronger to have been a person who is stronger in a human 
way not an animal one, that is, the excellence of the soul. 
Since, if justice is the interest of the stronger body, 
then, what is advantageous to the fiercest and strongest 
bestial living being can be regarded as justice. Then, it 
implies that in posing the question in this manner, 
Socrates should have expected to hear or to make
Thrasymachus refer to 'the stronger' of the soul.
Thrasymachus did not think in the same way that
Socrates did. He thought in the same way that many people 
would have thought. That is, the stronger was just the 
stronger, a man who was more powerful than any other man. 
It was not surprising that he answered Socrates by 
referring to the most obvious image of the stronger, that 
is, a man or a group of men who ruled others. To put it 
more precisely, the stronger was the ruler of a city.61 
He argued that the ruler held power and was strong and it 
was the truth that any ruling body, whether it be a 
democracy, oligarchy, or tyranny, always enacted the laws 
with which people had to comply, and served the interest of 
the ruler. Therefore, the interest of the stronger was the
60 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 338d).
61 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 338d-e).
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justice of the city.
However, Thrasymachus admitted to Socrates that it was 
true that no one was infallible. From this, Socrates asked 
whether Thrasymachus denied that it was possible that 
sometimes a ruler might mistake his own disadvantage for an 
advantage. Thrasymachus replied that Socrates1 argument 
was pettifogging, since he did not intend his meaning of 
ruler in the sense that Socrates tried to mislead to. In 
order to prevent such linguistic misunderstanding in their 
debate, Socrates had to ask again what he actually meant 
by the ruler and the stronger.62 Thrasymachus said it was 
the ruler as the ruler that he had in his mind. In this 
respect, it seems that there were two different concepts of 
ruler in their discussion, which generated this 
discrepancy.
To be sure, from the beginning of the discussion, 
Thrasymachus never conceived of the difference between the 
existing ruler and the ideal ruler when he started his 
argument that justice was the interest of the stronger. 
However, the ruler, the physician, the calculator, and any 
other craftsmen in reality were not infallible. Therefore, 
this dimension of the concept of the ruler necessarily 
undermined Thrasymachus1 argument if he continued to refer 
the meaning of the term to the existing ruler. Then, he 
was forced to shift from 'his loose way of speaking1 with 
regard to what he said namely that all were liable to 
err63, to the other dimension of the term, that is, the 
realm of the perfect or ideal, in order to be able to keep 
his argument intact.
The ideal ruler was understood by Thrasymachus to be
62 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 340b).
63 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 340e).
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'the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word1.64 
It was the ruler qua the ruler, since any one who erred in 
ruling could not be called the ruler. In effect, the realm 
of ideal had, in a way already been stipulated in the
nature of language itself.65 If Thrasymachus intended the 
meaning of the stronger in his argument to be the perfect, 
infallible ruler, then the meaning of justice had to be of 
the ideal as well. To be sure, it was generated from 
Socrates' dialectic method that entailed Thrasymachus' 
movement from one realm to another. This oscillating
movement of course reminds us of what we have discussed 
earlier regarding Socrates' discussion of the theory of 
names in the Cratylus. It is the same movement, that is, 
the movement between the realm of the divine and the human.
It was at this point that Socrates shifted
Thrasymachus' argument from human justice to divine
justice. In the realm of the perfect or divine, the ruler 
was infallible and so was justice. To be sure, it was 
justice of the divine that Socrates had imposed since his 
discussion with Polemarchus, that is, justice as human 
excellence never harmed or led to deterioration of anyone. 
In fact, as Socrates argued, Thrasymachus had given nothing 
new to the definition of justice. He had just added the 
term 'the stronger' to the previous answer which he 
himself had forbidden.66 For Thrasymachus had implicitly 
referred his meaning of ruler to that of the realm of the 
ideal or what was regarded in its 'very most precise sense 
of the word,' akribei logo. Then Socrates continued his
64 Plato, the Republic, ibid.
65 As Plato criticized the stiffness of the language in 
the Epistle VII.
66 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 339a).
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investigation from such a premise.67
Having been imposed on by his own argument,
Thrasymachus conceded to Socrates that the physician, in a 
precise way of speaking, was a healer of the sick not a 
moneymaker, and also the pilot was not a sailor but a ruler 
of sailors.68 Moreover, in such a realm, the advantage of 
any art and artist was nothing but to be as perfect as 
possible. However, the ideal art and artist were already 
perfect in themselves. Then the art must be aimed towards 
the perfection of something else rather than of itself. 
Therefore 'to provide for this, then, what is
advantageous, that is the end for which art was
devised'.69 Then medicine in this precise sense of the
word was considered the advantage of the body not of
itself. Hence, Socrates argued that the art of the
stronger and the stronger himself did not 'consider or
enjoin the advantage of the stronger but every art that of
the weaker which is ruled by it1.70 Of course, from this, 
Thrasymachus1 definition of justice seemed to suffer 'a 
reversal of form'.71
However, Thrasymachus did not surrender. In arguing 
against Socrates, he then raised the example of the 
shepherd by asking Socrates to consider that the actual 
reason why the shepherd takes care of the welfare of a
67 At this point, Plato has Cleitophon and Polemarchus 
discussed this point in order to elaborate the problem in 
Thrasymachus' argument. As Annas comments that
'Cleitophon's suggestion sounds a bit naive, but we can 
take it as an attempt to close the gap threatening to open 
between Thrasymachus's two formulations in terms of the 
stronger and of the ruler'. Annas, op. cit., p. 41.
68 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 341c-d).
69 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 341e).
70 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 342c).
71 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 343a).
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flock of sheep was just in the pursuit of his own 
interests. This was also true as regards the attitude of 
the ruler towards the ruled. The ruler lived happily since 
he had been served by his subjects who had complied with 
the laws which they thought just, though in fact they had 
been unjustly enacted with reference to the interest of the 
ruler.
At this point, Thrasymachus clarified his theory of 
justice. Justice was actually the interest of the unjust 
man who was stronger and therefore ruled. The unjust man 
had been able to take advantage of the just man because the 
latter was honest, straightforward, and simple-minded. The 
more unjust a man was, the happier his life would be, since 
it was more often than not that small criminals could 
hardly escape detection while the full scale of injustice 
as in the form of the tyrant not only eluded exposure but 
also was said to be happy. Moreover, his life had been 
blessed by his own subjects and others who heard his story. 
So it was the fear of suffering wrong and not the fear of 
committing crimes that caused one to revile injustice. 
Then Thrasymachus confirmed that 'injustice on a 
sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more 
masterful thing than justice,..and..it is the advantage of 
the stronger that is the just1.72
VI
Again, Socrates had to point out to Thrasymachus that 
he was still confusing the two opposing realms. In the 
realm of the ideal or that of the 'precise sense of the 
word, • the art of the shepherd was concerned with nothing
72 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 343c).
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but the welfare of his flock of sheep.73 To be sure, it 
was the wage-earning art that could be said to be 
responsible for making profit from sheep farming produce. 
Each art yielded a particular benefit. It was in fact the 
art of wage-earning that accompanied all other arts i.e., 
medicine, pilot etc., which yielded the benefit only to the 
subject which concerned each of them, that is, medicine- 
health, pilot-safety at sea. In this regard, a person
would not become a doctor because he earned wages, neither 
would we call a man who was paid for his practising 
medicine a wage-earner. Therefore, it was not in the art 
of ruling in every form that sought for its own benefit, 
since no true ruler of his own will would bother to rule or
73 This analogy of the shepherd and his tending of the 
herds of animals is problematic. As Michel Foucault points 
this out and examines it in details in his Towards a 
Criticism of 'Political Reason1. See Michel Foucault, 
'Towards a Criticism of "Political Reason” in The Tanner 
Lectures On Human Values 1981 Vol. II, Sterling M. McMurrin 
(ed.), Salt Lake City and London, 1981, pp.223-254. 
Foucault is right as he observed Plato's different 
treatment with regard to the analogy of the shepherd in the 
Critias, the Republic, and the Laws on the one hand, and 
the Statesman on the other. Foucault said 'Plato thrashes 
it out in the Statesman'. Also, according to Foucault, 
Plato solved the problem of the analogy [Foucault, ibid., 
p. 232 ] .
With regard to this problem, it can be said that Plato 
was aware of it. In the Republic, it was Thrasymachus who 
introduced this analogy to support his argument. What 
should have been derived from the analogy of the shepherd 
is that the shepherd feeds and takes care of his sheep 
because he will slaughter them in the end anyhow. However, 
Socrates found his way out by dividing between the art of 
the shepherd and the art of money-making. From this, the 
art of shepherd is left with the art of tending animals by 
itself. This method of division is dialectic as regards 
its search for the first principle or essence of the things 
in concern. In the Statesman, it is obvious that Plato 
really 'thrashed it out1 as Foucault commented. The 
Stranger pointed to the fact that, with regard to the myth 
of the revolution of the universe which is related to the 
story of Atreus, the descendants in the Orestes family, the 
gods1 care of the herds of men which resembled the care of 
the shepherd for his animals cannot be the art of the 
statesman. See further discussion in Chapter Eleven.
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hold the office in order to benefit other people. That was 
why money or honour had to be laid down as a return for the 
work of the ruler or those who held the office. Some were 
satisfied with money, and others with honour, but the good 
man reproached both. Therefore, for him, only a certain 
kind of penalty would possibly constrain him to rule. That 
is to say, if he did not rule, he would in turn be ruled by 
those who were inferior to him. Paradoxically, the good 
man was encouraged to rule through fear of being ruled by 
an inferior one.74
Of course, the inferior one always wanted to rule in 
order to take advantage of other people for his own self- 
interest. Then the good man had to fight for himself and 
won the battle in order to prevent the inferior from having 
control over him. For, when the inferior ruled, he was a 
worse ruler. So this seems to imply that the best ruled in 
order to protect himself as well as others who were like 
him; and when the best man ruled, justice prevailed because 
the best regarded justice to be advantageous to him. Also, 
the one who ruled must be the stronger. If the best was 
the stronger, which is as it should be, then, at this 
point, Socrates seems in a way to concur with 
Thrasymachus1s theory. Although, it seems to contradict 
what he had proved just a short while ago that the stronger 
ruled for the sake of the benefit of the weaker.75 
Accordingly, the question here is whether or not Socrates 
and Thrasymachus shared a similar understanding of the 
following terms such as 'the good and the bad, the 
stronger and the weaker, and the best and the worst1. 
Socrates seemed to be aware of this problem although he by 
no means conceded defeat, as he said he would reserve the 
dispute over Thrasymachus' theory that justice was in the
74 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 345d-347d). The discussion 
on the paradox of courage and fear can be found in the 
Laches and the Laws.
75 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 342c).
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interest of the superior for another occasion. It is 
understood that this is not a serious problem since he 
might possibly have shared with Thrasymachus the definition 
as it has been suggested. What is more important is that 
Thrasymachus stated that the unjust life was better than 
the just life, which indicated the discrepancy between 
their views on the terms in question.76 It has to be 
after the question of the happiness of the just and the 
unjust lives had been examined, in which Thrasymachus' 
views on these terms, namely, virtue, vice, good, bad, 
wise, ignorant were investigated, that Socrates would be 
able to return to discuss the original problem of the 
definition.
VII
Virtue, arete, was normally desirable while vice, 
kakia, was not. It is very doubtful what a man would view 
of virtue and vice if he argued that the unjust life was 
better than the just. Justice was assigned to be a kind of 
virtue not vice.77 From this, people expected justice to 
render justice to benefit them. However, in his argument, 
Thrasymachus should have thought that injustice rendered 
benefit and justice did not. If so, then justice in his 
view must be vice and injustice virtue. Could justice be 
vice? This is the theme of the questions Socrates put to 
Thrasymachus.
Indeed, for Thrasymachus, thinking in terms of profit, 
anything, whatever it might be, that did not return benefit 
for what one had done must be regarded as vice. Therefore
76 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 347e).
77 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 348e-349a).
208
its opposite had to be regarded as virtue. If justice 
paid, it was virtue. If it did not, it was vice. So it is 
mostly that case that injustice rather than justice 
returned the benefit. In fact, Thrasymachus* view was not 
too complicated to comprehend. He just called what was 
conventionally regarded as justice injustice, and injustice 
justice. However, it seemed that in that context there 
existed a double standard of justice and Thrasymachus 
sometimes referred to one and sometimes to another. The 
idea of the double standard of justice perhaps was 
unconscious and unacknowledged by Thrasymachus. On the 
other hand, it might be possible that he intentionally 
seemed to prefer the confusion to the clarification of 
those two standards of justice which Socrates tried to make 
him distinguish between.78 One was the conventional view 
of justice according to which one expected everyone but 
himself to act. The other was called the natural justice 
which one discreetly and secretly practised.79 
Thrasymachus regarded anyone who practised and believed in 
the conventional justice as 'a most noble simplicity or 
goodness of heart, euetheia.80 Whether the term 'goodness 
of heart' was literally intended, or was ironically used 
with a pathetic regard, depends upon the standard of 
justice referred to. With a view to the conventional 
justice, such a person was truly good-natured. However, 
according to the other, like that of Thrasymachus, he was 
just simple and foolish.81 In a sense, the existence of
78 The unjust man can exploit others in the society on 
the condition that the society has double standard of 
justice. Cf. this point in Adi Ophir, op. cit., pp. 46- 
72.
79 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 358a).
80 Plato, the Republic, ibid.
81 A man might have really admired someone or something
if it is congenial to his standard of moral values, 
provided he has only one standard. As regards the double 
standard of justice, if it possible for a person to
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the double standard of justice in individuals or the public 
blurs the demarcation line between justice and injustice. 
The term 'innocence1 possibly conveys twofold
connotations. Also, the use of irony in one way or another 
emerges and becomes possible because of the existence of 
individuals or the public who had a double standard of 
justice. The degree of irony correlates with the degree of 
hypocrisy.
However, Thrasymachus could not admit that the unjust 
man had 'badness of heart* as Socrates asked him whether 
it should be the case as the unjust man was opposed to the 
just who was said to have 'goodness of heart1. With 
regard to his own view of justice, namely the natural 
justice, injustice in the conventional sense could not be 
'badness of heart1, since it rendered what was due to him, 
that is, all kinds of the pleasures as such. Instead, any 
person who benefited from what he had done, no matter how 
he did it, was understood to have 'goodness of judgement', 
euboulia.82 Moreover, the unjust man could be regarded as 
being absolutely intelligent and good, phronimos kai 
agathos, when he had accomplished total injustice, that is, 
assuming political power and ruling over men and cities.83 
It is the fullest scale of exploitation that a man can do 
with regard to his self-interest by which the most happiest 
life can be made possible. At last, Thrasymachus1 view of 
virtue and vice came to the fore. Injustice was a kind of
experience a state of self-conflict. For instance, in 
front of a group of people who possess a certain kind of 
values of justice opposed to his, the person might be 
refrained from expressing his true judgement towards what 
he himself would actually regard as admirable or deplorable 
while other people go against or accept it. But he would 
enjoy recalling highly or merely be upset about it when he 
was by himself. See the Laws, (Book II 655d-656b).
82 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 348d).
83 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 349d).
210
virtue and wisdom, and justice was the opposite.84
Socrates said he was surprised that Thrasymachus held 
such a view, since, as regards the conventional view in the 
double standard of justice, most people would admit that 
injustice was profitable but vicious and disgraceful.85 
For them, injustice rendered both pleasures and shame. 
However, such an oxymoron did not seem to exist in 
Thrasymachus* explanation of injustice; for Thrasymachus 
had not shown any hesitation in putting injustice in the 
category of virtue and wisdom while others would hold back 
from that position. Socrates regarded Thrasymachus1 view 
as more problematic than the conventional one, since self- 
contradiction in a person*s thoughts or actions would cast 
doubt or uncertainty upon himself. It is more likely for 
one with such self-conflict to wonder about, thaumazo, and 
rethink the truth of what is in question than those who do 
not have such doubts. The fact that there was no sign of 
self-conflict in Thrasymachus that made Socrates say that 
he now absolutely believed that Thrasymachus really meant 
what he said otherwise he should not have talked in such 
manner in front of many people who held opposite views to 
him.86
Socrates proceeded to examine whether there was 
actually no inconsistency in Thrasymachus' argument. He 
highlighted a particular point. In fact, this point
84 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 348e).
85 As regards this point, Socrates said later in his 
speech on the imperfect souls and cities that in democracy 
the meanings of moral values have been reversed. People 
regarded the good as bad and so on. Things were miscalled. 
See the Republic, (Book VIII 560-1); the Laws, (Book II 
661b).
86 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 348e-349a). The origin of 
self-conflict with regard to a nature or habit of a person 
in relation to the public is elaborated in the Laws, Book 
II.
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underlay the argument that the unjust man took advantage of 
the just man because he was better than the other who was 
simple-minded, foolish and incapable. In this regard, 
Thrasymachus might have thought that all men desired the 
same good such as the pleasures of wine, women, feasts, and 
the like. He took for granted that the reason for a person 
not to act like others in pursuit of what was generally 
regarded to be the good, lay either in the person's 
stupidity or incapability, or both. He did not believe 
that the just man might have a different kind of knowledge 
which could generate a different view of the good. Thus, 
the reason for a person acting differently or perhaps 
absurdly could be the disparity in the view of the good 
rather than stupidity or incapability.
That is why, with regard to this point, Socrates asked 
Thrasymachus whether it was the just men or the unjust men 
who wished to outdo other people, pleonektein.81 
Thrasymachus answered that it was only the unjust men who 
could outdo other people, both just and unjust, for his own 
advantage.
With regard to the just man, he never competed with 
others like himself, because they all had the same idea of 
the good. Also, the just man could not surpass the others 
like him with regard to the perfection of their knowledge 
in the same way that the musician or the physician would 
not compete with others in tuning a lyre or prescribing 
nutrition, if they really were the true musician or 
physician.88 However, the musician or the physician would 
of course outdo those who had no connection with music or
87 Desmond Lee explained that it is difficult to
reproduce the term in translation. He suggested the words 
such as 'get better of1, 'outdo', 'do better than', as no 
single English term is appropriate. See Desmond Lee, The 
Republic of Plato, Harmondsworth, 1981, p. 92ff.
88 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 349d-350a).
212
medicine.
In that respect, the just man would only get the 
better of only the unjust. However, as regards all forms 
of knowledge, the knowledgable man would outdo the ignorant 
but not his like, namely those who understood what he 
understood. The knowledgable man was surely regarded as 
wise whilst the other was ignorant. Also, the wise man was 
generally regarded as good and the ignorant as bad. 
Therefore, the bad man and the ignoramus would try to 
overreach both the knowledgable man and the ignorant like 
himself.89 Thrasymachus stated earlier that only the 
unjust would outdo both the just and the unjust men. For 
this reason, he was subject to the severe force of the 
argument to contradict himself that 'the just man turned 
to be the wise and good, and the unjust the bad and 
ignorant1.90
Consequently, Thrasymachus was said to feel ashamed. 
It was also reported that no one had seen him in such state 
before.91 In effect, from this, he seemed to give up his 
position. He stated that he could not defend his position 
if he was not allowed to use longer speeches than Socrates 
imposed. However, with regard to his personality, 
surprisingly, he seemed to surrender very easily and 
quickly, for Glaucon noticed and mentioned later that 
Thrasymachus was now like a serpent which just had been 
charmed.92
As justice turned out to be good and wise, Socrates 
then went on to examine that whether or not, in enslaving
89 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 350b).
90 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 350c).
91 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 350d).
92 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 358b).
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another city, a city needed to combine justice with it. To 
this, Thrasymachus said that needs of the city depended on 
whether justice or injustice was regarded as wisdom. His 
reply indicated that he began to regard other different 
views as possible alternatives to his own view. Socrates 
proved that it was not possible for any function to be well 
accomplished if it had been carried out without justice. 
In contradistinction to the unjust man, the just man would 
not compete with his like, but he would make friends with 
others like him and he was also a friend to himself. In 
this regard, it was justice that brought 'oneness of mind 
and love1.93 Likewise, a city would perform her own 
function well if there had been justice to unite all 
elements in herself so that they would not be against one 
another. In other words, justice enables the city not to 
be an enemy to herself.
Of course, this was applicable to all other things, 
collective or individual. Furthermore, everything had its 
own specific function. When the best of its function had
been carried out, it would be regarded as the virtue of 
such a thing. Then, 'whatever operates will do its own 
work well by its own virtue and badly by its own 
defect1.94 With regard to the soul, its function was 
concerned with 'management, rule, deliberation, and the 
like, and also life'. Without this, nothing in the world 
could ever be accomplished. Then, the soul would govern 
well with its own virtue; so the virtue of the soul should 
be something that brings unity and love to itself.
Following this line of argument, Thrasymachus at last 
had to admit that the excellence or virtue of the soul must 
be justice and its defect injustice.95 As said earlier,
93 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 351d).
94 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 353c).
95 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 353e).
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we presumed that Socrates expected Thrasymachus to explain 
his theory of justice that 'the stronger1 must be 
understood with reference to the soul not the body. To be 
sure, what Socrates arrived at was not that the excellence 
of the stronger was justice; it was the virtue of any soul 
regardless of its strength or weakness. Then, any just 
soul and any just man 'will live well and the unjust 
ill1.96 Also, one who lived well should be blessed and 
happy. Therefore, justice could not be understood to 'pay 
to be miserable, but to be happy, 1 and 'never can 
injustice be more profitable than justice'.97 So it seems 
that what Thrasymachus had argued for the happiness of the 
unjust life was dialectically refuted by Socrates.98
Although Socrates had successfully proved what the 
consequences of justice and injustice should be, he 
confessed that the meaning of justice was still unknown 
since he hastened to concern himself with the consequences 
of justice before completing the discussion on its cause, 
namely justice itself. Although justice had been proved to 
be virtue and wisdom, it could not be regarded as a better 
answer to the original problem Socrates admitted that 
after all he knew nothing. He insisted that it was 
necessary to know what justice was before one could know 
whether it was really virtue or not, and whether its 
possessor was or was not happy. Otherwise, the kind of 
happiness it rendered to the just life would remain obscure 
although we know that justice brought happiness to the just 
soul and the just man.
96 Plato, the Republic, ibid,
97 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 354a).
98 It is not a substantial victory. Michael C. Stokes 
stated that it is the dialectical defeat of Thrasymachus. 
See Michael C. Stokes, 'Adeimantus in the Republic1 in 
Justice, Law, and Method in Plato and Aristotle, Spiro 
Panagiotou (ed.), Edmonton, Canada, 1987, p. 62.
215
VIII
It is this problem that caused Glaucon to step into 
Thrasymachus' position. Glaucon's nature or personality 
was described as 'always an intrepid enterprising, spirit 
in everything1", though he hardly believed that the life 
of the unjust man could be far better than that of the just 
man. However, he could not be content with Socrates' 
dialectical victory over Thrasymachus' untimely surrender. 
Glaucon and his brother Adeimantus were seriously concerned 
about the problem of justice. They strongly intended to 
search for the truth of the matter. In pursuit of the 
argument, the reasoning and the language of the argument 
from both sides should have been set forth so that anyone 
could consider which one was indisputable.100 So, the 
Thrasymachian argument must be carried on.
Glaucon decided to renew and elaborate Thrasymachus' 
position at its best in order to find out the truth about 
justice and injustice. In the meantime, he expected to 
hear a better defence from Socrates. Also, Glaucon argued 
that there were three kinds of goodness which rendered 
benefits to men; first, there was the good that one chose 
for its own sake not because of its consequences; secondly, 
there was the good that one loved both for its own sake and
99 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 357a). Glaucon's 
character is identifiable to the nature of the timorcratic 
man in Socrates' speech of the imperfect souls and cities 
in the Republic, Book VIII. Mary P. Nichols points that 
Glaucon's 'the most manly' character enables him to accept 
the speech on communism with regard to Socrates' answer to 
one of the three waves of problem concerning the education 
of the philosophic guardian for women and children. Mary 
P. Nichols, 'Spiritedness and Philosophy of Plato's 
Republic' in Understanding the Political Spirit: 
Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche, 
Catherine H. Zuckert (ed.), New Haven and London, 1988, 
p. 58.
100 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 358b, 362e).
216
for its consequences; thirdly, there was the good that one 
welcomed not for itself but only for the rewards and other 
benefits that accrued from it.101
Socrates said that justice must belong to the good, 
which someone aspiring to happiness must love both for its 
own sake and for the sake of its consequences.102 It 
seems that Glaucon was aware of the double standard of 
justice as he argued that the majority of the people 
believed that justice belonged to the good which one 
practised only for the sake of its consequences, though he 
possibly suffered from the practice itself.103 With 
reference to Socrates1 recent argument that the virtue of 
the soul was justice, Glaucon said that he desired 'to
hear what each of them, justice and injustice, is and what
potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the 
soul, but to dismiss their rewards and consequences1.104 
Socrates was urged to give the answer if he really intended 
to defend his case.105
Thrasymachus' argument was then expounded by Glaucon 
in the following way. First, as once argued, there existed 
the double standard of justice, namely natural and
conventional justice. According to the former, one
preferred to commit injustice rather than suffer it. The 
conventional justice emerged from the agreement made by 
those weaker ones who could not commit injustice but indeed 
suffered from it. In contradistinction to the conventional 
justice, the law of natural justice allowed the stronger to 
do wrong and reap benefits with impunity. For, when the
101 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 357b-c).
102 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 358a).
103 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 358a).
104 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 358b).
105 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 357b-c).
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weaker was wronged, he could not revenge himself.
Glaucon said that in view of these two kinds of justice, 
there existed the double standard of justice where one 
would prefer others to be just while he himself would 
secretly commit injustice whenever he had the chance. Only 
a mad man would make such a compact with anyone if he had 
power to do and get away from injustice, since it was 
believed that no one would do justice out of his own will 
but because it was necessity. Glaucon argued that there 
would be no difference between the just man and the unjust 
man if they could do wrong with impunity. Having such a 
chance, everyone would become a Gyges whom nobody ever 
suspected since by his magic ring he became invisible 
whenever he committed any crimes. Given this condition, if 
the most just man who was really simple and noble could 
hold his course unchangeable unto death even though he was 
mistaken for the unjust one all his life, while the most 
unjust man with his crafty expertise not only escaped 
detection but secured for himself the greatest reputation 
for justice, then one could be assured that the man was 
just not only for the consequence of justice such as 
honours and other rewards but also for the sake of justice 
itself. Following this, Glaucon concluded that not until 
these two kinds of life could each be separated in such a 
condition, the judgement as to which of the two was the 
happier could not be justly made.106 Otherwise, the 
truth might have been as people said that 'so much better 
they say is the life that is prepared for the unjust man 
from gods and men then that which awaits the just1.107
Following this, Adeimantus also came forward to 
continue where Glaucon had left off. He clarified and 
complemented his brother's speech. Like Glaucon, with a 
the idea of the double standard of justice in his mind, he
106 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 358e-361d).
107 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 362c).
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argued that people taught their children to be just not for 
the sake of justice but for its consequences. It had been 
taught that one should pretend to be just but not to be 
really just, since justice itself was regarded as being 
unpleasant and laborious whereas injustice was pleasant and 
easy to win. Speaking about the gods in relation to the 
just man and the unjust man, Adeimantus stated that the 
just man was praised and believed to be blessed by the 
gods. Also, the rewards for his justice would be extended 
further to his children's children, whilst the unjust man 
was said to suffer for his evil deeds in the house of Hades 
as it had been related by the great poets, Homer and 
Hesiod. However, 'another kind of language about justice 
and injustice employed by both laymen and poets' conveyed 
different message. It said that if the gods really 
existed, they must be unjust and discriminate towards men, 
since, by means of sacrifices, the unjust men who were 
richer than the just men could attract the better care from 
the gods. Otherwise, many good men should not have faced 
such misfortunes and tragic life.108 It was believed 
that only the gods could penetrate human minds.109 They 
knew who was pretentious and who was genuine. So how could 
they disappoint the good men unless they were unjust 
themselves?
Perhaps the gods were indifferent to human affairs. 
If so, men did not need to bother themselves with eluding 
the eye of the gods. Moreover, men should do and indulge 
themselves with what could pay them better, and that was 
injustice not justice. Adeimantus then affirmed the idea 
that no one was willing to be really just. There could be 
no other reason for those men to praise justice than their 
lack of power to practise injustice without impunity.
108 Cf. the Laws, (Book X 906b-d).
109 See Michael Davis, 'Politics and Madness' in
Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, J. Peter Euben (ed.), 
op. cit., pp.143-4.
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Therefore, justice was called forth by those who were 
either inferior because of their old age or lack of manly 
spirit, or it was because they were just divine by nature. 
Previously, no one had ever commended justice or censured 
injustice both for its consequences and more for its own 
sake as Socrates had asserted, since, without its rewards, 
justice itself seemed to be useless and undesirable. On 
the contrary, with regard to rewards, injustice was 
reasonably more attractive than justice.
Finally, Adeimantus concluded that it was from all 
these points that he and Glaucon were impelled to complete 
the unfinished argument started by Thrasymachus. Also, 
they had to ask Socrates, who had passed his entire life in 
the consideration of this matter, to render them a better 
argument on justice. He said that no one would believe 
that justice was better than injustice until Socrates could 
prove that justice by itself, dwelling in a man's soul, was 
the greatest good in itself and injustice the greatest of 
all evils in itself, regardless of their consequences, and 
by that means, a man would be his own best guardian for 
justice and against injustice.110
So, it seems that in the circumstance Glaucon and 
Adeimantus could not produce any stronger argument for 
justice. Even then, without a good reason, they said that 
they could not accept that result either. So far, the
stronger argument was that justice without rewards was
undesirable. However what Socrates argued was that one
chose to be just for the sake of justice and for its
consequences. Moreover, the highest priority regarding
110 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 363d-367e). Compare this 
point to 360c: 'And in the end, I suppose, they seize the 
citadel of the young man's soul, finding it empty and 
unoccupied by studies and honourable pursuits and true 
discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians in 
the mind of men who are dear to the gods." See also the 
Laws, Book X, 961d; the Phaedo, 113d.
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benefits lay in justice itself not its consequences. To be 
sure, what Socrates argued so far makes one recall what 
Cephalus had stated earlier with regard to the matter of 
life and happiness. Cephalus did not regard old age or 
wealth as the cause of happiness and unhappiness.111 
That both could be either very useful or useless depends on 
the character of man. To be sure, from the discussion, 
Socrates concluded that the excellence of the soul was 
justice. Also, we all know that the soul was regarded as 
the essence of man. Therefore, at this point, justice and 
the character of man are conflated to the extent that the 
discussion of the character of man is indispensable to the 
search for justice, and to understand the character of man, 
it is necessary to understand the nature of the soul. The 
search for the understanding of the nature of the soul is 
indeed the search for man's self-knowledge.
111 Also compare this to what Socrates stated in the 
Apology, 3 0a-b: 'For I go about doing nothing else than
urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or 
your property more than for the perfection of your souls, 
or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does not come 
from money, but from virtues comes money and all other good 
things to man, both to the individual and to the state. ' 
See also the Euthydemus, 280b-c.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Just City
In defense of justice, it seems that Socrates had to 
search for the soul. However, from the inception of the 
search, Socrates did not state that it was a search for the 
soul. Actually he said that he was to search for justice 
in man.1 During the search, he said he had to resort to a 
particular kind of method. For example, a person with 
myopia would find it rather difficult to read small letters 
from a distance, particularly when he was not yet familiar 
with the words or the group of letters. On the other hand, 
if he had observed that 'these same letters existed 
elsewhere larger and on a larger surface,1 then it would be 
easier for him to recognize them at a distance, no matter 
how it appeared.2
So in searching for justice in man, it would be quite 
difficult for someone who could not easily recognise 
justice, since he would not yet know exactly what justice 
was. Therefore, the search for justice would be easier to 
undertake in a city which consisted of a great number of 
men and was therefore larger. After that, one could then 
'examine it also in the individual, looking for the
likeness of the greater in the form of the less1.3 An
individual to be examined cannot possibly be anyone other 
than one's own self. As, during the search for justice in 
the polis, Socrates said that 'what we thought we saw there 
we must refer back to the individual man, 1 and 'we shall 
thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in 
his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these
1 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 368e).
2 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 368d).
3 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 368e-369a).
222
with those in the city to receive properly the same 
appellations1.4 Therefore, to examine one's self in order 
to find out whether it has such quality discovered in the 
city is to examine one's soul.
To familiarise oneself with an easier object before 
undertaking a more difficult seems to be a part of the 
method of the search. For the same reason, the search for 
the statesmanship and sophistry in the Statesman and the 
Sophist employs a method similar to the one used in the 
search for justice in the Republic.5 However, there is a 
logical reverse between the methods in the Republic and in 
the Statesman. In the Republic, one was recommended 'to 
look for the quality of justice in the states, and then 
only examine it also in the individual, looking for the 
likeness of the greater in the form of the less'. In its 
reverse, looking for the same kind of activity with regard 
to the statesmanship in the Statesman, one had 'to see in 
another small and particular example the nature of example 
in general, with the intention of transferring afterwards 
the same figurative method from the lesser things to the 
most exalted eminence of the king'.6 Also, the method of 
hunting the sophist is that one should take some lesser 
thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater.7 To 
be sure, that what is larger is easier to find than what is 
smaller perhaps cannot be taken for granted as the main 
reason. So the reason that justice of a city which was 
larger was easier to discover than that of an individual 
which was smaller seems to be inadequate.
4 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 434d-435a).
5 Plato, Statesman, (277e-278d); Sophist, (218d-e).
6 Plato, Statesman, (278e). Jacob Klein comments that 
despite their different level, the knowledge of the king 
and of the pig-breeder is the same thing. Klein, op. cit., 
pp. 152-3.
7 Plato, Sophist, (218d-e).
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I
With regard to the analogy of the city and man, there 
should have been other reasons. For, choosing justice in 
a city as a larger example for justice in man, the reason 
could not lie only in the virtue of the size or quantity of 
the city. It must also lie in the virtue or the nature of 
the city itself. Why must the analogy be the city and man?
To answer this, we have to go back to what has led us 
here. The investigation of justice in man originated from 
Glaucon and Adeimantus1 request for a defense of happiness 
of the just soul. Such a request was necessitated by the 
argument between Thrasymachus and Socrates. Thrasymachus 
put forward his argument because he was exasperated by the 
way Socrates conducted his discussion on the problem of 
justice with Polemarchus. The problem of justice 
originally emerged from the discussion between Socrates and 
Cephalus with regard to happiness and justice. Cephalus1 
view of happiness was opposed to Thrasymachus1. According 
to Cephalus, the primary cause of happiness lay in the 
character of man. The usefulness of wealth and age 
depended on the character of man. However, he also argued 
that a man was happy not because of either himself or 
wealth and age; both were important. As we know, in 
supporting of his argument, he alluded to Themistocles' 
reply to the Seriphean that 'neither would he himself ever 
have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the 
other if he had been an Athenian'. In other words, that a 
man became what he was was attributable to his city and the 
man himself. As argued above, Socrates' argument was quite 
congenial to that of Cephalus, namely Socrates' justice and 
Cephalus' character of man. Then, such a relationship 
between the city and man is indissoluble in the same way 
that the quest for justice of a city is inseparable from 
the quest for justice of a man and vice versa.
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Therefore, first of all, the most significant motif 
for Socrates in introducing the analogy of the city and man
is probably similar to what Cephalus alluded to and
regarded as generally applicable to man with regard to his 
life and happiness.8 Next to this, Thrasymachus is said to 
have referred to the study of man by way of political 
contexts to explain that by 'the stronger1 in his argument 
he meant the ruler of the city.9 Also, the absolute rule 
of the unjust man, namely tyranny, would render absolute 
happiness. So another reason for the use of the analogy of 
the city and man is that in order to refute the idea of the 
stronger as the ruler of the city employed in Thrasymachus, 
Socrates had to prove in the same way that the stronger man 
as the ruler of the city ruled or governed for the sake of 
justice, in which, apart from rendering happiness to 
himself, it benefited the others in the city altogether. 
The third reason is drawn from the Phaedrus which points 
out that 'to tell what the soul really is would be a matter
for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within
human power to describe it briefly in a figure1.10 That 
is why in the Phaedrus the soul has been described as an 
image of the composite nature of a pair of winged horses
8 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 330a). It is interesting 
that Torsten J. Andersson points out modern element in 
Plato as regards the sociological approach to the 
interpretation of man in the use of the analogy between the 
city and man in the Republic. However, it seems that 
although Plato should have been conscious of this 
interrelationship between man and society, he intended not 
to expose it unreservedly. Incidentally, Anderson does not 
refer at all to Cephalus from whom the idea seems to be 
initiated. Instead, he just argues that this pattern of 
the study of man in a political context has been first 
referred to by Thrasymachus at 338d-339a, 343b-3444c. See 
Torsten J. Andersson, Polis and Psyche: A Motif in Plato's 
Republic, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1971, pp. 15- 
17. The sociological element may exist in Plato. But his 
philosophical foundation is definitely not sociologism.
9 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 338d-339a, 343b-344c). See
Andersson in footnote 8.
10 Plato, Phaedrus, (246a).
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and a charioteer.11 Following the similar reason, then, 
in the Republic, in investigating the soul, the image of a 
city has been likened to the soul.
The last reason of the study of the soul by the image 
of the city is an educational one. In the Statesman, when 
the young Socrates said he could not understand what the 
Stranger had explained about his method of the search for 
the meaning of statesmanship, the Stranger replied that it 
was a human plight to need another example for the very 
example.12 The Stranger seemed to imply that what he had 
discussed about the statesmanship was already a good 
example of what it was, but it was still deficient to the 
young Socrates who required another good example for the 
one already given. Then he gave another example in 
explaining his manner of examination. He explained that 
children needed to familiarise themselves with some letters 
before they could recognise them in a more difficult form 
of syllables. Presumably, the method in the Republic is 
similar to that in the Statesman. The forms of the city, 
just and unjust, are taken as the easier example of the 
forms or nature of the soul, after one has gradually 
familiarised oneself with what can be easily understood. 
He then could recognise justice and injustice in his 
soul.13
Furthermore, as we know, Socrates studied not only the 
origin of the city itself but also examined its changing 
political constitutions. Certainly, that kind of
investigation contributes directly to the investigation of
11 Plato, Phaedrus, (246a). The image of the soul as the 
composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a 
charioteer in the Phaedrus is to be brought into discussion 
afterwards to complement the image of the soul as the city.
12 This point is related to the problem of self-knowledge 
which is to be discussed later.
13 Plato, Statesman, (277d-e, 278a-e).
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the nature of the soul if one takes the Phaedrus into 
account. In the second part of the Phaedrus, the theory of 
speech and writing is discussed from which the dialogue 
leads to the demand of the understanding of the nature of 
the soul as a prerequisite for the good discourse.14 
However, 'without knowing the nature of the whole man,1 one 
cannot 'acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of 
the soul1.15 Following the Hippocratic method, Socrates 
argued that in search for the nature of the soul one must
14 Plato, Phaedrus, (2 69e-270b).
15 Plato, Phaedrus, (270c). In search of the nature of the 
soul, Phaedrus mentioned the Hippocratic tradition which 
employed inductive method, namely to study human body in 
general, to discover human nature. With reference to the 
Hippocratic tradition, Walter Hamilton remarked that 'it 
is not possible to identify the source of Phaedrus* 
statement in the numerous extant works attributed to 
Hippocrates.' But W.H.S. Jones commented in his
translation of Hippocrates' Nature of Man that 'Galen is 
convinced that the first section (of the Nature of Man) is 
referred by Plato in the famous passage in the Phaedrus..* 
Howver, Jones also let us know that some scholar like E. 
Littre believed that Plato referred to Ancient Medicine not 
to Nature of Man, Apart from this, R.B. Levinson pointed 
to other matter such as breeding at 747c-d in the Laws 
which he regarded as Hippocratic influence on Plato, 
particularly from On Airs, Waters, and Places whose part 
dealt with the topic of human types in connection to the 
climate. The comprehensive comment with regard to Plato's 
method in the Phaedrus and Hippocrates is rendered by 
Ludwig Edelstein. He argued that Hippocratic method and 
Platonic dialectic are compatible since
'Hippocrates considered the body an organism; 
medical practice he based on the knowledge 
resulting from the comprehension of the scattered 
particulars into one concept and the division of 
the whole in turn into its natural species, or, 
to use Platonic language, on dialectic'.
See Plato, the Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII, 
translated by Walter Hamilton, Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 90; 
Hippocrates Vol. IV, On the Universe, translated by W.H.S. 
Jones, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. xxvii; R.B. Levinson, 
In Defense of Plato, Cambridge, Massachusett 1953, p. 222; 
The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Ludwig Edelstein, 
'Hippocrates' in N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (eds.), 
opcit.,pp. 518-519.
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consider
'first, whether it is one and all 
alike, or, like the body, of multiform 
aspect; for this is what we call 
explaining its nature,...and
secondly,..what its action is and 
toward what it is directed, or how it 
is acted upon and by what..'16
That is to say, with the examination of the soul 
through the image of the city, the study of the genesis of 
the city and its multiform of political life constitutes 
the understanding of the nature of the soul. Socrates told 
Phaedrus that Thrasymachus or anyone who seriously taught 
the art of rhetoric would 'first describe the soul with 
perfect accuracy1.17 However, when Thrasymachus appeared 
in the Republic, which is the only dialogue with which he 
had direct contact with the reader, it is Socrates himself 
not Thrasymachus who undertook such a task propounded in
the Phaedrus. To be sure, none of the sophistic
rhetoricians in the dialogues discussed the soul in the way 
that Socrates did. So this should have been Socrates1 
ironical remark against the sophists. If Socrates in the 
Republic really followed all his own instructions stated in 
the Phaedrus, that is, apart from those two measures quoted 
above he also rendered his discourse of the just soul in 
accordance with the third of the theory of good speech and 
writing, he must have
'classified the speeches and the souls 
and must have adapted each to the 
other, showing the causes of the
effects produced and why one kind of
the soul is necessarily persuaded by
certain classes of speeches, and
another is not1.18
16 Plato, Phaedrus, (270d, 271a-b).
17 Plato, Phaedrus, (271a).
18 Plato, Phaedrus, (271b).
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If so, this means that in reading Socrates1 discourse of 
the soul the reader must also bear in mind that Socrates 
rendered it in relation to the nature of the character of 
the soul of each of his interlocutors. Again, at this 
point, we notice the emphasis on the interrelationship 
between justice and the character of man.
II
Polis and Psyche
'The origin of the city,1 said Socrates, 'is to be 
found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our 
own needs, but each of us lacks many things1.19 And from 
this the city is originated:
'As a result of this, then one man 
calling in another for one service and 
another for another, we, being in need 
of many things, gather many into one 
place of abode as associates and 
helper, and to this dwelling together 
we give the name city or 
state...|20
First of all, the basic needs were the provision of 
food for existence and life, housing, and clothing, and to 
fulfil such needs everyone needed one another to produce 
what one was unable to do of his own accord.21 For one 
man was naturally fitted for one task and another for 
another. So, first, it has been said that there existed
such a desire which the city was able to fulfil. However,
had such a desire and its fulfilment been the only essence
19 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 369b).
20 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 369c).
21 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 369b-372b).
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of the city, Glaucon strongly resented that it could not be 
the description of the city of man. Rather, it was the 
city of pigs.22
To be sure, Glaucon and Adeimantus did not deny the 
existence of such a desire, but it was insufficient to 
represent a human city. Then Socrates asked what more 
Glaucon had to add to what he had just described. Glaucon 
replied that it was the custom, by which he meant the 
things which make human life more enjoyable than just the 
level of basic necessities. Such luxuries enabled them to 
'recline on couches, if they are not to be uncomfortable, 
and dine from tables and have made dished and sweetmeats 
such as are now in use1.23 If it could be regarded as 
another existing desire, then it must differ from what had 
been stated earlier. Socrates agreed and commented that if 
that was the case, then, what they were considering was not 
merely the origin of the city or the state of necessity, 
but the origin of a luxurious city or the healthy state.24
With regard to this second desire, a healthy city 
could become a fevered one. In such a city, everything 
would on longer be confined to necessities. After their 
basic needs had been fulfilled, some men would not be 
content with their usual way of life. It had to be 
embellished in response to an unnecessary desire, for 
example,
'couches will have to be added thereto 
and tables and other furniture, yes, 
relishes and myrrh and incense and 
girls and cakes..(and for) houses and 
garments and shoes..we must set 
painting to work and embroidery, and 
procure gold and ivory and similar
22 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 372d).
23 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 372d-e).
24 Plato, the Republic, ibid.
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adornments1 .25
And it was from this kind of desire that many new classes 
of profession in the city were derived. In a luxurious 
city, there was a need for the classes of huntsmen, 
sculptors, painters, musicians, poets, rhapsodists, actors, 
chorus-dancers, contractors etc. Also, husbandry and 
livestock became necessary in response to the exceeding 
consumption.
Following that, of course, doctors were much more in 
demand than before. Therefore, with regard to this 
condition, the city had to be enlarged to serve the further 
need which exceeded the requirements of necessity in the 
city. Proceeding in this pattern, the city then was likely 
to dispute over the ownership of the territory from which 
war with its neighbour inevitably followed. It was that 
kind of the city which first gave birth to war and its 
catastrophic consequences.26
Following this, the city was required to have its own 
army. As regards the stipulation of the origin of this 
city, 'it is impossible for one man to do the work of many 
arts1.27 To be sure, this business of fighting was a kind 
of art and profession.28 Moreover, the art of war was 
regarded as the greatest of all arts, since without it, no 
one could enjoy the wealth and luxuries produced by all 
other arts because they could have been taken away from him 
by other stronger ones. Then the city required the 
existence of another special class, that is, the guardians 
of the city. Being the greatest of all arts, 'it would
25 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 373a).
26 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 373b-e).
27 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 374a).
28 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 374b).
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require more leisure than any other business and the 
greatest science and training1.29 Like all other arts, 
the art of war needed natural propensity, practising and 
training from childhood. Since no man could become an 
expert of any art on that very day he started to perform 
it.
Socrates then continued to discuss this special class 
in details. First of all, there was the question of what 
kind of nature was suitable for the guardianship. Socrates 
asked his interlocutors to consider the similarity between 
the nature of a well-bred hound for the watch-dog's work 
and the nature of a well-born lad. He explained that such 
a nature should possess the qualities such as keen 
perception, quickness, and strength30; but to fight well, 
another quality was needed which was supposed to be the 
most important quality of all. That was courage, 
andreion,31 To be sure, for any creature, whether it be 
horse or dog or any other, in order for it to be brave, it 
must be high-spirited, thumos, every soul became fearless 
and unconquerable in the face of everything.32
With such qualities, the guardians were guaranteed to 
fight well against their enemies. However, they might 
possibly have done the same thing to their own people. 
Since, with regard to those qualities residing in their 
nature, nothing guaranteed that they would only be savage 
to their enemies and be kind to their friends. Such a 
nature reminds one of the virtue of the race of the bronze 
in Hesiod's myth of the races investigated by Socrates in 
the Cratylus, As discussed earlier, we understood that the
29 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 374e).
30 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 375a).
31 Plato, the Republic, ibid.
32 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 375b).
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virtue of the race of bronze lay in their propensity to 
'the lamentable works of Ares and deeds of violence1. 
Nevertheless, with their own unconquerable strength, they 
destroyed themselves. We also know that Socrates, under 
divine possession, did not discuss this race since it had 
left no name and received no honour at all. Furthermore, 
the nature of the guardians also reminds us of Polemarchus' 
proposition of what had been assumed to be the Homeric view 
of justice, that is, one should harm only one's enemy and 
benefit one's friends. Such a nature did not enable the 
guardians of the city to differentiate friends from 
enemies. To ask the guardians to have both gentleness and 
great-spiritedness at one time in their nature was perhaps 
illogical and impossible, but lacking either one, the city 
never had its good guardians.
Ill
However, Socrates argued that it could be possible 
since one could find such a mixture of gentleness and 
great-spiritedness in the natural disposition of the dog. 
Without any acquaintance or bad experience with both good 
and bad men, the dog was said to be gentle to its familiars 
and those whom it recognised, but it was angry to 
strangers.33 It was generally understood that by nature 
the dog was able to distinguish between its friend and 
enemy better than any other animal including man. Socrates 
showed that despite its seeming self-contradiction, such 
a nature already existed in nature.34 Further, Socrates
33 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 375c-e).
34 To be sure, we should not forget that, generally, the 
arguments in the dialogues have been conducted with logical 
rigidity. However, what has been regarded as impossible in 
the realm of arguments and speeches or linguistically 
structured thought, is not necessarily impossible in the 
realm of reality. Before having recourse to the analogy of
233
stated that the dog could be distinguished from other 
creatures on the basis of 'the known and the unknown'. 
From that, he inferred that it was 'an exquisite trait of 
his (the dog's) nature and one that shows a true love of 
wisdom, philosophon'.35
To be sure, the analogy of the nature of the dog is 
not to be taken too seriously. The dog's natural reaction 
to men cannot be taken for granted with regard to its 
accuracy and consistency.36 Furthermore, as Mary P. 
Nichols observes, the watchdog nature is unlike the 
philosophic nature in that ' (a) philosopher can indeed 
define his own and the alien by knowledge and ignorance, 
but he does not rest content with what he already knows,' 
and 'he does not resemble the dog or the guardian in 
repelling the unknown'.37 Following that, she also argued 
that taking the nature of the dog too seriously, one might
the nature of dog as an example of a possibility of such 
dichotomy, Socrates admitted that the requirements of such 
nature resembled impossibilities (see the Republic, Book 
II, 375d) . This is supposed to mean that it was impossible 
in logical terms. Then, to escape from the impasse, he 
found the solution to this problem from the empirical realm 
in the same way that he once did in the Cratylus, 393c, 
with regard to the natural offspring of each species.
35 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 376b). So it seems that 
a dog was by nature philosophic. To be sure, the 
comparison between the nature of the good guardian— with 
philosophic nature— and a dog should be intended to avoid 
the logical and linguistic impasses in the argument (see 
footnote 34) and interconnect the guardian— not yet
equipped with philosophic nature to the philosophic
nature to which the natural disposition of a dog was 
metaphorically employed as a transit, more than to take 
such an analogy precisely and seriously.
36 Paul Shorey quoted Huxley that 'The dog who barks 
furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him 
without opposition'. He seemed to agree that Plato is not 
quite serious with regard to this analogy of the dog and 
philosopher. See Paul Shorey (trans.), Plato's the 
Republic, op. cit., p. 172ff.
37 Nichols, 'Spiritedness and Philosophy of Plato's 
Republic', op. cit., pp. 50-51.
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have risked himself in attributing 'static character to the 
philosopher'.38 To another extent, the dog can be trained 
to be hostile or friendly to certain types of men. It 
might also be possible that with regard to this latter 
aspect the guardian is expected by nature to be teachable 
for the same purpose. Nevertheless, to argue again, the 
most significant reason for a comparison of philosophic 
nature to that of the dog is to prove that the dichotomy of 
the opposite qualities is possible and exists. Such a 
twofold quality is said to have its grounds in philosophic 
nature. Hence, it is necessary to add another quality to 
the guardian's nature if he is to really be a good guardian 
who will never take advantage of his own people or friends. 
That quality is the love of wisdom or philosophic nature. 
Then, with all the qualities such as the love of wisdom, 
high spirit, quickness, and strength in the guardian's 
nature, the city will have its good and true guardian.39
Then we know that after this there is a long 
digression from the description of the city to the 
education of its guardian. The guardian was supposed to 
have a philosophic nature similar to the analogy of the 
dog. Also, like the dog, the guardian had to be trained to 
recognise what he was supposed to know in order to be able 
to distinguish between what was to be friendly and what was 
not. Then, it was the education, paideia, that the 
guardian needed with regard to his specific function in the 
city. It can generally be assumed that the discussion on 
the education of the guardian has occupied the considerable 
part of the dialogue, namely from the end of Book II to 
BooK VII. To be sure, in Book IV, in his examination of 
the five major imperfect characters of the soul, Socrates 
started to shift to the analogy of the political 
constitution of the city. In the beginning of Book V, due
38 Ibid.
39 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 376b).
235
to the request from Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and some 
others, the discussion of the imperfect political 
constitutions had to be interrupted by a return to the 
discussion on the three waves of paradox, that is, the 
education of the guardian women, their children, and the 
realisation of the ideal city, followed by the discussion 
on the nature of the philosophic-ruler in Book VI and his 
education in Book VII. Then, three books later, the 
discussion of the imperfect political polities and their 
degrees of happiness in life had its turn in Book VIII and 
Book IX. In the beginning of Book X, the mood was changed 
by Socrates' introduction of the topic of the art of 
imitation. Finally, after this, the discussion on the soul 
was resumed and concluded both in itself and also the 
dialogue with the story of the myth of Er. Although it is 
generally known that Book VII concerns the education of the 
philosopher, however, it can be regarded as the extension 
of the education of the guardian, or the further
requirement for the guardian, if he really was to be a true 
and good guardian of the city. The need for the nature of 
both the guardian and the philosopher as the required
quality of the good and true guardian culminates in the 
idea of the philosopher-king as an essential for the ideal 
city and individual. As it appears in Socrates' famous 
speech that
'unless either philosophers become 
kings in our states or those whom we
now call our kings and rulers take to
the pursuit of philosophy seriously and 
adequately, and there is a conjunction 
of these two things, political power 
and philosophic intelligence, while the 
motley horde of the natures who at 
present pursue either apart from the 
other are compulsorily excluded, there 
can be no cessation of troubles for our 
states, nor for human race either'.40
40 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 473d).
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Undoubtedly, the best form of political constitution is the 
ideal city where the philosopher-king rules.
Socrates had depicted that justice prevailed in the 
city when it was ruled by the philosopher-king. However, 
its realisation remained a question of whether an existing 
city could become just like the just city, kallipolis, in 
Socrates' speech, or whether the discourse on the just city 
could be translated into practice. It was the nature of 
the just city to be governed by the philosophic guardian. 
In theory, what can be regarded as a city is a city which 
can become just or unjust. A city is still a city although 
it transforms itself through various forms of political 
constitution; but with other kinds of government, of 
course, it cannot be just, if there is only one model of 
the just city as Socrates argued. Hence, if a city is not 
just, it must be unjust. Socrates should have continued 
his rendition of the city and man analogy, but he just 
digressed to discuss the education of the guardian as 
regards the way to realise the philosophic guardian in the 
city. To this effect, it seems that Socrates was aware of 
the misgivings concerning the possibility of the just city 
in accordance with the possibility of the philosophic 
guardian.41 After that, around the end of Book IV and the 
beginning of Book V, Socrates was interrupted by Adeimantus 
and Polemarchus as he was going to resume the discussion on 
the imperfect polities.42 Again, after a long detour and 
after successfully achieving the realisation of 
philosopher-ruler in speech43, Socrates finally returned 
to his uncompleted depiction of the other kind of the city
41 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 376d). As Adeimantus 
responded to Socrates 1 digression that he certainly thought 
that the discussion on the philosophic guardian and his 
education would lead them to the desirable end.
42 Plato, the Republic, (Book IV 449a-450a).
43 Plato, the Republic, (Book V 541b).
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in Book VIII. It is the city without a philosopher-king 
which Socrates regarded as imperfect. Although there were 
many forms of imperfect city, only four types which 
corresponded to four major types of existing political 
constitutions were brought into the discussion.
IV
If the understanding of the city and the understanding 
of the soul are correlated, then the depiction of the soul 
would be as follows: the origin of the city was portrayed 
in the image of the origin of the city. The soul was in 
motion like the city whose desires by nature were evolving. 
In Book II, when Socrates first discussed about justice in 
the city, the city with its evolving desires began to 
develop into the just city, but at the end of Book IV and 
the beginning of Book V, Socrates started to discuss the 
imperfect or unjust cities which actually took place in 
Book VIII and IX. In the discussion, the just city was 
moving towards injustice, as it will be revealed in the 
course of this study that the soul as well as the city is 
in fact always in motion towards either justice or 
injustice.
From Socrates' discussion of the just and unjust 
cities in Book II, VIII, IX, it can be inferred that the 
just soul was the soul whose its rational element was in 
power and took control of other elements, namely spirit, 
necessary and unnecessary desires. In the same way that 
the city became just when 'philosophers become kings or 
kings become philosophers1.44 In discussing the imperfect 
polities, unlike his discussion of the just city, Socrates
44 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 376b, Book V, 473d).
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said that he like Homer had to invoke the spirit of the 
Muses, that is, the goddesses 'playing with us and teasing 
us as if we were children addressing us in lofty, mock- 
serious tragic style'.45 The story begins with the 
fragility of justice and ends with the tragic life of 
tyranny. In this regard, it is inferred that the just soul 
as well as the just city were subject to change like 
'everything else that has come into being, destruction is 
appointed1.45 The decline of the just soul originated in 
the loss of harmony in itself, as the just city declined 
because of the decay of its ruling race, philosopher-ruler, 
which was derived from the unseasonable breeding of the 
race itself.
The cause of the decay of justice in the soul also lay 
in its ruling element, namely, rational part. The lack of 
harmony of the ruling part was a crucial factor for the 
decline of the state, since its decline would not be 
possible despite a rise of dissension, stasis, 'so long as 
the ruling class is at one with itself, however small it 
be1.47 That means that even the ruling part in its unity 
and harmony was more powerful than the other elements 
although its number was only one or fewer than the others 
which were the majority. Actually, the ruling part could 
never be more powerful than the others in physical or 
quantitative terms. As Socrates refuted Callicles in the 
Gorgias that by nature the many were more powerful than the 
one48, so the one must be better and more powerful only in 
terms of wisdom and knowledge. Since without wisdom, the
45 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 545d-e).
46 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 546a).
47 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 545d).
48 Plato, Gorgias, (488d).
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other qualities were prone towards fallibility.49 It is 
in this respect that the one is said to be stronger and 
more powerful than the many.
At this stage, a point to be taken into consideration 
is that in reflecting the nature of the soul in the image 
of the city, Socrates stated that the decline of the ideal 
city resulted from the decay of its ruling class; and the 
ruling class deteriorated because of their unseasonable 
breeding which engendered the decadence of their next 
generation. Although the ruling class was wise, their 
untimely procreation could not be prevented by their 
'reasoning combined with sensation1.50
If the image of the soul is likened to the image of 
the city, then the soul takes place of the city. The city 
declined because its ruling class deteriorated. Then the 
soul decayed because its ruling part was weakened. But 
when Socrates in the spirit of the Muses said that the 
decline of the ruling class of the city originated in their 
unseasonable breeding, then, a problem arises: How is the 
decline of the ruling part of the soul to be understood 
with regard to its corresponding city?
It is notable that the cause of the decline of the 
polities throughout the discussion lay essentially in the 
unseasonable procreation of its ruling race. First of all, 
the ideal city fell when the nature of the offspring 
deviated from their parents, namely philosopher-rulers. 
Even the best of them did not possess the same qualities 
their ancestors did. They became the rulers of the city by 
virtue of their lineage not by their own merit. In other 
words, they were the illegitimate children and heirs of
49 As this theme of argument permeates the whole 
dialogues.
50 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 546b).
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their parents. To unravel the problem of interpretation 
with regard to the transformation of the soul corresponding 
to the city, two relevant factors need to be brought to our
attention. First, it is the Homeric style of telling the
story to which Socrates said he had to have recourse. The 
second point lies in his reference to procreation as the 
determinant agent of the transformation.
Invoking the Muses as the authoritative inspiration
can be regarded as the poetic style of giving speech or 
telling a story as it appears in Homeric-Hesiodic 
tradition. First of all, it is a poetic strategy as 
regards its effect of persuasive purpose. By concealing 
himself through the imitation of different characters, the 
poet is able to inspirit and variegate his work. The main 
intent of these poets as described by a Greek thinker in 
the fifth century is to 'exaggerate the importance of 
their theme, 1 and 'are less interested in telling the 
truth than in catching the attention of the public,' while 
their 'authorities cannot be checked' and also their 
'subject-matter, owing to the passage of time, is mostly 
lost in the unreliable streams of mythology1.51 Homer was 
said to proceed with his work both 'by pure narration and 
by a narrative that is effected through imitation1.52 He 
likened himself to another in a speech which bore an 
imitation of the one to whom he likened himself.53
What should be taken into consideration with regard to 
his narration through imitation is his invocation of the 
Muses in the beginning of the Iliad and the Odyssey. He
claimed that it was not himself but the Muses who assisted
his rendition of the story. It was the Muses who possessed
51 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 
Harmondsworth, 1983, Book I, 21.
52 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 392d-396e).
53 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 393c).
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the vision of the whole story. As in both the Iliad and 
the Odyssey, what Homer stated preceding the story itself 
is 'Let us begin, goddess of song..1 and 'The hero of the 
tale which I beg the Muse to help me tell. .This is the tale 
I pray the divine Muse to unfold to us..Begin it, goddess, 
at whatever point you will1.54 Furthermore, what has been 
said by the poets is the narration of past, present, and 
future things.55 The imitation of different kinds of 
people together with the narration of past, present, and 
future events in the poetic work, presuppose the suprahuman 
quality which the poets did not possess. They had to have 
recourse to divine authority in enhancing their works. To 
imitate a man in his speech and action presupposes a 
knowledge of his self-interpretation. To imitate men of 
either different or same times and places presupposes 
omniscience and ubiquity. These qualities are divine not 
human. For instance, in his analysis of one of the Greek 
plays, Michael Davis points out that:
'Athene can not only see Odysseus; she 
can also see Ajax. That Athene can 
"see," without looking...Athene 
apparently sees not only Odysseus's 
actions, the tracking, but also sees 
his intentions, his wish to find out 
whether Ajax is "within or not
within.".. .What Odysseus cannot see and 
must learn by signs, what it takes a 
god to see, is the inside of Ajax. The 
action of Ajax is utterly
unintelligible without this first 
scene.156
What is so exiting and attractive about the poetic
54 Both are quoted from the Iliad and the Odyssey of 
the Penguin Classics texts.
55 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 392d).
56 Michael Davis, 'Politics and Madness1, op, cit,, pp. 
143-144. The emphasis is mine. Compare the Republic, Book 
II, 363. Adeimantus expressed that the gods could see 
inside the human soul.
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work is that one seems to partake of divine vision whereas 
in reality he would never perceive other people beyond 
their appearances and never have such a total understanding 
of events. The appearance and essence of things demarcate 
the line between divine and human power. To a certain 
extent, it can be said that in real life a man lives with 
a certain degree of uncertainty. Conflicts and quarrels 
can be said to originate in misconstruing appearances and 
signs of actions of one another. On the other hand, the 
inability to penetrate others' essence can defer or prevent 
such problems as well. However, one enjoys oneself and 
compensates what one cannot have in reality by transposing 
oneself into the poetic realm. In such a realm, the poet 
ascribes divine qualities to his reader. Unknowingly and 
unconsciously the reader is able to read the minds of other 
people and have teleological knowledge of all things in the 
poetic realm. It is in this respect that the poetic work 
is intrinsically fascinating, and the poets are likened to 
the gods in pursuit of their poetic purpose, namely, the 
pleasure of their audience. The more the audience enjoys, 
the more the poet gains fame and glory.
In the discussion of unjust cities, Socrates compared 
himself to Homer who was in turn compared himself to the 
Muses in telling the tale. The Iliad can be said to be a 
tragic story of Achilles, the hero. In the story, Homer 
presents his narration through imitation of various 
characters, both human and divine. The discussion of 
unjust cities concerns itself with the tragedy of the 
predestined journey of justice to injustice. It is the 
story of a life of a city, past, present, and future. 
Also, it is the narration of the appearance as well as the 
essence. Socrates discussed the appearance and essence of 
the city. The essence of the city is its rulers and 
citizens, and the essence of the citizens is the story of 
their souls. Socrates likened himself to Homer with regard 
to his partaking of 'the eye of the gods1. It is the eye
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which like that of Athene can see without 'looking' both 
without and within, appearance and essence.57 Such an eye 
can see present, past and future of the unjust life. In a 
way, Socrates' narration is an imitation of the evil. 
Moreover, it is an imitation of the poet whose aim concerns 
mostly the pleasure of the audience.
Concerning divine inspiration, it has once been argued 
that it is Socrates' irony. Also, Socrates stated in the 
Republic, Book III with regard to the imitation of speech 
and action of a man of the right sort that
'when he comes in the course of his 
narrative to some word or act of a good 
man he will be willing to impersonate 
the other and feel no shame at that 
kind of mimicry.. (b)ut when he comes to 
someone unworthy of himself, he will 
not wish to liken himself in earnest to 
one who is inferior..'58
In the Platonic writings, Socrates is praised as the wisest 
and most righteous man of his time.59 Socrates himself 
must be regarded as 'a man of the right sort'. Also, he 
said with regard to the musical part of the education of 
the guardian in Book III that Homer, Euripides, and other 
poets should excuse him for banning their works for 'not 
that they are not poetic and pleasing to most hearers, but 
because the more poetic they are the less are they suited
57 Socrates often used the phrase 'even the blind can 
see' in the Republic. See the Republic, Book I, 416d, Book 
II, 548a, 550d. 'Seeing without looking* implies
understanding without reading. In reverse, it implies that 
reading does not necessarily lead to understanding. It 
even suggests that reading books or texts of some subject- 
matter does not necessarily make the reader understand it. 
This reading situation can be regarded as problematic only 
at the point of transition between oral and literate 
communication of a society.
58 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 396c-d).
59 Plato, Phaedo, (118a); Epistle VII, (324e-325a).
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to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be 
free1.60 However, he likened himself to such poets who 
were not responsible for their works since their source of 
knowledge came not from themselves but divine power. Also 
he banished them from the ideal city for the stated 
reason.61 However, Socrates just committed it by bringing 
what he himself told others to forbid. Of course, there is 
an exception. One compares himself to the inferior
'where he is doing something good..but 
will be embarrassed both because he is 
unpractised in the mimicry of such 
characters, and also because he shrinks 
in distaste his mind disdains them, 
unless it be for jest1.62
V
In his invocation of the Muses in the Phaedrus in 
giving the speech in praise of the non-lover, Socrates had 
to cover his face because he said he was ashamed to render 
that kind of speech, but he had to do it for some good 
reason. Similarly, it is known that Socrates said that the 
Muses he invoked played with the audience and teased them 
as if they were children and addressed them in a serious- 
playful-tragic manner. Socrates rendered his discourse of 
unjust cities in the spirit of the Muses, the poetic 
goddesses. Since the speech was given in such a tragic-poe 
tic style, colourful and embellished as it was, its 
metaphorical forms need to be interpreted.63
60 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 386b).
61 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 386b, Book VIII 568a-d).
62 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 396e).
63 Cf. the interpretation of the high-flown tragic-poetic 
style in the Republic, Book III, 413b. Socrates said that 
men were unwillingly deprived of true opinions, but
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Furthermore, his discourse on the tragic life of the 
soul must be regarded as both serious and playful towards 
the audience. Also it means that his partaking of 'the eye 
of the gods' must be considered accordingly. As it is 
understood that Socrates never claimed to possess divine 
authority in the same way that the poets did, his vision of 
the life of the soul, past, present, and future which is 
derived from his share of the divine vision must be 
regarded as a playful and earnest element of his speech. 
Since his daemonic voice only bade him refrain from some 
actions and reminded him of his ignorance, it is the poetic 
divine which has been claimed to be omniscient and 
ubiquitous. As regards the good which is to be taken as 
the reason for this action of Socrates, it is argued that 
the action is taken in pursuit of his mission, namely the 
pursuit of self-knowledge. And it is revealed during the 
course of this chapter that his invocations of the Muses in 
the Phaedrus and the Republic are attributable to the 
pursuit of the good, that is, self-knowledge.
Consequently, as regards the idea of procreation as a 
determinant agent of transformation of the city and the 
soul, it must be interpreted in the light of Socrates' 
ironic invocation of the Muses. As it has been discussed 
above, the idea of procreation is metaphorical. However, 
in the spirit of the Muses, it is half-serious and half­
playful, and this means that it can be interpreted 
literally and metaphorically. One thing which Socrates did
willingly of evil. The he put it in metaphorical terms 
that 'and doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the 
spells of sorcery or by force?' which Glaucon did not 
understand. So Socrates replied 'I must be talking in high 
tragic style, by those who have their opinions stolen from 
them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who 
forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument 
strips them unawares of their beliefs'. However, in some 
case, this poetic style would make things easier to 
understand. See the Meno, 7 6e.
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not state in his tale of the unjust cities is what 
procreation normally presupposes. This might be regarded 
as a silly question, however, its answer renders a clue to 
the problem of interpretation concerning the connection 
between the decline of the ruling class in the city and the 
ruling part in the soul. The explanation of the idea of 
human procreation is discussed by Socrates in the 
Symposium. In his speech of love, he related to his
friends what he had learnt from Diotima, a Mantinean woman 
who was specially skilled in the subject of love.64 
Diotima said that procreation originated from love , 
eros.65 The cause of love and desire lay in the yearning 
for immortality and the good which was indissoluble 'since 
love loves good to be one's own forever1.66 All men 
desired what was good because the acquisition of the good 
made them happy. Diotima regarded this as the ultimate 
answer since 'we have no more need to ask what end a man 
wished to be happy1.67 With this regard, the love of the 
immortality of the good engendered procreation and care of 
the offspring.68 Diotima stated further that for men this 
might have been understood to be the result of rational 
calculation. Actually, for animals as well as human beings, 
the cause could be explained in the same way:
'...the mortal nature ever seeks, as 
best it can, to be immortal. In one 
way only can it succeed, and that is by 
generation; since so it can always
64 Plato, Symposium, (201d). With regard to Diotima, 
Gilbert Highet comments '(i)t is impossible to say whether 
Plato's fiction had any basis in fact, since we have no 
independent testimony'. See Gilbert Highet, 'Diotima', in 
The Oxford Classical Dictionary, op. cit. So this implies 
Plato's own invention.
65 Plato, Symposium, (206a-e).
66 Plato, Symposium, (206e-2 07a).
67 Plato, Symposium, (205a).
68 Plato, Symposium, (207c-d).
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leave behind it a new creature in place 
of the old. It is only for a while 
that each live thing can be described 
as alive and the same, as a man is said 
to be the same person from childhood 
until he is advanced in years; yet 
though he is called the same he does 
not at any time possess the same 
properties; he is continually becoming 
a new person, and there are things also 
which he loses, as appears by his hair, 
his flesh, his bones, and his blood and 
body altogether. And observe that not 
only in body but in his soul besides we 
find none of his manners or habits, his 
opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or 
fears, ever abiding the same in his 
particular self; some things grow in 
him, while others perish. And here is 
a yet stranger fact: with regard to the 
possessions of knowledge, not merely do 
some of them grow and others perish in 
us, so that neither in what we know are 
we ever the same persons; but a like 
fate attends each single sort of 
knowledge. What we call conning, 
meletan,69 implies that our knowledge 
is departing; since forgetfulness is an 
egress of knowledge, while conning 
substitutes a fresh one in place of 
that which departs, and so preserves 
our knowledge enough to make it seem 
the same. Every mortal thing is 
preserved in this way; not by keeping 
it exactly the same for ever, like the 
divine, but by replacing what goes off 
or is antiquated with something fresh, 
in the semblance of the original. 
Through this device, Socrates, a mortal 
thing partakes of immortality, both in 
its body and in all other respects; by 
no other means can it be done1.70
The ephemeral nature yearned for the eternal with 
particular regard to the good. Socrates said that he was 
very doubtful as to whether what Diotima told him could
69 Meletan can be understood as 'recollection'. In
Hamilton's and Cairns' edition of Plato's dialouges, 
Michael Joyce translates 'studying'.
70 Plato, Symposium, (207d-2 08b).
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really be true. Diotima discovered what Socrates was being 
sceptical about, that is, whether her argument could be 
universally applicable, since not all men seemed to regard 
'procreation* as the way to immortality. Diotima confirmed 
that the argument still held good if Socrates carefully 
considered the influence of 'the love of winning a name, 
"and laying up fame immortal for all time to come" '.71 
Thus she explained to Socrates that it was because of the 
desire 'to win deathless memory for valour' that 'Alcestis 
would have died for Admetus, or Achilles have sought death 
on the corpse of Patroclus, or your own Codrus have 
welcomed it to save the kingdom of his children1.72
The signification of 'procreation,* genesis, cannot 
be confined to its literal term as 'producing offspring' in 
man and animals. It can also refer to 'generation' in the 
soul. Apart from pregnancy in body, there is also 
pregnancy of the soul since 'there are persons who in 
their souls still more than in their bodies conceive those 
things which are proper for soul to conceive and bring 
forth'.73 Alcestis, Achilles, Codrus and other heroes and 
heroines sacrificed their lives for their beloved in 
pursuit of an immortality which they regarded to be nobler 
than just immortality by means of procreation. What was 
generated from this kind of pregnancy of the soul were 
prudence, phronesis, and virtue, arete, in general. The 
begetters of these qualities were all the poets and the 
others who were regarded as 'inventors', euretikoi. 
Justice, dikaiosyne, and moderation, sophrosyne, were 
regarded as the best part of prudence since they were 
concerned with the order and regulation of the cities and
71 Plato, Symposium, (208c).
72 Plato, Symposium, (208d).
73 Plato, Symposium, (208e-209a).
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families. .74
Diotima said that pregnancy with these qualities 
happened to a man whose soul was divine. He would never 
'beget upon the ugly bodies' but only the beautiful, kalon. 
He would welcome the copulation of the soul rather than 
body particularly with the one whose soul 'is fair and 
noble and well-endowed1. The two souls were combined in 
one. Erotic intercourse of one's soul took place through 
the communication with another's by means of dialogue as 
Diotima suggested; 'in addressing such a person he is 
resourceful in discoursing of virtue and of what should be 
the good man's character and what his pursuits, and so he 
takes in hand the other's education'.75 The 'offspring' 
begotten from this union of the soul were virtues which 
were 'fairer and more deathless' than other kinds of 
offspring. She taught Socrates that 'every one would 
choose to have got children such as these rather than the 
human sort' since 'men in this condition enjoy a far 
fuller community with each other..and a far surer of 
friendship, philia'.76
VI
Regarding this significance of Socrates' invocation of 
the Muses and his application of the idea of procreation as 
the agent of the transformation of the city, the decline of
74 Plato, Symposium, (209a-b).
75 Plato, Symposium, (209b-c).
76 Plato, Symposium, ibid. With regard to the pivotal role 
of Platonic eros as the cause of generation of the self and 
the soul, Alford gives a useful interpretation. See C. Fred 
Alford, 'Metaphysical Selves, Real Selves', in The Self in 
Social Theory: A Psychoanalytic Account of Its Construction 
in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau, New Haven and 
London, 1991, p.19.
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the soul in the image of the polities in his discourse is 
to be interpreted in such a light. The ruling part of the 
just soul no longer combined with the beautiful. The 
unseasonable breeding in the ruling class of the city 
produced undesirable offspring which were no longer 
identical with their begetters.
Likewise, when the ruling part of the soul did not 
seek to unite with its like, the hybrid was begotten. What 
it had begotten were not prudence, justice, and moderation, 
as it once generated and nurtured. The soul was declining 
from what it once was, namely it was departing from 
justice. It could not distinguish what was to rule from 
what was to be ruled. It failed to differentiate the gold 
from the silver, the iron, and the bronze as the metals had 
been classified in Hesiod's myth of the race. It confused 
itself with regard to what and how to rule and to run the
politics of the soul. The new generation of the ruling
part weakened and no longer held its power. It was
illegitimate with regard to its ruling status. It should 
have been like its parents as it had been named after them, 
but its quality hardly corresponded to its name.77
The decline of the soul started from this point when 
its ruling part was 'not one with itself1. The Muses of 
Socrates told that change would not be possible despite the 
rise of dissension, provided that the ruling part had unity 
in itself. It can be inferred from this that conflicts 
could occur in the just soul. Dissension is not the only 
factor of the origin of the decline since it can be
dissolved by the unified ruling part. The problem lies in 
its weakened ruler. In the circumstance, when dissension 
arises, it seriously affects the ordering of the soul. The 
decline and dissension of the soul proceeds from this
77 Cf. what has been discussed in Chapter Four and Five as 
regards the theory of the correctness of name in the 
Cratylus.
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inception where the tale of the life of the unjust soul 
begins. It is the story of the conflict and power between 
the elements in the soul, that is, reason, spirit, and 
desires, or, in other words, the continual struggle among 
the races— the gold, the silver, and the iron and the 
bronze.
The underlying reason for employing the method of the 
study of the soul in the image of the city is attributable 
to the fact that justice in man is hardly conceivable 
because like small letters they might be too difficult for 
a myopic person to read, but it is easier if before he 
examines the smaller, he has observed that these same 
letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface.78 
The larger stage where justice exists is the city. 
Therefore, in Socrates' detailed discussion of the unjust 
polities of the city, there exists the meticulous 
description of the life of the unjust soul. There are 
three levels of explanation to comprehend in Socrates' 
speech. First, it is the life of the city. Next, it is 
the life of men in the city. Lastly, it is that life of 
the soul of these men in the city. The presupposition of 
the study of the city is the study of the soul. In search 
for the soul, Socrates first transposes the reader to a 
larger screen, that is, the city. Then he descends to the 
lower, smaller level, that is, men and their 
interrelationship; and the reader had been brought to the 
presumably smallest level which is the aim of the search, 
namely, the soul.
Resulting from this examination of all levels in the 
city is the descriptive analyses of the life of the soul. 
It is like a view through a microscope. Macrocosm of the 
city reflects microcosm of human soul. Following the 
description of each polity is the description of its
78 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 368d).
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corresponding character of man and his soul.79 To follow 
Socrates' instruction, when one has familiarised himself 
with justice and injustice in a larger screen, that is, the 
city, then, he can recognise them in a smaller one in any 
size or unity of society such as the community or family, 
and, eventually, of course, the smallest unit of the city, 
namely, an individual soul.
79 As said once, Leslie Paul Thiele acknowledges in her 
study of Nietzsche's politics of the soul that the concept 
of the multiple soul was not Nietzsche's but Plato's 
invention. She said that it is as old as political 
philosophy: 'Plato's "city in speech" of the Republic is
the macrocosmic description of what Socrates discerns in 
the souls of his interlocutors' (Thiele, op. cit.,p. 51). 
Also she points to the similarity between Plato and 
Nietzsche:
'(n)ot unlike Plato, he (Nietzsche) 
would clothe his philosophy in 
political attire. For the language 
that best facilitates the description 
and analysis of the soul is political.
The world of politics serves as a 
conceptual and terminological resource 
for the "readers of souls."..Nietzsche 
observed that organization, 
cooperation, and patterns of 
domination— in short, politics— allow 
pluralities to bear the appearance of 
unities. This is true for the human 
community no less than the community of 
the self. The politics of statecraft 
and soulcraft are analogous. The city 
is the soul writ large' (Thiele, 
opcit. ,p. 52) .
See Thiele, op. cit.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Imperfect Polities and the Imperfect Souls:
From Timarchy to Tyranny; The Fall of the Lineage
The just polity is the city which is governed by the 
philosopher-king/s. The number of rulers does not matter 
as long as they are at one with themselves. Such a polity 
is symbolised by aristocracy. When such rulers decline as 
discussed above, they are challenged by others. In other 
words, when the power of the gold and the silver had 
lessened, the iron and the bronze began to aggrandize 
themselves. Pulling against one another, the soul has to 
compromise with the rising powers, spirit and desires which 
represent honour and wealth. In between its transformation 
from the rule of wisdom to the rule of wealth or from 
aristocracy to oligarchy, the spirited element comes to the 
fore and takes control of the soul. Timocracy is the name 
of this condition of the soul. From this, Socrates 
concluded that with regard to the rule, kratountos, of the 
high-spirited element 'in us1, the most conspicuous 
feature of this form of polity is 'contentiousness and 
covetousness of honour1.1 At this point, there is 
supporting evidence that what Socrates described in the 
level of the city is in fact an analogy of the soul. As 
regards the passage at 548c, in Lee's and Cornford's 
translations, the predominance of the high-spirited element 
in timocracy has been emphasised as one of the elements 
'in us1 as in Lee's, and 'of our human nature1 as in 
Cornford's. It is quite important with regard to the 
interpretation of the signification of the analogy of the 
soul and the city. Also, it is necessary to consider the 
term kratountos as in this context it has been translated 
'predominance' by Cornford and Shorey. Kratethesomai, and
1 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 548c).
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'rule, hold sway1 as in krateousin, and also 'the ruler* as 
in kratountes. With regard to these connotations, the 
term helps the reader to understand more fully Socrates* 
rendition of the analogy between the politics of the soul 
and the politics of the city.2
Timocratic soul is said to be generated from 
unseasonable breeding. Portrayed in the level of family 
life, he is a son of a good father who 'lives in a badly 
governed state and avoids honours and office and law-suits 
and all such meddlesomeness and is willing to forebear 
something in order to escape trouble'.3 His mother, who 
resents his father's behaviour tried to guide him towards 
the different aims of life which are related to the pursuit 
of honour and wealth. It is notable that Socrates began 
his first description of the life of men in already 'badly 
governed state'. Also, he portrayed dissension between his 
parents. In other words, the parents are regarded as the 
ruler or guardian in the family; but they are not in 
harmony. A question arises then 'Is badly governed state 
a cause or effect of the disunity of the parents?'
If the city represents the soul and its ruling part 
represents the parents, then, the answer is that as soon as 
the unseasonable breeding takes place, the unjust polity 
also begins its life. It is stated that the young son 'is 
not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil 
communications'.4 His rational part has been cultivated by 
his father whilst his appetitive and passionate elements 
have been influenced by his mother and others. The new
2 See Plato, The Republic, translated by Desmond Lee, 
Harmondsworth, 1981; The Republic of Plato, translated by 
Francis Macdonald Cornford, Oxford, 1945; Plato, Republic, 
II, translated by Paul Shorey, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1963. A Greek-English Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, op. cit.
3 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 549c).
4 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 550b).
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generation of the soul is said to have to compromise within 
himself the conflicting elements and 'turns over1 its 
'government1 to the intermediate principle of ambition and 
high spirit1 and becomes a timocratic soul.5 Again, the 
application of the political phrase such as 'turn over the 
government1 emphasises Socrates1 intentional employment of 
the method of the study of the soul in the political 
condition of the city.
Declining from the philosophic nature, the timocratic 
soul begins to neglect the Muses, 'paying too little heed 
to music and then to gymnastics1.6 To be sure, earlier in 
Book II, music and gymnastic were regarded as the essential 
education of the true guardian, especially music as the 
education of the soul.7 However this first generation of 
the declining soul has not entirely abandoned music. 
Bequeathed to him by his father, the love of music and 
speech still prevails as the legacy from a father to his 
son8, but now the soul itself is no musician or rhetorician 
since it is preoccupied with gymnastic and other trainings 
of the same sort due to its predominance of the spirited 
element in the soul; and in due time the love of music 
would leave the soul completely. In this regard, the
timocratic soul with its unphilosophic guardian is no
longer a lover of wisdom. When philosophic nature is 
detached from the guardian, or wisdom from spirited 
element, 'intelligence is then no longer combined with 
simplicity and sincerity1. The soul becomes insecure with 
regard to the intelligence of other souls. So it never 
allows any intelligent being to take part in its rule; but
5 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 550a-c).
6 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 546d).
7 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 376e).
8 Compare this character to Polemarchus. Also consider 
the bequeathing of the argument from Cephalus to his son.
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it just aggrandises its power by recruiting those of a 
similar quality to itself in order to become a reign of 
'high-spirit and simple-mind..better suited for war than 
for peace1.9 Its justice would be useless in the time of 
peace but useful in war time. It reminds us of 
Polemarchus1 definition of justice with reference to 
friend-foe relationship. With this quality, the timocratic 
soul is self-willed and has a lack of culture. In this
regard, it would be able to realise the difference between
itself and others in hierarchical terms with regard to
honour and physical power unlike the educated or the
rational one which is conscious of its superiority and 
inferiority in terms of power of knowledge.10
I
While partaking of the divine vision, Socrates let 
the reader perceive that the destiny of the declining soul 
is tyranny after falling from aristocracy, timocracy, 
oligarchy, and democracy. That is why the city has been 
portrayed in its dynamism. The city or the soul is in the 
process of self-motion towards its destiny. Now it is 
moving itself through timocracy towards oligarchy; or the 
soul is declining towards the reign of desires via the 
reign of spirit. The sign of the transition from one 
generation to the other is foreseeable in its existing 
condition of the soul with regard to its elements viz. 
reason, spirit, desires. The timocratic soul is said to be 
a mixture of good and evil, that is, a mixture of some of
the qualities of the previous generation of the soul--
aristocratic soul and some of the oligarchy towards which
9 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 547e).
10 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 549a).
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it is inclining.11
Oligarchy is a political polity that is based on a 
qualification of property.12 It is the rule of wealth. 
The previous generation of the timocratic soul is 'not 
being poor, but by nature rich in itself*. That is why it 
could control its desires. Lacking reason, the soul feels 
itself to be poor and prone to wealth and property. The 
soul becomes lenient and lets the desire for wealth arise 
in itself. However, some of the qualities of its previous 
life which still exist make its ruler, the spirit, 
respectable, and refrain from other kinds of work and 
money-making. For this reason, as 'running away from the 
law as boys from a father1, the soul has to enjoy 
surreptitious pleasures and is prodigal of others * 
wealth.13 On account of the soul's neglect of music, it 
has not been cultivated to abstain from enjoying that kind 
of pleasure by persuasion but by force. From this, it 
necessitates the transition of the soul.
At this point, the explanation of the transition of 
the polity and the transition of its corresponding 
character of man is combined in Socrates' speech.14 Here, 
again, the combination confirms the understanding of the 
soul in the image of the city. Socrates separately 
discussed the nature of the polity and the nature of the 
man of its counterpart, but in explaining the transition of 
both of them, there is only one rendition of the 
explanation of the timocratic to the oligarchic type of
11 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 547d-548c).
12 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 550c). Plato seems to
be the first Greek political thinker who officially gives 
this definition to oligarchy although it might have been 
already generally understood by the Greeks.
13 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 548b).
14 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 553a).
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man. This implies that the explanation of the transition 
of man can account for his omission of the explanation of 
the transition of the polity and vice versa.
In the timocratic-oligarchic transition, the pattern 
of change recurs again. Diotima's speech on love of the 
immortality of the good as the cause of generation of both 
body and soul still holds true, and the unseasonable 
breeding is the cause of the decline of both kinds of 
generation. Out of love of immortality, the timocratic 
soul begets its offsprings. As it regards honour and 
passion as the good, therefore, it aims at generating what 
is like itself. However,the timocratic soul itself 
originated from the unseasonable breeding. The
unseasonable breeding was started a long time ago by its 
ancestors. This has affected its lineage of
descendants.15 The timocratic soul could not eternalize 
its timocratic quality. Its next generation turns out to 
be oligarchic.
In the beginning, the offspring of the soul imitates 
its timocratic begetters. With uncertainty in political 
life, it can happen that the reign of the spirit does not 
effect desirable consequences to its holder. On the 
contrary, it brings tragic destiny to the man, suddenly 
being 'dashed, as a ship on a reef, against the state, and 
making complete wreckage of both his possessions and 
himself1.16 The young soul becomes disenchanted with 
honour, since it held the principle of love of honour
15 Cf. the original evils in the ancestors of Orestes 
which seemed to have cursed all his lineage of family. The 
offsprings of each generation in Orestes’ family were 
decadent. They could not be named after the nature of 
their parents as regard the principle of name with 
reference to natural birth. This is related to the 
analysis of the term anthropos and the names of Orestes’ 
family in Chapter Five. This point will be discussed again 
later.
16 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 553b).
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because it followed its guardians. Also, neglecting music 
like its previous generation, it did not understand the 
reason for the love of honour. Therefore, anything it has 
practised in pursuit of honour is effected by force or 
familiarity not by understanding or persuasion. Now it 
realises that the pursuit of honour has rendered nothing 
but disaster. It is the predominance of high-spirit and 
its love of honour in its previous life that makes him 
forfeit all possession of wealth and property. B e i n g  
disillusioned by the transience, insubstantiality and 
fragility of honour, then, with regard to his 
reconsideration of what goodness and happiness are, it 
holds that only wealth is the good that brings true and 
lasting happiness. Hence, it 'will then established on 
that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set 
it up as the great king in his soul1.17 From this, the 
young timocratic soul develops into an oligarchic soul 
which lets its appetite element rule itself.
Now the oligarchic soul starts its life. As a 
predominant part, the new ruling class will force the 
dwindling principles, namely the rational which once 
presided over the others in its previous aristocratic life, 
and high-spirit which used to be in power in timocracy,
'to crouch lowly to right and left as 
slaves, and will allow the one to 
calculate and consider nothing but the 
ways of making more money from a 
little, and the other to admire and 
honour nothing but riches and rich men, 
and to take pride in nothing but the 
possession of wealth and whatever 
contributes to that1.18
This indicates that besides the ruling class, that is, 
desires, all other elements such as reason, spirit, in the
17 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 553c).
18 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 553d-e).
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soul still exist; but they are subdued and exploited by the 
rule of desires. Man of the oligarchic soul is still 
'clever' and 'courageous1, but his cleverness and courage 
are forced to serve its master, namely, to fulfil the 
desires. The oligarchic soul uses its reason to make as 
much profit as possible. It is courageous to do anything 
to attain these goals which the aristocratic or timocratic 
souls dare not to do. It is afraid or ashamed of being 
poor. That is why Socrates said that the oligarchic soul 
which lacks education, apaideusia19, lets the appetite 
part which is 'the blind god of wealth1 be the 'leader of 
the choir and first in honour1.20 The ruling part of the 
soul is metaphorised as the leader of the choir since when 
any element of the soul presides over the others, it leads 
them to 'sing the same song and dance the same 
movements1.21 Also, it is obvious that the oligarchic 
soul enjoys and appreciates the oligarchic song, dance, and 
chorus. It praises its like and depreciates others in the 
same manner that the timocratic soul recruited those of the 
high-spirit and simple-minded but never allowed the
19 The terms paideia and musike seem to be 
interchangeable in Socrates' speech from Book III onward. 
See the Republic, Book VIII, 546d, 548c, 549a, 554c. With 
regard to this point, Werner Jaeger with reference to 
Plato's the Laws explained the interplay of these terms 
with regard to the function of poetry in the ancient Greek 
society that '(t)he poet's duty is to educate the young,' 
and 'Plato emphasizes the identity of poetry and paideia,' 
since '(p)oetry and music, if they do that properly, can 
truly be called paideia'. See Werner Jaeger, Paideia, Vol. 
I, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 247-8; Vol.II, pp. 542, 
230. See also E.A. Havelock, 'The Preliteracy of the 
Greeks', in The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its 
Cultural Consequences, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982 p. 187.
20 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 554b).
21 Speech and action can be regarded as song and dance 
and different characters have their own music with which 
they sing and dance in accordance. This point in relation 
to the analogy of chorus and its leader has significant 
implication in the politics of the soul. This is to be 
discussed in the next chapter.
intelligent to take part in its rule.22
261
II
With regard to the oligarchic soul, the desires in its 
congenial atmosphere develop themselves into what Socrates 
called 'the appetite of the drone1. Metaphorically 
described so, it is a desire to gain the most profit by 
making the least efforts. It effects another two kinds of 
drone comparable to 'the beggarly and the rascally* in the 
city.23 Of course, beggars or rascals and their like can 
be said to be derived from men whose souls have been 
predominated by this kind of desire. The beggarly type can 
do nothing but live on charity. The rascal is discernible 
if one looks to 'guardianships of orphans1 since these 
kinds of men would try every way to do injustice with 
impunity. Generally speaking, a general oligarchic soul 
has a potential to develop itself into either the rascally 
or beggarly type. Both are regarded as dependants of the 
city, making no contribution at all.
Socrates compared a person of the beggarly type to a 
drone which lives on the honey made by other working bees. 
Though he used to be wealthy and seemed to belong to the 
ruling class, but in reality he was only a consumer of 
goods, 'neither he was ruler nor helper in the state*.24
22 See the Republic, Book VIII, 548a. The significance of 
the chorus and the expression of approval and disapproval 
towards certain kinds of music and dance are discussed in 
Book II of the Laws.
23 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 554c).
24 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 552b). With regard to 
this analogy, Cornford refers to the account of the drones' 
life in Plato's time by referring to Aristotle's History 
of Animals, ix, 40. Aristotle puts bees into different
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This type of man, like a stingless drone, is harmless. He 
can be seen in the city as one of the beggars, while there 
are some of them who like robber-bees are armed and 
dangerous. Socrates said that beggars and criminals can be 
easily found in oligarchic polity though the latter have to 
conceal themselves from the surveillance of the authority. 
It can be said that these kinds of men were generated from 
'a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong 
constitution of the state' as well as the soul.25
With regard to an oligarch who has the potential to 
develop into the rascally type, however, the existing 
better part, epieikeia or reasonableness, in his soul 
rationalised this evil desire, kakas epithumias, making him 
cunning and scheming. That reason sometimes inhibits him 
from revealing his evil desires and it is not because it 
knows that 'it is better not1 to commit crimes, but it is 
because of his fear of being debunked of his 'good image1. 
It is not reason, logo, but necessity and force, anagke kai 
phobos, that restrains him.26 So although such a soul is 
mainly under the rule of desire, there exists an internal 
dissension within himself. His reasonableness and his 
appetite of the drone are pulling against one another.
categories. As to the drones which are 'the largest of 
all, but devoid of sting, and lazy1, (Book IX, 40, 624b25- 
3 0), he describes that they '..make no honey, but subsist, 
they and their grubs also, on the honey made by the bees' 
(Book IX, 40, 624al7-22) . If the king-bee dies, the drones 
reared by the bees are understood to be more spirited 
although they do not really have stings but they have the 
wish to use it. There are other species of bee, namely, 
the robber-bee. The robber-bee and the drone not only do 
not work but also damage the work of other bees. Being so- 
called the robber-bee, it also, after spoiling its own 
combs, finds a chance to spoil others' unnoticed. It is 
from the nature of the drones and the robber-bees which a 
certain type of man in oligarchy has been drawn upon. See 
Cornford, op. cit., p. 276.
25 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 552d-e).
26 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 554d).
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Accordingly, torn between the two, he is 'a double man1 
possessing conflicting personalities. In appearance, he 
seems to be just and good and more respectable than many 
others because of the inhibition of his evil desires, but 
in his soul there is no unison and harmony. Also, 
disillusioned with honour, he would never spend money for 
such things, 'fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and 
calling them into alliance for the winning of the 
victory'.27 Fighting in his oligarchic style, the man is 
always defeated. However he is able to save and accumulate 
his property.
'As time goes on, and they advance in the pursuit of 
wealth, the more they hold that in honour the less they 
honour virtue. ,28 The city or the soul predominantly 
values most the possession of wealth as a qualification of 
the ruler. As regards the city, it is only the rich who 
hold office whilst the poor are excluded, although some of 
them are capable of ruling.29 The oligarchic polity 
generates the rich and also the poor which comprises 
beggars and rascals. Inevitably the city is split into 
two, that is, 'a city of the rich and of the poor, dwelling 
together, and always plotting against one another'.30 The 
city/soul is now moving toward change. In the same manner, 
the nature of the oligarchic soul itself is its immanent 
barrier to its stability. Socrates said that the manner of 
change, which is easily noticed even by the blind man, was 
originated in its 'insatiate greed for that which it set 
before itself as the good, the attainment of the greatest
27 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 555a).
28 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 550e).
29 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 551b). Poverty or wealth 
is not the criteria for the art of statesmanship. See the 
discussion in Chapter Twelve.
30 Plato, the Republic, (BooK VIII 551d).
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possible wealth'31, and the nature of the soul is not only 
incompatible to sobriety and temperance but also 
discouraging their possibility.
With this regard, the subsequent generation of the 
oligarchic soul transforms itself. In the father and son 
analogy, the oligarchic father breeds his son in his own 
way. With regard to its pursuit of wealth, the oligarchic 
father forces his son to inhibit his desires for pleasures 
which he regarded as useless and nonsensical, since his 
love of wealth predominates all other things. In pursuit 
of the accumulation of wealth, he is stingy and reduces all 
the unnecessary expenses.
Here, Socrates pointed out that all kinds of desire, 
including the sexual one, can be put into two categories, 
that is, necessary and unnecessary ones. The necessary 
desires are those that cannot be diverted or suppressed. 
Their satisfaction is beneficial and necessary to men. The 
appetite for bread and the desire to relish the taste are 
a good example. Men enjoy eating it because of its 
nourishment and taste. The desire to enjoy food is 
regarded as necessary insofar as it contributes to fitness; 
but the unnecessary desires exceed that level of human 
necessity. It is in fact the desires from which 'a man 
could free himself from youth up, and whose presence in the 
soul does no good and in some cases harm'.32 It not only 
undermines the body but also hinders the attainment of 
intelligence and sobriety of the soul.33 From this, 
Socrates said that it was evident that those who were 
called the drones in an oligarchy preoccupy themselves with
31 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 550d, 555b-c). It is
notable that in the Republic, the analogy of the blind man
has been referred twice. See also 4 65d.
32 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 559a).
33 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 559b-c).
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unnecessary desires whilst the oligarchs themselves were 
stingy because of their love of wealth.
The son of the oligarchic father has suppressed his 
unnecessary desires for all his early years until one day 
he experiences that kind of pleasure from 'the drones and 
associates with fierce and cunning creatures who know how 
to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety and 
condition1.34 This is exactly the starting point of the 
transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. 
As mentioned above, the oligarchic polity has an internal 
war inside itself, splitting into two opposing parties. 
Likewise, the oligarchic youth experiences a similar 
effect, since it has been suppressed by force not by reason 
in living his life in such an illiberal way. Although it 
seems to follow its begetters1 footstep very well, however, 
it is so vulnerable and susceptible. Like an unhealthy man 
who suddenly fails ill when he encounters 'just a slight 
impulse from outside,• the young son would be feverish when 
he first tastes those luxurious pleasures. After this, 
having no reason to control the desires, he then keeps on 
enjoying and indulging himself with his uncontrollable 
desires.
At this stage, he can either be swayed back to his 
original condition by the oligarchic influence either from 
his own father or other kin, or espoused by the democratic 
element to go on and eventually establish a complete 
democratic character in his soul. Sometimes, even 
controlled by his oligarchic father, yet in the end the son 
still breaks the chain due to the lack of true education of 
his father and temptation of the variety of pleasures 
outside.35
34 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 559d).
35 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 560a-b).
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III
From this, the life of the oligarchic soul has ended 
at the point that its next generation of the soul develops 
itself to democracy. The democratic soul loses all the 
power of the better element within itself since the part 
that just ascends the throne exerts the power of its 
'braggart discourses' to 'close the gates of the royal 
fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxilliary 
force itself, and will not grant audience as to enjoy to 
the words of older friends in private life'.36 In 
democracy, language and definition are used in 
contradiction to what they used to be. The democratic man 
would reverse all the meanings. He calls reverence and awe 
folly, temperance/lack of manhood, moderation and orderly 
expenditure/rusticity and illiberality, insolence/good 
breeding, licence/liberty, prodigality/magnificence, and 
shamelessness/manly spirit.37
That is to say, the transformation from an oligarchic 
to a democratic character lies in the change from 
restriction to necessary desires to liberation and 
unleashing of the unnecessary desires. However the 
democratic man will not be in such a frenzied condition so 
long. When he grows older, he returns to his normal state 
'receiving back a part of the banished elements1. 
Nevertheless he does not revert to oligarchy. In truth, 
the man establishes and lives his life in a democratic 
style, as the democratic polity treasures freedom and 
equality more than anything else. In his soul, the 
democratic man also regards and treats everything in the 
like manner corresponding to the polity he belongs to.
35 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 560c).
37 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 560d-e). It is not 
surprising if they would regard justice as injustice as 
Thrasymachus did in the first book of the Republic.
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That is he would not
'accept or admit into the guard-house 
the words of truth when anyone tells 
him that some pleasures arise from 
honourable and good desires, and others 
from those that are base, and that we 
ought to practise and esteem the one 
and control and subdue the others; but 
he shakes his head at all such 
admonitions and avers that they are all 
alike and to be equally esteemed..'38
The democratic man is indiscriminate in his treatment 
of the necessary and unnecessary desires. Good and evil 
are equally fostered. With this regard, it is remarkable 
that the love of freedom and egalitarianism of the 
democratic man engender the unsettling and uncertainty of 
his democratic behaviour. Since he indiscriminately 
regards all in equal terms, therefore, all elements in his 
soul are treated equally. They are all able to express and 
reflect themselves. Then it is not surprising that the 
democratic man would indulge his desire of the day:
'now wine-bibbing and abandoning 
himself to the lascivious pleasing of 
the flute, and again drinking only 
water and dieting; and at one time 
exercising his body, and sometimes 
idling and neglecting all things, and 
at another time seeming to occupy 
himself with philosophy, (a)nd 
frequently he goes in for politics and 
bounces up and says and does whatever 
enters his head; (a)nd if military men 
excite his emulation, thither he 
rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he 
turns, and there is no order or 
compulsion in his existence1.39
Comparing this with its preceding characters, the
38 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 561c).
39 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 561c-d).
268
democratic man seems relatively volatile. However this 
kind of life is highly treasured as the life of pleasure 
and freedom and happiness which he would cling to till the 
end of his life. At the same time, with regard to its 
corresponding polity, 'most people would..judge it to be 
the best form of society1 like a most beautiful and 
colourful fabric'.40 Socrates ended his description of 
the democratic man by stating its great charm and spell 
that
'he is a manifold man stuffed with most 
excellent difference, and that like 
that city he is the fair and many- 
coloured one whom many a man and woman 
would count fortunate in his life, as 
containing within himself the greatest 
number of patterns of constitutions and 
qualities1.41
But no matter how beautiful and good it appears to its 
citizens, democracy cannot be saved from change. It faces 
the same destiny to which oligarchy and other predecessors 
have been drawn. The predominant quality of the polity is 
its imminent barrier to its stability. The polity is 
virtually self-destructive. Democratic virtue draws a life 
of democratic soul to a close. For democracy, liberty is 
the highest quality of all. Since it has been regarded as 
the good, then, to gain it as much as possible means the 
greatest good.
40 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 557c). Plato has insight 
into this kind of democratic polity in relation to its 
citizens when he said that it is a most attractive of all 
societies. In fact, democracy has been regarded by all 
political camps as the best form or the least evil form of 
government. Both capitalism and socialism purport to be on 
the track of democracy. Even more, they claim to be more 
genuinely democratic than one another. This affirms 
Plato's political understanding as regards the nature of 
the political constitution of the city and man.
41 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 561e).
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That is why the ruler of democracy could not be anyone 
but demagogues who like 'bad cupbearers' are ready to 
intoxicate their thirsty subjects by providing them with 
excessive 'unmixed wine1 of liberty. The ruler of the soul 
is ready to yield to any rising element in order to 
aggrandize itself, unlimited desires and self-indulgence. 
Those who 'do not dispense the liberty unstintingly' are 
chastised and accused of being 'accursed oligarchs'. The 
ruler in such a polity who is ready to indulge his subjects 
in every way is commended and honoured in public and 
private. In other words, the polity highly regards 'rulers 
who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers'.42 
With regard to excessive liberty, the city/soul becomes 
lawless and loses itself in 'anarchical temper'. The 
order of the structure and relationship between men in the 
city and also between the elements in the soul crumble 
down. There no longer exists a demarcation line between 
things:
'the father habitually tries to 
resemble the child and is afraid of his 
sons, and the son likens himself to the 
father and feels no awe or fear of his 
parents, so that he may be forsooth a 
free man, (a)nd the resident alien 
feels himself equal to the citizens and 
the citizens to him, and the foreigner 
likewise, (t)he teacher in such case 
fears and fawns upon the pupils, and 
the pupils pay no heed to the teacher 
or to their overseers either,...the 
young ape their elders and vie with 
them in speech and action, while the 
old, accommodating themselves to the 
young, are full of pleasantry and 
graciousness, imitating the young for 
fear they may be thought disagreeable 
and authoritative'.43
The excess of liberty culminates in that identity and
42 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 562d-e).
43 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 563a-b).
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difference of the slaves and masters, men and women, and, 
finally, men and beasts disappears from the city.44 The 
total effect of this condition renders 'the souls of 
citizens so sensitive that they chafe at the slightest 
suggestion of servitude and will not endure it1.45 In 
this respect, it seems that indecision and confusion come 
to the fore and are also favourably regarded as the 
reflection of the state of genuine freedom. No master and 
no law, written or unwritten, that is to say, prevails in 
the city. All are free from any kind of repression and 
surveillance, and it is 'the excess and greed of this and 
the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this 
constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of 
a dictatorship1.46
Socrates said that any excess of anything is most 
likely to effect 'a corresponding reaction to the 
opposite' especially in politics. The love of wealth in 
oligarchy brings about an impoverished state and people. 
In a like manner, the result of extremity of freedom is 
slavery in the same regard of the individual and the city. 
And so, 'tyranny develops out of no other constitution than
democracy from the height of liberty, the fiercest
extreme of servitude1.47
IV
The politics in democracy is to be taken into account 
with regard to its transformation. In theory, democracy
44 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 563c).
45 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 563d).
46 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII, 563e-564a).
47 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 564a).
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can be made into a tripartite division. First, having 
originated from oligarchy, the class of drones still 
prevails but is much more dangerous due to the licence of 
the polity. With this regard, they, together with those 
stingless drones as their followers, become powerful and 
dominate the others. Considerably, in democracy, the 
fiercest part of it is said to 'make speeches and 
transacts business1 while the rest of them form themselves 
into a mob of chorus ready to cheer their leaders and 
tolerate no dissent of their opponents.48 Then the second 
group is the capitalist class, 'the most abundant supply 
of honey for the drones,1 which is derived from the 'most 
orderly and thrifty natures1 of those who are pursuing 
wealth. The last one comprises 'all cultivators of their 
own farms who possess little property1.49 It is the 
largest in number when it meets in the assembly, and it 
would do so only to get 'a share of the honey’ after 'the 
men at the head1 already have 'the lion's share for 
themselves1.
For, the rich who did not get to have a share but have 
actually been plundered by others are compelled 'to defend 
themselves with speeches in the assembly and any action in 
their power1. Regardless of the truth, those in that 
position are always charged with being the enemy of 
democracy or the oligarchs with revolutionary plans against 
the people. Particularly in democracy, this is the most 
economical use of political strategy to destroy enemies.50 
In its political battle, a demos always 'puts forward one 
man as its special champion and protector and cherish and 
magnify him1. It is in this respect that the tyrant 
arises.
48 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 564d).
49 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 565a).
50 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 565b).
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Socrates compared the origin of tyrant with the legend 
of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia that 'he who tastes of the one 
bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims 
is inevitably transformed into a wolf'.51 In the same 
way, the tyrant first supported by the majority of the 
people executes or banishes anyone in the name of the 
assembly or people's court. Under such a circumstance, a 
champion of the people at his peril might sometimes either 
be destroyed in the same way he destroyed others, or become 
the absolute tyrant. Having been through such experiences, 
the people become more concerned for the safety of their 
protector than ever. They, 'fearing for the tyrant but 
unconcerned for themselves, grant him full protection and 
bodyguard1. The tyrant who now becomes like a wolf not 
only slays the enemy of democracy or the rich but also 
starts to devour and exploit his own people. The excess of 
freedom and desires of the city conclude in its tragic end. 
They are under tyranny where the 'protector does not lie 
prostrate, "mighty with far-flung limbs," in Homeric 
overthrow, but overthrowing many others towers in the car 
of state transformed from a protector into a perfect and 
finished tyrant1.52 Tyranny is now in its perfect form 
and begins life.
In order to understand the nature of the tyrannous 
soul, it transpires that the unnecessary desires have to be 
taken into consideration. Socrates explained that this 
kind of desire exists in every human being.53 It is 
lawless and shameless, but as being a kind of unnecessary 
desire it can be as well controlled by the laws and the 
better desires in alliance with reason. This desire 
becomes distinct when other elements in the soul are not in 
action. For example, as sometimes in sleep, when the
51 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 565d-e).
52 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 566c).
53 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 572b).
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better elements of the soul slumber, such a desire bestirs 
itself in dreams in which a person does many shameful 
things that he himself in reality will never do. However 
it would be lulled to rest in a man whose body and soul are 
in a good and sober condition, 'and he goes to sleep after 
arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair 
words and thoughts1.54 When it has been released and 
developed until it becomes stronger and subdues all other 
parts in the human soul, it indicates that a life of a 
tyrannous soul begins, and the transformation from the 
democratic man to the tyrannical man is generated from the 
ascendancy of these desires.
As regards the democratic soul in the image of men in 
democracy, he is a person who has to compromise between the 
enforcement of his thrifty, oligarchic father and the 
influence of luxurious pleasures of the drones in society. 
He lives a moderate life between these two tendencies: 'he 
lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor 
lawless' . His son is supposed to have the same experience 
as his father, that is, living his life in moderation in 
between the conflicting influences. His father might have 
attempted to draw him towards the moderate life while the 
opposite tried to pull him towards the lawless appetite. 
His father was successful in maintaining his moderation 
because he has been pulled by a strong, thrifty, oligarchic 
father. However in the case of the second generation of 
democratic soul, he is pulled by the moderate, democratic 
father on the one hand, and by those with lawless appetites 
on the other. It is most likely that he loses his balance 
and swings to the appetitive side which 'engender his soul 
a ruling passion to be the protector of his idle and 
prodigal appetites, a monstrous winged drone1.55 Socrates 
described the condition of tyrannous soul that
54 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 571e-572a).
55 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 572e-573a).
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'when the other appetites, buzzing 
about it, replete with incense and
myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the
pleasures that are released in such 
revelries, magnifying and fostering it 
to the utmost, awaken in the drone the 
sting of unsatisfied yearnings, why
then the protector of the soul has
madness for his bodyguard and runs 
amuck, and if it finds in the man any 
opinions or appetites accounted worthy 
and still capable of shame, it slays 
them and thrusts them forth until it 
purges him of sobriety, and fills and 
infects him with frenzy brought in from 
outside'.56
Also, Socrates said that with regard to the madness and 
frenzy of a tyrannical temper, it is comprehensible why 
love,eros, has been identified with the tyrant. Those who 
attempt to rule over not only men but the gods are regarded 
as mad men. In this respect, the tyrant is not considered 
different from these men, the drunken, the erotic, the 
maniacal.57 Inevitably in responding to his insatiable 
desires, the tyrannical man would exhaust his parents' 
resources in order to get all needed pleasures. 
Corresponding to the polity, the soul is said to dare to 
harm its begetters or commit parricide if necessary. This 
means that the tyrannous soul would spare nothing of its 
parental legacy or quality. As it can be observed that the 
timocratic, oligarchic, or democratic souls still keep half 
of its parental quality in addition to its rising 
qualities. For example, the timocratic soul has a 
character sharing both what it is derived from and what it 
is moving towards, namely, aristocracy and oligarchy.
Without any force to counteract the insatiable greed, 
the tyrannous soul becomes freely obsessed with anything it 
desires. It exhausts everything in extremity as if it is
56 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 573a-b).
57 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 573c).
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in love with such things. For this reason, Socrates called 
it 'the indwelling tyrant Eros, eros turannos endon'.58 
The soul of the tyrant Eros uses all of its power to fulfil 
its desires. For this reason, it has become identifiable 
with power and madness.59
The tyrant starts to exhaust his parents1 resources. 
To get what he wants, he robs, steals or even commits 
parricide if his parents resist him. From his own family 
to others' and finally his own city, he becomes the 
autocrat, the absolute tyrant of the city.60 He 
inevitably gets rid of his own friends who once helped to 
establish his power but later resented his dictatorship. 
Finally, it would turn out that the tyrant has neither 
friends nor foes. Also, it is evident that courage, 
wisdom, and wealth in others threaten his security and 
safety. '(A)nd such is the good fortune that, whether he 
wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against 
them all until he purges the city.'61
It is a purgation of the best in order to keep the 
worst qualities in the city and also in the soul. It is 
necessary for him to have 'base companions who hate him' 
otherwise he has to forfeit his tyrannical life. No matter 
how badly he needs someone who can be real 'friends' or 
'trusties' to him, he could never find them since his 
tyranny destroys or keeps those people away. He is 
surrounded by 'the drones', the hangers-ons, who do 
anything for money. For this reason, the tyrant 'never
58 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 573d).
59 Adi Ophir comments that 'the relation between Eros 
and the will to power was well known to the Greeks'. See 
Adi Ophir, Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in 
the Republic. Routledge, London, 1991, p. 31.
60 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 574c-575d).
61 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 567a-c).
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knows what it is to be the friends of anybody1 throughout 
his life.62 This kind of tyrannous soul can only be
either master or slave. It never tastes freedom or true
friendship. With regard to its nature of insatiable 
desires, the soul is always prone towards the unlimited 
power to become the master of all. On the other hand, in 
living with such desires in the soul, he in reverse is 
dominated like a slave since it is untamable and cannot be 
befriended.
At this point, Socrates confirmed to Adeimantus that 
it was no wonder that most people who associated with the 
tyrant had to appease him. To support this, he digressed 
to discuss Euripides and the importance of tragedy.
Tragedy was esteemed as a storehouse of wisdom. And 
Euripides who was the wisest of tragedians profoundly 
announced that '(t)yrants are wise by converse with the 
wise1. The poet probably meant that 'these associates of 
the tyrant are wise1. Socrates stated further that 
Euripides and other poets probably were very wise in 
praising the tyrant's absolute power as godlike and so and 
so forth.63 In this respect, Socrates said that the poets 
of tragedy must excuse him and his friends in disallowing 
them their ideal city or the others with a similar
political constitution because of their flattery of the 
tyrant. While they could go round to other cities
62 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 576a).
63 John B. Morrall comments on Euripides' Orestes, c. 
710-713 that his comparing the power of the tyrant to the 
gods could not be regarded as a compliment. Also, from 
Helen North's study of sophrosyne, it has been pointed out 
that in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, the ambition 
of the tyrant in competing or equalizing with the gods can 
be regarded as 'hybris' in opposite to 'sophrosyne'. See 
Morrall, op. c i t North, op. cit., pp. 32-84. Hence, the 
comparison between the tyrant and the gods should be 
understood in the same respect. Euripides' words might be 
ironic and sarcastic in order to be able to simultaneously 
save himself wisely from persecution and to be able to 
express the intended meaning.
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'collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive 
voices,1 and drawing 'the polities towards tyrannies and 
democracies1.
Tyranny and democracy respectively are the polities 
which mostly pay and honour these poets. It has been 
argued that tragedy and its function respond very well to 
the nature of political freedom and equality of 
democracy64 and the nature of arbitrariness of tyranny. 
Particularly the latter, the tragic poet can be glorious 
and famous if he could satisfy the tyrant's self- 
complacency; but in the end, such poets would find 
themselves incapable of appeasing adequately these polities 
whose pride has been boosted by these poets themselves.65
Finally, the long journey of the life of the city and 
the soul has come to its tragic end. It is far too late 
for the demos to protest after it realised 'to its cost 
what it is and what a creature it begot and cherished and 
bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to 
expel the stronger'. Indeed, tyranny inevitably leads to 
'a very parricide' when it enslaved and devoured its own 
people who like its parents gave birth to it. Ending in 
tragedy, the city and the soul finds itself in such a 
condition that
'the demos trying to escape the smoke 
of submission to the free would have 
plunged into the fire of enslavement to 
slaves and in exchange of that 
excessive and unseasonable liberty has 
clothed itself in the garb of the most
64 John B. Morrall, op. cit., He suggested '(t)ragedy 
reached its classically mature development..as an artistic 
reflection of this political and social iseqoria (equality 
of opportunity to influence political decisions by free 
speech)'.
65 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 568a-d).
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cruel and bitter servile 
servitude1.66
The tyranny is understood to be the most evil and also 
the most miserable. However Socrates said that not 
everyone thought so since in its setting condition for the 
birth of tyranny which was democratic 'the many have many 
opinions1.67
After finishing the description of the imperfect 
cities, Socrates confirmed his method of the study of the 
soul in the image of the city again that what had been 
stated about the city was applicable to the soul in respect 
of virtue and happiness.68 Then, from 576d to 588a, he 
proved that the life of the just man was happier than the 
unjust. The degree of happiness was measured by the 
distance of a certain unjust character of the soul from the 
just one. The life of a tyrant has been proved to be seven 
hundred and twenty nine times more painful than that of a 
just man, since the three elements of his soul have 
descended through five imperfect types.69 With regard to 
the above discussion of the just and the unjust city and 
soul, it seems that the decline of the soul is inevitable 
as regards the beginning passage in Socrates1 speech: 
'...since for everything that has come into being 
destruction is appointed1. Here, the questions arise. 
First, does Socrates possess a teleological view of the 
soul, that is to say, the inevitable decline of the just to 
the unjust soul? Secondly, what is the nature of the soul
66 Plato,
67 Plato,
68 Plato,
the Republic, 
the Republic, 
the Republic,
(Book VIII 568e-569c). 
(Book VIII 576c).
(Book VIII 576d).
69 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 587). That is to say, the 
soul descends from aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, 
democracy to tyranny. It is also possible that the use of 
number is Socrates' ironical response to Thrasymachus1 
disposition for quantitative benefit.
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regardless of its justice or injustice since what has been 
discussed about the soul so far is only concerned with 
either the just and the unjust souls?
V
To discuss these problems, it requires one to 
reconsider the origin of the just and the unjust souls. In 
the Republic, Book II, Socrates depicted what the just city 
and soul was. Although the city started its life with its 
basic desires, it does not mean that any organization which 
possesses only the desires can be called a city. In the 
same way, any soul which only has such desires cannot be a 
human soul. In the meantime, Socrates has proved that a 
just soul is the one which possesses three elements, that 
is, desires, spirit, and reason, and all are ruled by the 
rational part. With regard to the nature of the soul and 
the nature of the just soul, Raphael Demos' distinction 
between a complete and perfect individual helps the reader 
to understand the matter. According to Demos, a complete 
individual is one who 'possesses all three parts of the 
soul, and perfect with respect to a given part when the 
latter is fully developed1.70 The soul which consists of 
these three parts can be called a human soul. Therefore, 
by nature the soul is tripartite.
As a perfect individual is one whose soul is ruled by 
rational part, then it is possible that a complete soul 
might be either perfect or imperfect. It depends which
70 Raphael Demos, 'Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the 
Ideal State', Classical Quarterly. 7, 1957, pp. 163-164.
Demos's article deals with the paradox that if the ideal 
state consists of ideal men, then, these men need no state. 
But if the ideal state consists of un-ideal individuals, 
'how can one legitimately call a community perfect when so 
many of its members are imperfect?'
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part of the soul rules. As mentioned above, there is only 
one form of the just soul or city where reason unites with 
power whilst there are many types of imperfect or unjust 
soul or city. For this reason, a complete soul has two 
possible potentials, that is, just and unjust. It can 
evolve itself into either just or unjust forms. As regards 
the just soul, Socrates portrayed that each element of the 
soul needs one another and each knows its place whether it 
should be ruled or should rule in order to achieve justice. 
Reason and spirit alone cannot live without desires. 
Desires and reason need courage and vigour from the spirit. 
Desires and spirit cannot function properly without reason. 
With regard to the 'proper function' of the elements of the 
soul, it is necessary that the soul should be ruled by 
reason. In his description of the just city, Socrates 
pointed out the hierarchical importance in reverse from the 
lower to the higher classes of the city. Likewise, with 
regard to the just soul, reason must predominate other 
elements. Nevertheless, all elements are indispensable 
with regard to the nature of the soul, a complete 
individual. The just soul is the soul which has completed 
its evolution towards what Socrates has described.
As regards the unjust soul, Socrates spoke in the 
spirit of the Muses that it declined from the just soul. 
It means that the just soul is not immutable. The 
unseasonable breeding is the cause of the decay of the 
soul. As discussed above, reasoning combined with 
sensation of the philosopher-ruler cannot prevent this 
untimely procreation. Here, an important question arises. 
What causes this unseasonable breeding?
Socrates said that the unseasonable breeding occurred 
when the guardians missed the geometrical number which is 
determinative of better and inferior births.71 Although
71 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 546d).
281
it has been worked out differently, that geometrical number 
has been generally agreed to be two hundred and sixteen, a 
minimum period of human gestation; but as argued above, the 
terminology can be understood in both regards as the 
pregnancy of the body and the pregnancy of the soul. Of 
course, with regard to the former, it is obvious that a 
normal birth of a human offspring needs at least two 
hundred and sixteen days of pregnancy according to the 
Greeks at that time. The number should have been already 
known too well.
Actually, if it is only Socrates' intended message, 
there is no need for him to give such a complicated 
geometric puzzle just in order to present that number. The 
result is not as important as the way it has been 
arithmetically solved. The solution would render some 
meaning which must be concerned with the pregnancy of the 
soul. Unfortunately, the problem of the number remains 
unsolved with regard to a definite way of calculation. 
However, what has been suggested by Adam will be discussed 
later in connection with the idea of the good.72
The cause of the decay of the soul can be assumed to 
emanate from the cause of its generation, that is, the love 
of immortality. Timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and
tyranny declined because of their love of what they
72 Adam has worked out the figure 216 by way of 33 + 43 + 
53. Adam also referred to Aristotle who cubed the size of 
the triangle, 6, which also renders the same number. A 
recent interesting diagram of the number with regard to the 
elements and characters of the soul can be found in 
Brumbaugh's On the Mathematical Imagery. However, it much 
more concerns with the explanation of the number 729 with 
regard to the happiness of the just man and the suffering 
of the tyrant than with the geometrical number in passage 
546a-c. See James Adam, The Republic of Plato, edited with 
critical notes commentary and appendices, Book VI-X, 
Cambridge, 1965, pp. 264-318; Robert Brumbaugh, 'Republic, 
VIII-IX: On Mathematical Imagery', in Platonic Studies of 
Greek Philosophy: Forms, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock,
Albany, New York, 1989, pp. 81-88.
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regarded as the good or the virtue for themselves. 
Timocracy loves honour, but honour brings it down, also 
wealth, freedom, absolute power and self-indulgence in the 
case of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny respectively. 
For this reason, it seems to be an anti-climax to say that
the love of reason itself is the cause of decay. This is
supported by what has been said by Socrates that 'the men 
you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their 
wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation, but 
they will escape them, and there will be a time when they 
will beget children out of season1.73 It is an excess of 
the love of the immortality of the 'good' which causes the 
decay of the soul from aristocracy to tyranny.74 
According to Socrates' speech on the imperfect cities and 
the imperfect souls, it seems that apart from the three 
elements the soul by nature possesses the love or desire 
for the immortality of the good. It presupposes the 
dynamism of all three parts of the soul. For this reason, 
the just soul inevitably declines after it has lived its
life for a period of time. That is why Socrates talked
about the father who seemed to be too good and could not 
keep a balance with the need of his own family, or the 
timocratic father whose love of honour brought disaster to 
his family and also disillusioned his son who had been 
forced to love and treasure honour without proper music or 
education, or the oligarchic father whose family had lived 
a frugal life until his son broke the chain and became the 
lover of freedom instead of the lover of wealth; and the 
democratic man whose love of freedom could not control his 
son who was dominated by an insatiable greed for anything 
and became a madman or a tyrant if he was fortunate enough 
to be a leader of the greedy mob.
73 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 546b).
74 This implies that the love of reason alone cannot be 
regarded as the love of the good and justice.
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Tragically, it seems that Socrates has given the 
reader a teleological view of the fatalistic nature of the 
soul. This would not be the case if Socrates' invocation 
of the Muses to render this tragedy of the soul is taken 
into consideration. It is the divine power that Socrates 
had recourse to. In truth, it is 'the eye of the gods' or 
the panopticon.75 Possessing the panoptic view, Socrates
75 With regard to the origin of the panopticon, Michel 
Serres writes:
'Let us speak of the peacock, a bird 
twice monstrous, which wears so many 
feathers, and such long ones, that it 
cannot fly. As though evolution had 
made a mistake, by excess, it shows us 
a hundred eyes we dream can see, but 
know cannot. When it struts, it shows 
an ocellated tail on which it exposes 
only feather eyes. Let us speak of 
those eyes.
One day the peacock crossed Hermes' 
path, who was then called Argus, a man 
who could see everything. Argus had, 
they say, two pairs of eyes, one in 
front on his face like everyone, 
another in the back of his head. No 
dead angle. Others say he had a 
hundred eyes, fifty in front and as 
many as on his neck. Still others say 
he had an infinite number of eyes 
strewn everywhere on his skin. 
Clairvoyant at the beginning of the 
tradition, he is a figure who becomes 
at the end of his fantasmatic growth 
pure eye, an ocular globe of eyes, a 
skin tattooed by eye-shapes. Growth 
and fantasy often accompany each other.
Argus sees everywhere and is always 
watching. He sleeps with only one pair 
of eyes at a time or with only half his 
eyelids closed. Half asleep, half 
awake. The best of those watchers of 
the earth and the air, he deserves his 
nickname of Panoptes, the panopticon.'
See Michel Serres, 'Panoptic Theory' in The Limits of 
Theory, Thomas M. Kavanagh (ed.), with an Introduction, 
Stanford, California, 1989, pp. 25-26. The attempt of 
achieving the panopticon or the eye of the gods has been 
commenced with the prophets, soothsayers, seers, augurs, 
and later with the poets. The sophists and their treatment
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could have an overview of the whole journey of the life of 
the unjust soul. For a man with an ordinary eye cannot 
foresee the totality of events. Socrates 'dreams he can 
see, but knows he cannot1.76 Without the Muses, Socrates 
could not purport himself to be capable to see the past, 
present, and future of the life of a soul. In the spirit 
of the Muses, the discourse must be treated as half-serious 
and half-playful like a fairy tale for children. With 
regard to the fairy tale, the devil could become powerful 
if the children behave badly and the angel would rescue 
them if they are good. Likewise, a life of the unjust soul 
might or might not happen in the way that Socrates had 
related. To do justice to Socrates, one cannot ascribe 
teleologism to Socrates' view of the soul, as he always 
reminds his interlocutors of his ignorance. The only 
wisdom he possessed, if it be wisdom at all, is human not 
divine.77 The speech on the unjust soul is one that can 
see within without 'looking1. Socrates never claimed to 
know anything except his self-knowledge, that is, 'he knows 
himself that he does not know'.
of human subjects can be regarded as a similar attempt. 
Actually, the birth of the human sciences with particular 
regard to History is definitely intended to achieve this 
panopticon. The panopticon superficially seems to be 
originated in the will to know and the will to truth. In 
fact, it is indirect search for self-knowledge.
76 The phrase is borrowed from Michel Serres' 'Panoptic
Theory.' See footnote 75.
77 Plato, the Apology, (20a).
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CHAPTER NINE
The Nature of the Soul: Know Yourself-See Yourself-See Your 
Soul: Metaxy as the Nature of the Soul
As regards the question of the nature of the soul, as 
stated above, it can be said that there is an 'either/or* 
situation that if a complete individual is not just, it 
must be unjust, and if not unjust, it must be just. 
Another problem is that, as it has been inferred in the 
above discussion, justice and injustice in the soul 
originate from the same cause, that is, the love of the 
immortality of the good. Also, there is always dissension 
between the elements of the soul which the rational part 
has to control. For, as long as the ruling part is one 
with itself, the rising dissension can effect no change at 
all. Moreover it seems to imply that the soul by nature is 
in a self-conflicting condition. Its ruling part has to 
struggle against the other elements in order to maintain 
its governance. However, the just and the unjust souls can 
be distinguished by its ruling part, but they do not differ 
from each other with regard to the origin of their 
generation: both are said to be endowed with eros; it is 
the love of the immortality of the good. This leads the 
reader to a problem somewhat similar to what Demos proposes 
in his article, that is, the paradoxes in the ideal city1: 
first, how the ideal city can be perfect if it is composed 
of un-ideal individuals; secondly, as a need for the city 
exists only because human beings are deficient, if the 
ideal city is composed of ideal individuals, then, the 
ideal men need no city.2 Likewise, one can apply the same 
set of questions to the study of the nature of the soul. 
Can the soul be just if the other elements apart from the
1 Demos, op. cit.
2 Demos, op. cit., pp. 164-165.
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rational part are unjust? Why must the just soul have a 
'ruling part1 at all if all are already just?
The first problem to be dealt with is 'Is the nature 
of the soul self-conflict?1 The previous argument shows 
that the unjust soul declined from the just soul. To be 
sure, it can be said that the just soul developed from the 
unjust soul as well. A complete individual whose ruling 
part is not the rational part cannot be called the just 
soul. It is unjust. However, if the soul has developed 
itself and attains justice later, then it becomes just. In 
this regard, the just is generated from the unjust and the 
unjust from the just. Thus, it seems that the nature of 
the soul is not in harmony. And justice in the soul is 
just a short interval between the endless war.
In the Phaedo, it has been argued that if knowledge is 
recollection or the soul is immortal, the soul cannot be a 
harmony.3 Socrates in the Phaedo supported his argument by 
referring to the examples he also gave in the Republic. 
The rational part of the soul sometimes opposes the desires 
by drawing it away from eating or drinking. Also, he 
guoted the passage in the Odyssey xx, 17, 18, with regard 
to the conflict of the spirited element and the others in 
Odysseus: 'He smote his breast, and thus he chided his
heart: "Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than
this"?'4 The conflict in the soul is evident that
'it could never, if it be a harmony, 
give forth a sound at variance with the 
tensions and relaxations and vibrations 
and other conditions of the elements 
which compose it, but that it would 
follow them and never lead them1.5
3 Plato, Phaedo, (94e).
4 Plato, Phaedo, (94d); the Republic, (Book III 439-441c).
5 Plato, Phaedo, (94c).
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However harmony emerges in the just soul when reason 
rules and guides the others, and the result is that 'each 
part keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that 
each enjoys its own proper, pleasures and the best 
pleasures and so far as such a thing is possible, the 
truest1.6 For this reason, in the just soul, each part is 
just with reference to one another, and they are just as 
long as its ruling part is reason. If reason is weakened 
or does not care to rule for the happiness of the whole, 
the soul then becomes unjust. This is the reason why the 
just soul needs governance by reason; if the other elements 
are just, they have not become just of their own accord, 
since by nature, spirit and desires love honour and wealth 
respectively. Only the wisdom-loving part loves knowledge 
which can guide the soul as a whole to justice and the 
good.
I
The most significant factor which causes the decay of 
the soul is not the desires but the love of the immortality 
of the good in itself.7 The effect of love, as stated 
before, is twofold, namely good and evil. With such love,
6 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 586e-587a).
7 Love or eros is the essential force of life, but 
Aristotle overlooked the signification of love in this 
respect. He just emphasised rationality and 
rationalisation. As C. Fred Alford comments with regard to 
the power of eros as the beginning that '(s)ince it is the 
demanding, erotic, needy, desiring aspects of the self that 
make it such a problem, Plato's account is superior for my 
purposes, as it begins at the beginning, Aristotle tends to 
rationalize the passions, downplaying the demanding, 
demonic desires of the self, making them on the whole 
safer1. See C. Fred Alford, The Self in Social Theory: A 
Psychoanalytic Account of Its Construction in Plato, 
Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau, New Haven and London, 
1991, p. 19.
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the soul yearns for the absolute truth, good, justice,
happiness etc. It is a starting point for every soul no 
matter which part of it rules. With love guided by reason 
as its ruling part, the soul searches for the true wisdom. 
With others, the love of the immortality of the soul takes 
for granted as the truth anything that it understands to be 
the cause of its pleasures and pains. For spirit and
desires, honour and/or wealth are taken as the good, and 
the truth. Socrates stated with regard to this dark side 
of the love of the immortality of the soul that:
'The evil is that the soul of every
man, when it is greatly pleased or 
pained by anything, is compelled to 
believe that the object which caused 
the emotion is very distinct and very 
true; but it is not, (t)hese objects 
are mostly the visible ones, are they 
not?'8
For this reason, Socrates pointed out that 'the soul 
is most completely put in bondage by the body1.9 In the 
Phaedo, he discussed with his friends what life and the 
soul are in the eye of philosophy. In the dialogue, he 
identified the body with some elements which he later 
analyzed in the Republic as spirit and desires.10 Honour 
and wealth are concrete things which the soul, especially 
the spirited part and the desires, easily clings to.
Indeed, it can be inferred that two kinds of love 
exist, namely, one guided by reason, the other guided by 
the other elements in the soul. If there are two kinds of 
love, then there must be two kinds of lover. With regard 
to this point, the discussion on the lover's speech in the
8 Plato, Phaedo, (83c).
9 Plato, Phaedo, (83d).
10 C. Fred Alford argues that Plato's invention is to 
impose desires into the soul. See C. Fred Alford, The Self 
in Social Theory, op. cit.
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Phaedrus comes to the fore. Three lovers' speeches have 
been presented in the dialogue. Although the first one was 
called the speech of the non-lover, it is clear that such 
a speech emanates from the mind of the lover. To be sure, 
it is a written speech, since Phaedrus who recited Lysias' 
speech intended to show Socrates the effective rhetoric of 
a lover as regards the persuasion of his beloved. It 
indicates that for Phaedrus, who seemed to fall in love 
with Lysias' speech of the non-lover, a true lover must 
conceal his love in order to successfully conquer the heart 
of his beloved.11
Therefore, the speech of the non-lover is no doubt a 
speech of the lover in disguise. This was understood by 
Socrates himself who in his own and better version of the 
speech of the non-lover revealed a hidden intention of the 
lover behind Lysias' speech of the non-lover.12 Having 
been asked for comments on Lysias' speech, Socrates 
criticised the fact that Lysias seemed to be repetitious in 
saying many things about the same subject. He just did it 
in 'youthful fashion' trying to 'to be exhibiting his 
ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in 
both ways excellently'.13 The gist of the speech is only 
that after praising the calm sense of the non-lover and 
blaming the madness of the lover, the argument requires the 
audience to favour the non-lover.14 In this regard, irony 
and calm sense in Socrates' speech points to the fact that
11 Phaedrus is the lover of discourse. He has been swayed 
by the love speeches. Nussbaum says 'Phaedrus, too yields 
to the influence of beauty and is moved by wonder (257c), 
(f)rom having been the critical and rationalistic "speaker" 
of Socrates' first speech (244a), he becomes the loving and 
yielding boy to whom the maniac second speech is spoken'. 
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, op. cit.. p. 204.
12 Plato, Phaedrus, (237b).
13 Plato, Phaedrus, (235a).
14 Plato, Phaedrus, (23 6a).
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he is just another lover in disguise like Lysias. His love 
speech is behind his dialectic speech of critical cross- 
examination. He is a lover of discourse and also a 
philanthropist. Of course, he has love for a young man 
like Phaedrus15, but his love differs from Lysias1 love.
Also, as said above, Lysias' speech is just a speech 
of a lover in disguise. Virtually, the intention of the 
author does not differ from the lover speech. That is why 
Socrates said that Lysias wanted to show that he was able 
to say the same thing in two different ways and differently 
in both ways. Hence, Phaedrus requested Socrates to give 
a non-lover speech which is 'better than that in the book 
(of Lysias) and no shorter and quite different'.16 Before 
rendering the speech, Socrates had to cover his face 
because he said he was ashamed to give such a speech which 
he thought was blasphemous to the god of love.17
In his speech, Socrates pointed out that first of all 
the definition of love, its nature and its power must be 
explained, otherwise it would cause confusion since both 
the lover and the non-lover seemed to desire the same 
thing, that is the beautiful. Then, love must be a desire 
of the beautiful. However, man had two leading and ruling 
principles.18 At this point, the discussion of the love 
speech can be conflated with the discussion of the soul in 
the Republic. Two leading and ruling principles referred 
to here are the rule of reason and the rule of the other 
elements in the soul. Socrates in the Phaedrus stated with 
regard to these two principles that 'one is the innate 
desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which
15 See Nussbaum, op. cit., pp. 204, 232.
16 Plato, Phaedrus, (235d).
17 Plato, Phaedrus, (2 37a).
18 Plato, Phaedrus, (237d-e).
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strives for the best'.19 What he explained about them is 
reminiscent of what he described in Book VIII-IX of the 
Republic:
'These two sometimes agree within us 
and are sometimes in strife; and 
sometimes one, and sometimes the other 
has the greater power, (n)ow when 
opinion leads through reason toward the 
best and is more powerful, its power 
called self-restraint, but when desire 
irrationally drags us toward pleasures 
and rules within us, its rule is called 
excess, (n)ow excess has many names, 
for it has many members and many forms; 
and whichever of these forms is most 
marked gives its own name, neither 
beautiful nor honourable, to him who 
possesses it'.20
Those whose love are guided by desires appear in 
various forms. Those who are lovers of food are called 
gluttons. This is applicable to many other things. In the 
Republic, these various types can be put under four major 
forms or unjust souls or polities, that is, timocracy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. So this kind of love 
can be understood as
'the desire which overcomes the 
rational opinion that strives toward 
the right, and which is led away toward 
the enjoyment of beauty and again is 
strongly forced by the desires that are 
kindred to itself toward personal 
beauty, when it gains the victory, 
takes its name from that very 
force1.21
Socrates then described the lover of this kind who was 
regarded as a slave to pleasure. Such a lover would never
19 Plato, Phaedrus, (237e).
20 Plato, Phaedrus, (237d-238a).
21 Plato, Phaedrus, (238c).
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endure the beloved who was better than himself or his 
equal, because if the beloved was wiser or stronger than 
him, he would not be able to exploit and enjoy the 
pleasures from him. He would turn his beloved into a slave 
to his own desire. After he had exploited everything from 
his beloved, he would just desert him for another fresh 
one. This kind of lover would take vengeance if his 
beloved disappointed him. More importantly, he would keep 
his beloved away from philosophy which could lead him to 
wisdom. For it in turn would make his beloved despise his 
tyrant Eros.22 He loved his beloved just as the wolf 
loved the lamb.23
Socrates ended his speech without discussing the other 
half, that is, what was good about the non-lover. This 
surprised Phaedrus since he expected to hear what Socrates 
would say about the non-lover, so that he could compare it 
to Lysias' speech. Socrates replied that there was no 
reason to make a long speech since the non-lover possessed 
all the opposite advantages to those in the lover. 
Socrates did not want to continue the speech since he was 
ashamed and afraid of blaspheming the gods of love. For he 
believed that 'if Love is, as indeed he is (the son of 
Aphrodite), a god of something divine, he can be nothing 
evil1.24 Actually, the kind of love which had been stated 
in Lysias1 speech and the speech of Socrates is just a kind 
of love which had been led by the ruling desires in the 
soul. The non-lover is just a lover in disguise. Socrates 
said that one should learn about true divine love before 
'falling in love' with the non-lover who was in fact a kind 
of tyrant Eros.
22 Plato, Phaedrus, (239b). Compare tyrant Eros in the 
Republic, (Book IX 573b-e).
23 Plato, Phaedrus, (241d).
24 Plato, Phaedrus, (242e).
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II
To purify and recant his blasphemous speech, Socrates 
had to render another speech on divine love. He accepted 
that the lover was regarded as a mad man, and madness was 
generally understood as evil25, but it is a gift of the 
gods, the greatest blessing which had been sent to man 
through madness.26 If not, the term 'mania' would not 
have been connected with the noble arts.27 It must be the 
same reason that love had been identified with madness. It 
must be given by the gods for the greatest happiness of 
human beings.28
A good example was the divine madness in the inspired 
poet. It could be regarded as a gift of the gods to the 
poet. However, it has been understood that Socrates 
criticised the divine inspiration of the poet, because the 
poet lost control of himself when he produced his work. He 
could not tell where his art came from. He assumed that it 
must come from divine power. In the same way, for
25 At this point, Nussbaum comments that
'(c)learly the pre-Phaedrus dialogues do attack 
mania as a "simple evil", a state of the person 
that cannot lead to genuine insight and one that, 
more often than not, produces bad actions, 
(m)ania is called a species of viciousness at 
Republic 400b2 (cf. Meno 91c3, Rep. 382c8), (i)n 
a number of passages it is linked with excessive 
appetite— gratification, or wantonness (hybris, 
Rep. 400b2, 403; Crat. 404a4), (i)t is linked 
with delusion, folly, and the "death" of true 
opinion in the Republic 539c6, 573a-b (cf. 382e2, 
Tim. 86b4, Ps. Pol. Ref. 416a22)'.
See Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 204.
26 Plato, Phaedrus, (244a).
27 Plato, Phaedrus, (244b-e).
28 Plato, Phaedrus, (245b-c).
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Socrates, love was the king of divine inspiration or divine 
madness in the human soul. It could be said that love 
existed in the nature of the soul. No one could explain 
why it was so. If there be any particular reason, Socrates 
could see no other reason than that it must be meant for 
the greatest happiness of man.
The third speech in the Phaedrus is Socrates' palinode 
in response to his previous blasphemy. He argued that in 
order to understand love, it needed to take account of the 
nature of the soul. There were two kinds of soul, divine 
and human.29 In the realm of the gods, the soul possessed 
these qualities, namely absolute justice, beauty, wisdom, 
goodness. The only pilot of the divine soul was reason.30 
For a human soul, by nature yearned for the good and the 
beautiful.31 It could be more comprehensible if it was 
likened to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses 
and a charioteer.32
A chariot was moved by the power of a pair of winged 
horses; so winged horses represent the elements of the soul 
by which the soul was moved. That the soul was moved by 
its own elements means that it is self-moving.33 The 
driving force of the life of human beings derives from the 
winged horses or all elements of the soul. In fact, each 
element of the soul can be regarded as a kind of desire. 
The rational part of the soul possesses a love of wisdom; 
the power of the spirited part lies in its love of honour; 
and the desires love pleasures generated from wealth and 
the like. These elements are dynamic because love
29 Plato, Phaedrus, (245c).
30 Plato, Phaedrus, (247d-e).
31 Plato, Phaedrus, (252a-257b); Symposium, (210d-212a)
32 Plato, Phaedrus, (246a-b).
33 Plato, Phaedrus, (246c).
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permeates them all. One of the winged horses is said to be 
noble and of a noble breed: 'a friend of honour joined with 
temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory,... 
. . guided only by the word of command and reason1.34 It 
represents the love of reason or the rational part of the 
soul. The other represents the love of pleasures or 
desires: 'a friend of insolence and pride,... shaggy-eared 
and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs1.35
The wing is said to be the only part that partook of 
the nature of the divine. Therefore, 'the natural function 
of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is 
heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the 
gods'.36 The wing signifies that the human soul once 
experienced the truth. Also, that is why the soul loved 
what was beautiful and good which partook of the divine 
beauty and good, and only such a soul passed into human 
form.37
When the soul saw the likeness of the divine 
qualities, it fell in love with the objects. The soul was
34 Plato, Phaedrus, (253d-e).
35 Plato, Phaedrus, (253e). Nussbaum argues that both are 
important as 'we require the co-operative engagement of 
our non-intellectual elements in order to get where our 
intellect wants us to go, (t)he power of the whole is a 
sumphuton dunamis, a 'powerful naturally grown-together1 
(246a).' See Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 214.
36 Plato, Phaedrus, (246d-e).
37 Plato, Phaedrus, (249b). It can be said that human 
beings possess what can be put in Kantian terms as 
'synthetic a priori and analytic a priori1. Since man must 
'understand a general conception form by collecting into a 
unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the 
senses1. For example, this can be those of mathematical 
and geometrical knowledge. Such knowledge is said to be 
acquired by means of recollection since the soul once 
beheld it when it journeyed with God, as Socrates 
demonstrates in the Meno that a slave boy is able to solve 
a geometrical problem without any previous knowledge.
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regarded as insane because it could not control itself and 
did not understand its condition. It did not realise that 
it was yearning for the divine qualities which it 
experienced once before. In that condition, the desires or 
the unruly horse became wild and forced his mate and the 
charioteer to approach the objects in order to propose the 
joys of love, but the other horse or reason was obedient to 
the charioteer. If the charioteer was unable to control 
the unruly horse, it meant that the holder of the soul 
'gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to 
lust and begetting1.38 On the other hand, if the unruly 
horse had been tamed and guided towards the divine, then, 
'the growth of the feathers begins1.39 After the full 
growth of the wing, the charioteer could, with such wings, 
drive his chariot upward to the divine realm.
Ill
From this, the nine characters of man are categorised 
according to the degree of absorption of divine nature, in 
other words, the degree of their being able to control the 
unruly horse of desires. 'The soul that has seen the most 
shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a 
philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or 
loving nature'.40 This type is what has been called 
aristocratic in the Republic. Its soul is ruled by reason. 
The second one is a timocratic or kingly nature such as a 
lawful king or a warlike ruler who are highly spirited and 
regard honour as the highest virtue. From the third to the 
ninth, the souls are dominated by necessary and unnecessary 
desires. These types of men are mostly found in oligarchy,
38 Plato, Phaedrus, (251a).
39 Plato, Phaedrus, (251c).
40 Plato, Phaedrus, (248d).
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democracy, and tyranny. Such are politicians41 or 
business men, hard-working gymnasts, prophets, poets and 
some imitative artists, craftsmen or husbandmen, sophists 
or demagogues, and tyrants.42 Amongst these, it is said 
that only the philosopher has wings since this type of man 
'is always, so far he is able, in communion through memory 
with those things the communion with which causes God to be 
divine1.43 Although the others have no wings, they 
however have potential to grow them in the future if they 
live their lives justly. At the end of his palinode, 
Socrates argued that between the two kinds of love one 
should turn to the love of wisdom or philosophy because it 
is divine and true.44
Socrates stated that each character can become better 
or worse depending on whether it lives its life justly or 
unjustly.45 That is why the human soul is said to fall 
when it can no longer follow the divine as its wings become 
heavy.46 When Socrates said 'a human soul may pass into 
the life of a beast', he meant that the soul declines from 
justice to injustice, from the rule of reason to the rule 
of spirit and the rule of desires. On the other hand, 'a 
soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into 
a man1 means that a man can become better if he lives his 
life justly by moving towards the rule of the better 
elements in his soul.47
41 Of course, it is not the politician in Socratic sense 
as stated in the Gorgias, 52Id.
42 Plato, Phaedrus, (248d-e).
43 Plato, Phaedrus, (249c).
44 Plato, Phaedrus, (257b).
45 Plato, Phaedrus, (248e).
46 Plato, Phaedrus, (248c).
47 Plato, Phaedrus, (249b).
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From the soul, in the image of the charioteer with 
winged horses, love can be more comprehensible with regard 
to its two different kinds of horse. They represent two 
different kinds of love, and a discourse of the one is to 
be countered by a discourse of the other which is good and 
divine. That is, as Martha C. Nussbaum rightly argues, the 
Phaedrus is presented as a apologia for eros and it is a 
work in which a more complex view of these motivations has 
been worked out and some of them are accepted as good since 
'it can be a constituent of an orderly and pious life 
dedicated to understanding of the good1.48 The lover and 
the non-lover speeches in the Phaedrus dialectically 
interplay with one another. They in fact can be regarded 
as a springboard to the love of metaxu asserted by Diotima 
in the Symposium.49
However, with regard to two opposing forces, it 
entails the changeability of the soul. The changeability 
of the character of the soul also affirms its nature of 
self-motion. It cannot be said that the soul is always in 
a state of self-conflict, since, if the soul is always in 
a state of internal war within itself, then life would not 
be worth living.
In the Phaedo, Socrates1 friends understood that he 
chose to die. He also asked Cebes to tell Evenus the poet 
to 'come after him as quickly as he can1, that is, to 
follow his death50, but Socrates was not asking anyone to 
commit suicide. Suicide is not permitted until god, who is 
the guardian of man, 'sends some necessity upon him1.51 
Apart from this, committing suicide is unphilosophical.
48 Nussbaum, op. cit., pp. 203, 213.
49 See also Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 232.
50 Plato, Phaedo, (61b).
51 Plato, Phaedo, (62c).
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For, anyone who has any worthy interest in philosophy like 
Socrates must prepare himself for death not suicide. 
Socrates proved that the soul is immortal and death is not 
miserable as other people thought. Following the proof of 
the immortality of the soul and the recollection of 
knowledge, his argument entails that neither harmony nor 
discord is the nature of the soul.52 However, as Hans- 
Gorg Gadamer rightly analyses there is proof in the Phaedo 
that the soul can have harmony and lose it.53 Hence, what 
should be comprehensible as regards the nature of the soul 
is that it is always self-moving towards either justice or 
injustice. It oscillates between these two realms, but the 
nature of the soul itself is neither just nor unjust.
IV
The Good
Know Thyself-See Yourself-See Your Soul: Metaxy as the
Nature of the Soul
It can be inferred from the above that the nature of 
the soul is neither just nor unjust. Its nature is in an 
intermediate condition, metaxu. From the above, it has 
already been demonstrated that justice in man emerges when 
his soul is led by the rational part. Injustice is present 
in the soul whenever it is ruled by the other elements. In 
the discussion on the education of the guardian of the just 
city, Socrates replied to Adeimantus that what is greater
52 Plato, Phaedo, (94c).
53 He argues that in the Phaedo Plato intended that 'the 
soul must be thought of as Socrates thinks of it, that is, 
by departing from our human self-understanding1. See Hans- 
Gorg Gadamer, Dialogues and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical 
Studies on Plato, translation with introduction by P. 
Christopher Smith, New Haven and London, 1980, pp. 31-32.
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than justice and also is the greatest of all things is the 
idea of the good; since without the idea of the good, other 
knowledge becomes useless.54 The just soul is required to 
understand the idea of the good since
'the just and the honourable, if their 
relation and reference to the good is 
not known, will not have secured a 
guardian of much worth in the man thus 
ignorant, and my surmise is that no one 
will understand them adequately before 
he knows this1.55
So Socrates is requested to explain what the idea of 
the good means in the same way that he has set forth the 
nature of justice, temperance, and the other virtues. He 
stated that no one would pursue justice if there is no good 
in it.56 Most people prefer to seem to be just and 
honourable rather that to really be so. They pretend to be 
just because they think that an appearance would render the 
good to them. For the good itself, people would never 
desire what just resembles the good. They desire what is 
really the good, since what resembles the good can satisfy 
no one. Before proceeding to the discussion of the good, 
Socrates made an excuse that he feared that he might fail 
to give an adequate explanation and that in his eagerness 
he might turn out to be a laughing-stock.57 Actually, 
this adumbrates what Socrates in his parable of the Cave 
described the person who after ascending the Cave to see 
the Sun and its true nature returned to the Cave again and 
appeared to be pathetic and ridiculous in front of his 
fellow-men.58 Also, it is understood that Socrates was
54 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 504e-505b).
55 Plato, the Republic , (Book VI 506a).
56 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 505a-b).
57 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 506e).
58 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 517a, 517d).
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ridiculed by Glaucon for his first account of the good.59 
This means that he was aware that his explanation of the 
good might seem ridiculous to Glaucon who like the men in 
the Cave could not apprehend the significance of the 
analogy. Also, it implies that he might have been one who 
has experienced what is beyond the Cave, that is, the Sun 
itself. As he was aware of this, he said that what he 
could talk about was only the offspring of the good, not 
the good itself. The explanation of the offspring of the 
good, is regarded as the interest which is due to his 
friends because he could not give them what they really 
wanted, that is, the account of the good itself.60 Before 
proceeding, he asked them to listen carefully otherwise he 
could deceive them unintentionally 'with a false reckoning 
of the interest'.61
Socrates explained that things can be put into two 
divisions. First, there are the things that are regarded 
as beautiful or good when they have been predicated 'to
be1 . Second, it is the qualities of the beauty or the good
themselves which many things partake of and are then called 
beautiful or good. The first one is what has been seen but 
not thought while the other has been thought but not seen. 
With regard to the former, it is visible because of its 
faculty of being able to be seen and because of men's 
faculty of being able to see. Man can see with his eyes. 
The latter is intelligible because of its existence in the 
intelligible region and also because of faculty of 
reasoning in human soul. However, in the case of visible 
objects, they need the presence of light in order to be 
visibly seen. What makes human vision see best and visible 
things be seen is nothing but the sun. So the sun is 
regarded as the cause of vision although it itself is not
59 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 509c).
60 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 506e).
61 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 507a).
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vision.
The eye is the most sunlike of all the instruments of 
sense. It receives the power which it possesses as an 
influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun. In the same 
way that the sun is the cause of vision but not vision 
itself, Socrates urged that his friends should understand 
what he meant by the term 'offspring' of the good 'which 
begot to stand in a proportion with itself1. In the realm 
of the visible, the offspring of the sun is sight and 
vision. In a similar respect, the offspring of the good in 
the intelligible region is knowledge and truth.62 
Moreover, Socrates argued that the sun not only 'furnishes 
to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides 
for their generation and growth and nurture though it is 
not itself generation'.63 Following this, the idea of the 
good in the image of the sun must be understood accordingly 
te possess the same quality.
IV. I
At this point, Gadamer suggests that the idea of the 
good can be interpreted that it, 'without having "being" 
itself, is said to give being, to einai kai ten ousian 
(being and reality), to what is known in thinking'.64 He 
states further that following the interpretation of the 
allegory, a problem arises with regard to the special 
status of the idea of the good. He says 'the comparison 
forces us to take this ascent beyond being in such a way
62 Plato, the Republic,, (Book VI 508c-509a) .
63 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 509b).
64 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic- 
Aristotelian Philosophy, translation and with an 
introduction and annotation by P. Christopher Smith, New 
Haven and London, 1986, p. 89.
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that the good becomes the "cause" of the being of the many 
ideas, (b)ut of course the question remains: "cause" in
what sense?'65 With regard to this problem, Gadamer 
offers his interpretation as follows:
'The word "cause" (aitia) , which we 
know as the fourth genus of the
Philebus, is not used here either for
the sun or for the idea of the good, 
(o)n the contrary, the text moves in 
the semantic field of dynamis (power): 
parechein (allowing), pareinai 
(standing by), proseinai (being 
present), (t)he rendering of the good 
that Socrates gives (511b) makes 
unequivocally clear that here the good 
is interpreted as tou pantos arche, the 
"starting point (principle) of 
everything.|6°
The fourth class in the Philebus concerns the cause of 
the combination of two things with regard to the good, 
namely pleasure and reason. In the dialogue, two theories 
have been proposed as regards the nature of the good. 
Philebus1 hedonism argues for pleasure as the essence of 
the good. During the course of the discussion, it has been 
proved that neither reason nor pleasure alone can be 
regarded as the nature of the good. As Socrates suggested 
at the beginning of the discussion that to pursue for the 
truth not just a victory in argument, any alternative 
besides these two ideas should be taken into consideration, 
so he proposed that the third class might be the cause; it 
is the combination of pleasure and reason.
However, the cause of such a combination has to be 
counted as the fourth class.67 The cause of this 
combination or addition has been stated before in the
65 Ibid.
66 Op. cit., pp. 89-90.
67 Plato, Philebus, (22d-23d).
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Phaedo as regards the multiplication of numbers.68 Such 
a cause is not what Socrates meant in the Republic with 
regard to the idea of the good. To follow Gadamer's line 
of reasoning, what Socrates referred to is the 'starting 
point of everything1. With regard to this point, one is 
reminded of what Plato said in the Second Epistle. It 
shows his serious concern for the significance of the 
understanding of the original cause of everything. He 
mentioned in his letter to Dionysius the problem of the 
nature of the first principle. According to the letter, 
Dionysius was not satisfied with his demonstration of the 
nature of the first principle.69 It is quite possible 
that the message requires careful interpretation.70 The 
importance of this principle is evident as Plato stated 
that the problem of this nature of the first principle 'is 
the cause of all the trouble, and if that be not expelled 
from a man, he shall never genuinely find the truth1.71 
From the Republic and the Second Epistle, it appears that 
there is a connection between the idea of the good, the 
truth, and the nature of the first principle. It can be 
inferred that the good consists of the truth of the nature 
of the first principle which is the truth of all things.
As the good has been regarded as the 'starting point 
of everything1, then the question of 'what is it like?1 is 
still unclear. The courageous Glaucon expressed his 
scepticism. He wondered whether Socrates had omitted 
something from his explanation. Indeed, Socrates admitted 
to him that he has omitted a great deal. Also, he still
68 Plato, Phaedo, (96c).
69 Plato, Epistle II, (312d).
70 Plato said he would never write any discourse on the 
truth or the nature of the first principle. He regarded 
those who write anything on the subject as being ignorant 
of themselves. See the Epistle II, 312d; the Epistle VII, 
341b.
71 Plato, Epistle II, (313a).
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insisted that he would have 'to pass over much, but 
nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable1 he 
'would not willingly leave anything out'.72 What has been 
omitted must be quite important with regard to the truth of 
the nature of the first principle itself, but, as Socrates 
asked for an excuse from his friends, it is not practical 
to discuss it. Also it is likely that the reason that 
Socrates did not discuss the matter is similar to the 
reason which has been given by the author of the 
dialogues.73
Before investigating the problem of the nature of the 
first principle of all things, the term 'everything1 should 
be taken into consideration. As argued above, there are 
two realms of beings, that is, the visible and the 
intelligible. From this, Socrates1 further explanation 
departs. Suppose that both realms are divided by a line. 
The visible realm consists of two levels, that is, physical 
objects themselves and their shadows and images. In this 
realm, it is understood that the sphere of the objects 
themselves which are the originals of the images is true 
and also differs from the other whilst the other is related 
to the original in the same way that the realm of opinion 
is related to that of knowledge. In the realm of the 
intelligible, the objects themselves in the visible realm 
are in turn regarded as images. Socrates explained this by 
referring to students of geometry and mathematics who took 
for granted as absolute assumptions the odd and even 
numbers, geometric figures, three forms of angles etc., and 
proceeded from these assumptions through a series of 
consistent steps to the conclusions which they set out to 
find.74 The investigation of this division can be put in 
modern terms as an empirical knowledge. It can be
72 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 509c-d).
73 Plato, Seventh Epistle, (342a-344d).
74 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 510c-d).
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undertaken by mathematical reasoning, dianoia. In the 
realm of the intelligible, the investigation is taken 
toward the numbers or the figures themselves. It is the 
inquiry of the forms per se. This part can be understood 
by the power of dialectic. In this realm, it treats
'its assumptions not as absolute 
beginnings but literally as hypotheses, 
underpinnings, footings, and 
springboards so to speak, to enable it 
to rise to that which requires no 
assumption and is the starting-point of 
all, and after attaining to that again 
taking hold of the first dependencies 
from it, so to proceed downward to the 
conclusion, making no use whatever of 
any object of sense but only of pure 
ideas moving on through ideas to ideas 
and ending with ideas'.75
IV. II
From this, Glaucon said that so far as he understood 
with regard to the account given by Socrates, the aspects 
of the reality and the intelligible are distinguished by 
the fact that the latter which can be understood by the 
power of dialectic is truer and more exact than the former 
which is perceivable through empirical science. With 
regard to the aspect of reality, as in Socrates' reference 
to numbers and figures, like the mental habit of geometers 
and the like mind, what they use to approach it is not 
reason, nous, but mathematical reasoning, dianoia, or 
understanding which is in between opinion and reason. Then 
Socrates summed that up in the realm of the intelligible: 
four affections occur in the soul in hierarchical order as 
follows: intelligence or reason— dialectic, understanding 
or mathematical reasoning— dianoia, belief— pistis,
75 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 511b-c).
307
illusion or conjecture— eikasia76, And these four
sections must be arranged 'in a proportion, considering 
that they participate in clearness and precision in the 
same degrees as their objects partake of truth and 
reality1 71
After this point, Socrates started to render the 
imagery of the Cave. It can be interpreted in connection 
with what Socrates just delivered with regard to the 
intelligible realm. What the people in the image of the 
chained prisoners in the cave first saw are just the 
shadows of themselves and other things. They take the 
shadows for granted as reality so long as their necks and 
legs have not been released from the fetters.78 In this 
condition, they regarded what they saw as 'being1 the 
objects themselves. As the imagery goes on, it transpires 
that men in different conditions regard what they see as 
'being1. When any of them were freed from fetters and were 
able to move around and lift up their eyes, at first they 
could not understand the light of the fire which makes 
possible the visibility and shadows of the objects. Due to 
the pain caused by the dazzle and glitter of the light, he 
turns back to the shadows and still regards them as 
something more real than real objects in the light, since
he was at a loss and could not yet discern what he just had
a chance to see.
However, if he were compelled to look at the light of 
the fire itself, and also if 'someone should drag him 
thence by force up the ascent which is rough and steep, and 
not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light 
of the sun, 1 then, such would be so painful to him. His 
eyes would be filled with the beams of the light 'so that
76 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI Slid).
77 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 511e).
78 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 515b-c).
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he would not be able to see even one of the things we call 
real'.79 After some habituation, he realises that what he 
formerly regarded as being are merely shadows or illusions, 
since he is not able to see the actual things which are the 
origins of the shadows in the light of the sun. At this 
stage, he believes that the objects which he has just 
perceived are true beings which he is able to distinguish 
from images. Of course, in the light of the sun, first, it 
is very easy for him to discern the shadows and then the 
likeness or reflections in water of men and things. He 
might have regarded these images as the beings themselves. 
Later he is disillusioned when he can look at the objects 
themselves. Again, he is convinced that what he now sees 
is the truth of the beings, but he goes on to contemplate 
further the appearance in 'the heavens and heavens itself, 
more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and 
the moon, than by day the sun and the sun's light1.80 
When he is finally able to look upon the sun itself and see 
its true nature, then he can infer and conclude that the 
sun is the cause of everything he has seen.81
The imagery of the cave in fact is an analogy of the 
intelligible in the image of the visible. Its conclusion
is that the sun is the cause of everything. With its
light, shadows and visibility become possible. Things 
become visible because of the light of the sun. Things are 
what men understand them to be in relation to different 
levels of the light of the sun. From this, it can be 
linked to the above four sections. The men in the cave 
would never think that the shadows they are seeing are 
illusion until they have seen the light and the things
themselves. Shadows are 'being' to such men. Likewise,
although they realise what shadows are, they would however
79 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 515e-516a).
80 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 517a-b).
81 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 517b-c).
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take for granted what are not shadows as 'being1. They 
would do so until they have found out that it is only 
belief. Not until they are able to see the sun itself and
see its true nature, would they still take something for
what it really is. Hence, for men in all conditions in the 
cave, there exists 'being1. In every level of 'being1, the 
sun is the cause of all.
As mentioned above, the image of the sun is likened to 
the idea of the good. It has been said that truth and
reality are comparable to the light of the sun which
enables us to see what objects really are. The light of 
the sun is not the sun itself in the same way that truth 
and reality are not the good itself. The sun is neither 
the light nor the visible, but it 'furnishes to visibles 
the power of visibility and also provides for their 
generation and growth and nurtures though it is not itself 
generation'. Likewise, the good is said to give being to 
what is known in thinking, without having being itself. 
Socrates suggested that the comparison of the image of the 
sun should be applied to the soul both in the beginning and 
in the end of his speech on the good. At the end, he told 
Glaucon, who asked what had been omitted, that '(a)nd if 
you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the 
things above is the soul's ascending to the intelligible 
region, you will not miss my surmise, since that is what 
you desire to hear'.82
Since the soul is concerned with the intelligible 
realm, as in our earlier discussion of the transformation 
from justice to injustice and the nature of the soul, it 
shows that in each life or generation of the soul such as 
aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, 
there exists what each regards as the good and the truth of 
being. It is demonstrated that the transformation of the
82 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 517b, 508d).
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soul occurs because the soul is self-moving. The soul has 
self-motion because of the power of love in accordance with 
its tripartite elements. After the investigation of the 
nature of the soul, it transpires that the soul is the 
cause of being. The soul not only gives being to what is 
known in thinking but also nurtures and grows beings which 
it gives without having being itself, as it has been put in 
the form of an analogy of the relationship between the 
parents and the way they nurture their son. A particular 
type of soul emerges from its previous form. The soul 
gives values, meaning, truth, and good etc. to what it 
experiences. And all the values and meanings it gives are 
in accordance with its ruling part.
IV.Ill
Thus, the good is derived from the knowledge of the 
nature of the soul. Our earlier argument entails that the 
nature of the soul is neither just nor unjust; it 
oscillates between both realms. The nature of the soul is 
neither good nor evil; it is in between, metaxy. The 
knowledge of the nature of the soul as metaxy is the good 
which is greater than justice. It is beyond justice and 
injustice. The soul is the cause of everything, and to 
understand this, the eye of the soul has to be able to see 
itself. The soul projects 'being' to other beings, and 
the self-knowledge of the soul emerges when it projects in 
reverse to itself so that it can understand itself. As 
both just and unjust souls exist, then there are also two 
kinds of eye of the soul which each see things differently, 
but they are regarded as one of a kind when they are 
compared to the third kind of eye which sees itself. The 
third eye of the soul emerges to look after itself with 
regard to what is good. As Socrates concludes
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'..in the region of the known the last 
thing to be seen and hardly seen is the 
idea of the good, and that when seen it 
must need point us to the conclusion 
that this is indeed the cause of all 
things of all that is right and 
beautiful, giving birth in the visible 
world to light, and the author of light 
and itself in the intelligible world 
being the authentic source of truth and 
reason, and that anyone who is to act 
wisely in private or public must have 
caught sight of this1.83
So now it is comprehensible why the just and 
honourable with no relation and reference to the good 
'would not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man 
thus ignorant of the good1.
Returning to our earliest problem concerning the 
geometrical riddle of the perfect number for human 
breeding, the solution can now be drawn from our
understanding of the whole picture of the soul. What has 
been worked out from the riddle is the equation 33+43+53 = 
216. The result points to a minimum period of human 
gestation, but that concerns only one side of human being, 
namely the physical. As a man consists of body and soul, 
so the riddle must also be interpreted with regard to the 
soul. In our discussion of the just and the unjust souls, 
a prerequisite to the understanding of the five characters 
of man which embrace the just and the unjust types is the 
knowledge of the tripartite soul. Without this, the
apprehension of the governance of the soul in relation to 
the five types of polities is hardly possible. As regards 
our recent discussion of the idea of the good, it 
transpires that there are four levels of beings caused by
the good. These four stages of being in the realm of the
visible are obvious to everyone with regard to the sun as 
the cause. It requires just a normal sense-perception.
83 Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 517c).
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However, in the realm of the visible, the soul is regarded 
as the agent with regard to the understanding of these 
different conditions of being in relation to intelligence, 
mathematical reasoning or understanding, belief, and 
illusion. The degree that these conditions of being can be 
understood is attributable to the extent that a particular 
element in the soul rules over the rest. Also, in reverse, 
a different governance of the soul would interpret these 
four conditions of beings differently. What we have now is 
the sequence of numbers three, five, and four with regard 
to the tripartite soul, the five characters of man, and the 
four kinds of being respectively.
In the Republic, these numbers in fact have been 
brought into the discussion in chronological order; that 
is, the tripartite soul comes first followed by the idea of 
the good which renders the four levels of being, and the 
five characters of man. In the geometrical riddle, number 
three and four are easily noticeable, but with regard to 
what Socrates said, what he was going to render was the 
perfect number with regard to human procreation. The 
perfect number is the clue for the reader to go further 
from the basis of what he already possesses, that is, three 
and four. Before this, Socrates had already told us to 
consider the idea of the good in a form of a divided line, 
and this can be now taken as a clue with regard to a side 
of a triangle. In geometry, three and four in the context 
of the perfect number are the sides of the Pythagorean 
Triangle, the first possible right-angled triangle whose 
hypotenuse is the rational number 'five'. Three, four, and 
five can be understood with regard to the nature of the 
soul, that is, the tripartite elements, interpretation of 
beings, and characters of the soul.
Actually, this kind of interpretation of the
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geometrical riddle was initiated by Robert S. Brumbaugh84, 
but he has not explained the signification of the cube 
root. Three is a determinative number. As the tripartite 
soul oscillates between the rule of its three elements, 
this power of self-motion also determines the other 
numbers, that is, four and five to oscillate in relation to 
the ruling power of the soul, and this is where the cube 
root 'three' comes from. That the number 216 results from 
33+43+53 renders a picture or the understanding of the 
nature of man.
As stated before, the result 216 is less important 
than the equation itself. Furthermore, this equation is 
not to be interpreted in a teleological sense, since at the 
Republic, 527a-b, it is argued that geometry is not
suitable for the understanding of the genesis or becoming. 
It is intended to be used to understand the being of man 
not its genesis or becoming. Therefore, the equation is 
the answer in itself already. So the nature of man can be 
understood in relation to this equation. Moreover, the 
number 216 can be worked out in another way.85 The area 
of the triangle whose sides are 3, 4, 5 is 6, and if it is 
made solid as in solid geometry, it also turns out to be 
216. To make it solid, it needs to be cubed. Three or 
tripartite soul is so important in this regard. In 
potentiality, man possesses this metaphoric number of 3, 4, 
5. To make a solid state of the triangle is to combine 
these numbers in one as a whole of a human being, and the 
cube of six furnishes a complete understanding of human 
nature. This is the origin of the statement which states 
that 'this entire geometrical number is determinative of
84 Brumbaugh, op. cit., pp. 81-87.
85 See James Adam, the Republic, Appendices to Book VIII, 
Part III, pp. 306-308.
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this thing, of better and inferior births1.86 With regard 
to the analysis of the better and inferior births, it is to 
be discussed in relation to the art of statesmanship in the 
next chapter, since the art of the statesmanship concerns 
the care for human beings.
IV. IV
It has been argued before that the soul is self-motion 
whose prime mover is love. It oscillates between justice 
and injustice. Justice has only one form whilst injustice 
is pluralistic. Hence, the soul moves between the one and 
the many.87 A complete man can be either a perfect or an 
imperfect man. Actually, he must be either perfect or 
imperfect. If he is not one, then he must be the other. 
Therefore, a man is 'the one and the many', since the one 
and the many or justice and injustice are already his 
potential. If the one exists, then the many must also 
exist. That is why in the discussion on the one in the 
Parmenides, the conclusion has been drawn from the lengthy 
discussion that 'the one and the others in relation to 
themselves and to each other all in every way are and are 
not and appear and do not appear'.88 If the one is being, 
then, the many is also being. If the one is not-being, 
then, the many also is not-being.89 This is also the 
reason why the argument— that things which 'are not' exist 
and has to be counted as one class among the many classes
86 Plato, Republic, (Book VIII 546c).
87 The good is metron. See the Philebus, 64e-65a.
88 Plato, Parmenides, (166c).
89 Compare this to the Statesman, 284-285c.
of being— has been put forward in the Sophist.90
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The attempt to separate everything from everything 
else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a 
man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical. Man is 
neither being nor not-being. He is the one and the many at 
the same time. Also, he is 'being and not-being' at once. 
He is metaxy. The man who has ascended the cave to see the 
sun itself returns to the cave after all. It is 
inevitable, because he is human not divine. Human is 
neither bestial nor divine; that is why Socrates posed the 
question to Menexenus:
'Tell me, I beg of you, if evil is 
abolished, will it be impossible any 
longer to feel hunger or thirst or 
other such conditions? Or will hunger 
exist, so long as men and animals 
exist, but without being hurtful? 
Thirst, too, and all other desires—  
will these exist without being bad, 
because the bad will have been 
abolished? Or is this a ridiculous 
question— as to what will exist or not 
exist in such a case? For who can 
tell'.91
Man feels hunger as a hurt, and is also benefited by 
it.92 Theodorus said to Socrates that if Socrates could 
persuade all men of the truth of what Socrates said as he 
did to him, 'there would be more peace and fewer evils
90 Plato, Sophist, (258b-e). In his study of the problem 
of the linguistic inconsistency with regard to the one and 
the many in the Sophist, Francis Jefferey Pelletier 
concludes 'this is not paradoxical— there is no Russell- 
like contradiction here,..(i)n either case, we can see why 
Plato is truly said to have "shown that not-Being is, in 
the same sense that Being is," and therefore to have 
disposed of Parmenides' Problem'. See Francis Jefferey 
Pelletier, Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not- 
Being, Chicago, 1990, p. 148.
91 Plato, Lysis, (220e-221b).
92 Plato, Lysis, (221a).
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among mankind'. To this, Socrates answers
'it is impossible that evils should be 
done away with, for there must always 
be something opposed to the good; and 
they cannot have their place among the 
gods, but must inevitably hover about 
mortal nature and this earth'.93
In the Statesman, man and beasts are divided by a 
geometrical method, that is, the diameter of the square of 
the side of the square root of two feet, which is the 
square root of four feet. Man and beasts are just 'a 
square root' away. In employing a geometrical method to 
divide man and beasts, it turns out that man is and is not 
separated from animals. Man can become beasts in many 
forms. A symbolic imagery of such a soul is portrayed in 
the image of
'one of those natures that the ancient 
fables tell of, as that of the Chimera 
or Scylla or Cerberus, and the numerous 
other examples that are told of many 
forms grown together in one'.94
The picture of the dark side of man is made 
comprehensible when one 'moulds a single shape of a 
manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of 
tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to 
spring forth from itself all such growths'.95 The whole 
man is conceivable when one puts an image of a lion and an 
image of a man together with the image of the wild beasts 
just mentioned. The lion represents spiritedness while the 
beasts represent unlimited forms of desires. The largest 
is the beasts, next to this is the lion, and the smallest 
in size is the rational which is represented by the image
93 Plato, Theaetetus, (176a).
94 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 588c).
95 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 588c).
317
of a man. These images are united into a single image of 
a human being. Therefore, 'to anyone who is unable to 
look within but who can see only the external sheath it 
appears to be one living creature, the man1.96
In conclusion, the nature of man is metaxy,97 The 
tripartite soul has love as its prime force to move or 
oscillate itself between justice and injustice. In the 
Cratylus, Hesiod's myth of the races has been appropriated 
to render the fact that man differs from animals with 
regard to its potential of 'looking up at1, anathrei, Man 
looks up at the good which is divine. Socrates told his 
interlocutors that the name of Uranus who is the father of 
Cronos can be originally referred to 'looking up at the 
things above'.98 Man possesses this divine element when 
he looks up at things. When he sees things, he sees them 
more than animals do. He searches for something more than 
just what animals see. In his looking up at things, he 
wonders and searches for the truth and the good. Values 
and meanings have been given to things man has seen. They 
are variable and changeable, but one thing which is quite 
important is there is always a space or a lag between what 
he thinks about the objects and the objects themselves. 
This can lead one to the point that theory and practice 
cannot be united in reality. In a sense, utopianism is 
inherently in human nature. It makes man 'look up at 
things'. However, utopianism can be either just or unjust, 
since utopianism originates from love: it is the love or 
desire for the good.
96 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 588d-e).
97 Consider Plato's only view on man in the Epistle VI, 
323b: '..and though man has his good qualities, he is, with 
rare exceptions and in the greater part of his actions, 
quite changeable..for nothing human is altogether stable'. 
See also the Phaedo, 90a.
98 Plato, Cratylus, (396c) .
In the Statesman, man is said to be not completely 
separated from animals. Man is neither divine nor an 
animal. Man is man. To be a perfect man is to know 
oneself as a man neither divine nor an animal. The self- 
knowledge of human nature of metaxy guides one to love 
neither what is nor what is not. Diotima taught Socrates 
that a true love is the love of metaxy, and any love or 
desire which is neither good nor bad will exist even if the 
bad things no longer exist."
99 Plato, Lysis, (221b)
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CHAPTER TEN
Self-Knowledge and the Politics of the Soul
Socrates:'And in the matter of honours and office too this will be 
his guiding principle: He will gladly take part in and enjoy those 
which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private 
life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit of his 
soul.'
Glaucon: 'Then, if that is his chief concern, he will not willingly
take part in politics.'
Socrates: 'Yes, by the dog, in his own city he certainly will, yet
perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential 
conjuncture, 'the Republic, (Book IX 592a) .
The mission of Socrates is political. Socrates stated 
in the Gorgias that he is 'one of the few in Athens who 
attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of 
the present time who manages affairs of state'.1 The
purpose of his mission seriously concerns 'the care of 
soul'. To care for one's soul is to know oneself. The 
search for self-knowledge is the essence of Socrates'
mission. Socrates regarded this as the art of the
statesman. It is indisputable that the statesman's chief
concern is man. A true statesman is required to understand 
the nature of man.2 The understanding of human nature is 
indispensable to statesmanship. The statesman is generally 
understood to be more involved with politics than with any 
other profession, and the art of politics must be the art 
of statesmanship. Also, the statesman must be a law-giver. 
In the search for the best laws for the city in the Laws, 
it is argued that it is important to discover the nature
1 Plato, Gorgias, (52Id).
2 That is why, in the Statesman, a seemingly unnecessary 
discussion of what is the statesman's chief concern is 
necessary though the answer itself is quite simple. At 
first, the Eleatic Stranger does not allow the young 
Socrates to answer right away that man is the greatest 
concern of the statesman until a dialectic division and a 
geometric riddle have been completely brought into the 
investigation. Since the discussion in the Statesman 
itself attempts in practice to guide the reader to the 
understanding of the nature of man.
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and condition of men's souls since it is 'one of the 
things most useful to that art whose task it is to treat 
them'.3 That art is the art of politics.4
For Socrates, the art of politics is the art 'which 
has to do with soul'.5 From this, it seems that Socrates 
should have regarded himself as a statesman. His political 
mission and his idea of a statesman and politics seem quite 
peculiar. It is generally understood that he never 
undertook to become involved in Athenian politics.6 Of 
course, compared to the conventional politics of Athens, 
Socrates' politics seems to be quite unconventional.7 In 
truth, Socratic politics seems paradoxical and ambiguous. 
So this chapter will concern the elaboration of such 
politics. It will cast light upon the interrelationship 
between the Socratic concept of man and politics.
From the previous chapter, the essence of man is shown 
to lie in his tripartite soul whose love or eros of the 
immortality of the good is the prime force of human life. 
With regard to the tripartite soul, there are three kinds 
of love, namely, the love of wisdom, the love of honour, 
and the love of pleasures. The rational part of the soul 
which possesses the love of wisdom is identified with 
'human' whilst the other two are metaphorised as bestial, 
that is, the lion and the many-headed monsters. However,
a complete man is a mixture of all these elements. Only a
man whose rational part dominates the others is just. 
Therefore, there exists only one form of just man, but the 
forms of the unjust are many. However, it can be said that
3 Plato, Laws, (650b).
4 Plato, Laws, (Book II 650b).
5 Plato, Gorgias, (464b).
6 Plato, Apology, (3Id).
7 See Carter, The Quiet Athenians, op. cit.
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in general there are two forms of life, namely the just and 
the unjust. Love can be considered with regard to these 
two forms of life. The predominance of the love of honour 
or the love of pleasures generates injustice in anyone who 
possesses either kind of soul. So it can be re-concluded 
that with regard to these two general forms of human life 
there are two kinds of love, that is, the love of justice 
and the love of injustice; but it is said that the love of 
justice cannot be secured without the knowledge of the idea 
of the good. Lacking understanding of the idea of the 
good, the just soul inevitably transforms itself into 
various kinds of injustice as they have been portrayed in 
the four main forms of governance, that is, timarchy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.
With regard to its nature, the soul is self-motion. 
It is neither in harmony nor in discord. Although an 
internal war or self-conflict seems to exist in the human 
soul, however, rhythm and order as a divine gift from 
Apollo and the self-motion help relieve suffering and 
disharmony in the soul. However, it oscillates between 
harmony and discord, the just and the unjust lives.
With regard to its love of the immortality of the 
good, each life of the soul, just or unjust, has its own 
appreciation of and attachment to the values of what it 
regards as the good. To be sure, different characters of 
man in relation to its particular ruling part of the soul 
have different interpretations of the truth and the good. 
The simile of the Cave is an example of human nature in 
relation to epistemological difference. Justice in the 
soul cannot be secured until the love of wisdom as its 
ruling part arrives at the understanding of the idea of the 
good. Only such a soul which is able to see itself as the 
true cause of being is good and just. The eye of the just 
or the unjust soul alone cannot see the truth. Only this 
emerging third eye which sees within and without itself
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through its nature of justice and injustice can achieve 
self-knowledge.
The self-knowledge of the soul or the nature of the 
soul can be understood as metaxy. The soul now understands 
its nature of self-motion which oscillates between one and 
the other. Simultaneously, it realises the cause of 
justice and injustice, harmony and discord. With the third 
eye established in the soul, the soul can realise that it 
is stationary and moving at the same time. This point has 
been made before in the Republic8, and pleasure and pain 
originate with this motion of the soul.9 The self- 
knowledge of the soul as metaxy generates a neither/nor 
position which never inclines 'the perpendicular to right 
or left or forward or back1 as in the middle position is 
achievable through 'know thyself1; and 'justice'
originates from the understanding of the nature of the 
soul.
At this point, Socrates' explanation of the term 
justice under his irony of divine inspiration in the 
Cratylus comes to light. There are three reasons which he 
believes to be the origin of the term justice. First, it 
is the motion of some element which passes through all the 
universe and by means of which all created things are 
generated. This element is said to be very rapid and 
subtle. Secondly, justice is said to be the sun because 
the sun alone superintends and passes through all things. 
This version of justice is modified so that actually it is
8 The argument at 43 6c-437a is intended to prove the 
plurality of the soul. It shows that it is not possible 
for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to 
be at rest and in motion. From this, it is inferred that 
the soul is tripartite. However, with regard to the soul 
as a whole not its composite parts, the example of a man 
whose top appears stationary whilst his body revolves 
indicates the simultaneous rest and motion of the soul.
9 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 583d-584c).
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not the sun but its heat which permeates all things. The 
last reason is Anaxagorean who argued that justice is the 
mind, nous, for the mind is ruled by itself, is mixed with 
nothing and orders all things and passes through them.10 
These three versions of justice complement one another if 
they are compared with the earlier discussion of the nature 
of the soul. With regard to the self-motion, the cause of 
being, the simile of the sun, and the Anaxagorean self- 
ruling mind, the element in question is the Socratic soul. 
'Justice* emerges in accordance with the understanding of 
the nature of the soul.
How is Socrates' idea of man related to his politics? 
Also, in what way is the Socratic mission political?
I
The interrelationship between man and politics can be 
understood in the light of the analogy of the city and the 
soul. In the previous chapter, it has been argued that 
Socrates analyzed the nature of the soul in the image of 
the city. The city has been metaphorically understood to 
represent the soul. However, in Socrates' speech in the 
spirit of the Muses, it is undeniable that there exists 
some element of a difference between the city and the 
individual. As argued before, in the spirit of the Muses 
Socrates' speech can be interpreted both literally and 
symbolically. Literally, it is quite obvious that the 
speech portrayed the interrelationship between the city and 
the soul. The city and the soul are inseparable in the 
same way that the study of the different characters of man 
is indispensable to the study of the different polities of 
the city. The study of the character of man has to be
10 Plato, Cratylus, (412d-413d).
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interpreted against its context, namely, its relation to 
its city. The city here embraces all social and civil 
units and organisations from family to government. This is 
confirmed by Socrates' speech on the origin of the city. 
It is indisputable that a human life never emerges and 
lives by itself with no contact with other human lives. 
Even a test-tube baby in one way or another has to be 
raised by human beings.
Hence the inseparability of the individual and the 
city necessarily blurs a demarcation line between nature 
and nurture. It is evident that an early nurture of a 
person cannot be regarded to be less influential than his 
nature. To be sure, the degree of influence of the city 
which is to be regarded as the nurture of individuals, is 
not restricted to the stage of childhood of a person 
although the early influence would leave a much more deeper 
imprint on a young soul. With regard to this point, G.K. 
Browning rightly states that
'man cannot and should not be seen 
outside this context, an individual's 
values and aspirations are shaped 
comprehensively by the political 
community he inhabits, (t)he "natural" 
habitat for Plato's "democratic" is the 
democratic state'.11
Generally, it is logical to say that democracy 
nurtures democratic character. However, the 'first 
democratic man' did not originate from democratic polity. 
He originated from oligarchy. Moreover, democracy is 
potentially a birthplace of tyrannous man. Actually, this 
point will be discussed later.
Although such a context is unquestionably
11 G.K. Browning, 'Plato and Hegel: Reason, Redemption and 
Political Theory', History of Political Thought, Vol. VIII 
No. 3 Winter 1987, p. 389.
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indispensable with regard to the study of man, however, the 
interrelationship of the city and man must always be 
interpreted with regard to human nature. That is to say, 
one needs to consider how the city affects or nurtures the 
tripartite soul of its citizens. Before proceeding with 
the study of the influence of the city over man, it is 
necessary to clarify the nature of the city.
II
In the Phaedrus, Socrates gives the example of nine 
occupations of people with regard to the extent of their 
partaking of divine nature. However, it would be 
ridiculous to state that he believed there existed no more 
than these occupations in the city. For instance, he did 
not mention a physician.12 However, all kinds of 
occupation and people can be re-grouped according to the 
nature of their souls. They can be divided into three 
general classes in accordance with the tripartite soul.
What can be regarded as a city must consist of these 
three classes in the same way that a complete man must have 
a tripartite soul. The three classes reflect three 
essential elements of the soul. On the other hand, the 
tripartite soul entails the existence of the three classes. 
If the three classes are essential elements of the city, 
then, it can be inferred that human nature or the nature of 
the tripartite soul entails the existence and nature of the 
city. Lacking one of the three, it is no longer a city, or
12 It is possible that these nine occupations might be 
easily recognised in Athenian society. Usually, an
occupation of a person reflects his interest or what he 
regards as his chief concern. A man's chief concern should 
be what he loves or desires. This argument is valid on the 
condition that a man is free to choose any occupation he 
wants.
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a community of human beings. A community with desires only 
is nothing but a 'community of pigs' as Glaucon remarked 
after Socrates' unfinished account of the ideal city which 
had then arrived at just one class in the city.13 Each 
class represents the kind of individuals whose ruling parts 
in their souls are similar. Philosophers are said to be 
those whose souls are dominated by the love of wisdom. 
Guardians are the class of the lovers of honour. The other 
class is ruled by the love of pleasures, or necessary and 
unnecessary desires.
Indeed, the discussion of the nature of the city is 
just a reverse study of the city in the image of the soul. 
Also, the forms of political constitution can be understood 
with regard to the characters of man. As Socrates said to 
Glaucon before he proceeded to give the speech on the 
imperfect polities:
'Are you aware, then, that there must 
be as many types of characters among 
men as there are forms of government?
Or do you suppose that constitutions 
spring from the proverbial oak or rock 
and not from the character of the 
citizens, which, as it were, by their 
momentum and weight in the scales draw 
other things after them'.14
Thus, like the characters of the soul, the ideal or 
the just city is one whilst its unjust forms are many. The 
ideal city corresponds to the just man. The just man's 
soul is ruled by its rational part. When the rational part 
rules, it means that wisdom and power are united. The just 
man is a philosopher-king for himself for this reason, and 
the ideal city is ruled by one or a class of such 
philosopher-rulers. The city is much the same as the soul 
regarding to its power of self-motion. To render the
13 Plato, the Republic, (Book II 372d).
14 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 544d-e).
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example of the forms of government of the city in speech, 
the four main types of government are taken into account. 
In speech, each form of the inferior types of government is 
rather static and vivid and therefore easily grasped, 
although in reality the city is as dynamic as the soul. 
When it is in motion from one form to another, its shape, 
form, boundary and texture in reality is not as distinct 
and contrasting as when it is at rest in speech. With 
regard to this point, Averroes'comments are perceptive as 
he clarifies the transformation of polity:
'He15 makes known which governance is 
most opposite (to the virtuous 
governance; and makes known [which may 
be set down as being between these two 
governances— i.e., the virtuous [and 
that] which is most opposite) to it—  
being of the rank of intermediaries 
between the extreme; and how these 
intermediaries are arranged with 
respect to the extremes, as is the case 
with the other opposites that have more 
than one intermediary between them and 
still are distinct. An example of this 
is the colour white. Black is its 
opposite. Between the one and the 
other there are intermediaries; these, 
however, are arranged— i.e., some are 
(closer) to white and some are closer 
to black. It is evident that if this 
is also the case with governance, the 
transformation of the two extremes that 
are as opposite to each other as can be 
will consist in their first turning 
into the intermediaries, and at that 
also according to the arrangement of 
the intermediaries. That is, they 
first turn into the closest of the 
intermediaries, then, into that follows 
it, (until) it turns into the extreme 
that is most opposite (to it)'.16
15 Averroes is referring to Plato.
16 Averroes, On Plato’s Republic, trans. with an 
introduction and notes by Ralph Lerner, Ithaca and London, 
1974, 'The Third Treatise: 79.25-80.10. This passage
matches Averroes1 general metaphysical theory of the cyclic 
and recurrent nature of the universal itself.
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In this respect, in reality, the number of the 
imperfect forms of the city as well as the number of the 
characters of man are various and many more than the given 
four examples. Between aristocracy and tyranny, there must 
exist the intermediaries between the intermediaries of each 
one. In this regard, Averroes1 example of colour is very 
appropriate, as, of all the colours, there are three 
primary ones which all the other colours evolve around. 
Indeed, the tripartite soul and its various forms can be 
understood with regard to the nature of the three primary 
colours and their generation of the others by means of 
their interaction.
Suppose the colour of timarchy is green. Its shades 
are, for example, emerald green and olive green. In its 
self-motion, it can shade into the intermediary between 
itself and its becoming colour which at this stage it is 
hard to distinguish one from the other. That is why 
timarchy can be regarded as a base of oligarchy, oligarchy 
a base of democracy, and democracy a base of tyranny, and 
vice versa. Also, seen from this point of view with regard 
to the shade of colour, despite many different aspects 
between British and American democracies, they nevertheless 
are in the same shade of colour. The polity transforms 
into timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny when its 
political power has been respectively taken over by those 
lovers of honour, lovers of gain, lovers of freedom, and 
lovers of extremity.
Whenever the city neglects or devalues its 
philosopher, there arise restlessly internal wars from 
which its polity inevitably declines. However, as argued 
above, a city as well as a complete man must consist of 
three elements. Although the philosopher or the rational 
part might be devalued or suppressed, however, it still 
exists in the city and the soul. If the suppression of 
philosophy, which is the activity of the philosopher, were
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to continue unabated, in other words, if the other classes 
were predominant in the city, then, the pattern of the 
decline of the city from timarchy through oligarchy, 
democracy to tyranny would be inevitable. Lacking 
philosophy, the city is dated with endless internal wars. 
The other two classes would never have real friendship with 
each other. Moreover, one class not only fights with 
another but also fights within itself. Not until 
philosophic intelligence is united with political power, 
'there can be no cessation of troubles for our states, nor 
for the human race either1.
Ill
The city has various forms of polity. They are either 
just or unjust. A contemporary polity of a city can be 
regarded as democracy, timarchy, oligarchy, or tyranny. On 
a popular level, a political constitution of a city is 
judged from 'Who Gets, What, When, and How1.17 The 
criterion is drawn from the measure of the major control 
and the assumption of such power, but with regard to the 
essential composite elements, the city nevertheless 
possesses the elements of democracy, oligarchy, timarchy, 
tyrannny, and even aristocracy. Since the city is composed 
of citizens of various characters, namely, timocrats, 
oligarchs, democrats, tyrants, and aristocrats, when any of 
these characters takes control of the city, of course it is 
easier to notice such a dominant one, while the others are 
unclear. In American democracy, there nevertheless are 
some communists in the same way that some democrats exist 
in the Republic of China.
17 This is Lasswell's popular definition of politics. See 
Harold D. Lesswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How, 
New York, 1936.
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In the unjust soul or polity, it is more often than 
not that the rational part or philosophers are hardly 
noticeable. That is why Socrates needs to seek justice in 
man by having recourse to its larger counterpart in the 
image of the city. In the image of the city, it is clear 
that three classes exist in the city in much the same way 
as the soul is tripartite. Furthermore, with regard to the 
nature of dynamism of the city, it can be inferred further 
that the city is in potentiality of becoming any one of the 
polities with regard to its three classes of citizens. At 
this point, some might pose a teleological question of the 
origin and destiny of the city. The answer is that the 
study of the nature of the city should not be viewed either 
from its static or dynamic position, since the truth of it 
cannot be said to be either one or the other. The point of 
departure is in the middle, the in-between position. The 
study of the origin of government should start at the point 
that the position of the city is metaxy. It is moving 
towards either goodness or badness. To try to assume a 
spatio-temporal polity of the city in a certain point of 
time and space as its reality is to mistake a particular 
for its whole, although the study of the particular is a 
starting point for the whole; this point is evident in the 
Athenian Stranger's speech. He states to Clinias and 
Megillus that
'Now, what are we to say about the 
origin of government? Would not the 
best and easiest way of discerning it 
be from this standpoint?.. .That from 
which one should always observe the 
progress of States as they move towards 
either goodness, arete, or badness, 
kakia. .. .The observation, as I suppose, 
of an infinitely long period of time 
and of the variations therein 
occurring....Tell me now: do you think 
you could ever ascertain the space of 
time that has passed since cities came 
into existence and men lived under 
civic rule?... During this time, have 
not thousands upon thousands of States 
come into existence, and, on a similar
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computation, just as many perished?
And have they not changed at one time 
from small to great, at another from 
great to small, and changed also from 
good to bad and from bad to good?18
With regard to this point, Eric Voegelin has argued 
for what he calls the Platonic metaxu, It is 'neither the 
temporal dimension1 nor 'the dimension of an eternity1 in 
which the story of the quest originates and moves. It 
begins 'somewhere in the in-between of the two...the 
dimension symbolised by Plato as the metaxy1.19
IV
The city consists of individuals. Each individual 
possesses a tripartite soul. The character of a man can be 
understood with regard to the ruling part in his soul. The 
number of the character of man corresponds to the number of 
elements in his soul. Generally speaking, there are five 
characters of man. Aristocratic and timocratic types 
correspond respectively to the governance of the love of 
wisdom and the love of honour in the soul. Oligarchic, 
democratic, and tyrannous characters result from the 
predominance of the love of pleasures which consists of 
necessary and unnecessary desires. To be sure, oligarchy, 
democracy, and tyranny are the main characters among the 
countless ones of the soul of predominating desires which 
departs from oligarchy via democracy and terminates at 
tyranny. Then, to be more precise, the city consisted of 
men of these different characters, but no matter how many
18 Plato, Laws, (Book III 676a-c).
19 See his thesis of the Platonic metaxy in Eric Voegelin, 
Order and History, Volume Five, In Search of Order, Baton 
Rouge and London, 1987, '6. The Story Begins in the Middle: 
The Platonic Metaxy', pp. 27-28.
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characters appear to exist in a city, however, they can be 
put into three main types of the characters of the soul 
from which they originate. It is for this reason that the 
nature of the city is said to consist of three classes of 
men in the same way that a human soul is tripartite. Also, 
with regard to the stipulation that human nature in respect 
to its self-moving, tripartite soul is metaxy, it is 
pointless to attempt to look for a state of nature of man 
or the city other than to look at man and the city, as 
argued above, from the position of metaxy.
The nature of man determines the nature of the city. 
The tripartite soul entails three classes of men in the 
city, but men also have characters. When the love of 
wisdom takes control over the others in the soul, it 
generates an aristocratic character. When aristocratic 
individuals take control of the city, the polity of the 
city is aristocracy. This is also applicable to other 
characters in relation to their corresponding polities. It 
is in this sense that the characters of men generate the 
polities of the city; but where do the different characters 
of men that effect the polities of the city originate from?
In explaining the cause of influence over a particular 
type of man, Socrates stated that:
'We know it to be universally true of 
every seed and growth, whether 
vegetable or animal, that the more 
vigorous it is the more it falls short 
of its proper perfection when deprived 
of the food, the season, the place that 
suits it...So it is, I take it, natural 
that the best nature should fare worse 
than the inferior under conditions of 
nurture unsuited to it...Then, 
Adeimantus, shall we not similarly 
affirm that the best endowed souls 
become worse than the others under a 
bad education? Or do you suppose that 
great crimes and unmixed wickedness 
spring from a slight nature and not 
from a vigorous one corrupted by its
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nature, while a weak nature will never 
be the cause of anything great, either 
for good or evil? '^ °
It is evident from the above passage that two factors 
are conducive to the formation of certain characters. One 
is the nature of individuals. The other is the nurture or 
education. Although it is understood that the concept of 
man or human nature is universal, however, man is different 
from one another with regard to individual 'vigorousness1. 
In this respect, men differ from each other not in kind but 
in degree. That is why two men in the same environment can 
be quite different from each other. At this point, 
Cephalus1 reference to Themistocles1 argument comes to 
light, namely that 'neither would Themistocles himself 
ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor 
the Seriphusian if he had been an Athenian1.21
With regard to the definition of education, what 
Socrates referred to could not be confined to what is 
generally called 'formal education1. What can be regarded 
as formal education in the time of Socrates and Plato is 
the teaching of the sophists; but, according to Socrates, 
not even the sophists' teachings could have so much 
influence upon the formation of men's characters. As 
Socrates pointed out to Adeimantus:
'Or are you too one of the multitude 
who believe that there are young men 
who are corrupted by the sophists, and 
that there are sophists in private life 
who corrupt to any extent worth 
mentioning, and that it is not rather 
the very men who talk in this strain 
who are the chief sophists and educate 
most effectively and mould to their own 
heart's desire young and old, men and
20 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 491d-e).
21 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 329e-330a).
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women? 122
However, their teachings are only a part of such 
education. Here, the education which has a greater effect 
upon men originates from the public. It cannot be any 
particular individual sophists who are responsible for the 
corruption of the young. Socrates defended himself in the 
Apology, saying that it was impossible for him to corrupt 
the young as regards the charge pressed on him. In truth, 
it is the Athenian public as a whole which has to take the 
responsibility. The influence of the public is everywhere. 
The power of the public can be noticed in many events. The 
exertion of the power of the public over an individual has 
been elaborated by Socrates:
'when the multitude are seated together 
in assemblies or in court-rooms or 
theatres or camps or any other public 
gatherings of a crowd, and with loud 
uproar censure some of the things that 
are said and done and approve others, 
both in excess, with full-throated 
clamour and clapping of hands, and 
thereto the rocks and the region round 
about re-echoing redouble the din of 
the censure and the praise. In such 
case how do you think the young man's 
heart, as the saying is, is moved 
within him? What private teaching do 
you think will hold out and not rather 
be swept away by the torrent of censure 
and applause, and borne off on its 
current, so that he will affirm the 
same thing that they do to be 
honourable and base, and will do as 
they do, and be even such as they?'23
Socrates ascribes importance to the public or the
22 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 492a-b).
23 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 492b-d). Cf. Alcibiades 
I, (135e) : Socrates: 'I should like to think you will
continue to do so; yet I am apprehensible, not from any 
distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the 
state, lest it overcome both me and you1.
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many, polloi, with regard to the formation of the 
characters of the young more than the sophists. He even 
regards the public as 'the educators1, paideutai.24 He 
stated that the public as the educators 'impose by action 
when their words fail to convince1.25 It can be said from 
the above that the public is powerful and influential with 
regard to its relationship with individuals. Individuals 
can be swayed by public influence. However, with regard to 
this relationship, one has to consider not only the public 
by which power has been exerted, but also the individuals 
whom such power influences. That is to say, one has to 
understand the individuals as the subject of power. 
Meanwhile, with regard to 'who plays the power, it is not 
possible to identify "who" the public is and "who" is 
responsible for the exertion of the power. The public qua 
public is the subject who exerts such power and influence. 
With regard to its 'invisible subject', such public power 
can be deemed as 'power with no subject'. It must be in 
this respect that Socrates regarded this kind of power to 
be more significant and influential than that of the 
individuals such as the sophists, since it is easier to 
detect and counter-balance the power with a subject which 
is more tangible than the power of an unidentifiable
24 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 492d).
25 Plato, the Republic, ibid. Plato's awareness of the 
influence of the public over human personality does not 
differ from 'socialisation' in modern sociological term. 
With regard to this point, Lord Annan in his intellectual 
history of post-war Britain points to the significance of 
the social institutions with regard to the formation of 
generations of 'the Establishment'. He said that the 
Establishment, as Alan Taylor called, is 'the network of 
people and institutions with power and influence who rule 
the country' and 'every activity breeds its own 
Establishment, the Jockey Club, the benchers of the Inns of 
Court, the General Council of the TUC'. Noel Annan, Our 
Age: The Generation that Made Post-war Britain, London, 
1990, p. 14.
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subject.25
V
First of all, it might be silly to state that rock and 
sand can never be under such influence of the public in the 
same way that individuals can. Hence, the matter in 
concern lies in human nature that engenders the possibility 
of such a power relationship. In Book Two of the Laws, the 
Athenian Stranger discussed the education with respect to 
law-giving. He stated that children first learn to 
differentiate between good and bad through pleasure and 
pain since 'in children the first childish sensations are 
pleasure and pain1.27 For this reason, children 
experience pleasure, love, pain, and hatred although they 
are not yet able to understand or 'grasp a rational 
account1 of their experiences. After having been rightly 
trained with reference to what pleasures and pains they 
should love or hate, and after being able to grasp the 
rational account, these children can be said to have been 
educated. But the right discipline in pleasure and pain is 
said to wear off in the course of human life.
At this point, the Athenian Stranger said that the 
gods in pity for the human race thus born to misery granted 
them
'as companions in their feasts the 
Muses and Apollo the master of music, 
and Dionysus, that they may at least 
set right again their modes of
26 Cf. Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures1, in Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and other writings 1972-1977, edited
by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, 
John Mepham, Kate Soper, London, 1980.
27 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653a).
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discipline by associating in their 
feasts with gods1.28
In fact, such a divine gift is 'the pleasurable perception 
of rhythm and harmony' which man perceives in his action 
and movement. It has been said to be endowed to the nature 
of human beings not any other animals.29 It is the nature 
of every young creature to be incapable of 'keeping either 
its body or its tongue quiet1 but to be 'always striving 
to move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in 
dances and games, and uttering, also, noises of every 
description'.30 Then, it is said that the divine gift in 
accordance with our nature
'cause us to move and lead our choirs, 
chorous, linking us one with another by 
means of songs and dances; and to the 
choir they have given its name from the 
"cheer", charas, implanted 
therein'.31
At this point, it is necessary to understand the 
meanings of Apollo, Dionysus, Muses, and Choir with regard 
to rhythm and harmony in the context of the public power as 
the educators and education.
Apollo together with the Muses have been understood as 
the god and deity of music.32 Music is said to comprise 
both song and dance which deal with postures and tunes.33 
As Apollo and the Muses are the leaders of music, its 
postures and tunes deal with rhythm and harmony. Since,
28 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653d).
29 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653e, 664e-665a).
30 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653d, 672c, 673c,
31 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653e-654a).
32 Plato, Cratylus, (405a, 406a).
33 Plato, Laws, (Book II 655a).
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with regard to the name of Apollo in the discussion of the 
etymology of names in the Cratylus, Socrates stated that
'his name and nature are in 
harmony,..he is a musical god...with 
reference to music we have to 
understand that alpha often signifies 
"together," and here it denotes moving 
together in the heavens about the 
poles, as we call them, and harmony in 
song, which is called concord;..this 
god directs the harmony, making them 
all move together, among both gods and 
men1.34
In music of ancient Greece or in a play of modern 
time, postures are concerned with gestures while tunes are 
concerned with diction.35 In other words, it concerns 
words and deeds, logos and ergon. With regard to human 
perception, 'postures and tunes1 are the only means through 
which man expresses and communicates with one another. Led 
by the Apollonian guidance, man prefers order to disorder 
in his movement, that is to say, man naturally seeks rhythm 
and harmony in his verbal and physical movement. It is 
also said that rhythm and harmony in movement renders him 
'pleasurable perception1. Here, a question arises, 'from 
what is this pleasure originated?1 It requires one to 
consider the meaning of choirs or chorus as it has been 
said that in rhythm and harmony, Apollo and the Muses would 
cause man to move and lead his choirs. As choirs or chorus 
means 'bands of dancers and singers1.
With regard to this context, rhythm and harmony must 
be understood in terms of grouping. In a musical or 
dancing performance, it is delightful and enjoyable for the 
audience to see the dancers or the singers synchronize
34 Plato, Cratylus, (405c-e).
35 Plato, Laws, I, translation and with notes by R.G.
Bury, Loeb Classical Library, 1984, p. 96ff.
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their movements. To be sure, whatever the performers do to 
attract the audience, they must do it in one way or another 
rhythmically and harmonically, since rhythm and harmony 
render a kind of pleasure. It is the pleasure which arises 
in those who are the spectators of such rhythmic and 
harmonious performances. On the other hand, the 
pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony also emerges 
in those who themselves create rhythmic and harmonious 
performances. In this regard, both the spectators and the 
performers enjoy the pleasure of rhythm and harmony. At 
this point, there emerges another kind of pleasure of 
rhythm and harmony which derives from the concord of both 
sides, the performers and the spectators. They together 
enjoy the pleasure which they partake in its generation. 
It is the emerging rhythm and harmony among the band of the 
performers and the spectators from which the pleasure 
emanates. It is for this reason that the value of music, 
as the Athenian Stranger indicated, is understood by most 
people to consist of 'its power of affording pleasure to 
the soul'.36
Nevertheless, it is more often than not that despite 
its rhythmic and harmonious quality a performance fails to 
please the audience. A discord then arises in such a 
situation. Generally, the audience would regard any 
performance which fails to please them as a 'a bad 
performance1, and any which pleases them as a 'good 
performance1. To be sure, such value judgments depend on 
both the nature of the performance and the nature of the 
audience. A performance can be either 'good1 or 'bad'. 
This entails that music which possesses the quality of 
rhythm and harmony can be judged as either good or bad. 
Also, there might possibly be a case that not all the 
audience totally agree about the same performance. 
However, the majority of the audience is regarded as the
36 Plato, Laws, (Book II 655c).
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real voice of the audience. As argued earlier, one could 
not identify who the audience is. In the meantime, a group 
of performers is easily identifiable in the same way that 
individuals are the subject of the power of the public. It 
is said that Apollo and the Muses are given to be 'our 
fellows' in the dance. Then, it can be said that this 
pleasurable perception in fact is inherent in human nature. 
With regard to this perception, it renders men 'periods of 
respite from their troubles' as they can enjoy themselves 
in rhythm and harmony or in their choirs.37 This can be 
the reason why the Athenian Stranger suggested that the 
term choir, chorous, possibly derived from cheer of joy, 
chara; and, in the Cratylus, Socrates stated that 'chara 
(joy) seems to have its name from the plenteous diffusion 
of the flow of the soul'.38
Dionysus is the god of wine and orgia who presides 
over the celebration with wild dancing, drinking and 
partying.39 In Book One of the Laws, the Athenian 
Stranger has made his point that the drinking party, 
symphosia, can be regarded as an educational institution in 
the same way that Clinias and Megillus, the Cretan and the 
Spartan, regarded common meals as part of military training 
in their countries, that is, a social institution can 
render either harm or benefit to people who participate in 
it. With regard to any kind of activity, the Athenian 
Stranger asserts:
'In my opinion all those who take up an 
institution for discussion and propose, 
at its first mention, to censure it or 
commend it, are proceeding in quite the 
wrong way. Their action is like that 
of a man who, when he hears somebody
37 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653d).
38 Plato, Cratylus, (419c).
39 The Oxford Classical Dictionary, N.G.L. Hammond and 
H.H. Scullard (ed.), Oxford, second edition, 1989, p. 352.
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praising cheese as a good food, at once 
starts to disparage it, without having 
learnt either its effects or its mode
of administration in what form it
should be administered and by whom and 
with what accompaniments, and in what 
condition and to people in what 
condition'.40
Thus, good or bad results depend on how a social activity 
is conducted.41 Likewise, the drinking party which is one 
of such social institutions can be either beneficial or 
harmful. Whatever results it renders, the drinking party 
can be regarded as having influence over anyone who joins 
it. Drunkenness originates from drinking; also, it is a 
matter of fact that drunkenness 'intensifies pleasures and 
pains and passions and lustsf.42 He who drinks becomes
'more jovial than he was before, and 
the more he imbibes it, the more he 
becomes filled with high hopes and a 
sense of power, till finally, puffed up 
with conceit, he abounds in every kind 
of license of speech and action and 
every kind of audacity; without a 
scruple as to what he says or what he 
does1.43
The drunkard 'is uplifted above his normal self' and 
listens to no one since he now regards himself as 
'competent to rule both himself and every one else'.44 
The drunkard is audacious because his soul is oblivious to 
itself. In truth, he has 'little control of himself1.45 
The fiercer his appearance is, the softer his soul becomes.
40 Plato, Laws, (Book I 638c-d, also 640e-641a).
41 Plato, Laws, (Book I 638c-639d).
42 Plato, Laws, (Book I 645d-e).
43 Plato, Laws, (Book I 649b).
44 Plato, Laws, (Book II 671a-b).
45 Plato, Laws, (Book I 645e).
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At this stage, his soul 'become softer and more ductile, 
even as iron when it has been forged in the fire'.46 As 
a consequence, the person arrives 'at the same condition of 
soul as when he was a young child1.47 'It appears, then, 
that not only the greybeard may be in his "second 
childhood," but the drunkard as well*.48 Drunkenness
renders pleasure to the soul as well as softness. In this
condition, the person is easily led to sing or dance any 
kind of music. Since any learning which is accompanied by 
'the element of charm* or pleasure is more effective than 
that which is not. This kind of softer and jovial
disposition makes 'the moulding of the soul* possible. It 
is therefore in this sense that drunkenness is educational. 
However, a drinking party is indispensable to the 
educational drunkenness as such. According to the Greeks, 
drinking is impossible without the giver of wine. 
'Dionysus,1 said Socrates in the Cratylus, 'the giver of 
wine (oinos), might be called in jest Didonysus, and wine, 
because it makes most drinkers think (oiesthai) they have 
wit (nous) when they have not1.49 With this regard,
46 Plato, Laws, (Book II 666b-c).
47 Plato, Laws, (Book I 645e).
48 Plato, Laws, (Book I 646a).
49 Plato, Cratylus, (406c). See also Marcel Detienne, 
Dionysos at large, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1989; Leo Strauss, What is Political
Philosophy?, op. cit., p. 31: 'Why does the Platonic
dialogue about politics and laws begin with such an 
extensive conversation about wine?..The talk about wine- 
drinking is a kind of vicarious enjoyment of wine,
especially since wine-drinking is a forbidden pleasure. 
Perhaps the talk reminds the two old interlocutors of 
secret and pleasurable transgressions of their own. The 
effect of the talk about wine is therefore similar to the 
effect of actual wine-drinking; it loosens their tongues; 
it makes them young; it makes them bold, daring, willing to 
innovate. They must not actually drink wine, since this 
would impair their judgment. They must drink wine, not in 
deed, but in speech.
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Dionysus, the god of wine, is understood to be one of the 
gods who partakes of the education of human beings.
VI
The power of the public as the educators of 
individuals has to be understood in the context of the 
interpretations of Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and chorus. 
The gifts of Apollo, Dionysus, and the Muses are understood 
to render pleasure to the mortals. Man is endowed with 
such a nature which enables him to have 'periods of respite 
from troubles1. To enjoy the pleasure of music, men follow 
their leading gods. The pleasure can be derived from their 
partaking in the Apollonian or Dionysian choirs. At this 
point, Jaegerfs account of the emergence of the worships of 
Apollo and Dionysus in ancient Greece renders a good 
explanation. He stated that despite the violent contrast 
of Apollo and Dionysus:
'the Greeks obviously felt that these
gods had something in common which,
in the age when we find them jointly 
revered, was their power to affect the 
souls of their worshippers...It might 
almost be said that Apollo's spirit of 
order, clarity and moderation could 
not have sunk so deeply into men's 
hearts if the wild excitement of 
Dionysus, sweeping away all civic 
eukosmia, had not first broken the 
ground. The revolution and
resettlement gave the Delphic religion 
such authority that it came to command 
all the constructive energies of 
Greece'.50
50 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, 
Volume I, Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens, trans. from 
the second German edition Gilbert Highet, New York and 
Oxford, 1965, p. 167.
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Jaeger also argued that the reason that the Greeks 
joined in the festivals of Apollo and Dionysus lies in the 
miserable life of man. Since 'the fortune of mortal men 
is as changeable as the day'.51 Therefore, for the 
Greeks, the self-indulgence or self-forgetfulness of 
Dionysiac intoxication 'which was complementary to the 
severe restraint of Apollo's creed1 was regarded as one of 
the paths to happiness by escaping from the 'tragic 
realization into the inner world of their own souls'.52 
In this respect, Jaeger's interpretation seems to echo what 
the Athenian Stranger said in the Laws. However, it is not 
clear yet how the public is related to the education of men 
with reference to the gods and human nature.
There are two ways of approaching this problem. 
First, one must consider the popularity and significance of 
the theatre and poetry which was believed to have 
originated from the gods. Apollo and Dionysus are regarded 
as the significant figures with regard to the Greek 
theatre. It is said that '(t)he dramatic element in the 
religion of ancient Greece manifested itself most 
prominently in the connect worship of Apollo, Demeter, and 
Dionysus'.53 It originated from the fact that '(i)n the 
earliest times of Greece, it was customary for the whole 
population of a city to meet on stated occasions and offer 
up thanksgivings to the gods for any great blessings, by 
singing hymns, and performing corresponding dances in the 
public places'.54 Later, the function of theatre and
51 Ibid.
52 Opcit., p. 168.
53 John William Donaldson, The Theatre of the Greeks, A1.5 
treatise on the History and Exhibition of the Greek Drama, 
London, 1860, p. 9. See also Chapter I 'The Religious 
Origin of the Greek Drama', pp. 3-11, and Chapter II 'The 
Connected Worship of Dionysus, Demeter, and Apollo', pp.
12-26.
54 Ibid., p. 27.
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poetry in ancient Greece developed itself to be part of 
public education or instruction.55 Education or
instruction means both to maintain and to change ethos, 
laws and other social and political values in the city.56 
As Jaeger explained in his study of the ancient Greek 
culture the importance and influence of theatre and poetry 
to the Greeks:
'It worked by suggestion on the 
audience, to make them feel the passion 
portrayed on the stage as vividly as if 
they were their own. This applies even 
more to the citizens who made up the 
chorus: by rehearsing for a whole year, 
they grew into the roles which they 
were to portray. The chorus was the 
high school of early Greece,....It was 
not for nothing that the institution of 
chorodidascalia preserved in its name 
the word which means "instruction”. 
Since the performances were infrequent 
and highly ritualized, since the state 
and the whole population were 
interested in them, since each band of 
performers in eager competition with 
others devoted themselves for a year to 
practising the new 'chorus1 which the 
poet himself prepared for the great 
day, and since a number of poets 
competed every year to win the crown of 
tragedy, it is no exaggeration to say 
that the tragic festival was the climax 
of the city's life1.57
55 Donaldson, op. cit., pp. 27, 28; Havelock, Preface to 
Plato, op. cit.; 'The Preliteracy of the Greeks1, in The 
Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural 
Consequences, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 185-207; Bruno 
Gentili, Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From 
Homer to the Fifth Century, trans., with an introduction by 
A. Thomas Cole, Baltimore and London, 1988, p. 3.
56 Cf. North, Sophrosyne, opcit. According to Kitto, 
'(t)he technical history of Greek Tragedy is largely an 
account of the efforts to make the Chorus an integral part 
of a continually changing system1. See H.D.F. Kitto, Greek 
Tragedy: A Literate Study, London and New York, 1981, p. 
55.
57 Jaeger, Paideia I, opcit., p. 248.
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In a sense, with regard to this educational role, the 
influence of the theatre in ancient Greece is comparable to 
the influence of the mass media such as newspaper, radio, 
television, cinema in modern times; but modern mass media 
seem to be less powerful than the ancient theatre58, since 
the plays of the ancient theatre were performed in front of 
the public and they were regarded as 'the climax of the 
city's life 1 as Jaeger called it. Particularly, the 
festivals of the Great or City Dionysus were the most 
important for the Athenians.59 During the performance, 
messages were passed on to the audience. They consisted of
58 For example, Leo Aylen expressed that from making two 
television films of Plato dialogues it helps 'to clarify 
the difference between the drama of fifth-century Athens 
and almost all other western dramatic writing, including 
the later Greek'. Leo Aylen, The Greek Theater, London and 
Toronto, 1985, p. 7. Gentili also stated that 'Greek poetry 
differed profoundly from modern poetry in content, form, 
and methods of representation1. Gentili, op. cit., p. 3.
59 Pickard-Cambridge explains the importance of the City 
Dionysia, saying that it 'was derived not only from the 
performances of dramatic and lyric poetry but from the fact 
that it was open to the whole Hellenic world and was an 
effective advertisement of the wealth and power and public 
spirit of Athens, no less than of the artistic and literary 
leadership of her sons, (b)y the end of March the winter 
was over, the seas were navigable, and strangers came to 
Athens from all parts for business or pleasure,... before 
the performance of the tragedies began, the orphaned 
children of those who had fallen in battle for Athens, such 
as had reached a suitable age, were caused to parade in the 
theatre in full armour and receive the blessing of the 
People,..the festival was also made the occasion for the 
proclamation of honours conferred upon citizens or 
strangers for conspicuous service to Athens; and it was a 
natural time for the visits of ambassadors from other 
states for business requiring publicity, (t)he festival was 
a time of holiday; prisoners were released on bail to 
attend the festival and sometimes took the chance of 
escaping, (t)he Law of Euegoros, quoted by Demosthenes, 
forbade legal proceedings and distraint or taking of 
security for debt during this and some other festivals; but 
the date of the law is unknown, and it is possible that in 
the fifth century the holding of an assembly was not 
excluded'. See Sir Arthur Picard-Cambridge, The Dramatic 
Festivals at Athens, revised by John Gould and D.M. Lewis, 
second edition, Oxford, 1968, pp. 58-59.
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ethos, codes of behaviour, laws, social and political 
values, and, most of all, the meaning of human excellence. 
It is true in a sense that the influence should be said to 
come from the poets who created the plays.60 It is also 
true that the contents of early Greek music and poetry were 
concerned with serious matters, to do with human life. As 
already discussed in an earlier chapter, it 'had been 
concerned for centuries with the dispute about the highest 
arete and the greatest good in life'.61
VII
In general, poetry was regarded as the enactment of 
the ethos of the ancient Greek society which must not be 
understood to be a literate society until the last third of 
the fifth century before Christ.62 Havelock argued that
60 As this argument has been made in Jaeger. Cf.
Euthyphro, 6b-c. Gentili points out that Jaeger's weak 
point lay in its overemphasis on the individual aspects of 
the educational process and in its claim that the Greek 
educational model might provide an ethical norm for our own 
time. He also argued that 'a new factor in the relation 
between poet and public which emerges in lyric, as opposed 
to epic, has to do with the specific character of the 
audiences involved, which from time to time must be seen as 
limited to the members of a given social group or milieu'. 
See Gentili, op. cit., p. 56.
61 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol. 
Ill, The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, 
trans. from the German by Gilbert Highet, New York and 
Oxford, 'Plato's Laws' p. 230. See also A.W.H. Adkins, 
Merit and Responsibility, op, cit. For the tragic poets' 
rendition of the problem of the conflict of human 
excellences, see Morrall, 'Political Ideas in Greek 
Tragedy',op, cit.,} Renford Bambough, 'Greek Drama', in 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. Ill, Paul Edwards (ed.), 
New York and London, 1967, p. 386.
62 Havelock, The Preliteracy of the Greeks, o p . cit.. p. 
185. Pickard-Cambridge also suggested that in Athens around 
the fifth and fourth centuries, '(t)here were books, but
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the 'words, melody and dance1 of the ancient Greek plays 
were the means through which their cultural tradition was 
preserved.63 Here, it is quite necessary to take 
Havelock's thesis into consideration in order to elaborate 
the power and significance of the public with regard to 
education. In the context of oral society, theatre and 
poetry are quite significant with regard to what is called 
'the audience situation'. In such a context, to enjoy the 
pleasure of poetry, individuals cannot divorce themselves 
from the audience situation which is dependent upon the 
oral communication and at least the repetition by group of 
persons.64 The performances were occasioned by the
festivals in honour of the gods.65 With regard to this
probably not more than a tiny fraction of the audience 
possessed them'. See Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic 
Festivals of Athens, o p. cit., p. 276.
63 Havelock, 'The Oral Composition of Greek Drama', in The 
Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural 
Consequences, op. cit., p. 312. Donaldson stated that the 
custom of performing song and dance as the worship of the 
gods which later became the institution of the Greek 
theatre was first practised in the Doric states. Music and 
dances in such warring states such as Sparta and Crete were 
the channel through which not merely the encouragement of 
a taste for the fine arts but also military discipline and 
the establishment of a principle of subordination had been 
preserved. See John William Donaldson, The Theatre of the 
Greeks, op. cit., pp. 27, 28.
64 Havelock, The Preliteracy of the Greeks, o p . cit.. p. 
203. Havelock said that reading had not yet been taken into 
mousike which was central to the education of the Athenian 
upper classes in the first half of the fifth century.
65 There were two major kinds of festivals in Athens. One 
is what Pickard-Cambridge calls the Lesser festivals which 
comprise three festivals, the Anthesteria, the Lenaia, and 
the Rural Dionysia. The Anthesteria which was the oldest 
of the festivals of Dionysus at Athens was performed about 
the end of February. The Lenaia roughly took place in 
January and the rural Dionysia in December. The other is 
called the great or City Dionysia which was the last of the 
Athenian festivals of Dionysus to be instituted. It took 
place by the end of March. See Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, 
The Dramatic Festivals of Athens, op. cit. . pp. 10, 25, 42, 
58.
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'audience situation1, the way the plays do not affect the 
individuals is not as important as the way the audience 
affects its members. In this respect, what is more 
important than the influence of the poets is the reaction 
of the audience to the performances. Any ideas or messages 
in the plays would be less effective without the response 
of the audience. Although an individual can assess the 
works of the poets, however, the judgement of the public or 
the audience is more significant in terms of influence and 
power. Any ideas or messages which annoy the public can be 
censured, but fame and glory can be awarded to anyone whose 
works win the majority of the public.
It is quite necessary to reiterate the importance of 
the dramatic festivals by meticulously presenting a picture 
of the events. In the festivals, performances each day 
could go on continuously from dawn until evening. The size 
of the audience was said to be very large by modern 
standards for dramatic performances, which was about 
14,000-17,000 spectators.66 The audience included women 
and boys.67 The spectators were required to purchase 
tickets.68 From this, it can be assumed that the 
performances were in popular demand and there were immense 
fees for famous actors and poets. With regard to the 
atmosphere in the theatres, Pickard-Cambridge explained 
'(t)here is no reason to doubt....that most of the audience
66 Pickard-Cambridge, The Dramatic Festivals at Athens, 
op. cit., p. 263. He argued that the size of the audience 
would never have been 3 0,000 spectators as Plato stated in 
the Symposium. He assumed that Plato was influenced by the 
conventional figure of the population of Athens which was 
around 3 0,000 people.
67 Ibid., p. 267, 265. He also suggested that there were 
also slaves in the audience, but the number should not be 
very many.
68 Op. cit., p. 267. It is said that five drachmae is the 
highest price for a ticket.
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took its playgoing seriously1.69 If the audience was in 
a bad mood, they could 'hiss off' an actor and his play 
after one after the other or even violently eject them from 
the theatre.70 Even physical violence which was legally 
an offence was possible in the theatre. That is why there 
had to be special officers who had the uneasy task of 
controlling the situation.71
So it can be said that the reaction of the audience 
may have been wild and hysterical. They could have 
emotionally responded to individual lines or passages which 
were mainly prompted by moral reasons. In this respect, it 
is evident that the audience were quite serious and 
sensitive with regard to their social-political and moral 
sentiments.72
The dramatic festivals were spectacular. What 
appealed to the audience of the Greek theatre was 
attributable to its form and methods of presentation. 
Presented in a festive performance, the Greek theatre 
rendered a possible moment of joy for a congregation to the 
members of the audience. As argued before, the audience
69 Op. cit., p. 274.
70 Op. cit., pp. 273, 272. Pickard-Cambridge refers to the 
passage in Demosthenes that an actor or a poet could be 
forced to retire. The audience sometimes used dried fruits 
and confectionary to pelt actors whom they did not like. 
Their hissing was sometimes accompanied by the noise of 
heels kicking against the seats.
71 Opcit., p. 273.
72 Op. cit., p. 275. While there is no doubt about the 
Athenians' seriousness towards the plays, however, the 
matter of the degree of intelligence of the Athenian 
audience as a whole is in question. With reference to the 
contents of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, 
and Aristophanes, Pickard-Cambridge believes that the 
Athenian audience 'must have possessed on the whole a 
degree of both seriousness and intelligence1 (p. 277). 
Gentili argues that particular plays could be presented to 
specific social groups. See Gentili, op. cit., p. 56.
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derived pleasure not only from the rhythm and harmony of 
the choric performance in the plays but also from the 
rhythm and harmony which was prompted by their own 'choric* 
or collective expressions of shared sentiments responding 
to the performance. Moreover, the Greek drama in its form 
of mousike which combines words, melody, and dance makes 
its performance so influential and powerful.73
What the poetry without melody and dance cannot do but 
mousike can is arouse pathos in the audience.74 For the
Greeks, different types of music in melodic sense were
believed to have in themselves the power to influence men's 
characters and emotions.75 As regards dancing, it is said 
that its place in 'Greek culture and its various 
manifestations was much more important than it is in modern 
life1.75 The ancient Greek dancing is a 'language to be 
learned, and in which to communicate'.77 The rhythm and 
harmony of both music and dancing in the plays is evident 
in its choric performance of the chorus. Then, with regard 
to its psychological effect on the audience, one has to 
take into account the importance of the function of chorus 
as part of the form of presentations.
As stated earlier, the chorus is a band or group of
73 Gentili, op. cit., p 24: 'Mousike was felt to be the 
most efficacious of all the arts that the educator had at 
his disposal'.
74 Op. cit., pp. 24-25.
75 Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit., pp. 259, 260: 'For instance, 
enharmonic melodies (which were normal in tragedy) made men 
brave'.
76 Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit., p. 246.
77 Aylen, The Greek Theatre, op. cit., p. 28. That is why 
some poets were not only good at composing but also at 
dancing. Sophocles was an example. Picard-Cambridge 
stated that Sophocles was himself 'an accomplished dancer, 
who "danced with a lyre" round the trophy erected after the 
battle of Salamis'. Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit., p. 251.
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singers and dancers. Its performance with regard to the 
pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony influences the 
audience in terms of mimetic effects. The Athenian
Stranger said that 'whenever the choric performances are 
congenial to them in point of diction, tune or other 
features,...then these performers invariably delight in 
such performances and extol them as excellent'.78 This 
happens to the audience as well. The function of the 
chorus in its Dorian origin was to establish a principle of 
subordination in the public. Later on, in the theatre, its 
function was not far from its original use. The rhythm and 
harmony in the choric performances presuppose a leader of 
the chorus. The leader was 'either the musician or some 
fugleman among the dancers, who set the example to the 
others1, for instance, 'to lead off the lament1.79 In 
this respect, the audience appreciated rhythm and harmony 
derived from the chorus's corresponding to the leader. 
Unconsciously, the audience were in turn guided at that 
moment by the chorus as a whole which assumed a leading 
role by setting an example to the audience. The audience 
would respond to the chorus's guide. Following the chorus 
as a leader, the audience would cheer or hoot at a 
character. Then, not much different from its original 
stage, the function of the chorus in the theatre was 
intended to move the audience. Gentili calls this effect 
'sympathetic magic'. He analyses that the chorus is an 
imitation of life and this
're-creation is so vivid and faithful 
that it involves the audience to the 
point where everyone present would say 
that he himself is the one speaking— so 
well executed are the words and the 
chorus sings, (i)mitative performance 
and ceremonial ritual combine in a kind 
of sympathetic "magic" that identifies
78 Plato, Laws, (Book II 655d-e).
79 Donaldson, op. cit., p. 29.
chorus with audience1.80
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It is not surprising that in most of the Old Tragedy 
plays the chorus played the part of the public, community, 
the City, or a band of sympathetic spectators.81 What is 
most important with regard to the purpose of the 
performance of a poetic text is to link the emotion of the 
text with that of the audience or to attune the audience to 
the textual mood; and this emotional relationship between 
the audience and the performances is indispensable with the 
idea of mimesis. Mimesis is understood as 'the imitative 
process that is transmitted to the audience and then itself 
imitated and reenacted in the form of sympathetic emotional 
response1.82 Gentili perceives that 'pleasure is one of 
the aspects or functions of mimesis itself1.83 Actually, 
the original sense of mimesis is 'the enactment of deeds 
and experiences, whether human or divine'.84 Indeed, 
mimesis cannot be confined to the imitative process of the 
audience in the dramatic experience. The imitative process 
can take place anytime and anywhere. Mimetic action or its 
total concept of impersonation involves a combination of 
rhythm, melody, gestures, words, and sometimes costume.85 
In other words, mimetic effect in real life involves 
characters or personalities of people. It can be said that 
music and dance in real life or on stage are inherently
80 Gentili, op. cit., p. 51.
81 See H.D.F. Kitto, The Greek Tragedy, o p . cit.. pp. 160, 
260, 264. Kitto said about the change of the chorus in the 
New Tragedy that it no longer has 'independent status in 
the play, as representing humanity or the City, but becomes 
either a useful Confidante or a nuisance (p. 341) 1 .
82 Gentili, op. cit., p. 55.
83 Gentili, op. cit.
84 Eva C. Keuls, Plato and Greek Painting, Leiden, 1978,
p. 24. She also argues that this original sense of mimesis 
was never lost in Plato.
85 Ibid., p. 29.
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mimetic.
VIII
As regards mimetic effect in theatrical experience, 
what Gentili understood about the inseparable relationship 
of the idea of mimesis in poetics and its deriving pleasure 
does not differ from the Athenian Stranger's theory of the 
pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony in human 
nature. So, imitation or learning accompanied by pleasure 
in the chorus in this poetic-theatrical sense becomes a 
kind of education or paideia or socialisation of a culture 
of tradition in the city. With regard to this point, 
Gentili perceptively explains:
'Given a poetics posited in this 
fashion on an identification of the 
psychological processes involved in 
execution and reception, poetry became 
the principal means for integrating the 
individual into his social context. 
The poetics of mimesis accordingly took 
on the character of a true aesthetics 
of performance, in which the audience's 
"horizon of expectation" played a 
primary role. Poetic performance, 
whether epic or lyric, was conceived as 
more than a means for allowing 
audiences to see themselves in the 
mirror of mythical or contemporary 
events; it could also serve to arouse 
in them a new perception of reality and 
broaden their awareness to include the 
new modes of social and political 
activity which new needs and goals 
demanded'.86
With regard to the horizon of expectation of the 
audience, one has to understand that the success of the 
poets is to win the votes of the audience; and to do so,
86 Gentili, op. cit., p. 55.
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the poets must aim at producing most pleasurable works for 
the audience. For the notion of pleasure was generally 
regarded as the essence of all Greek poetics from Homer to 
the tragedians. To succeed in producing such effects, a 
poet must be able to understand his audience's background 
and catch their mood. The poet is supposed to have 
awareness of his audience's 'horizon of expectation'.87 
In this regard, the poet produces his work in response to 
the taste of the public. Some messages in a performance 
are intended to arouse 'pathos', to intoxicate the audience 
to an extreme frenzy, but the most important strategic 
element in Greek drama which helps to accomplish the 
effectiveness of poetic purpose is its choric 
performance.88
Indeed, it is from this angle that the chorus was 
regarded as the carriers of the cultural tradition.89 The
87 In fact, the horizon of expectation is applicable to both 
kinds of audience, dramatic and literary. H.R. Jauss 
stated that 'the possibility of objectifying such a horizon 
of expectation is a precondition for the possibility of 
giving to one's conception and presentation of literary 
history the specific form of historicity that is 
appropriate to it'. Jauss' full expression of 'horizon of 
expectation' is cited in Gentili's Poetry and Its Public 
(p. 55f). The instance of this 'horizon of expectation' 
is perceivable in the successful productions of the Rambo 
genres movies at the high time of a revival of American 
patriotism in Reagan's time. In contrast, the presentation 
of the Vietnam War and its aftermath in numerous films such 
as the Deer Hunter and Apocalypse Now were once mostly 
welcomed by the American public with regard to its desire 
to reflect its own repentance.
88 The role of the chorus in a sense is still operative in 
poetic text of the modern time. In radio or television 
programmes and films, the chorus is used in different 
forms. Sometimes it is subtly performed. In radio or 
television comedy, the chorus is easily detectable in its 
spasmodic laughter background, claqueer or canned laughter. 
Or in the game show, there is a signal or indicator for the 
studio-audience to applaud or cheer and so on and so forth 
in order to excite and call for sympathetic emotional 
response from the home-audience.
89 Havelock, 'The Oral Composition', op. cit., p. 312.
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chorus is led by its leader who sets the example to others. 
The chorus in effect influentially guides the audience, 
provided that the audience approve of the concerned 
messages. When the audience becomes 'high or extremely 
frenzied1 with regard to any particular part of the 
performance, they might be unaware of their own choric 
performance. They now become a chorus themselves. Any 
members of the audience with strong personalities who are 
the first to 'either loudly applaud or hoot at1 a 
character can be said to play the leading role of choric 
behaviour of the whole audience. When the majority of the 
audience is concurrent and become the chorus themselves, it 
becomes powerful and alienates the minority or individuals. 
In that situation, a discord arises among them which 
generates displeasure opposite to the pleasurable effect of 
harmony. An individual who becomes alienated from a 
difference between himself and the majority might have to 
suppress an expression of his own taste and conform with 
the others. There are also some who, uncertain of their 
own predilection, might unconsciously follow the majority 
since at the moment it is more pleasurable to join the 
chorus of the whole audience by which he as its immediate 
part of the whole is being pressurised.
The influence and power of the chorus of the audience 
is much stronger than that of the theatrical chorus, since 
it is not just a drama but real life. In this respect, 
individuals are absorbed into the public. With regard to 
this relationship between the public and individuals, it 
can be said that an individual person either lives his life 
in conflict with the public if he tries to maintain his own 
values and beliefs or even character which are opposed to 
others, or lives 'a peaceful and happy life' if he shares 
similar attitudes or behaviour with the public. A leader 
of the chorus might be wrongly mistaken for a powerful 
figure. In the theatre, undoubtedly the chorus must follow 
its leader's guide, but in real life, the majority of the
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audience does not necessarily follow a first striker of 
approval or disapproval. Even the leader can win the 
support of the majority of the audience. The power of the 
majority lies not in the leader. Power emerges and 
originates whenever there arises the oneness of the many. 
In sum, the education in ancient Greece can be understood 
with regard to the conception of rhythm and harmony and the 
pleasurable perception of the quality in human nature which 
reflect themselves in the Greek theatre as the worship of 
Apollo who is identified with the harmony of music and 
dance, and Dionysus who represents the frenzy of song and 
dancing and intoxication. In this respect, it is the 
public not the poets who play the decisive role of educator 
with regard to the Greek theatre.
However, the influence of public behaviour cannot be 
confined to their reactions toward the theatre. The 
evidence from both the Republic and the Laws points to the 
influence of the public at large although their influence 
at dramatic performances is quite distinct with regard to 
the significance of the poetry as 'the carriers of their 
cultural tradition'. As quoted earlier, in the Republic 
when Socrates is speaking about the public, he refers to 
the public behaviour in assemblies, courts, theatres, camps 
or 'any other public gathering of a crowd1.90 Also, the 
passages in the Laws show that the Athenian Stranger could 
not restrict his application of man's divine gifts of 
rhythm and harmony with respect to his education to the 
audience situation at the theatrical stages.91 To be
90 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 492b-d).
91 Consider the Laws, (Book II 656b). In Preface to Plato, 
Havelock argued that Plato himself invented the notion of 
mimesis as an imitation of the moral character of an 
original. See Havelock, Preface to Plato, op. cit., p. 
57ff. Disagreeing with Havelock, with reference to the 
Republic, (Book III 400ab), Gentili believed that Plato 
referred such theories to 'Damon's ethico-musical notion
of song and dance as "imitation of life (biou mimemata)--
a recreation through different rhythmical and musical
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sure, apart from dramatic performances, other kinds of 
performance in front of the public can also be regarded as 
public exhibitions, epideixis, particularly the sophistic 
exhibition.92
The sophists as well as the poets claimed possession 
of the knowledge of human excellence, but the way the poets 
present their ideas is effectively decisive with regard to 
the nature of learning accompanied by pleasure. Moreover, 
the earlier argument in the Laws concerning social 
institutions emphasises the importance of any social 
institution with regard to its good and bad effects93; and 
what is most important is that the public influence over 
individuals begins since their early childhood. That is to 
say, the public has continuously exerted its influence upon 
the individuals in 'the theatre of life1. The theatre of 
life is everywhere; so is its importance. With regard to 
this point, John Gunnell's interpretation renders a similar 
account.94 Greek theatre and drama is just a reflection 
and imitation of the reality of the theatre of life. It is 
just a part of a larger context of the theatrical stage of 
human life. Some also argued that the Greeks in the fifth
genres of differing human characters and moral attitudes'. 
See Gentili, op. cit., pp. 249f, 52. With regard to my 
concern, Gentili and Havelock both confirm that Plato is 
aware of the idea of mimesis in relation to the theatre qua 
theatre and the theatre as a stage of human life.
92 See Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in
the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science, op. cit.. 
pp. 93-108.
93 Plato, Laws, (Book I 638c-d, 639a, 640d-e).
94 Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the 
Origins of Political Vision, op. cit., 'The Platonic 
Restoration: The Laws', p. 218: 'Existence in terms of 
life lived as a ritual play is the principle of the 
educational system of the Laws.'
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century before Christ were aware of this fact.95
IX
The theatre of life is our second approach to the 
public as the educator with regard to the concept of Apollo 
and Dionysus. In the theatre of life, the music of life 
consists of speech which can be seen as song, and action as 
dancing. When a person speaks or acts, he might just do it 
according to his own habits or imitate what he has seen or 
learnt. That is why it has been stated that 'all music is 
representative and imitative1.96 When the human life is 
placed and viewed in a theatrical context, everyone becomes 
a performer in his own right. He might be either an actor 
or a member of the chorus. With regard to the musical 
interrelationship of the performers, the Athenian Stranger 
explains:
'Inasmuch as choric performances are 
representations of character, exhibited 
in actions and circumstances of every 
kind, in which the several performers 
enact their parts by habit and 
imitative art, whenever the choric 
performances are congenial to them in 
point of diction, tune or other 
features (whether from natural bent or 
from habit, or from both these causes 
combined), then these performers
95 This has been argued by Gentili. It is said that 'the
actual activities of the poet devising and constructing—
-are thus conceived as mimesis the imitation of nature
and human life, (c)onscious formulations of this idea 
appear as early as the fifth century, presenting imitation 
either as a re-creation, through voice, music, dance, and 
gesture, of the actions and utterances of men and animals—  
-or, with more specific reference to the figurative arts, 
as the production of an inanimate, visible object that is 
a realistic replica of something living1. See Genitli, op. 
cit., p. 51.
96 Plato, Laws, (Book II 668a).
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invariably delight in such performances 
and extol them as excellent; whereas 
those who find them repugnant to their 
nature, disposition or habits cannot 
possibly delight in them or praise 
them, but call them bad. And when men 
are right in their natural tastes but 
wrong in the former, then by their 
expressions of praise they convey the 
opposite of their real sentiments; for 
whereas they say of a performance that 
it is pleasant but bad, and feel 
ashamed to indulge in such bodily 
motions before men whose wisdom they 
respect, or to sing such songs (as 
though they seriously approved of 
them) , they really take a delight in 
them in private.,9^
The language the Athenian Stranger employed in this 
passage is theatrical. What he stated seems to be 
concerned with the musical interrelationship of the 
performers in the theatre qua theatre. However, if it has 
been carefully considered in the context of the theatre of 
human life, the passage would be rather more intelligible. 
It is pointless to talk about the nature of the habits of 
the performer in conflict with that of the others or the 
chorus if its context is theatrical, since those in a 
theatrical performance do not act according to their real 
personality but to a script. However, the matter becomes 
serious if it is placed in real life. From the above 
passage, the Athenian Stranger portrays the picture of 
conflict between one's nature or habits and the others'. 
Stated differently, it is the conflict between an 
individual and the public, or the one and the many. To put 
it in the context of the study of self-knowledge and 
politics, it is at the deepest level, the conflict between 
the soul and the city. However, the state of conflict 
cannot be ascribed to the nature of the relationship of the 
soul and the city, as the nature of the soul and the nature 
of the city is neither in conflict nor in harmony. Either
97 Plato, Laws, (Book II 655d-656a).
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can occur. It depends on the nature of each of them. The 
soul and the city will be in harmony insofar as one's 
nature or disposition corresponds to another's. The soul 
and the city will come into conflict with each other when 
their natures differ from one another.
As stated earlier, the nature of the soul and the 
nature of the city correspond to one another, that is to 
say, the correspondence between the tripartite soul and the 
three classes of the city. Their natures are self-motion. 
The city as well as the soul oscillate between two forms of 
life, just and unjust. The unjust types of the soul are as 
many as the unjust political constitutions of the city. 
Four major characters of the unjust forms are 
distinguishable, namely, timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, 
and tyranny. Justice is attributable to only one form of 
governance of the city and of the soul, the rule of wisdom 
or the city of the philosopher-ruler. The conflict arises 
when a particular type of soul finds itself alienated 
amongst a society of different ones in the same way that a 
society of a certain kind is conscious of its lack of 
harmony when it finds out that there is a single alien 
amongst its members.
Already mentioned in the discussion of Socrates' 
speech on the unjust polities in the spirit of the Muses, 
each type of soul and city possesses its own aesthetic 
appreciation. Each judges what is good and beautiful 
according to what each regards as the good. What each 
regards as the good is determined by its ruling part of the 
soul or the ruling class of the city.98 Therefore, with 
regard to music, each type of soul and city praises a type 
of music whose song and dancing responds to its idea of the
98 This point has been clarified in the discussion of the 
good in relation to the Sun simile, the analogy of the 
Divided Line, and the allegory of the Cave in 'The Good: 
Know-Thyself— See Yourself— See Your Soul: Metaxy as the 
Nature of the Soul' in Chapter Nine.
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good. For instance, the oligarchic soul enjoys and 
appreciates the oligarchic song and movements. Any speech 
and action are judged according to its oligarchic edifice. 
The oligarchic soul uses its reason to make as much profit 
as possible. It is courageous to do anything to attain 
these goals which the aristocratic or timocratic souls dare 
not to do. The oligarch is afraid or ashamed of being 
poor. The concept of goodness, courage, wisdom, beauty, 
justice and other virtues are interpreted differently by 
different types of souls and cities.
It is notable that when one takes control over the 
other two elements in the soul, the latter still exist but 
have to follow the direction of their master or ruler; that 
is to say, a man with an oligarchic soul can be 'clever' 
and 'courageous' since rational and spirited parts still 
exist in his soul; but they are forced to serve its 
master's desires. In this respect, the application of the 
idea of the interconnection of the chorus and the 
pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony in human 
nature to the understanding of the nature of the characters 
of the soul and the city is evident when Socrates said that 
the oligarchic soul has 'the blind god of wealth' be its 
'leader of the choir and first in honour'.99 A ruling or 
a most powerful element of the soul at a particular time is 
metaphorised as the leader of the choir since when any 
element of the soul presides over the others, it leads them 
to sing the same song and to dance the same steps and 
movements which have been reflected in the whole 
personality of a person. However, the four major types of 
imperfect soul or city are just the archetypes which, as 
Socrates said in the end of Book Four of the Republic, are 
'worth while to take note' although the forms of evil or 
injustice are infinite. One should not expect to find an 
absolute 'oligarchic' or 'democratic' character in reality.
99 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 554b).
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As discussed earlier at the beginning of this chapter, 
this point has been made clear by Averroes in the Third 
Treatise of his interpretation of Plato's Republic. 
Averroes applies the analogy of colour in order to 
comprehend the possibility of infinite varieties of human 
characters and political constitutions. Hence, the extent 
of discord between conflicting characters has to be 
understood with regard to their relative density and 
consistency. This can be illuminated by modifying 
Averroes1 analogy of colour. Suppose each element of the 
soul has its own colour; the rational part is red, the 
spirited part is yellow, and the desires are blue. When 
the aristocratic man is declining, it loses its density of 
redness and turns toward the yellow timocrat. In between 
the two major colours of red and yellow, there are a number 
of intermediate colours. The sharp contrast or, say, 
conflict between the red and the yellow is apparent, but 
it will be lesser if it is the interaction between the 
approaching-yellow red and the yellow instead of the red 
and the yellow or the red and the blue; and this is 
applicable to the general understanding of the social and 
political interaction of man. Again, one has to bear in 
mind that the application of the analogy of colour to the 
tripartite soul is just theoretical or archetypal. In 
reality, the character of a man is a mixture of these three 
colours, and it is a fact that from the mixture secondary 
colours and very much more have been effected. Therefore, 
in a sense, apart from its four major types, it can be said 
that the characters of individuals are as colourful as the 
colour, which varies within the cycle of the interaction of 
its tripartite soul, or the mixture of primary colours.
X
The theme of the soul and the city and their
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interaction is applicable to a human being since his early 
childhood. 'Every young creature,1 said the Athenian 
Stranger, 'is incapable of keeping either its body or its 
tongue quiet, and is always striving to move and to cry, 
leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and 
games1.100 This human condition presupposes the
existence of rhythm and harmony.101 Rhythm and harmony 
are said to be able to render pleasure to man. Man is said 
to be given the pleasurable perception of rhythm and 
harmony by Apollo and Dionysus. With this perception, the 
sympathetic magic emerges.102 So pleasure originates in 
the moment of sympathetic magic. Rhythm and harmony are 
indispensable to the idea of mimesis. Imitation or mimesis 
entails the interaction of at least two parties. Also, its 
mimetic situation necessitates a prime mover or 'the 
leader' as in the case of the choric performance, since the 
original sense of mimesis is said to be the enactment or 
copying the appearance of deeds and experiences.103 The 
'enactment by dramatic means1 is said to be how mimesis was 
originally referred to. Furthermore, dramatic means 
constitutes 'an indissoluble combination of rhythm, melody, 
gestures, words and, occasionally, costume1.104 In this
100 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653e).
101 In his study of Dionysos, Detienne has recourse to 
Plato's Laws. He writes: 'A newborn is a frenzied little 
animal, crying and gesticulating without rhyme or reason 
and imbued with an instinct to jump (to kata phusin pedan), 
always ready to jump or leap. Without this instinct 
neither rhythm nor harmony would exist.' From this he 
derives his argument for the physiological basis which 
reflects itself in 'Dionysos' sovereignty over festivals 
and over the righteous elderly'. Marcel Detienne, Dionysos 
at Large, o p . cit.. 'The Heart of Dionysos Bared', p. 58.
102 The term is used by Gentili in his study of the 
psychological effect of the chorus in Greek theatre. This 
has already been discussed earlier.
103 Keuls, op. cit., 'Plato's Mimesis Doctrine', p. 24.
104 Keuls, op. cit., p. 29.
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respect, music or drama which consists of song and dance 
are inherently mimetic.105 The theatre of life can be 
equally interpreted with reference to mimesis and the 
perception of rhythm and harmony. From this, it can be 
said that human activity which comprises speech and action-
— song and dance is inclined towards rhythm and harmony
rather than chaos and discord.
If rhythm and harmony are preferred because they 
render pleasure, then, it can be inferred that their 
opposite is undesirable because it effects displeasure. 
When a member of the chorus imitates or follows the others 
or the leader of his team, rhythm and harmony emerges. 
Likewise, when a person follows or imitates what other 
people he is among do, such imitation renders rhythm and 
harmony. In the Greek theatre, music and choreography were 
invented by the poet. In the theatre of human life, speech 
and action in a particular situation can be influenced by 
the emotional response and values of the majority of the 
people at particular time and place. In that situation, a 
person who possesses different tastes from the others' 
might have to hide his real sentiments by conforming with 
them. He has to praise or despise what they praise or 
despise. Of course, he has to contradict his own self to 
conform with the others. In doing so, he has to suffer 
from self-disorder in exchange for the pleasure and delight 
of rhythm and harmony which is derived from his imitation 
of the others. Moreover, in his conformity, he is rewarded 
by being accepted as a member of the group. He is regarded 
as a good man by those to whose 'good' values he is 
committed. In this regard, conformity renders security 
from which the pleasure in turn is derived. In a sense, 
that conformity renders security presupposes the 
possibility of insecurity in the non-conformer. A person 
will be secure if he becomes a conformer by accepting the
105 Keuls, op. cit.
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norms or values of the others.106 In the beginning, he 
was insecure when he confronted others whose behaviour was 
alien to his. With regard to the fact that he becomes 
secure when he accepts the values of others, it can be said 
that his insecurity and self-conflict originate in the 
uncertainty of his own beliefs or values. His own edifice 
varies with the ruling part of his soul. When they are 
challenged by the counterparts of the others, the
possibility and degree of his insecurity and self-conflict 
are dependent upon the solidity and cohesiveness of the 
ruling part of his soul. As Socrates stated at the 
beginning of his speech about the decline of the city and 
the soul that it is the simple and unvarying rule, 'that 
in every form of government revolution takes its start from 
the ruling class itself, when dissension arises in that, 
but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it 
be, innovation is impossible'107; but when the ruling
part of the soul is shaken by the influence of others, 
self-conflict or discord emerges.
With regard to his pleasurable perception of rhythm 
and harmony, a prolonged state of insecurity and self-
conflict is of course undesirable. The soul has to seek to 
resume its harmonious and secure state. It can do so 
either by self-submission or self-defence. In the former, 
the soul loses its 'identity' which contradicts the
others in exchange for a mutual harmonious relationship 
without and within itself. It is in such a state that the 
one is assimilated, omoiousthai, into the others.108 
However, such a description of the process of assimilation
105 Consider an advertisement about the public transport in
the United Kingdom. It rightly indicates the power of the 
public over any individuals whose conduct differs from the 
majority: 'Try disappearing into the crowd while the whole 
crowd is staring at you'.
107 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 545d).
108 Plato, Laws, (Book II 656b).
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seems rather mechanistic and ingenuous with regard to the 
conscious manifest exertion of force and coercion of the 
many to the conscious submission of the one. In truth, as 
stated above, the possibility and degree of contradiction 
and assimilation depends on the character of the soul of an 
individual and of the public. For instance, sustained 
interaction is necessary in the case of individuals of 
'stronger character'. Furthermore, the influence of 
thought and ideas through speech and action can affect, 
willy-nilly, a person's soul. It is in this regard that 
Socrates warned young Hippocrates before he went to see 
Protagoras:
'When you buy victuals and liquors you 
can carry them off from the dealer or 
merchant in separate vessels, and 
before you take them into your body by 
drinking or eating you can lay them by 
in your house and take the advice of an 
expert whom you can call in, as to what 
is fit to eat or drink and what is not, 
and how much you should take and when; 
so that in this purchase the risk is 
not serious. But you cannot carry away 
doctrines in a separate vessel: you are 
compelled, when you have handed over 
the price, to take the doctrine in your 
very soul by learning it, and so to 
depart either an injured or a benefited
This can be applicable to what a person experiences 
from the public in general. Whether or not the influence 
is intentional, it inevitably affects the soul. Since 
Socrates argued in the Theaetetus with regard to the theory 
of knowledge that the human soul is like a block of wax 
which
'is the gift of Memory, the mother of 
the Muses, and that whenever we wish to 
remember anything we see or hear or 
think of in our own minds, we hold this
109 Plato, Protagoras, (314a-b).
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wax under the perceptions and thoughts 
and imprint them upon it, just as we 
make impressions from seal rings'.110
It is for this reason that the public or the many 
plays an important role in educating or assimilating an 
individual or the one. For, a person who is living amongst 
the people of a certain kind of character can be possibly 
assimilated into such a character of the larger whole.
Placed in this context, every man is always related to 
others in an 'I and Thou1 relationship. All but himself 
are 'others' to him, and he himself simultaneously takes 
the part of 'others' to another. Accordingly, men start 
this twofold relationship with one another from the time 
they are born. Ever since, a man is continuously 
influenced by others through which his 'self' or 'being' or 
'personality' or character is formed. Also, he as one of 
the many takes part in forming the other self.111
110 Plato, Theaetetus, (191c-d). With regard to the 
sensitivity of human sense-perception, Freud even argues: 
'we close our most important sensory channels, our eyes, 
and try to protect the other senses from all stimuli or 
from any modification of the stimuli acting on them. We 
then fall asleep, even though our plan is never completely 
realized. We cannot keep stimuli completely away from our 
sense organ nor can we completely suspend the excitability 
of our sense organs. The fact that a fairly powerful 
stimulus will awaken us at any time is evident that "even 
in sleep the soul is in constant contact with the 
extracorporeal world...there is a great number of such 
stimuli, ranging from the unavoidable ones which the state 
of sleep itself necessarily involves or must tolerate from 
time to time, to the accidental, rousing stimuli which may 
or do put an end to sleep. A bright light may force its 
way into our eyes, or a noise may make itself heard, or 
some strong-smelling substance may stimulate the nucleus 
membrane of our nose.' Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation 
of Dreams, translated and edited by J. Strachey, London, 
1954, p. 83.
111 A similar account of this has been already stated by 
John Rawls that it is the fact that 'the members of 
community participate in one another's nature,' through 
which 'the self is realized in the activities of many 
selves.' C. Fred Alford requotes Sandel's citation of John
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As regards the passage 'every young creature is 
incapable of keeping either its body and its tongue quiet1, 
it can be interpreted that they are mostly seeking a 
rhythmic and harmonious condition. It presupposes their 
great insecurity. Of course, the young are the most 
insecure of all since what they essentially need is 
security and certainty. They at the earliest moment of 
their life are still puzzled and wondered about everything 
they experienced.112 Tautologically speaking, a sign of 
insecurity and uncertainty and frenzy in a newborn child 
indicates the absence of opposite qualities. As stated 
before, insecurity and uncertainty originates in the 
uncertainty of one's values or beliefs. Such a state 
originates in the lack of solidity and cohesiveness of 
one's soul. Its inclination towards rhythm and harmony in 
an external relationship with others presuppose that it 
needs 'others' to inform or confirm its self-knowledge. It 
can be inferred that this original insecurity which causes 
man to be inclined towards rhythm and harmony signifies the
Rawls in The Self in Social Theory, op. cit.. p. 52. See 
also, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 
Cambridge, 1982, pp. 150-151, and John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, Cambridge, Massachusett, 1971, p. 565.
112 Detienne's study of Dionysus seems to follow the same 
direction. However, his argument does not extend as far as 
mine, since he only refers to 'fear' and insecurity in 
human beings instead of the problem of self-knowledge. His 
argument regarding the physiological basis is exemplified 
by an interesting case of the nursing of infants. He 
stated that the reason why nurses rock their infants, which 
is called kinesitherapy, is homeopathy since human beings, 
child or adult, 'are all subject to fears, to certain 
weaknesses of soul, and "when mothers want to put fractions 
babies to sleep, the remedy they exhibit is not stillness
but its very opposite, movement they regularly rock the
infants in their arms and not silence, but a tune of some
kind....Hence, when such disorders are treated by rocking 
movement the external motion thus exhibited dominates the 
internal, which is the source of the fright or frenzy, (b)y 
its domination it produces a mental sense of calm and 
relief from the preceding distressing agitation of the 
heart'. Marcel Detienne, Dionysos at Large, op. cit.. p. 
58.
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absence and the search for self-knowledge in a human being. 
It is from this point that the saying, 'all men desire 
good1, is inferred, since the knowledge of the self 
presupposes the knowledge of the good for itself as regards 
the self-interpretation of the values of the good as it has 
been discussed in the simile of the Sun, the analogy of the 
Divided Line, and the imagery of the Cave. So, with regard 
to human nature, that is to say, the tripartite soul and 
its self-motion, what the Athenian Stranger said comes to 
light: 'the human race thus born to misery'. What is
given to relieve man of this misery is the pleasurable 
perception of rhythm and harmony, since it helps men to 
overcome or forget their suffering, epiponon, and 
insecurity and uncertainty. However, it can be only 
temporary since the soul is always in motion. A seeming 
state of harmony of 'the middle course, meson,1 taken as 
a resolution to the conflicting characters could make one 
take it for granted as an Archimedean point of self- 
knowledge.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Philosopher becomes King
In the light of the above discussion, Socrates' speech 
on the decline of the city and the soul becomes more 
comprehensible. In Chapter Seven, the procreation and the 
relationship within a family have been argued to be a 
metaphoric generation and interaction of the soul since the 
city was likened to the image of the soul. However, it was 
also argued that in the spirit of the Muses, the content of 
the speech can be interpreted both literally and 
metaphorically. Here the literal interpretation becomes 
meaningful in connection with Socrates' idea of the public 
as the educators and the Athenian Stranger's speech on the 
nature of the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony. 
From this, it will reveal that both metaphoric and literal 
interpretations of Socrates' speech on the declining city 
and soul not only complement but are also indispensable to 
one another.
The story in the speech begins with the unseasonable 
breeding of declining aristocratic parents in a declining 
aristocratic polity. As argued before, the decline started 
as soon as the unseasonable breeding took place. Socrates 
portrayed the conflicting personalities of the father and 
the mother. A child born to them is said to be 
aristocratic in his origin or 'by nature', but having been 
brought up in such an opposing atmosphere which is said to 
be undesirable, he has to seek a rhythmic and harmonious 
solution. Sooner or later, he develops his own personality 
or 'second nature'. 'Under these two solicitations he 
comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his 
soul to the intermediate principle of ambition and high 
spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of
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honour1.1 At this point, Alford's study of Plato's 
political psychology explains that the son in the process 
of being torn in two directions 'will seek some sort of 
psychological compromise' by taking 'a middle course, 
resigning "control of himself to the middle element and 
its competitive spirit" '.2 A son of a declining 
aristocratic family becomes a timocratic man.
From this, it is evident that when applied to other 
points in the dialogues, the argument that 'everyone 
besides himself is his "others" ' can be said to fit 
itself in quite well. The son is viewed as the individual 
psyche against his others, namely his father and mother. 
The influence of others over a person starts in his early 
childhood; that is to say, the need for others as a 
consequence of his self-uncertainty and self-insecurity 
begins as soon as one is born. With regard to the nature 
of the perception of rhythm and harmony, one can imagine a 
child who repeats certain behaviour which attracts his 
parents' approval or affection, but for what is disliked by 
his parents, the child has to compromise between himself 
and his 'others' either by avoiding his expression of such 
behaviour in front of his parents or by obliterating it.
In this regard, the others act as though they are a 
mirror reflecting what the child himself looks like so that 
he can recognise himself as in Lacan's 'mirror stage of 
development', le stade du miroir, According to Lacan's 
theory, the psychological development of the mirror stage 
takes place during the period of six months to two years of
1 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 550b).
2 Alford, The Self in Social Theory, o p . cit. . p. 65. 
Alford
argues further for the problem of mental frustrations in 
the Athenian society deriving from the 'oral narcissistic 
dilemma' of a son who has to take a male version of his 
mother's path. As a psychoanalyst, Alford believes that 
Plato is conscious of this problem and his work seeks a 
solution for such a problem. See also, pp. 65-68.
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age. Alford refers to 'Lipstick experiments1 and the like 
to support Lacan's timing of the mirror stage. Alford 
explains that when 'the child's nose is smeared with 
lipstick and he is placed before the mirror, it being 
presumed that if he responds with embarrassment he must 
recognise himself, generally support Lacan's theory'.3 In 
the same way that the child physically recognises himself 
with a self-painted red spot on his nose in a mirror, the 
individual psyche psychologically recognises its partial 
self-image by reactions from the others towards the 
expression of its ideas or sentiments. His expression 
represents himself to the others like a child who colours 
his nose with lipstick. A child will never know what he 
himself looks like or will never be aware of himself as a 
self object without a mirror. Likewise, he will never be 
able to learn or to be aware of his self-image without its 
reflections from the others.
However, unlike a mirror, people of different 
characters render different reflections. Moreover, such 
reflections of people have influence upon a person. As 
regards the three elements of the soul, each type of the 
characters of the soul influences a person by attracting 
and encouraging its counterpart and attacking or 
terrorising the others. Both sides, namely the one and the 
many, are not tabula rasa. It seems to be a war-like 
situation between the hidden nature in the tripartite soul 
of an individual in interaction with the five characters of 
men whose souls are ruled by one of those three elements. 
It is in this regard that, as stated elsewhere, the city 
and the soul are in a state of self-motion oscillating 
between harmony and discord. In that condition, it can be 
said that whether or not it is conscious of what it is 
doing, each type of character nurtures its counterpart in 
the soul of one another. When torn between opposing
3 See Alford, op. cit., p. 36.
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influences, a person reconciles himself and others by 
developing himself an intermediate nature. Otherwise, he 
has to surreptitiously enjoy the pleasure of his own taste, 
that is to say, he has to pretend to praise or blame what 
the others do.4
The middle course, meson, as a resolution to such 
conflicts has been said to be a developmental process or 
assimilation in the transformation of the city and the soul 
in Socrates' speech in Book Eight of the Republic.5 This 
is quite compatible with Averroes1 analogy of the opposite 
colours and their intermediate elements. Also, when a 
person who has been through the situation of conflicting 
influences reconciles such a state of disorder by 
developing an intermediate character, he could have thought 
that he had discovered his real self. Also he would have 
told himself that his self-knowledge had been achieved. 
Presumably, it happens to a timocrat, oligarch, democrat, 
or tyrant who emerges from conflicting parenting. 
Nevertheless, whenever assimilation is impossible with 
regard to uncompromising parties, it entails a revolution 
or violent upheaval.6 As stated before, the possibility
4 Cf. Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 548b). As regards 
a timocratic son of declining aristocratic parents: 'And
will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it 
and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of 
others' wealth because of their appetites, enjoying their 
pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys 
from a father'.
5 Cf. Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 547b, 550b). At 547b 
Socrates says 'When strife arose, the two groups were 
pulling against each other.... contending against one 
another, they compromised'. Also consider what he states 
at 550e: 'May not the opposition of wealth and virtue be
conceived as if each lay in the scale of a balance 
inclining opposite ways?'.
6 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 551b, 557a, 567a-569a). 
Socrates specifically refers to the transformation from 
oligarchy to democracy and from democracy to absolute 
tyranny.
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and degree of conflict is dependent upon the solidity and 
density of the character of the soul of both sides. In 
other words, it depends on whether a type of character is 
the nature of a person, or it has been so long and firmly 
established in the soul until it becomes his second nature. 
With regard to the latter, Socrates emphasised the 
significance of education by means of imitation in his 
discussion of the education of the guardians: 'Or have you 
not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far 
into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature in 
the body, the speech, and the thought?'7
I
With regard to the city as a context in which a person 
develops and realises his 'nature', his first context is 
his own family. He develops his first nature from his 
interacting relationship with his parents or guardians. 
Next to this might be his neighbours or his peer-group. He 
might confront his own habits or disposition or nature with 
that of the others and then has to be either assimilating, 
conforming or resisting. The scope of context can expand 
from a small unit of the city such as a family to the city 
or the global context as a whole.8 With regard to harmony 
and assimilation, it is observable that people of a 
country have a national or cultural identity. Considered 
in terms of political culture, each country is said to 
possess its own distinct political aspects. However, it is 
evident that they can be put into four categories of the
7 Plato, the Republic, (Book III 395d).
8 This point can be understood with regard to the idea of 
context and the fusion of historical horizon in Gadamer's 
hermeneutics. When a person of a culture experiences 
different cultures, a fusion of the two is required for the 
possibility of an intercommunicative action of cultural 
diversity.
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imperfect polity. As stated earlier, the criterion for a 
certain type of polity is drawn from the measure of its 
major control and assumption of political power. This 
portrays its dominant characteristics with regard to 
totality and harmony. But as also stated before, with 
regard to discord and contrariety, it is also evident that 
in a certain polity, whatever it may be, there exist 
different degrees of democrats, oligarchs, timocrats, and 
even tyrants. If it is the case that the existence of 
these types of character of men correspond to the nature of 
the tripartite soul, then, their existence must also 
presuppose the existence of a philosophic-ruling or 
aristocratic type of man.
The above lengthy discussion has shown how the public 
significantly plays the educating role in accordance with 
the interpretation of the theatre of Apollo and Dionysus in 
relation to human nature. In the theatre of life, the 
audience is the public as a whole. In truth, the public as 
a whole constitutes the city. The public is in fact the 
city, and the city as well as the public cannot be 
identified. It is not far from being true to argue that
the public everywhere is the educator of man in the
community. With regard to the existence of the just and
the unjust types of the soul in the city and the existence
of the influences of the just and the unjust city in the 
soul, it can be said that the war without and within the 
soul and the city is between good and evil. Hence, with 
regard to the influence of the city as such over the soul, 
the Athenian Stranger commented that 'yet what blessing 
could we name, or what curse greater than that of 
assimilation which befalls us so inevitably?'9 Surely, it 
must be a curse when
'a man who is living amongst the bad
habits of wicked men, though he does
9 Plato, Laws, (Book II 656b).
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not really abhor but rather accepts and 
delights in those habits, yet censures 
them casually, as though dimly aware of 
his own turpitude,1
which
'(i)n such a case it is, to be sure, 
inevitable that the man thus delighted 
becomes assimilated to those habits, 
good or bad, in which he delights, even 
though he is ashamed to praise 
them.|10
But it will become a great blessing whenever it begets 
'children of seasonable breeding1.11
After all, with the understanding of the public 
influence in connection with the interpretation of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian gift, in accordance with the 
nature of the tripartite soul, the simile of the Sun, the 
analogy of the Divided Line, the allegory of the Cave, the 
five types of the just and unjust city and soul, then, 
Socrates1 speech on the mysterious perfect number at 546b-c 
in the Republic can be fully comprehended. The meaning of 
the number 3, 4, 5 has been discussed in Chapter Nine.
Here the meanings of 'dominating and dominated1 and 'the 
assimilating, omoiounton, and dissimilating, anomoiounton1 
and 'the waxing and the waning' can be interpreted against 
the context of the interrelationship of the city and the 
soul.
In that context, the public or the others of good 
character can influence or dominate an individual who is 
dominated to develop the character as such. From that, the 
assimilation of the individual into those others follows, 
while the others of bad character could not dominate his 
soul, namely, he is dissimilated from them. As a result of
10 Plato, Laws, (Book II, 656b).
11 Plato, Laws, (Book II 656c).
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a number of assimilations and dissimilations, the power of 
certain elements of the tripartite soul 'waxes and wanes1, 
that is to say, they undergo alterations of increase and 
decreases. If the interrelationship of the city and the 
soul carries on in that manner until he can understand 
himself with regard to the relation of the symbolic number 
3, 4, 5 and human nature, then, it will render harmony and 
the good to the soul. This geometrical number in 
accordance with the understanding of the interrelationship 
of the city and the soul is said to be determinative of the 
generations of better or inferior characters of the soul. 
Clearly, this twofold consequence of the influence of the 
public underlies the earlier contention of the Athenian 
Stranger that every form of social institution or the city 
as a whole can render either harm or benefit to people who 
participate in it.12 In this regard, the city is regarded 
as the parents or the rearer of its citizens.13
II
From above, it is clear that between the city and the 
soul, there exists a power relationship. As once stated in 
an earlier discussion, the nature of the city and the soul 
is in a sense in a state of war; firstly, there is the war 
within the soul itself; secondly, there is the war within 
the city. As regards the latter, it is the war between the 
one and the many in the soul, as there are three classes in 
the city corresponding to the three elements in the soul. 
In such a relationship, the like always attracts its like
12 Plato, Laws, (Book I 638c-d, 640e-641a).
13 It can be said that from this point Socrates derives his 
defense of the city as the begetter and educator of his 
'self'.
379
both in the city and in the soul.14 With regard to the 
like, the like in the soul and its counterpart in the city 
can strengthen one another in the same way that what is 
unlike itself in the city can dominate and weaken the 
unlike in the soul and vice versa. With regard to the 
difference, their relationship is either one dominates or 
is dominated by another. It is the master-slave 
relationship. With regard to this domineering
relationship, there are two contradictory ways to approach 
it. This point has been made by Socrates to Callicles in 
the Gorgias.15 First, it is believed that by nature what 
is greater by quantity dominates what is lesser as regards 
'those who make the laws to keep a check on the one, the 
many are superior to the one' . However it has been also 
argued that by nature what is lesser but better and 
superior can dominate what is greater but worse and 
inferior as 'one wise man is often superior to ten 
thousand fools1.
Although they are in a warlike relationship, however, 
it is quite ironical to state that such a conflicting state 
which is derived from human ontological insecurity and 
uncertainty of the self is inclined towards unity and 
harmony as a relief; but only harmony in the just soul 
whose self-knowledge has been achieved is invulnerable. 
Harmony emerges when like is united with like. The unity 
of the likes takes place either when two or more of a kind 
meet and strengthen one another, or when what is unlike has 
been conquered or dominated by its rival so that its 
counterpart can become the dominant like itself. From 
this, it can be inferred that the explanation of the 
internal war of the city or its civil strife actually can
14 In the discussion of the education of the guardians in 
the Republic, Adeimantus consents to what Socrates asked 
him whether the like always summons the like. See the 
Republic, (Book IV 425c).
15 Plato, Gorgias, (488d, 490a).
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in a way be reduced to the war of the soul. The politics 
of the city is the politics of the soul. When it is said 
that one has to conquer oneself, it means that one has to 
strengthen a certain part and weaken the others in one's 
soul, since there are the conditions of 'being partly 
self-superior and partly self-inferior1 in the soul and in 
the city.16 Furthermore, it can be stated that when one 
is waging war within oneself, at the same time, one is 
waging war against the others in the city. As when he is 
fighting against himself, it is inevitable that he is 
strengthening the power of one and weakening the others in 
the tripartite soul. Being situated in the city, the 
element in his soul which has become powerful strengthens 
its counterpart in the city. Similarly, when one is waging 
war against the others in the city, one is making war 
within oneself.
It is pointless to ask the questions 'what is the 
state of nature or the beginning of the city and the soul?1 
or 'when did such a war begin?1 or 'who ruled in the 
beginning?1 to which only unfounded answers can be given. 
It is more practical to state that, as argued above, the 
point of departure of the city and the soul always begins 
at the point of metaxy, the intermediate state. Any 
starting point other than the point of metaxy is 
inconceivable in the same way that there will never be a 
clean canvas for artists to trace the lineaments of the 
ideal constitution in practice, since it will never be 
possible for the multitude to become aware of the value of 
philosophy and to be convinced that 'no city could ever be
16 Plato, Laws, (Book I 627a-b). Clinias stated that the 
reason for the tradition of common meals in Crete and 
Sparta lies in their raison d1 etat. since he believed that 
all states were involved ceaselessly in a lifelong war 
against one another'. Accordingly Cretan laws had been 
made to serve this purpose. From this point, then, the 
Athenian Stranger logically drew his argument from the 
state of war of the city to the state of war of the soul. 
See Laws, (Book I 625c-626e).
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blessed unless its lineaments were traced by artists who 
used the heavenly model1 .17 With regard to the nature of 
the many and the public as the educator, it has been said 
that no existing polity 'is worthy of the philosophic 
nature *.18
In such a powerful and dominating relationship between 
the city and the soul, it transpired that power and 
domination were exerted either to 'invigorate' something 
or 'counteract' the others. In such a relationship, the 
existence and survival of some quality presupposes the 
preservation and nourishment of its own quality and the 
protection and prevention of itself from the others. Such 
a situation necessitates the entrance to the politics of 
the philosopher, since the chief penalty for him is to be 
governed by someone worse if he will not himself hold 
office and rule.19 Also, the return to the Cave of the 
one who has seen the sun itself is inevitable. He has to 
return to live his life amongst the others in the cave.20 
In this sense, it can be stated that philosophy becomes 
political because of its self-love.
On the other hand, philosophic nature as a kind of 
quality always loves and yearns for the union of itself and 
its like. It can be derived that from love the soul 
becomes pregnant and generates another soul similar to what 
it loves and unites itself with21, but it has been shown 
that there is no good reason for the need for the union
17 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 500e-501a).
18 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 497b).
19 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 347c-d).
20 Otherwise, Socrates would have given his advice that the 
enlightened person should not laugh unthinkingly when 
someone has to go through the transition from one realm to 
another. See the Republic, (Book VII 517a-518b).
21 See Diotima's speech in the Symposium, (206c-212a).
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with the like of the same qualities such as the wise, and 
the good, since they are already perfect and therefore 
self-contained. Also, the unity of the opposite qualities 
such as the bad and the ignorant would render damages and 
harmful results instead of benefit. Furthermore, it is 
impossible for the bad to be a friend to the good. So as 
regards the love for its like of philosophy, its reason has 
to be made comprehensible.
Ill
Socrates has clarified this point in the Lysis. The 
dialogue discusses the nature of friendship, philia. In 
the dialogue, Socrates explains the meaning of true 
friendship which emerges only in the philosophic 
relationship. As the philosopher is the lover of wisdom, 
his position is neither wise nor ignorant:
'We may say that those who are already 
wise no longer love wisdom...nor again 
can those be lovers of wisdom who are 
in such ignorance as to be bad; for we 
know that a bad and stupid man is no 
lover of wisdom. And now there remain 
those who, while possessing this bad 
thing, ignorance, are not yet made 
ignorant or stupid, but are still aware 
of not knowing the things they do not 
know.122
What follows this is that the position of the 
philosopher is metaxy: he who is 'as yet neither good nor
bad1.23 The friendship between the philosophers is 
possible since 'neither is opposite friend to opposite, 
nor like to like, 1 and 'in the soul and the body and
22 Plato, Lysis, (218a).
23 Plato, Lysis, (218b).
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everywhere, just that which is neither bad nor good, but 
has the presence of bad, is thereby friend of the good1.24 
A further question is posed concerning the utility of such 
friendship of those 'neither good nor bad*. It has been
shown that it is 'the nature of the good to be loved
because of the bad by us who are midway between the bad and 
the good, whereas separately and for its own sake it is of 
no use1.25 And it can be inferred that the benefit which 
arises from the friendship of 'the neither good nor bad* 
lies in their common desire for what is desired, that is, 
the good.
However the good exists because of the bad as in the 
case of the existence of medicine for the sake of disease. 
So such cannot be the good in the sense that the 
philosopher desires because their friendship will no longer 
be possible after evil things are abolished. On the other 
hand, it is impossible for evil to be abolished as long as 
hunger or thirst exist.26 However, the neither/nor 
position is said to be capable of enduring in the absence 
of the bad and the good. So the friendship of such a 
position is said to be derived just from its desire for its 
like.
With regard to the point of the good in relation to 
the bad, as Socrates has already warned, one must be very 
careful not to be deceived27, As one is a friend of 
medicine which is a good thing because of disease which is 
a bad thing. One who needs medicine must be sick or 
unhealthy, but those who are healthy are healthy because 
they are free from disease. As their bodies are free from
24 Plato, Lysis, (218b-c).
25 Plato, Lysis, (220d).
26 Plato, Lysis, (221a).
27 Plato, Lysis, (219b-c).
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disease, they do not need medicine whose goodness exists 
for the sake of the bad of disease and unhealthiness. 
Accordingly those who are healthy are neither good nor bad 
in such terms of relationship between the good and the bad. 
To be healthy, those who are healthy do not need medicine. 
What they need is just to preserve their neither/nor 
position. It is only when they have a disease that 
medicine must be called for. In this regard, the good 
which the neither good nor bad position desires is the 
preservation of its quality. Apparently, it can be said 
that Socrates would say 'the good is what is neither good 
nor bad1. Thus Socrates needs to be indirect about this 
point in order not to be trapped in a linguistic paradox. 
So, for the neither good nor bad, the good is useless 
whilst the bad is harmful. With regard to the pleasurable 
perception of rhythm and harmony, the like always desires 
the like for such a purpose. So it is only from the 
relationship between the like of itself, that is, the 
neither good nor bad, that benefit can be derived. 
Therefore, the neither good nor bad desires, in fact, 
belong to one another in pursuance of its own good.28
Therefore, it can be said that the philosopher enters 
politics because of eros. It is his desire or eros for the
28 That is why after his warning in the Lysis, 219b-c 
Socrates leads his argument to another cause of friendship 
which the good whose existence is possible because of the 
bad no longer takes part in. What has been arrived at is 
that desire is the cause of friendship. Such desire is 
originated from the fact that one is the like or belongings 
of another. From this, Socrates leads to the point that 
whether he should maintain that 'the good itself belongs to 
every one, while the bad is alien? Or does the bad belong 
to the bad, the good to the good, and what is neither good 
nor bad to what is neither good nor bad1. {Lysis, 222c) He 
said after this that he had come to a logical impasse, but 
he then, like the professional pleaders in the law courts, 
asked his listeners to perpend the whole of what has been 
said. The problem cannot be solved unless one could not 
understand the point which Socrates warned with regard to 
the meaning of the good in relation to the bad, and the 
good in itself.
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love of wisdom or the good which is neither good nor bad 
and neither wise nor ignorant, in other words, metaxy. His 
eros can be understood in two categories. First, it is out 
of self-love because he has to protect and preserve himself 
or his own quality. Secondly, it lies in his desire for 
the like of the same quality in others. With regard to the 
latter, some comment that it is the obligation of the 
philosopher to enter politics in order 'to pay a debt1.29 
However, among other things, the raison d f etre of his 
political practice is not just for the interest of himself 
but for the city as a whole in the same way that his ruling 
part takes power for the interest of the whole soul and not 
for the interest of any particular part.30 Actually, 
almost the whole discussion of Book I of the Republic is 
attributable to the scrutiny of the logical feasibility of 
the argument.31
Preceding the discussion of the nature of the justice 
of the city and the soul, its prologue stipulates that the 
ruler who is stronger must rule for the benefit of the 
ruled if he is a real ruler. At the beginning of the
29 Stanley Rosen, 'The Good1, in Nihilism, New Haven, 
1968, p. 161f f. He states that two reasons for the 
philosopher's engagement in politics are 'either out of 
self-protection or to pay a debt'. Either point, self­
protection or returning what is due to others, proves that 
the Platonic dialogues, or perhaps the Republic in 
particular, are far from being apolitical. This view is 
supported by John Burnet's remark on a discrepancy between 
Pythagorean and Platonic concepts of philosophy. Despite 
the Pythagorean influence, the meaning of philosophy in the 
dialogues is not just 'a "purification" and a way of 
escape from the "wheel" '. Burnet argues that Plato was 
well aware of the danger derived from an attitude of 
philosophy which could 'degenerate into mere quietism and 
"otherworldliness" '. Seeking to avert this, Plato 
'insisted on philosophers taking their turn to descend once 
more into the Cave to help their former fellow prisoners'. 
John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, o p . cit.. p. 83.
30 See Plato, Statesman, (296e-297a) .
31 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 339c-353e).
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debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus, Socrates bantered 
with Thrasymachus by twitting the meaning of the term 
'stronger1 in his argument. The stronger becomes the 
stronger in physical strength. So the interest of the 
stronger which lies in what benefits the body as flesh is 
the interest of Polydamas, the pancratiast. As mentioned 
elsewhere, Socrates would have thought of the soul rather 
than the body with regard to what would be regarded to be 
human. Thrasymachus had been long overdue to give the 
answer which Socrates intended him to give. At the end of 
the debate, Thrasymachus was made to concede that justice 
was the virtue or the excellence of the soul. To be sure, 
he never said that justice was the interest of the body. 
What he actually meant was that justice was the interest of 
the stronger man who is stronger than anybody in every way, 
but the 'stronger man1 in Thrasymachus was defeated by 
'the stronger man' in Socrates' speech.
To be sure, Socrates never said that justice was the 
interest of the body. What he actually meant was that 
justice was the interest of the stronger. We know that 
what he said is that justice was the virtue of the soul, 
since the soul has the function of 'ruling' without which 
a man could never accomplish anything. Justice presupposes 
oneness and love because the just would never outdo the 
just. The just does not outdo the just in the same way 
that the wise would never get better of the wise and the 
one who knows about music would never think to get the 
better of his like with regard to the tuning of a lyre; 
But the just would outdo the unjust as the wise would do so 
to the ignorant. Certainly, the more would outdo anything 
less than itself but not its like in the same way that the 
superior would never let anything inferior be over itself. 
Only like is allowed to govern like since it is not 
different from that when it governs itself. The stronger 
always governs the weaker until there is no difference 
between them. Then, therefore, it seems that justice must
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be the interest of the stronger. Here the stronger is the 
stronger man, and the stronger man is the one who has the 
stronger soul. Therefore, it has come full circle to the 
point that justice is the interest or virtue of the soul.
However, Socrates argued in the case of the body that 
the flesh could not be the only advantage for the stronger. 
It benefits both the stronger and the weaker. It seems 
also true that justice must be the interest of both the 
stronger and the weaker souls. The just does not harm or 
worsen the unjust by outdoing it since the just would never 
deteriorate anything. To be sure, it must render only 
benefit. The musical outdoes the unmusical for the reason 
that it cannot let what is unmusical be mistaken for what 
is musical. When the unmusical can differentiate between 
what is and what is not musical, then, it will no longer 
mistake 'what is not* for 'what is'. The unmusical will 
then pursue the musical path, because it desires to be 
musical otherwise it would never purport to be musical.
IV
Hence the musical cannot 'mind his own business1.32 
He cannot leave the unmusical to itself. To put it another 
way, the musical has to dominate the unmusical in pursuance 
of itself, namely, the quality of being musical. To 
subject the unmusical to itself, the musical does so with 
the virtue of its own existence, that is, rhythm and 
harmony which is the essence of music. Similarly, the just 
city enslaves or dominates the unjust with its own virtue, 
that is, justice. The musician enslaves the unmusician 
because of his love of music and his being musical. The 
just city enslaves the unjust because of its love of
32 Plato, Apology, (37e).
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justice and its being just. In this sense, one subdues 
one's opponent because of one's self-love which is the love 
of a certain quality.
As stated above, if justice is the interest of both 
the stronger and the weaker soul, then, it seems that 
justice is the interest of everyone regardless of the 
extent of his strength or weakness. As the weaker is 
weaker, and the stronger is stronger, then, justice could 
not render the same benefit at the same time to persons of
different types. The interest of the stronger is not to
let himself be governed by the inferior, but the interest 
of the weaker is to let himself be governed by the stronger 
so that he will become better and stronger. Therefore, 
although justice renders benefit, it does so with regard to 
what is due to what kind of the character of man he is. 
Such a conclusion reminds one of the earliest stage where 
Socrates asked Cephalus whether justice is, as it had been 
generally referred from Simonides' phrase, 'to render each 
his due'.33 Such a phrase which has been pulled apart 
from its context can cause ambiguity and arbitrary 
interpretation. It implies that Socrates had attempted to 
ascribe his own interpretation to this popular and
seemingly sufficient definition of justice. Moreover, it
is ironically disclosed in the process of the discussion 
itself that the definition of justice as the interest of 
the stronger is still intact. Socrates had not attacked 
the definition itself. Actually, he had strengthened it by 
vindicating the appropriate meaning of the term stronger. 
That is why it has been stated that the 'stronger' in 
Socrates is stronger than that in Thrasymachus. However if 
the interest of the stronger is the interest of the 
philosopher, justice is not only the interest of the 
philosopher but also the interest of the others. The 
philosopher perceives that the three classes in the city
33 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 331e).
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are indispensable to one another in the same way that the 
whole soul necessarily consists of the three elements. 
Thus the philosopher rules for the sake of all, and the 
justice of the philosopher is the justice of all.
The power relationship of the city and the soul 
originates in the conflict and harmony continuum which is 
in turn generated by human insecurity and uncertainty of 
self-knowledge. It has been argued that the philosopher is 
regarded as the musical and just. As a true musician, he 
is said to 'always be found attuning the harmonies of his 
body for the sake of the concord in his soul1.34 So 
unlike the false harmony of the imperfect city and soul, 
the just city and the just soul of the philosopher are 
hardly oscillated between the conflict and harmony 
continuum, since his music always guides him to philosophy, 
and his philosophy always keeps him musical and harmonious. 
The Muses and music for him originated from mosthai which 
means searching, and philosophy. Also the origin of the 
name of Apollo denotes harmony and concord. This has been 
consummated by his understanding of the term Dionysus as 
being derived from oiesthai because a Dionysian effect 
makes one think and have wit.35
Harmony in the soul of the philosopher is achieved via 
his search for self-knowledge which renders him the 
understanding of human nature and the nature of the good as 
metaxy. Only the philosopher understands the necessity of 
the existence of the tripartite soul and its corresponding 
forms in the city. It is only in this regard that he in 
his politics attempts to harmonize the city in the same 
manner that harmony in his soul has been reached. When the 
philosopher engages in politics, it is not conventional
34 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 591d).
35 Plato, Cratylus, (405d-406c).
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politics. In essence, it is the politics of the soul. As 
justice and the metaxy of the good never damages anything, 
therefore, it can be said that the governance of the 
philosopher-ruler is based on friendship in accordance with 
his understanding of the nature of the city and the soul. 
The rule of the philosopher as a genuine statesman renders 
harmony to the city as a whole. As the Athenian Stranger 
asked his warlike interlocutors from the warring cities:
'For imagine a man supposing that a 
human body was best off when it was 
sick and purged with physic, while 
never giving a thought to the case of 
the body that needs no physic at all! 
Similarly, with regard to the well­
being of a State or an individual, that 
man will never make a genuine statesman 
who pays attention primarily and solely 
to the needs of foreign warfare, nor 
will he make a finished lawgiver unless 
he designs his war legislation for 
peace rather than his peace legislation 
for war.,36
Summarily, it is by nature and of necessity that the 
philosopher has to practise his politics of the soul. To 
be a philosopher is to be the statesman at once. Politics 
is inherent in philosophy and vice versa. It is in this 
regard that philosophy and politics are inseparable. If 
the philosopher does not rule, he will inevitably 
degenerate. What follows is the tale of the decline of the 
imperfect city and soul. The philosopher who does not rule 
will produce a generation of decadence, but as soon as he 
establishes his rule within himself, the kallipolis begins 
its life, and the starting point of the ideal and just city 
emerges. He has to prove himself the best in both war and 
philosophy.37
36 Plato, Laws, (Book I 628d).
37 At Book VIII, 543a of the Republic Socrates said: '...and 
that the rulers or kings over them are to be those who have 
approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy.'
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V
From above, it can be inferred that whoever knows what 
the philosopher is knows what the statesman is and vice 
versa. Accordingly, the knowledge of that statesman is 
equivalent to that of the philosopher.38 So the dialogue 
which concerns itself with the discussion of philosophy 
more than any other dialogue must be said as well to be the 
prologue to the study of the statesman. That dialogue is 
the Republic, At this point, the philosopher-king emerges. 
His philosophical understanding informs him of the nature 
of the city and the soul. It distinguishes between 'what 
is and what is not1, i.e., harmony and discord. At the 
same time, the philosophical spirited or kingly element in 
his soul forces him to protect and preserve justice in his 
soul and the city by entering politics.
It is said that when a person engages in politics, he 
practises politics in his own way. He would do it with 
regard to his own self-interpretation of the nature of man 
and society. A crude example is that an oligarch will use 
his financial resources in exchange for political office 
and power which in turn must be instrumental in increasing 
his wealth. Likewise, when the philosopher engages in 
politics, he practises it in a philosophic style. Since 
his art of politics is derived from philosophy, it informs 
him of the nature of man and the city. At the same time, 
the art of politics as such in turn secures its foundation, 
that is, philosophy. In this regard, in its full
38 The realms of the knowledge of the statesman and the 
philosopher are intertwined. As, in the Republic, the 
search for justice in the soul must be done in the image of 
the city. In the Statesman, the study is just in reverse. 
The art of the statesman first of all requires 
understanding of the nature of man. Furthermore, the study 
of the art of statesmanship must begin from its smaller to 
larger scale. That is, it has to start from one's self- 
rule. This will be further discussed in what follows.
392
development and totality, philosophy is in fact 'political 
philosophy*. Politics in which political philosophy is 
practised is the politics of the soul.
In the Gorgias, 52Id, Socrates told Callicles that he 
thought he was one of the few who practised true 
statesmanship. At the end of the Meno, after the 
conclusion had been reached that 'virtue is found to be 
neither natural nor taught*, however, Socrates stated that 
it can be realisable if 'somebody among the statesman is 
capable of making a statesman of another' appears. 
Furthermore, Socrates, in the Euthyphro, 3c, expresses that 
'for the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if 
they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his 
clever notions to others; but when they think he makes 
others to be like himself, they are angry with him. * Of 
course, the person whom the Athenians referred to is 
Socrates himself. In this regard, as stated earlier, the 
mission of Socrates is political. Socrates is practising 
the art of politics when he 'goes about and interferes in 
other people's affairs'.39
With regard to the nature of the power relationship 
between the city and the soul, it is not surprising that 
the study of the soul is inseparable and indispensable to 
the study of the city. All social institutions can be 
regarded as the city. What has been regarded as the city 
or the public is the 'others' which form the power 
relationship among individuals. In a sense, the polity of 
the city reflects itself in its laws. All the laws, nomos, 
either encourage or discourage people to do something and 
not others. In other words, it forms and nurtures 
something and inhibits others, as the characters of the 
Spartan and the Cretan citizens differed from that of the 
Athenian. The Cretans were more like the Spartans than the
39 Plato, Apology, (31c).
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Athenians, since they had been brought up in the city which 
possessed certain character of the laws.40 Laws cannot be 
confined to what has been officially legislated. It is 
necessary that the art of statesmanship concerns itself 
with such laws as all social activities constitute. Of 
course, in a way, one can understand the laws of a polity 
by analyzing the way its people have a drinking party or a 
common feast.41
All social institutions can render good or bad effects 
which form the second nature of men. Rightly conducted, it 
would generate good characters in men. Such arts of 
directing or conducting social activities for the best 
purpose is political philosophy. The task of the 
philosopher-king is to cultivate his like quality in those 
who possess the potential to become like himself. If we 
regard Socrates as a man who practises political 
philosophy, then, to understand what political philosophy 
is, one needs to observe what Socrates does or refrains 
from doing.
As regards the meaning of the statesman, the dialogue 
of its namesake concerns the search for a statesman. It is 
in one of the two of the whole dialogues when Socrates 
keeps silent and listens to the discussion between the 
Eleatic Stranger and his interlocutors. With particular 
regard to Socrates, it should be unusual to regard 
someone's silence as disapproval of what he is listening 
to. What is peculiar in the Statesman lies in its method 
of the search. Under the search for the statesman in its 
microcosm which is its underlying method, there are the 
dialectic division between man and animals, the myth of the 
revolution of the universe and the art of weaving.42
40 Plato, Laws, (Book I 625a-b).
41 As these social institutions were discussed in the Laws.
42 Plato, Statesman, (261b-266d, 268d-277d, 279b-311c).
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Nevertheless, it is still unclear what exactly the 
statesman is. Then the Eleatic Stranger employs the art of 
weaving to exemplify the art of statesmanship. The reason 
for the use of the art of weaving is that 'it is always 
easier to practise in small matters than in greater 
ones.*43 Therefore, one is expected to understand the art 
of statesmanship from the study of the art of weaving. In 
fact, the discussion of the art of weaving itself 
preoccupies more than half of the space in the dialogue. 
However, what the Eleatic Stranger brought into the 
discussion in his search for the statesman seems to 
generate the opposite effect to what he intended. His 
conduct of the discussion seems superfluous and irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, the Eleatic Stranger is well aware of 
'irritating impatience' which occurs from such
analyses.44
As shown in Chapter Four, the dialectic and geometric 
division presupposes the requirement of the statesman's 
knowledge of human nature. The Eleatic Stranger did not 
give an immediate reply to the young Socrates when he 
answered that the statesman's chief concern is man, since 
the statesman needs to know not just the name but the 
essence of man. That is why such a method of division has 
to be employed. That 'the nature of human race is not 
related to walking in any other way than as the diameter 
which is the square root of two feet' is just the clue 
which required special interpretative attention. With 
regard to the power, dynamis, of geometric application, 
there is an animal element in man which makes him in 
potentiality bestial. However, at 3 09c, the Eleatic 
Stranger said that man possesses a divine bond as well. 
Surely, this dichotomy would inspire someone who would 
never be content with such an enigma to investigate further
43 Plato, Statesman, (286b).
44 Plato, Statesman, (277c, 286b-c).
395
the truth of the matter.
As regards the myth of the revolution of the universe, 
what is conspicuous lies in its intended contrast between 
the age of Cronus and the age of Zeus. What man in the age 
of Cronus has signifies what man in the age of Zeus lacks. 
In turn, it also tells us what man in the age of Zeus 
possesses and what man in the age of Cronus lacks. The 
different conditions of the two ages presuppose different 
conceptions of the statesman. Moreover, the Eleatic 
Stranger admitted that there was a great error in the 
exposition of the king and the statesman in the story of 
the myth. The point is absurd with regard to the fact that 
it was the Eleatic Stranger himself who introduced the myth 
into the discussion. He could have corrected earlier what 
he later regarded as an error. Also, if the art of weaving 
or clothes-making is regarded as a perfect example of the 
art of statesmanship, then, it should have been brought 
into the discussion since the beginning of the dialogue so 
that they should have bothered themselves with such 'too 
long and irrelevant talks'.
Such discursive methods which were regarded by the 
Eleatic Stranger as examples conducive to the understanding 
of the art of statesmanship are not easily comprehensible. 
So it seems that his 'very example requires another 
example1.45 An example is still necessary as the Eleatic 
Stranger states that
'it is difficult to set forth any of 
the greater ideas, except by the use of 
examples; for it would seem that each 
of us knows everything that he knows as 
if in a dream and then again, when he 
is as it were awake, knows nothing of 
it all*.46
45 Plato, Statesman, (277d-e).
46 Plato, Statesman, (277d).
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He states further that he has just touched upon the 
problem of human experience with regard to knowledge, 
episteme pathos. That is the problem of an obscurum per 
obscurius or the infinite regression of the reference of 
the unknown.47 The young Socrates could not understand 
the meaning of the art of statesmanship which has been 
likened and exemplified in the previous examples, namely, 
the division between man and animals, and the myth of the 
revolution of the universe. He still needed a further 
exemplification. With regard to this problem, the 
situation might be easier if the Eleatic Stranger had given 
right away the definition of statesman; for instance, when 
one has been asked to explain what justice is, one might 
answer that justice is 'giving one his due' or 'the 
interest of the stronger’ etc. However as it has been 
shown elsewhere, any straightforward definition is hardly 
free from being ambiguous. The situation turns out to be 
that those who answer do not understand what they say. 
However they seem to know the matter in concern since they 
can linguistically express its meaning; but, for the 
Eleatic Stranger, a decisive factor lies not in those who 
seem to possess the knowledge. One cannot judge what a 
person is by taking for granted what he claims or has been 
claimed to be. The sophist or the statesman or the 
philosopher is someone who practises his art or 
apprenticeship not one who claims the title. In this 
regard, the world of language or names can be regarded as 
only a dream. With regard to the Eleatic Stranger's 
problem of discursive methods in the Statesman, it can be 
made more comprehensible by the use of the following 
example.
If a physical trainer has been requested to explain 
the meaning of a physical trainer, he might say that a 
physical trainer is someone who knows how to keep the human
47 See the Cratylus, 439b. This point has been discussed 
in Chapter Four.
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body fit and strong. Anyone who has listened to that 
answer might think that he himself also knows what a 
physical trainer is. He can give the same answer to anyone 
who asks a similar question to the one he used to ask the 
physical trainer. At a linguistic level, he can be equally 
regarded as a physical trainer in the same way that the 
physical trainer is physical trainer, since he can speak 
like a physical trainer. However, concerning the practice 
of the art of physical training, he is far from being a 
physical trainer if he does not know what to do. Moreover, 
it would be ironical if that 'physical trainer' is also 
unhealthy. So it seems that when the physical trainer is 
asked to explain what a physical trainer is, he has to show 
it in practice, and the person who asks or would like to 
know what a physical trainer is cannot be said to 'know' 
it merely by seeing the expert practise his art.
In this sense, 'to really know means to train to 
become like1. In this regard, therefore, to know what the 
statesman is means one has to train oneself to become a 
statesman. Also, our recent argument entails that to train 
to become a statesman is at once to train to become a 
philosopher.48
VI
The way the Eleatic Stranger conducts the discussion 
with regard to the search for the statesman does not invoke 
Socrates1 disapproval. As it has been argued that Socrates
48 With regard to this point, the Eleatic Stranger also 
states that the investigation of the statesman is 
undertaken to make one 'a better thinkers about all 
subjects1. He should have meant the philosopher. In J.B. 
Skemp's translation of 258d of the Statesman, the term 
philosopher has been used in this context. See Plato, The 
Statesman, trans. J.B. Skemp, London, 1961.
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practises his philosophical apprenticeship and the art of 
statesmanship, and the Eleatic Stranger's conduct of 
discussion in search of the statesman is not opposed to 
Socrates, then, it can be inferred that when the Eleatic 
Stranger conducts the discussion, he at the same time 
practises the art of statesmanship and philosophy. When a 
philosopher-king practises his art, he has to be certain 
that a person whom he discusses it with understands his 
meaning and would not abuse his knowledge. He has to be 
responsible for what he has done.49 Hence, when he tries 
to produce his like, he at the same time has to prevent the 
generation of any undesirable quality.
Also, as discussed before, all social institutions are 
said to have twofold effects. Accordingly, the art of 
statesmanship involves every level of social activity in 
which in turn the practice of the art of statesmanship can 
be found. It is in this regard that the Eleatic Stranger 
urged that the search for the art of statesmanship must 
begin by trying 'to see in another small and partial 
example the nature of example in general, with the 
intention of transferring afterwards the same figurative 
method from lesser things to the most exalted eminence of 
the king1.50 Contrary to the method in the Republic, this 
method in the Statesman is argued to be 'always easier to 
practise in small matters than in greater ones1.51
Actually, this kind of method is initiated in the 
search for the sophist in the Sophist, 218d-e. He states 
that some lesser thing can be taken and used as a pattern 
for the greater since 'what example we set before us which 
is well known and small is no less capable of definition 
than any of the greater things1. Then sophistry can also
49 This point is discussed in the Gorgias, (460c-d).
50 Plato, Statesman, (278e).
51 Plato, Statesman, (286b).
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be found in every level of social activity. With regard to 
this method, namely the search for what is practised rather 
than who practises it, it helps save a person who is 
searching from being attached to a nominalistic fallacy. 
From this, it is possible that the statesmanship or 
sophistry might not be found in those who have the 
namesakes but in those who have been called differently. 
In this regard, the one who has been called 'statesman' may 
not be the philosopher unless he practises the art of 
statesmanship. So the statesmanship in a king or in a 
swineherd must be equally regarded.52 Ironically, those 
who have been regarded as the rulers could have been just 
the servants of the city. Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades 
and Themistocles had been accepted by the people as their 
distinct statesmen. Socrates stated that he never blamed 
them for regarding themselves as the servants of the city 
since they provided those things which the caterers would 
have done to their masters. Socrates satirically remarked 
that they were free men who 'voluntarily put themselves in 
the position of servants1.53 Nevertheless, not only these 
people but also others such as priests, and people of the
52 Klein, Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, 
and the Statesman, op, cit,, p. 153. This point has been 
inferred from what the Eleatic Stranger said in the 
Sophist, 227a-b, with regard to the method in concern. He
said that one should 'honour them all equally and do not 
in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than 
another, and do not consider him who employs, as his 
example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more 
dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, 
but only, for the most part, as more pretentious1. This 
point also supports what Socrates discussed in the Cratylus 
regarding the theory of names. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, there is an ironical element with regard to the name 
of Hector and his son. They were 'king' as they had been 
called. Also, the beings whose name 'man, anthropos' may 
not deserve such denomination if they lack human quality. 
As in the Statesman, 266a-c, according to the Eleatic 
Stranger's application of a seemingly unnecessary geometric 
method to the division between man and animals, the 
demarcation line between human and animal is in the 
position of metaxy.
53 Plato, Statesman, (289e).
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assembly always 'lay claim to the art of
statesmanship'54, since with regard to virtue, they were 
incapable and they could not even prove themselves good 
citizens. The statesman must aim at 'diverting her (the
city) desires another way instead of complying with them--
in persuading or compelling her people to what would help 
them to be better1.55 The statesman must be the one who 
really possesses 'political philosophy1 not the one who 
'merely seems to possess it1.56
We know from Chapter Three that Socrates’ mission is 
to make his interlocutors wonder about themselves and their 
self-knowledge so that the search for self-knowledge can 
begin in those who have been inspired. To be sure, the 
search for self-knowledge is inspired by the search for the 
good which in turn is what the search for self-knowledge 
will lead to. However, that is the substance of Socrates’ 
mission. It is then true that a purpose in the art of 
statesmanship must also be to inspire the search for self- 
knowledge and the good; but political philosophy informs 
those who practise it about the nature of the soul and the 
city. From that, the philosopher-king is aware of the 
different conditions of the soul as well as the city, as it 
has been stated that 'the discovery of the natures and
conditions of men’s souls will prove one of the things
must useful to that art whose task it is to treat them; and 
that art is the art of politics’.57
So the knowledge of the nature of man is a 
prerequisite in the art of statesmanship. In his practice, 
he will differently approach different kinds of men in
54 Plato, Statesman, (290c-291b).
55 Plato, Gorgias, (515d-517d).
56 Plato, Statesman, (293c-d).
57 Plato, Laws, (Book I 650b).
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order to make another one like himself, the person in 
question must achieve what the philosopher-king has 
achieved, that is, the understanding of the good and human 
nature. Therefore, the philosopher-king practises his art 
in order to guide the person in question to achieve it. 
Thus, it is for this reason that the dialectic and 
geometric division between man and animals and the myth of 
the revolution of the universe were employed to inspire 
further a deeper and more serious examination of human 
nature and the care of human beings which are the 
statesman's chief concern. As the significance of the 
application of the square root to the understanding of 
human nature has been already meticulously discussed and 
frequently referred, here the message in the myth of the 
revolution of the universe is to be comprehended.
With regard to human life in the age of Cronos, 
necessity does not exist. The gods rule and tend the herd 
of human beings, but their relationship is comparable to 
one between man whose nature is more divine, and animals of 
a different and lower species like a shepherd and a flock 
of sheep. However, man in the age of Zeus lives without 
the care of a God-shepherd. The condition and relationship 
of men in the age of Zeus are different from the previous 
age. The concept of happiness in the two ages is 
incommensurable. It is impossible to say which kind of 
life is more blessed. Man in the age of Cronos might have 
regarded life without necessity and difficulty as ideal and 
happiest. The relationship is much more like the life of 
animals under the care of human beings in the age of Zeus. 
In such a Arcadian society or under the care of God, it is 
said that:
'there were no states, nor did men 
possess wives or children; for they all 
came to life again out of the earth, 
with no recollection of their former 
lives. So there were no states or 
families, but they had fruits in plenty
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from the trees and other plants, which 
the earth furnished them of its own 
accord, without help from agriculture.
And they lived for the most part in the 
open air, without clothing or bedding; 
for the climate was tempered for their 
comfort, and the abundant grass that 
grew up out of the earth furnished them 
soft couches.*58
From above, the Eleatic Stranger remarked that the 
rise of the statesman among men in the age of Cronus was 
hardly possible, since 'no necessity had hitherto 
compelled them1.59 Also, philosophy never comes into 
being. If men in such an age lack philosophy, he would 
never have had through possession of some peculiar power 
'in any respect beyond his fellows perceptions tending 
towards an increase of wisdom1. Everything has been under 
the control of the gods. One doubts that for that reason 
in the age of Cronus the gods care for the mortals. 
However, the reason has not been stated. Moreover, it does 
not state whether men in such an age are willing or 
unwilling to be in the care of the gods. Also such care 
seems to be the care of the body, and men in such an age 
seem to be able to concern themselves with their bodies 
rather than their souls. In a way, the gods seem like the 
caterer rather than the ruler, since the care of the gods 
is absolute. The gods know that the good for the mortals 
is nothing but food and shelter. By nature, men are under 
the gods1 control regardless of their will. Perhaps, this 
is the only necessity existing in the age of Cronus.
58 Plato, Statesman, (272a-b).
59 Plato, Statesman, (274c).
403
VII
In another sense, it is much more like the
relationship between the tyrant and his subjects. 
Accordingly, the Eleatic Stranger concludes that if men in 
the age of Cronus lived their lives in such a condition, 
then, there would have been more happiness in the age of 
Zeus where men were free and had to take care of 
themselves.60 However, what is more important is man in 
the present time as the Eleatic Stranger said 'let us pass 
those matters by, so long as there is no one capable of 
reporting to us what the desires of the people in those 
days were in regard to knowledge and the employment of 
speech' because 'the reason why we revived this legend
must be told, in order that we may get ahead
afterwards1.61 So the story of human life in the age of 
Cronus is intended to contrast the nature of man in both 
ages which in turn makes one realise one's own condition 
and search for what is the good for them with reference to 
their human condition.
To be sure, preceding the age of Zeus, there existed 
another age. When the age of Cronus completed itself, the 
universe revolted and the earth turned backwards because of 
fate and innate desire. What came after was the age of men
in which the gods 'let go their care'. Injustice and all
the elements of harshness in the animals emerged from great 
disorder effected by the revolution of the universe. When 
men became separated from the guidance of the divine pilot, 
they deteriorated and mingled 'but little good with much 
of the opposite sort' instead of great good and little 
evil as they did in the beginning. They were led to
destruction in the end, and the divine power then took its
60 Plato, Statesman, (274d).
61 Plato, Statesman, (272d).
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place again and restored order and made it immortal and 
ageless.62
The myth has rendered two opposite kinds of life, 
purely divine and purely bestial, before it comes to the 
age of man of the present time. What human life in this 
age would be, the myth told us that 'there is less to say 
and it is more to our purpose1.63 In the reign of Zeus, 
man is supposed to be the ruler of his own course, 
autokrotora,64 All necessities exist. With regard to all 
difficulties in material condition, men need to develop 
skills and knowledge which it had been told of in the old
traditions that all these were given to men by Hephaestus
and Prometheus. They have to learn to provide themselves 
what they need and lack. Then it has been said that 'from 
these has arisen all that constitutes human life'. The 
myth came to the conclusion that with regard to the 
condition of human life in our time which
'the gods had failed them and they had 
to direct their own lives and take care 
of themselves, like the whole universe, 
which we imitate and follow through all
time, being born and living now in our
present manner and in that other epoch 
in the other manner.'65
In the reign of Cronus, men were under the care of the 
gods, but no one knows whether they were happy and enjoyed 
their lives in the same way that men in the reign of Zeus 
did. In the unnamed age, men became wild and bestial and 
mingled more with evil than the good, but men of the 
present time are free to live their lives. It can be said
62 Plato, Statesman, (273b-e).
63 Plato, Statesman, (274b).
64 Plato, Statesman, (274a).
65 Plato, Statesman, (274d).
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that they had been through 'good and evil1 lives which they 
are now free to imitate. They might struggle to imitate 
either one of the opposite manners of living.
Man in the time of Zeus was free to choose his own 
path. As regards the line of succession of each age in the 
myth, it is not, as Jean-Pierre Vernant argues, 'linear and 
irreversible time1.66 Before telling the tale, the 
Eleatic Stranger stated that the tale 'is the portent 
connected with the tale of the quarrel between Atreus and 
Thyestes *.67 The source of the myth can be said to come 
from Homer. Atreus, the son of Pelops and the father of 
Agamemnon, is the ancestor of Orestes. The tale of Atreus 
and Thyestes is about the feud in the family. In other 
words, it can be regarded as genocide. The story of 
Orestes comes from Homer's great epic. As a consequence of 
the evil from the genocide, the sun turned back on its 
course in horror when 'Atreus served up to Thyestes the 
flesh of the latter's own children1.68 In the myth of the 
revolution of the universe, the time of an age elapses or 
turns backwards because of the evil of itself. The tale of 
the bloodshed between brothers and the myth of the 
revolution of the universe can be connected to Hesiod's 
myth of the races69, as they tell of the cause of the 
change in the nature of each age of human beings; but as 
stated above, man in the present time has the free will to 
choose his own manner of life. The time in the myths in 
both the Statesman and the Cratylus is cyclical. Vernant's 
study points out that with regard to the myths in the
66 See Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks, 
op, cit., p. 6.
67 Plato, Statesman, (268e).
68 Herbert Jennings Rose, 'Atreus' in The Oxford Classical 
Dictionary, op, cit., p. 144.
69 In Chapter Five, the conflation of these two stories can 
be found in Socrates' etymological analysis in the Cratylus.
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Statesman and the Cratylus, it is incomprehensible in the 
context of human time to be continuously degenerating, 'but 
it makes perfect sense if we accept that the series of ages 
is a recurring renewable cycle, just like the sequence of 
seasons*.70 'To be or not to be* one or another kind of 
life is of the free will of man. What has happened can 
recur. As the Eleatic Stranger said 'Of the portents 
recorded in ancient tales many did happen and will happen 
again*.71 Man in the reign of Zeus could choose to be 
like one of the preceding ages.
However, in doing so, he just forgets himself that he 
by nature is not 'man' of the other ages. But what he 
could do is imagine and understand what life would be if he 
lived in any one of the other ages, either of Cronus or the 
unnamed ages. He might not be able to think or understand 
the condition of life in the same way that man in that 
condition thinks and understands. He might not be able to 
understand such different conditions of life better than 
men in those conditions understand; but he can understand 
and think of what kind of life he will have and what he 
himself would be if he lives in such different kinds or 
conditions of life with his present and existing nature. 
He can imagine that in the age of Cronus he is unable to 
enjoy his life with his family in the same way that he does 
now, although he knows that his life will be less painful 
and toilsome.
In the unnamed age, he can, or perhaps would never 
like to, imagine what a chaotic and violent life he would 
experience. In the myth, the meaning of such evil is not 
elaborated, but man in age of Zeus can think of it at hand. 
Man in the age of Zeus can think and imagine himself to be
70 Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks, op. cit., p. 
6.
71 Plato, Statesman, (268e).
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in other epochs because these epochs already exist in his 
present life. It is possible for him to understand men in 
other ages if he and they are of the same nature or race. 
That is the destiny of man in the reign of Zeus which 'is 
less to say and it is more to (his) purpose'. He might 
also be able to understand those men in the 'past' better 
than they understood themselves if those men could not 
realise the nature common to his and theirs in the same way 
that he now understands. However, man of the present time 
might not be able to understand those men in the past 
better than they understood themselves if he could not 
realise the nature common to his and theirs in the same way 
that men in the past understood, but he might be able to 
understand those men in the past exactly the same way that 
they understood themselves if he and they all understood 
the common nature of man. He would never be able to 
understand either those men in the past or men of his own 
time if he failed to understand and appreciate their common 
nature. When he understands and is able to appreciate the 
common nature of man, he can understand others, who either 
understand or do not understand the common nature of man, 
as they understand themselves as 'human being'. That 
common nature of man is metaxy. Hence, it would be a great 
mistake to regard the gods' care in the reign of Cronus to 
be the art of statesmanship for man in the reign of Zeus. 
As the Eleatic Stranger asserts that
'the form of the divine shepherd is 
greater than that of the king, whereas 
the statesmen who now exist here are by 
nature much more like their subjects, 
with whom they share much more nearly 
the same breeding and education'.72
72 Plato, Statesman, (275c).
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IX
As stated above, the care for men in the reign of 
Cronus centres upon physical needs. Such care is absolute 
and necessary. If men in the age of Zeus have to live 
their life under such care, they would be situated in the 
kind of relationship between a shepherd and a flock of 
animals. It is more likely that they would regard their 
guardian as a dictator or a tyrant rather than a statesman. 
But one cannot say that the gods are tyrannous to men in 
such an age since the nature of those men is unfree and 
perhaps they never thought that they lacked something in 
their lives. Men in the age of Zeus had to provide 
themselves with what they needed. Under such necessity, 
they had to fulfil their physical needs of their own 
accord, but what they needed was not only physical 
fulfilment, but the care of their own selves or souls. It 
is the soul which is self-moving and free to choose its own 
destiny. Self-motion in the soul presupposes its power, 
dunamis, which is driven by eros. Every soul loves the 
good and what is good, but men have to drive and direct 
their own chariot-psyche.
In this regard, men in our age need the art of 
chariot-driving like the pilot of the gods in the age of 
Cronus. The art of statesmanship fulfils this aspect which 
men need, and the art of statesmanship is supposed to be 
found in all men since they by nature have 'to direct their 
own lives and take care of themselves'.73 To rule 
oneself, one must first understand oneself. The search for 
self-knowledge is then essential. The knowledge of human 
nature is necessary. That is why the Eleatic Stranger has 
to conduct the division between man and animals in such a 
peculiar way.
73 Plato, Statesman, (274d).
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With regard to the politics of the soul, the statesman 
applies his knowledge of human nature at the same time that 
he attempts to guide someone to the understanding of human 
nature. However, the nature of man is metaxy, man is 
neither divine nor bestial although at some time he might 
be more divine or more bestial. Furthermore, there are 
different types of soul. So, in this regard, when the art 
of statesmanship is practised, it has to be at once 
defending and producing, and with regard to the metaxy of 
human nature, the art of statesmanship cannot only be 
determined by the voluntariness of its subject. It depends 
on the character of the subject. It has been explained 
that the art of those who use compulsion is regarded as 
tyrannical whilst the voluntary care of voluntary bipeds is 
called politics or the art of statesmanship. This point 
seems to be a loophole through which someone can mistake 
the statesman for the tyrant. It is true that the 
statesman can use compulsion, but it is not the use of 
physical force and terrorism like that of the tyrant. 
Paradoxically, the compulsion in the art of statesmanship 
is exerted in his persuasive speech. To be sure, it does 
not mean that the tyrant is ignorant of sophistry, rhetoric 
in particular.
Sophistry and philosophy are very close to each other. 
They concern themselves with the pursuit of virtues, the 
good, arts and knowledge. They are practised by means of 
discourse. Their terminology and vocabulary are never too 
far from being similar, though form and substance of 
philosophy are so much different from presentation of 
sophistry. Undoubtedly, people are easily confused between 
the sophist and the philosopher as the Athenians mistook 
Socrates for a sophist. So the trilogy of the search for 
the understanding of the sophist, statesman, and 
philosopher is made in order to investigate the matter. 
With regard to a seeming similarity like two different 
objects behind the same screen, the tyrant and the sophist
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can be mistaken for the statesman and the philosopher. 
What makes the statesman completely different from the 
tyrant is his love and care for the people. The tyrant's 
care for his subject is as involuntary as the subject's 
respect for tyrant, though it is difficult to differentiate 
true love and care from false ones. The demarcation line 
between the statesman and the tyrant does not seem very 
clear. However, they differ very much from one another 
with regard to the purpose of the care of their subjects. 
With regard to the statesman's care, he intends to make 
another like himself who can rule and take care of himself, 
but the tyrant cares for his subject in order to exploit 
and suppress him as long as he can.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
The Statesman
The discursive methods, namely, the dialectic division 
between man and animals, and the myth of the universe, are 
said to be examples of the art of statesmanship. This is 
like teaching children to read the letters by making them 
recognise 'the several letters well enough in the short and 
easy syllables so that they could make correct statements 
about them'. Then, if in other syllables, 'they are in 
doubt about those same letters1, then, 'the easiest and 
best way to lead them to the letters which they do not yet 
know' is
'to lead them first to those cases in 
which they had correct opinions about 
these same letters and then to lead 
them and set them beside the groups 
which they did not yet recognize and by 
comparing them to show that their 
nature is the same in both combination 
alike, and to continue until the 
letters about which their opinions are 
correct have been shown in 
juxtaposition with all those of which 
they are ignorant, (b)eing shown in 
this way they become examples and bring 
it about that every letter is in all 
syllables always called by the same 
name, either by differentiation from 
the other letters, in case it is 
different, or because it is the 
same1.1
The common elements in the discursive analyses are 
like the letters which were intended to be recognized by 
those who are interested in the search for the art of 
statesmanship. The common element in the dialectic 
division and the myth of the universe can be said to be
1 Plato, Statesman, (278a-b).
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concerned with the understanding of human nature, since the 
statesman is generally understood as one who rules and 
takes care of the herds of human beings. To be able to 
give the best care for human beings, the statesman is 
required to understand human nature. The understanding of 
human nature is the proper science of the statesman.2 
Attaining self-interest presupposes the knowledge of the 
self.3 This common element is like the letters which are 
set as the examples which those who learn are expected to 
be able to recognise when they are 'transferred to the 
long and difficult syllables of life'4; as those who 
conversed with the Eleatic Stranger are treated 'as if 
they were children,1 since 'they however are not much too 
old for children*s tales.'5
As said above, the young Socrates could not understand 
the message in the discursive analyses of the Eleatic 
Stranger, and the examples required examples and the art of 
statesmanship itself is the art of weaving. The study of 
the art of weaving is not taken just for its own sake. The 
Eleatic Stranger asks that 'when a pupil is asked of what 
letters some word or other is composed, is the question 
asked for the sake of the one particular word before him or 
rather to make him more learned about all words in the
2 After finishing the dialectic division, the Eleatic 
Stranger said 'when that division is made and the art of 
herding human beings is made plain, we ought to take the 
statesmanlike and kingly man and place him as a sort of 
charioteer therein, handing over to him the reins of the 
state, because that is his own proper science, episteme.1 
See the Statesman, 266e.
3 Plato, Alcibiades I, (132c). See also Michel Foucault, 
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, 
Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton (ed.), 
London, 1988, pp. 25-26.
4 Plato, Statesman, (278d).
5 Plato, Statesman, (268e).
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lesson?'6 Certainly, it is for the sake of understanding 
all subjects like a group of pupils learning their letters 
to understand all words. Apparently, at this point, as it 
has been argued before, it emphasises the inseparability of 
the art of statesmanship and philosophical apprenticeship.
I
The Eleatic Stranger claims that the art of 
statesmanship can be made comprehensible in the study of 
other trivial arts. At random, the art of weaving wool is 
chosen for the purpose.7 What is the purpose? The Eleatic 
Stranger says 'no man of sense would wish to pursue the 
discussion of weaving for its own sake; but most people, it 
seems to me, fail to notice that some things have sensible 
resemblances which are easily perceived.18 In the art of 
weaving as well as in others, there are aspects of action, 
that is, it is either for or against something.
Regarding both purposes, appropriate material should 
be selected in accordance with different situations. To 
make certain kinds of garments, certain kinds of methods 
must be used with regard to the nature of the material. In 
order to fasten together all the materials, some need 
extraneous matter such as liquids and cement whilst others 
do not. The latter which results from the art of weaving 
is called clothes. Thus clothes-making is the purpose of 
the art of weaving. Clothes are made as protective 
coverings. One practises the art of weaving in order to 
produce clothes to protect oneself. In this regard, the 
art of weaving as well as others is instrumental in serving
6 Plato, Statesman, (285c-d).
7 Plato, Statesman, (279b).
8 Plato, Statesman, (285e).
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this purpose. Accordingly, what the statesman does with 
regard to his statesmanship is producing something for his 
defense. In the process of weaving, the art of weaving 
consists of other arts. It is said that all production 
necessarily involves two arts, namely, the arts of 
contingent and actual cause.9 The former is 'those arts 
which do not produce the actual thing in question, but 
which supply to the arts which do produce it the tools 
without which no art could ever perform its prescribed 
work1.10 In the case of weaving, the arts of contingent 
cause are those that produce the tools that 'partake in 
the production of clothing,' whereas those which involve 
'washing and mending and all the care of clothing1 are of 
actual cause.11 With regard to the latter, such arts 
further require other arts in accomplishing their task.
The arts of carding and spinning concern themselves 
with composition and division. Composition and division 
could not be possible without the art of measurement.12 
There exist two kinds of measurement to which the art is to 
be applied. They are the measurement of quality an<j 
quantity.13 With regard to the measurement of quality, in 
practising it, what one ought to do is that:
'when a person at first sees only the 
unity or common quality of many things, 
when all sorts of dissimilarities are 
seen in a large number of objects he 
must find it impossible to be 
discouraged or to stop until he has 
gathered into one circle of similarity 
all the things which are related to 
each other and has included them in
9 Plato, Statesman, (281d).
10 Plato, Statesman, (281e).
11 Plato, Statesman, (281e-282a).
12 Plato, Statesman, (283d).
13 Plato, Statesman, (285b).
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some sort of class on the basis of 
their essential nature.'14
This description of the art of measurement in the art 
of weaving reminds one of the dialectic division between 
man and animals.15 It explains why the square root has to 
be applied at the final division between man and animals. 
Humanity could not be separated from other species by 
quantitative measurement. One must understand the quality 
of being human. The quantitative measurement cannot tell 
the difference between man and animals. It only renders 
the idea that man is 'tame, gregarious, non-cross 
breeding, featherless bipeds1.16 The art of measurement 
has to pursue the division of things in terms of quality 
until the essence of each particular thing can be found. 
As there exist two ways of measurement which are both 
indispensable. Thus the art of measurement must 
distinguish qualities such as greatness and smallness with 
reference not only to the relationship between each of the 
qualities but also to the standard of the mean, metron11, 
Since the latter alone would yield the result of the non­
existence of all beings whilst the former by itself would 
render the impractical result,18 the statesman would 
never exist if the search for him is conducted through the 
measurement made in terms of his relation to others. The
14 Plato, Statesman, (285a-b).
15 The art of measurement is itself the art of dialectic. 
See Statesman, 286d-287a.
16 Plato, Statesman, (265e-266e). Sextus Empiricus takes 
this quantitative analysis as Plato's criteria of man. He
criticised the fallacy of this concept of man that 'Plato 
gives a worse definition of Man than the others when he 
states that "Man is a wingless animal, with two feet and 
broad nails, receptive of political science" '. Sextus 
Empiricus, Against the Logicians I, 281.
17 Cf. the discussion of the good as metron in the Philebus, 
64e-65a.
18 Plato, Statesman, (283e-284a).
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existence of statesmanship will be meaningless and 
impractical if it has been measured with regard to the 
standard of the mean alone. It has been regarded also that 
'if this is not admitted, neither the statesman nor any 
other man who has knowledge of practical affairs can be 
said without any doubt to exist1.19
With regard to the art of actual and contingent causes 
in the art of statesmanship, the Eleatic Stranger further 
divides it by means of the art of measurement into seven 
general classes. It is said that neither state nor 
statesmanship could ever exist without these arts.20 As 
regards their close relationship to state and 
statesmanship, it is possible that those who practise those 
arts will claim their share in statesmanship. Such arts 
are carpentry, pottery, bronze-working, generalship, 
painting, decorating, music, medicine, husbandry, cooking, 
hunting, gymnastics, etc., which fall under either one of 
these seven classes, namely, first, the art of actual cause 
in each art, then, the classes of instrument, receptacle, 
vehicle, defence, plaything, and nourishment. These arts 
can be said to be concerned with the property in tame
19 Plato, Statesman, (284c). Also at 284d, the Eleatic 
Stranger says:
'That sometime we shall need this principle of 
the mean for the demonstration of our present 
purpose good and sufficient is, in my opinion,
magnificently supported by this argument that
we must believe that all the arts alike exist and 
that the greater and the less are measured in 
relation not only to one another but also to the 
establishment of the standard of the mean. For 
if this exists, they exist also, and if they 
exist, it exists also, but neither can ever exist 
if the other does not.1
Compare this to the Parmenides, 166c: 'The one and the
others in relation to themselves and to each other all in 
every way are and are not and appear and do not appear. '
20 Plato, Statesman, (287d-289c).
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animals which are included in the heading of the art of 
herding or nourishing. Therefore, the class of slaves and 
servants in general is left to be considered.21
Slaves and servants are the people who practise the 
art of service. This class consists of voluntary and 
involuntary slaves. What is to be considered is the 
voluntary one, since the other would never make any claim 
to any share in statesmanship; neither would those 
voluntary labourers be for hire. However, the
statesmanship would be claimed by merchants or those who 
'carry about and distribute among one another the 
productions of husbandry and the other arts, whether in the 
domestic market-places or by travelling from city to city 
by land or sea, exchanging money for wares or money for 
money1.22 Next is the class of heralds and those 'who 
become by long practice skilled as clerks and other clever 
men who perform various services in connexion with public 
offices1.23 Further, it is the class of the priests or 
prophets and those who regard themselves as 'interpreters 
of the gods to men'.24 Then, it is the class of sophists 
which is the large crowd of people of very mixed races; 
some are like lions and centaurs and other fierce creatures 
and some like satyrs and the weak and cunning beasts. That 
'they make quick exchanges of forms and qualities with one 
another' makes it most difficult to separate them from the 
statesman.25 They practised conjuring something elusive 
and non-existent. These people with the arts of service 
which is just the art of contingent causes to the art of 
statesmanship more than any others 'set up claims against
21 Plato, Statesman, (289c-e).
22 Plato, Statesman, (289e).
23 Plato, Statesman, (290b).
24 Plato, Statesman, (290c).
25 Plato, Statesman, (291a-c).
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the king for the very fabric of his art, 1 'just as the
spinners and carders and the rest claims against the
weavers'.25
This dialectic dividing the contingent from the actual 
cause in the art of statesmanship can be related to the 
story in the myth of the revolution of the universe. These 
arts would be redundant in the age of Cronus since the gods 
would have already provided everything which these men 
tried to practise their arts to attain. These men cannot 
be regarded as practising the art of statesmanship. They 
are either the servants or the tyrants of the city. We do 
not know for what reason the gods care for their subjects, 
but we know the reason of those men in the age of Zeus. 
They paid their service in order to get what they wanted, 
and what they wanted was of the same kind as what they 
gave.
II
Hence, from above, the statesmanship should be 
determined by neither the art of nourishment nor the art of 
service nor the quantitative measurement. So it can be 
inferred that the number of the ruler, his wealth or 
poverty, the voluntariness or involuntariness of his 
subjects, and his rule with or without written laws cannot
be taken as the criterion of the statesman.27 Only the
art of statesmanship must be the distinguishing feature, 
namely, the forms of government must be distinguished 
solely by the presence of the art of statesmanship per se 
in the same way that philosophy differentiates the 
philosopher from the sophist. With regard to the number of
26 Plato, Statesman, (289c).
27 Plato, Statesman, (292c).
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the rulers, whether it is the rule of the one, the few, or
the many, each form of government can be divided into two
opposites with regard to the presence or absence of the art 
of statesmanship. That is, monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy can be differentiated from tyranny, oligarchy, 
and democracy although the number of the rulers of these 
polities remains the same. However the art of
statesmanship could be found only in 'one or two or very 
few men1 but never in the multitude.28 The multitude in
the city could never acquire the art of statesmanship in
the same way that the desires in the soul could never 
acquire philosophy since the desires as well as the 
multitude love and regard pleasures as the good. However, 
as it has been previously shown, it will be a mistake to 
interpret that the art of statesmanship must be found in 
those who hold the ruling offices of monarchic or 
aristocratic polities, since the statesman is the one who 
really possesses the art of statesmanship; it does not 
matter whether he is a ruler or a private citizen.29
The statesman and his art can be compared to the 
physicians and their practice of the art of medicine. As 
long as they exercise their art, they are always regarded 
as physicians 'whether they cure us against our will or 
with our will, by cutting us or burning us or causing us 
pain in any other way, and whether they do it by written 
rules or without them, and whether they are rich or 
poor1.30 As regards the absence of laws in the rule of 
the statesman, the Eleatic Stranger explains that 'for the 
differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing 
in human life is ever at rest, forbid any science 
whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and
28 Plato, Statesman, (292e-293a).
29 Plato, Statesman, (293a-d, 259b).
30 Plato, Statesman, (293b-c).
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for all time'.31
Moreover, the inflexible nature of law is opposed to 
the nature of philosophy, since the context which is 
congenial and appropriate for the nurture of philosophy 
must be where those with a philosophic nature have the 
freedom to search for virtue and the good. Such has to be 
done through the dialectic method in which questioning and 
answering must be carried on until it reaches the nature of 
the first principle. However the nature of law and its 
enforcement are 'like a stubborn and ignorant man who 
allows no one to do anything, contrary to his command, or 
even to ask a question, not even if something new occurs to 
some one, which is better than the rule he has himself 
ordained1.32 The statesman would never put himself under 
any law. In fact, he is the law-maker himself since he 
knows what is just and what is unjust. Although the 
statesman understands that such limitation in the nature of 
law would never make the rule by law 'the most perfect 
right', yet he has to 'legislate for the majority and in 
a general way only roughly for individuals1 because no one 
'could sit beside each person all his life and tell him 
exactly what is proper for him to do1.33 Of course, no 
statesman would 'ever put obstacles in his own way by 
writing laws,1 'if he were able to do so1.34 The purpose 
of law-making is to maintain justice in the city, but what 
it can do is just imitate as closely as possible the 
perfect pattern of justice in the rule of philosopher-king. 
As the nature of the city and the soul is self-moving, 
laws like a physician's prescription have to be changed in 
accordance with the changing condition of the patient.
31 Plato, Statesman, (294b).
32 Plato, Statesman, (294c).
33 Plato, Statesman, (295a-b)
34 Plato, Statesman, (295b).
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Moreover, the statesman understands that his 'laws' which 
have been issued for the situation when he 'is going away 
and expects to be a long time absent from his patterns or 
pupils1 can be changed or opposed by other laws 'if the 
scientific law-maker, or another like him, should come' to 
the city.35
At this point, with regard to law-changing, a problem 
arises. The Eleatic Stranger said that to change the old 
laws and make better ones, the people in general said that 
it must only be done by means of persuasion.36 However 
the art of statesmanship cannot be restricted to the 
willing of the subjects. Whatever the statesman has done, 
no matter if it was violent or contrary to the written 
precepts, should not be regarded as an 'unscientific and 
baneful error1.37 So the power of the statesman can be 
regarded as absolute. Here, the Eleatic Stranger urges 
that it is at this point that a serious problem has to be 
pointed out.38 The problem originates in the attempt to 
imitate the art of statesmanship. As it is just an 
imitation without any possession of the true art of
statesmanship, it inevitably oscillates between the
extremities of the dictatorship of the one and the
dictatorship of the many. Paradoxically, it swings from 
what has been negated as the arbitrary rule of the
charlatan who claims to possess a rule or special knowledge 
of his own to what seems to be the legitimate lawful 
government whose laws and judgements in every subject have 
been decided and sanctioned by the arbitrary power of the 
disqualified many.
35 Plato, Statesman, (295c, 295e-296a)
36 Plato, Statesman, (296a).
37 Plato, Statesman, (296b-297b).
38 Plato, Statesman, (297c).
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It has been stated what existing forms of government 
can do with regard to the art of statesmanship is merely to 
imitate it as closely as possible; but the imitation of 
absolute power is incommensurable to the actual practice of 
the art of statesmanship which possesses knowledge of the 
good and wisdom. They do not benefit the city. They 
damage the city. The abusive power of the imitators 
inevitably incites discontentment amongst the subjects 
which finally leads to revolution and the overthrow of that 
reign of absolute power. Following this, the absolute 
power of the single or very few experts can no longer be 
accepted in order to prevent such an extreme abuse of 
power. Power or authority not only in politics but also 
any other field has to be decided or judged in the last 
analysis by the general assembly of the people. They will 
never allow anyone to do anything contrary to the laws 
which have been made by the assembly. Of course, they 
purported to know by nature what political virtue such as 
justice is.39 Now the dictatorship of the one completes 
its transformation into the dictatorship of the many. 
'Anyone who is found to be investigating the art of 
pilotage or navigation or the subject of health and true 
medical doctrine...contrary to the written rules,1 would be 
regarded as
'a star-gazer, a kind of loquacious 
sophist, and secondly anyone who is 
properly qualified may bring an 
accusation against him and hale him 
into court for corrupting the young and 
persuading them to essay the arts of 
navigation and medicine in opposition 
to the laws and to govern the ships and 
the sick according to their own 
will.|40
39 As Protagoras flatters the people by stating that they
are naturally endowed with a share of the sense of justice.
40 Plato, Statesman, (299b-c).
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For they thought that nothing was wiser than the laws 
which had been given by them.
Ill
Hence, it can be understood that the imitation of the 
just rule of the statesman by those existing rulers who 
lack the understanding of the art of statesmanship is 
easily prone to corruption and abuse of power. The 
dictatorship of the one has been regarded as an arbitrary 
rule. The dictatorship of the many is the rule of the 
'lawfully lawless many'. The latter of course ruins a 
philosophical investigation of many important subjects, 
particularly, the art of statesmanship. However, the 
violation of some laws which have been carefully made and 
approved by the people causes greater ruin than the 
imperfect laws to some other ordered activity.41
However, the real statesman would change the laws 
'when he thought another course was better though it 
violated the rules he had written and sent to his absent 
subjects1.42 The art of statesmanship restores itself by 
the plasticity of itself. It modernizes itself by making 
itself viable to be re-enacted and developed by those of a 
different time and place who possess a philosophic-kingly 
nature like his. To put it differently, it enables the 
statesman to communicate with his 'absent subjects'.
Thus the just city under the rule of the philosopher- 
king is governed without any written laws. The imitation 
of the rule of the philosopher-king is of course not as
41 Plato, Statesman, (3 00a-b).
42 Plato, Statesman, (3 00c-d).
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just and perfect as the ideal city itself. However, it 
renders forms of government which can be regarded as less 
difficult to live with1. Although all but the ideal polity 
are difficult, they can be ranged from the hardest to the 
easiest ones. As said before, there is only one form of 
just city, that is, the rule of the philosopher-king. It 
is distinguishable from other polities by presence of the 
art of statesmanship. The art of statesmanship
differentiates the just from the unjust polity. Among the 
unjust or imperfect polities, what distinguishes one from 
the others is the principle of lawfulness and 
lawlessness.43 With the existence of good written rules 
in the polity, the rule of the one, the rule of few, and 
the rule of the many are respectively called monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy. Tyranny, oligarchy, and also 
democracy stand in opposition to their counterparts with 
the rules of good written laws.
With laws, monarchy is the best among these forms of 
government while democracy is the worst. Since the many 
are weak and ignorant by nature, therefore the laws which 
reflect their characters and desires are inferior to the 
laws of the one or the few who are better and wiser. They 
are superior to the many in the same way that the rational 
and the spirited parts are superior to the desires. 
Democracy with laws can become the totalitarianism of the 
general will if one views the assembly of the people in the 
Rousseauesque manner. It restrains what the general will 
regards as alien or different from what it desires or 
likes. However, without laws, the rule of the one is the 
worst since tyranny is the most powerful in all respects. 
Political power which is in the hands of only one person is 
more dangerous than in the rule of the few or the many. 
Decision-making made by one person is of course quicker and 
more effective than those made by the many. If it is made
43 Plato, Statesman, (302b-e).
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with a good judgement, it is the best, but if it has been 
made by a madman, the consequence are disastrous. So the 
lawless democracy makes life in the city most desirable.44 
In this regard, it can be said that with regard to the 
theory of knowledge, an anarchistic method or epistemology 
should be preferred to anything else in democracy. 
Therefore, the rule of the one is the best polity of all 
with laws while the rule of the many is the best polity of 
all without laws.
However, to rule with laws is to rule the city by 
imitating as closely as possible the rule of the true 
statesman or the philosopher-king. To be sure, as 
mentioned above, such a rule is a rule without laws. The 
nature of its plasticity is derived from its underlying 
knowledge of human nature of metaxy. Thus its plasticity 
can accommodate itself to the nature of the city and man. 
However, with regard to the rule by laws which aim at 
imitating this flexibility of statesmanship,
'if they were to do this without 
science, they would be trying to 
imitate reality, they would, however, 
imitate reality badly in every case; 
but if they were scientific, then it 
would no longer be imitation, but the 
actual perfect reality of which we 
spoke1.4^
This means that to rightly imitate the statesman, one 
must become like the statesman himself. The imitation, 
mimesis, of the object becomes the object itself. It is no 
longer an imitation. If it is not successful, the 
imitating polity or ruler would achieve only the forms of 
government which are guided by good written laws. In 
contradistinction to this, it also implies that the
44 Plato, Statesman, (303b).
45 Plato, Statesman, (300e).
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statesman successfully makes another like himself. At 
first, it might be called an imitation. The imitator would 
first learn to recognise each letter in simple and short 
syllables. Until he understands and is able to distinguish 
certain letters in long and difficult syllables of life, 
then he is no longer the imitator but the statesman 
himself. Again, when certain forms of government, namely, 
the rule of the one, the few, and the many, rightly imitate 
the art of statesmanship, they would respectively be called 
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. On the other hand, 
a ruler becomes a tyrant
'when he acts in accordance with 
neither laws nor customs, but claims, 
in imitation of the scientific ruler, 
that whatever is best must be done, 
even though it be contrary to the 
written laws, and this imitation is 
inspired by desire and ignorance1.46
Also, the rules of the few and the many in this 
respect have to be called oligarchy, and democracy.
IV
When the philosopher-king rules, it is said that all 
the five names of governments, that is, monarchy-tyranny, 
aristocracy-oligarchy, and democracy become only one.47 
They become one under the rule of the best polity of the 
philosopher-king. On the contrary, these five names but 
six forms of government arise when
'men are not contented with that one 
perfect ruler, and do not believe that 
there could ever be any one worthy of
46 Plato, Statesman, (3 01c).
47 Plato, Statesman, (3 01b).
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such power or willing and able by 
ruling with virtue and knowledge to 
dispense justice and equity rightly to 
all, but that he will harm and kill and 
injure any one of us whom he chooses on 
any occasion, since they admit that if 
such a man as we describe should really 
arise, he would be welcomed and would 
continue to dwell among them, directing 
to their weal as sole ruler a perfectly 
right form of government1.48
Here, a very significant stage has been reached. The 
imperfect polities arise because of two reasons. First, no 
one believes in the possibility of the rule of the 
philosopher-king. Secondly, if people think that there is 
such a man, they will install him as their sole ruler to 
look after their well-being. The paradox in the passage 
301b-d is apparent. At first, all forms of government are 
reduced to one when the rule of philosopher-king takes 
place. Secondly, those forms of government again arise 
because although people do not believe in the possibility 
of the philosopher-king, however, when they think they 
found such a man, they let him take control over them as 
'sole ruler a perfectly right form of government'. The 
second statement consists of two seemingly self- 
contradicting parts. One is opposed to the actualization 
of the rule of the philosopher-king whilst the other seems 
to be supporting it. With regard to the latter, all other 
forms of government should rather have been resolved to a 
single polity; but they are said to come into existence 
when the people let someone whom they thought was a perfect 
king rule over them.
If one can distinguish certain letters in rather long 
and unfamiliar syllables and if one can understand that the 
art of statesmanship like the art of weaving is at once 
defending and producing, he should be able to point out 
this paradox. Furthermore, he should have also been able
48 Plato, Statesman, (301c-d).
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to understand that what seemed to be paradoxical in the 
Eleatic Strangerfs statements actually is not so. He 
should have been able to see through the smokescreen which 
is used to cover something and prevent it from reaching 
those who are prone to abuse it. Also, he should have been 
able to distinguish between a star-gazer, a kind of 
loquacious sophist and a real statesman. That is, he 
should have been able to recognise that it is Socrates who 
was the only one or one of the few, who practised the true 
art of statesmanship.
If one can distinguish the care of the gods in the 
reign of Cronus and the care of the statesman in the reign 
of Zeus, he would definitely understand why there is no 
paradox in the two statements. People always have faith in 
the seeming art of statesmanship in the age of Cronus. 
They expect the perfect ruler to look after their welfare. 
They mistake the image of the shepherd for the statesman. 
They mistake themselves for the herds of animals. They 
never examine the identity and difference between 
themselves as human beings and other animals, although the 
first thing which has been discussed in a strange manner is 
the dialectic and geometric division between man and 
animals.
The second point in the discussion is the two kinds of 
relationship with regard to the care of the shepherd-gods 
for the herds of animal-cum-man and the care of the human- 
statesman for the herds of his human-fellows. They forgot 
that in the reign of Zeus man had to rule and take care of 
himself. Therefore, when the people found someone whom 
they regard to be a perfect ruler and then let the person 
rule them, at that moment, they start to give birth to a 
tyrant. The tyrant and the slave are a perfect match. One 
presupposes the other. When the people do not rule and 
take care of themselves but look to someone to look after 
them in the same way that the gods in the time of Cronus
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looked after their subjects, they turn themselves into 
slaves. When slave emerges, its tyrant or master is not 
far from being true. The absence of belief in the 
possibility of the philosopher-king presupposes the absence 
of belief in self-rule, since the essence of the 
philosopher-king is first and foremost self-knowledge and 
self-rule. In this regard, the absence of this kind of 
belief presupposes the coming into existence of slavery and 
tyranny. Their misunderstanding of the nature of man is 
conducive to misunderstanding the theory of the rule of the 
philosopher-king. That is why when they think they have 
found a perfect ruler, they let him take control over 
themselves. From this, a vicious cycle begins. It begins 
at the point where the Eleatic Stranger urged the young 
Socrates to return to the simile of the physician and the 
noble captain of a ship and use it 'to help us to discover 
something1. Also, apart from the discovery of the truth of 
the art of statesmanship, it points to, as it has been 
discussed, the reality of the origin of the disbelief of 
the possibility of the idea of the philosopher-king which 
in turn generates trust in the justice and fairness in the 
rule of laws of the many. All these originate in the lack 
of the art of statesmanship which actually is the lack of 
philosophy. The absence of both is the absence of self- 
knowledge.
The true statesman never rules in the same way that 
those in the rules of the one, the few, and the many do. 
The city of the statesman is first and foremost established 
in the soul, since his primary political engagement is the 
politics of the soul. As Socrates replies to Glaucon who 
was yet very sceptical about the possibility of the 
kallipolis:
'Well, perhaps there is a pattern of it 
(the ideal city) laid up in heaven for 
him who wishes to contemplate it and so 
beholding to constitute himself its 
citizen. But it makes no difference
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whether it exists now or ever will come 
into being. The politics of this city 
only will be his and of none
other.'49
When the statesman rules, he makes another like 
himself, and at the same time he is cultivating the like, 
he keeps away the unlike. In the politics of the soul, the 
political action of the philosopher-king is to nurture a 
philosophic-kingly nature like his and defend it against 
the rise of the influence of others.
V
The art of statesmanship must be separated from other 
arts such as the art of service and the art of rhetoric. 
Without its supervision, the art of service and the art of 
rhetoric are purely sophistic.50 The art of statesmanship 
can be said to be the art which supervises all other arts. 
It controls and rules all other arts.51 It is 'the power 
of determining* what to learn, whom, how ,and when to 
persuade, with whom, how, and when to wage war, and what is 
to be judged as justice or injustice, when to be courageous 
or moderate, etc. In other words, the art of statesmanship 
is concerned with the knowledge of the good. The knowledge 
of the good is the knowledge of beauty, proportion, and 
truth.52 The understanding of the truth of the nature of 
man leads to the knowledge of the measure of human action. 
When human action is undertaken with regard to the measure, 
metron, it brings about beauty in the same way that
49 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 592b).
50 Cf. the Gorgias and the Philebus, 58a-59a.
51 Plato, Statesman, (304c).
52 Plato, Philebus, (65a).
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rhythmic and harmonious song and dance are beautiful. The 
mixture of these three leads to the good.
The art of statesmanship renders the measure and 
harmony for those virtues which oppose one another.53 It 
integrates all virtues. For instance, courage has been 
proved elsewhere to be in conflict with self-control, since 
sometimes one needs to be courageous and sometimes to be 
moderate. Self-restraint and freedom are apparently 
opposed to each other.54 So it is quite appropriate to 
liken the art of statesmanship to the art of weaving. The 
art of statesmanship renders measure and harmony to all 
these virtues by weaving them together in one ' in the 
manner in which it combines the threads, and the kind of 
web it produces1.55 It integrates all particular virtues 
into a single whole. The measure and proportion of wisdom, 
courage, self-control culminate in justice, a single whole 
virtue which originated in a harmony of the particular 
virtues.56 All these virtues are regarded as the four 
cardinal virtues. Justice, self-control, courage, and 
wisdom are mutually inclusive.
With regard to the art of statesmanship, the
53 Plato, Statesman, (306a-311c).
54 Athens is regarded in western political history
as the birthplace of democracy. She represents freedom and 
liberty. At the same time, Socrates, the most well-known 
man in the city is regarded as a man of virtue and 
righteousness. He has been praised for his self-control as 
it appears in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon. 
However, what is ironical is that Socrates' life and 
thoughts have been symbolized as a free mind whilst the 
Athenians have been said to display their bigotry and 
prejudices as regards the charges they pressed on Socrates. 
This is an interesting paradox concerning the dispute 
between man and the city.
55 Plato, Statesman, (305e-306a).
56 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 428b-432b).
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philosopher-king knows when he should be highly-spirited or 
when he should control himself, and when he should mind his 
own business or when he should not. As stated before, 
according to the true statesman or the philosopher-king, 
justice benefits himself and others. However, different 
kinds of men gain different benefits. Justice cannot be 
indiscriminate towards different kinds of men. Otherwise, 
it cannot be just. In a sense, it can be said that justice 
is 'what has been given to each his due*. To be sure, 
different kinds of men have different interpretations of 
the meaning of interest. The interest of the philosopher- 
king is of course incommensurable to that of the others. 
The justice of a certain polity and a certain type of soul 
is incommensurable to one another, but only the justice of 
philosopher-king can render 'each his due1.
Like a Homeric hero, the justice of timarchy and a 
timocrat is based on friend and foe relationships 
regardless of right and wrong. Courage and endurance in 
fighting for friends against enemies override any other 
kinds of virtue. For timarchy and a timocrat, courage or 
high spirits rule over reason and desires. Oligarchic and 
democratic polities and their counterpart individuals 
treasure what they desire more than anything else. An 
oligarch honours wealth. A democrat honours freedom. So 
the definition of justice can be put in the phrase 'give 
each his due1.
As regards oligarchy, the city should let anyone who 
is capable of running his business reap the full benefits. 
The city must protect individual rights and also enforce 
particularly commercial laws. The laws of contract and 
copyright are essential so that anyone who breaks the laws 
must be punished and fined. Otherwise, the business of the 
oligarchs would not be possible. Timarchy and a timocrat 
never take for granted such an idea of justice in the 
oligarchic and democratic sense of 'give one his due'. In
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a timarchic polity, although someone is capable of making 
a profit, the profit is not guaranteed to be returned to 
him, since the profit and any other kinds of valuable 
things should be allocated on the basis of friend-foe 
relationships. Political power in timarchy is based on 
physical and military strength. To be sure, political 
power everywhere seems to base itself on such a condition. 
However, in oligarchy, wealth can be purchased for physical 
and military strength. In other words, warriors sell 
themselves for money and wealth since in oligarchy wealth 
is regarded as the highest virtue.
The love of pleasures develops itself from the love of 
wealth to the love of freedom. The love of freedom is just 
the love of anything which one could think of from time to 
time. For this reason, democracy is a most colourful and 
lively piece of fabric. In fact, the only virtue which 
effaces itself behind others is self-indulgence. 
Nevertheless, a presiding virtue in society seems to swing 
from one to another in accordance with its swinging and 
volatile temper and character of the city and its members. 
However, its underlying virtue is based on a liberal 
conception of justice which protects both the positive and 
negative versions of liberty. In this sense, democratic 
justice is stipulated in a situation that each one minds 
his own business. As freedom and liberty have been 
treasured more than anything else, it is inevitable that 
democracy and a democrat regard all men as equals. It 
indiscriminately imposes its egalitarian view on all human 
beings.
In such a 'free society1, it is possible that someone 
who is stronger in a Thrasymachean sense takes a most 
advantageous position from such a character of the 
democratic majority.57 Tyranny and a tyrant are a witness
57 Thrasymachus has a tyrannical character. See Annas, 
op. cit., p.302.
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to the naivety of political ideology or the illusion of 
democratic egalitarianism. The concept of justice in 
tyranny which culminates in that justice is in the interest 
of the stronger in the city. With regard to this concept 
of justice, such a human city is not different from the 
world of animals.
To be sure, no other single polity, namely, timarchy, 
oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny differs from the animal 
world. The imperfect polities are always in flux. 
Timarchy is prone towards oligarchy, democracy, and 
tyranny. The decay originates in their deficient self­
definition. Their self-understanding is inadequate with 
regard to the understanding of the tripartite soul as a 
whole. The lack of their true self-understanding as human 
beings is regarded as 'a kind of vice which gives its name 
to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general 
which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in 
the inscription at Delphi,1 that is, 'Know thyself1.58
Only the self-understanding or self-knowledge of the 
philosopher-king leads to a complete and perfect concept of 
man, as honour, wealth, liberty, and self-indulgence are 
not a cause of true happiness for the philosopher-king. 
The philosopher-king therefore does not compete or fight 
against other classes for such things. Only his justice 
could render 'each his due, so the question is 'how can 
he accomplish his idea of justice?1 Although he does not 
have such assets to give to the others, however, he has his 
philosophical discourse or speech which fulfils what the 
others expect to achieve; but it is a fulfilment of the 
kallipolis, the city in speech or the city of logos. It is 
first and foremost the city of the soul.
At the same time, the discourse will protect the
58 Plato, Philebus,. (48c-d) .
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philosopher-king and his city against the rise of decay 
which originates in the unseasonable mixture of the 
elements of the soul and the unseasonable mixture of the 
classes of the city. For this reason, the justice of the 
philosopher-king can be said to render what is due to one 
who has the potential and nature to become another 
philosopher-king or statesman. With regard to this point, 
earlier in the chapter, it has been said that the 
philosopher-king enters the politics of the soul in order 
to preserve himself and the like quality in others and to 
defend against the influence of the other kinds. In saying 
that in the politics of the soul, the philosopher-king 
searches for and cultivates his like, it does not mean that 
the like has to be united with the like in the sense that 
a timocratic soul or the others are united with their like. 
It has been already inferred from the discussion in the 
Lysis and the Symposium that the reason for a friendship 
or a unity of human beings must be based on the concept of 
the metaxy of man, that is, 'a neither good nor bad loves 
a neither good nor bad1. They search for each other in 
order to fulfil the part they lack. That is why it is 
argued in the Statesman that a certain character must not 
be separated from its opposite. The unity of the like with 
the like in the simple sense, that is, ' of the bad with 
the bad or of the good with the bad1, cannot be a serious 
work of the art of statesmanship.59 For this reason, 
self-control must never be separated from the courageous
VI
At the end of the Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger
59 Plato, Statesman, (309e).
60 Plato, Statesman, (310d-311a).
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concludes his discussion of the art of statesmanship with 
the idea of procreation and the art of weaving. With 
regard to the idea of procreation, one has to resort to the 
earlier interpretation of the idea of procreation in Book 
VIII of the Republic and the speech of Diotima in the 
Symposium. The idea of procreation has twofold meaning, 
socially and individually. They are intertwined. The like 
should not be united with its like as the Stranger states 
that
'(t)he fact is, they act on no right 
theory at all; they seek their ease for 
the moment; welcoming gladly those who 
are like themselves, and finding those 
who are unlike themselves unendurable, 
they give the greatest weight to their 
feeling of dislike....(t)he decorous 
people seek for characters like their 
own; so far as they can they marry 
wives of that sort and in turn give 
their daughters in marriage to men of 
that sort; and the courageous do the 
same, eagerly seeking natures of their 
own kind, whereas both classes ought to 
do quite the opposite.'61
The reason for the unity of the opposite kinds lies in the 
fact that the unity of human beings with similar characters 
or virtues leads to the self-aggrandizement of such virtue 
which goes beyond its proportional measure. The decay, 
which commences from the decline of timarchy to tyranny is 
good evidence. When the extent of the virtue goes beyond 
a proper limit, hubris emerges. As said before, this 
condition originates from love and terminates at love. But 
it is a negative kind of love which terminates itself in 
utter madness. The Stranger explains this in the case of 
a pair of virtues of courage and self-control that
'because in the nature of things
61 Plato, Statesman, (310c-d).
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courage, if propagated through many 
generations with no admixture of a 
self-restrained nature, though at first 
it is strong and flourishing, in the 
end blossoms forth in utter madness,
(b)ut the soul, on the other hand, that 
is too full of modesty and contains no 
alloy of courage or boldness, after 
many generations of the same kind 
becomes too sluggish and finally is 
utterly crippled1.62
The extremity of any particular virtue leads the city and 
the soul to hubris and then decay. Indeed, when the city 
and the soul are in such a condition, they becomes unjust, 
since justice originated in the measure and harmony. When 
any virtue presides over the others and becomes too extreme 
because of self-ignorance of either the city or the soul, 
it causes injustice in the city and the soul. In 
contradistinction to this, when a courageous soul 'lays 
hold upon such truth, made gentle, and would it not then be 
most ready to partake of justice?'63
Through his discourse, the philosopher-king has 
exerted the power of justice. Discourse, speech, or musike 
directly affects the soul. Therefore his philosophical 
discourse affects the soul of all of his audience. For 
those with aristocratic nature, the discourse will guide 
them to the perfection of the soul. For the others, 
namely, timarchic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannous, 
the discourse will render each of them his due. It means 
that what each of them acquires from the discourse depends 
upon the potential of his own. The extent that 
philosophical discourse can guide each of them toward the 
justice of the soul depends upon the nature and development 
of each one. In this sense, justice primarily benefits the 
soul not the body. The benefit of justice is internal
62 Plato, Statesman, (310d).
63 Plato, Statesman, (309e).
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rather than external. Only a person who has justice in his 
soul knows and appreciates what benefit and happiness it 
upon him.64
this regard, the discussion of the nature of 
in the Republic has been argued to be
'suggesting a new perspective on 
justice; a perspective which takes 
seriously the idea that justice is a 
human virtue, not merely an artificial* 
or a social one, Socrates clearly 
believes that justice is an essential 
component of what enables human beings, 
whether as individuals or as groups and 
communities, to lead a good and 
flourishing life, (i)n this regard 
"Socratic" justice departs from 
ordinary or conventional ideas about 
it.*65
Again, only the justice of the philosopher-king 
renders each member in the society his due. Each one has 
what he needs according to the nature of his soul. Such an 
idea of justice in the city of the true statesman differs 
from other kinds of justice in other cities, because the 
true statesman or the philosopher-king recognises
'justice as an enabling condition in 
human beings and communities* and does 
not only "limit justice to the role of 
guarding the rights of individuals" but 
also "include within justice a 
knowledgeable concern with how our 
actions and arrangements affect the
64 As Kimon Lycos rightly interprets Socratic
justice that it 'had to be 'internal* to this 
flourishing in the sense that it involved the application 
of reason, a distinctive capacity of the human life form, 
to the life-form itself and to its relation to other life- 
forms'. Kimon Lycos, Plato on Justice and Power: Reading 
Book I of Plato's Republic, London, 1987, p. 173.
confers
In
justice
65 Ibid,, p. 154.
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realisation of human capacities in 
people" *.66
In this regard, the philosopher-king is unjust if he does 
not exert his power of justice to render each his due. In 
other words, he will never be just if he does not enter the 
politics of the soul.67 His politics is aimed at 
preserving and cultivating his like, namely, the 
philosophic-kingly nature, and arresting the change from 
timarchic, oligarchic, and democratic characters into 
tyrannous one. From his point of view, the city as well as 
the soul consists of three indispensable classes. He does 
not detest the existence of the others. On the contrary, 
he is aware of the interdependence of each of them. 
Furthermore, his understanding of the metaxy of human 
nature enables him to realise that by nature all men are at 
the position of 'neither good nor bad'. He has his love 
for them all. It can be said that his politics is based on 
such a concept of friendship in relation to the nature of 
metaxy. He goes round the city and questions the people. 
With regard to his concern for the city affairs in this 
sense, he is a philanthropist.68
Through his art of statesmanship, he creates a special
66 Op. cit., p. 174.
67 At this point, Lycos ends his study of Socratic 
justice by stating that '(t)here is, after all, a sense in 
which it is unjust not 'to render to each what is due, 
(a)nd the factors which sustain our present perilous world- 
situation prevent us from rendering 'what is due1 to human
beings as such the power, not merely the right, to
flourish and realise their potential.1 Lycos, op. cit., 
p.174.
68 At Euthyphro, 3d, Socrates says: 'But I fear that because 
of my love of men, philanthropias, they think that I not 
only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone 
without payment, but that I would even pay something 
myself, if anyone would listen to me.' See also, Strauss, 
What is Political Philosophy? and other Studies, op. cit., 
p. 32.
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bond amongst them. With regard to his understanding of 
nature of the metaxy in the soul as well as the city, his 
politics is concerned with rendering measure, metron, to 
each element in the soul and each class in the city.
VII
Consequently, the art of statesmanship is aimed at 
weaving together the opposing and conflicting characters in 
the city and the soul. As recently mentioned, the mention 
of the idea of procreation at the end of the Statesman has 
a twofold implications which actually are intertwined. At 
the level of the individual or the soul, with the art of 
statesmanship the philosopher-king cultivates and balances 
the elements in the soul of the young. At the same time, 
this affects the social level in the city. When an
individual knows himself, he becomes a just element in the
city. At the social level, when the philosopher-king binds 
together the three classes or characters of man in the city 
with his philosophic discourse which is able to give each 
of them his due. Then justice in the city emerges.
Each class possesses its own virtue or its
interpretation of the highest good. Socrates stated in 
Book IV of the Republic that justice is left over after all 
these virtues, namely sophia, andreia, and sophrosyne, have 
been considered. All the three classes need a good
proportional mixture of all these virtues in the same way 
that the tripartite soul needs it in order to be just. 
That justice originates in this general concord of reason 
and emotion which becomes virtue.69 The understanding of 
this nature of the soul and the city is not sophia as it 
represents other kinds of knowledge which has been applied
69 Plato, Laws, (Book II 653c).
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to the knowledge and skills of the sophists. At this 
point, Socrates is said to 'replace sophia with 
phronesis*.70 This kind of understanding or knowledge is 
prudence, phronesis.71 Each class realises its place and 
recognises the others in the city in the same way that each 
element realises its place and recognises the others in the 
soul.
With the art of statesmanship which originates in the 
true understanding of self-knowledge of man as metaxy, the 
philosopher-king is able to bind the city and the soul 
together and creates the bonds amongst them. These bonds 
are possible through the philosopher-king1s musike. In 
cultivating another statesman like himself, the 
philosopher-king's
'whole business of the kingly weaving 
is comprised in this and this alone, in 
never allowing the self-restrained 
characters to be separated from the 
courageous, but in weaving them
together by common beliefs and honours 
and dishonours and opinions and
interchanges of pledges, thus making of 
them a smooth and, as we say, well- 
woven fabric, and then entrusting to 
them in common for ever the offices of 
the state1.72
70 Zdravko Planinc, Plato's Political Philosophy:
Prudence in the Republic and the Laws, 1991, p. 61.
71 Socrates in the Republic has been generally regarded
by some scholars to be too idealistic as regards his 
political utopianism. At the same time, Plato as the 
author of the dialogue has been similarly regarded. The 
utopianism, Zdravko Planinc says, is the most important 
feature of Plato*s idealism as it 'is said by his critics 
to be its lack of prudence or phronesis. With regard to 
this point, Planinc*s recent book on Plato's political 
philosophy argues for the evident presence of prudence as 
a essential feature in his political philosophy. See 
footnote 70.
72 Plato, Statesman, (310d-311a).
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Also from this, all classes in the city are bound together 
by the kingly science which
'had drawn them together by friendship 
and community of sentiment into a 
common life, and having perfected the 
most glorious and the best of all 
textures, clothes with it all the 
inhabitants of the state, both slaves 
and freemen, holds them together by 
this fabric, and omitting nothing which 
ought to belong to a happy state, rules 
and watches over them1. 5
The city under the rule of the philosopher-king is 
like the texture just described, but the first and foremost 
piece of fabric which the philosopher-king has to weave is 
a fabric of the soul of the individual, since the 
individuals are the foundation of the city. Justice and 
injustice in the soul can be studied in its larger context 
of the city. The beginning of justice and injustice in the 
soul is also a starting point of justice and injustice in 
the city. In this regard, the care of the self is also the 
care of the city as a whole in the first and last instance.
When one takes a good care of oneself by oneself, it 
means that the person needs nobody to look after him. Then 
he is a full master of himself. There is no need for any 
tutor or guardian if he has founded his own guardian in 
himself. Socrates answered Lysis as to why his father did 
not allow him to do anything he would like to do. A father 
or a guardian will let a son do anything on his own when he 
considers that his son has 'a better intelligence than 
himself, * then he will entrust him with himself and all 
that is his. Next, when he has taken good care of his own 
household, his neighbour will do the same as his father, 
that is, he will entrust him with 'the management of his 
house, as soon as he considers (him) to have a better idea
73 Plato, Statesman, (311c).
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of its management than himself1. In the last instance, 
Socrates said to Lysis that it is the city and the people 
who 'will entrust you with their affairs, when they 
perceive that you have sufficient intelligence'.74 It is 
in this regard that the great king of the city originates 
from the great king of one's soul. Indeed, it is self- 
knowledge that is the origin of the art of statesmanship 
and vice versa.
Therefore, the dialogue that has been assumed to be 
missing as regards the trilogical search for the sophist, 
the statesman, and the philosopher is actually not missing. 
The starting point of the search is at the Sophist, 217a. 
The search for the statesman continues in the Statesman. 
However, there is no dialogue on the philosopher. Some 
speculations have been made as regards the 'missing
dialogues'. It has been said that the dialogue is either
lost or has never been written at all. If the latter be
the case, it must be unintentional, since Plato makes 
Socrates be well aware and insists right at the beginning 
of the Statesman that the trilogical search must not be 
stopped 'until we have finished with them'. Considered in 
the direction of the argument in this thesis, such a 
dialogue actually exists. The dialogue on the philosopher 
inherently co-exists with the dialogue on the statesman.
Mitchell H. Miller argues that 'philosopher' has just 
concealed itself from the nonphilosophical ones whose 
misinterpretation is harmful rather than beneficial.75 To 
realise it, it seems that insight and careful
interpretation are required. Following Miller's argument, 
Plato reserves the message on the meaning of the 
philosopher for those who have a philosophic nature. With
74 Plato, Lysis, (209c-e).
75 Miller, Jr., The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman, 
op. cit., p. 115.
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regard to the principle of mimesis, Plato should have 
intended anyone with a philosophic nature to understand and 
imitate what he has understood and practised. In similar 
respect, Miller also regards the Statesman as being mimetic 
in which Plato was, 'even while concealing the philosopher- 
king and urging the rule of law for "the many," nonetheless 
hoping that the stranger's educational "instructions" would 
eventually overcome the need for the concealment, 1 and 
' (t)hough it would occur not through Plato himself but 
rather through "someone else like him" (295e), such an 
overcoming would be...Plato's true return and 
restoration.'76 She thus concludes that the Statesman 
itself is a means to a 'philosopher'.77 Her argument 
supports the point just made concerning the unity of the 
philosopher and the statesman or philosophy and 
politics.78
76 Op. cit., p. 118. See also the Statesman, 285e-286a:
'the
greatest and noblest conceptions have no image wrought 
plainly for human vision, which he who wished to satisfy 
the mind of the inquirer can apply to some one of his 
senses and by mere exhibition satisfy the mind.'
77 Ibid., 'The Statesman Itself as a Means', pp. 114-118.
78 Also, with regard to this view, it can be inferred from 
what Socrates said in the Republic, Book VI 497b-c, that no 
existing form of society is good enough for the philosophic 
nature but it will reveal itself only to 'the best polity 
as it itself is the best.' As discussed earlier, the polity 
or the polis consists of men. So when 'the best polity' is 
mentioned, it must be referred to the character of man as 
such. And the meaning of the polis does not necessarily 
mean the people as a whole. It is 'others' in relation to 
the individual.
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CONCLUSION
The Metaxy of Politics: The Politics of Metaxy
Socrates's aspiration is to know what a good life is. 
The Socratic ignorance is irony.1 He knows that he does 
not know. Since he knows he is ignorant therefore he keeps 
asking the questions. He puts the questions to those who 
think they know. All the questions put forward by Socrates 
lead to an enigmatic question of the good. With the 
Socratic elenchus, those who know become puzzled. They 
become ignorant. They are ashamed. Some are angry because 
of the Socratic docta ignorantia. It seems that Socrates 
knows something but claims ignorance in order to humiliate 
or outsmart them. It seems that he is just crafty in 
playing with words. What he has done does not seem 
serious. However, it is not playful. It is neither 
serious nor playful. That neither serious nor playful 
activity is Socrates' mission.
I
The Socratic mission transfers ignorance to other 
people. That is, others become ignorant like himself. He 
insults them by touching their spirited parts. He arouses
1 Irony, eironeia, in other ancient Greek use is said to 
'involve an intention to deceive'. See C.D.C. Reeve, 
Socrates in the Apology, Cambridge, 1989, p. 5ff. Reeve 
also gives other examples of the views on Socratic irony. 
According to Quintilian, Socratic irony means 'something 
contrary to what is said to be understood?' However, 
Vlastos's view is congenial to this study as he argues that 
it is ' "complex" irony in which "what is said both is and 
isn't what is meant'. See Gregory Vlastos, 'Socratic 
Irony', Classical Quarterly 37, pp. 79-96. See also Dilwyn 
Knox, Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas of Irony,
Leiden, 1989, Part Two: Ironia Socratica, pp. 97-126.
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their love of knowledge. In this regard, he generates a 
will to know. Also, when one's beliefs of what he regards 
as the most important things such as justice and the good 
have been shaken, he is then perplexed and puzzled about 
his self-understanding or self-interpretation. The 
question of the good inevitably leads to the question of 
self-knowledge. One's acknowledgment of self-ignorance is 
a starting point for one's search for self-knowledge. The 
search for self-knowledge is intertwined with the search 
for virtue and the good. Wonder is a sign of the beginning 
of philosophy of a philosopher. The Socratic mission 
inspires a philosophic nature in pursuit of man's self- 
knowledge, that is, human nature.
The essence of man is the soul. Human soul is 
tripartite. It consists of a rational part, a spirited 
part, and desires. The soul is self-motion because it is 
moved by Eros or love. Therefore, the soul is moved by the 
love of reason, the love of honour, and the love of 
pleasures. Discord and harmony take place as regards the 
struggle among these elements of the tripartite soul. 
Aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and 
tyrannical characters result from the struggle for power 
among the three elements of the soul. The imperfect 
polities are in flux. These characters of man reflect 
themselves in the domination of one class over the others 
in the polity. Thus political constitutions can be 
understood to be corresponding to those human characters or 
types of the soul. Harmony in the imperfect polities is 
just a temporary condition for impending discords like the 
saying 'peace is just an intermission of the endless war'.
Only the soul which is presided over by the love of 
reason has a right opinion to pursue justice and harmony. 
However, justice is meaningless without the understanding 
of the good. The idea of the good is conceivable in the 
nature of the soul. The nature of the soul is metaxy. The
447
understanding of the nature of the tripartite soul and its 
metaxy discloses the secret of the Platonic geometric 
number and calculation for a perfect number of a seasonable 
breeding of human beings. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are 
related to the tripartite soul, the Cave, the Divided Line, 
and the imperfect polities which are all aimed at 
describing human nature. Human nature can be encapsulated 
in the concept of metaxy, Man in relation to bestial 
nature is explained in the geometric analogy of the square 
root, dunamis. The nature of man cannot be understood in 
the state of knowledge of 'either/or1.2 If the question is 
'Is Man to be or not to be?1 then, 'to be and not to be1 is 
the answer.
Philosophy and the art of politics are intertwined. 
Man is also the essential object in concern for the 
statesman. Self-knowledge and the knowledge of human 
nature is the object of the art of statesmanship. The 
philosopher is the statesman and the statesman is the 
philosopher. The true politics is concerned with the care 
of the soul. The philosopher is the true statesman in a 
sense that he is one who is the king of the city; first of 
all, it must be the city of his soul. To preserve his 
philosophic-kingly nature, the philosopher must enter 
politics and become the statesman. To preserve justice in 
his soul, he must become a philosopher-king. The politics 
which the philosopher-king realises and engages in is the 
politics of the soul. Engaging in the politics of the 
soul, the philosopher-king preserves his quality as well as
2 Bernstein calls this 'the Cartesian Anxiety1. He states 
that it is originated in Descartes' search for a foundation 
or Archimedean point. The Either/Or dilemma is that 
'either there is some support for our being, a fixed 
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the 
forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with 
intellectual and moral chaos1. Richard J. Bernstein, 
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics 
and Praxis, Oxford, 1983, p. 18; see 'The Cartesian 
Anxiety1, pp. 16-20. This dilemma, I argue, can trace back 
to Parmenides and Heraclitus.
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cultivating his counterpart in others who have potential. 
In preserving and cultivating such a nature, he at the same 
time deters the self-aggrandizement of other qualities.
Political constitutions correspond to the types of 
human characters. In turn, human characters can be 
influenced by the polity of the city they live in. The 
polity is the public as a whole. Besides oneself, all are 
'the others' for him. A polity always consists of three 
main classes in the same way that a soul is tripartite. 
Sometimes an individual is among democrats or oligarchs or 
timocrats, or tyrants and their followers. Politics is 
more or less everywhere when one is with 'the others'. 
Even when he is alone but is still thinking about 'the 
others' which he has experienced. The philosopher-king 
prevents the influence of 'the others' which are alien to 
his nature . At the same time he protects himself, he 
cultivates the philosophic-kingly nature in the others. 
The politics of the soul is within and without at the same 
time.
The philosopher-king uses discourse and dialectic as 
his tools and weapons to fight in his politics of the soul. 
As Mousike directly affects the soul. As regards his art 
of politics, there will never be one single speech for all 
human beings. The philosopher-king is restricted by no 
laws. It depends on each individual character. Although 
his speeches might be many, however, their essence is one. 
The art of statesmanship penetrates all other arts. Its 
form might be different but its substance is the same, that 
is, to preserve what is good and change what is bad. The 
philosopher-king seeks and gives birth to his like. 
Socrates regards his as the art of midwifery. The metaphor 
is evident in the Phaedrus , the Symposium, and the 
Republic.
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Laws, nomosf are essential in the politics of the 
soul. As nomos embraces almost everything from a codified 
system of laws itself to values and all kinds of social 
institutions. It can be said the public is the law and 
vice versa. The philosopher-king is also a law-giver.3 A 
law-giver is actually a name-giver, Since a name-giver 
possesses the knowledge of the nature of things. A name- 
giver must be a dialectician, Since a dialectician 
understands the nature of language and knows how to use it. 
Language is a fundamental social institution of man. In 
a sense, it can be said that language itself is the polis 
and nomos.4 The way people use their language has 
importantly affected their thinking and behaviour. 
Moreover, spoken and written languages are more influential 
than any other kinds of language. As stated before, as a 
musike, it renders direct impact on the soul.5
Socrates creates his kallipolis from speech, logos. 
In the ideal city, the meaning of things has been used 
differently from the city in reality. Things have been 
named differently. Justice and the good have been 
differently interpreted. To be sure, different polities 
have different kinds of language. Each polity has its own 
language. A citizen of a certain polity has been brought 
up with a language of that polity. In this regard, the
3 Plato, Cratylus, (388c); Statesman, (278b, 279b, 309b).
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau regards language as the first social 
institution. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Essay on the 
Origin of Languages1 in The First and Second Discourses, 
together with the Replies to Critics and Essay on the 
Origin of Languages edited and translated by Victor 
Gourevitch, New York, 1986, pp. 240.
5 Rousseau, op. cit., p. 242. He says '(i)magine a 
situation
where you know perfectly well that someone is in pain; you 
are not likely to be easily moved to tears at the sight of 
the afflicted person; but give him time to tell you 
everything he feels and you will soon burst into tears. 
Only thus do the scenes of tragedy produce their effect.1
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city moulds her people. In turn, when someone has created 
a city of his own language or speech, and then 
successfully secures it, it is the first step towards the 
city in reality. That is why Socrates said that it is not 
illogical to have a kallipolis in speech.6
In his city, the philosopher-king gives laws to his 
citizens. Such laws, n o m o s , are given under the 
supervision of the art of statesmanship. It is aimed at 
nurturing the philosophic-kingly nature and ruling over 
people of other classes. The philosopher-king employs 
speech which is a kind of logically structured language in 
constructing his city and edificing the laws. The purpose 
of structuring the city and laws is to render justice and 
harmony amongst the citizens in the city. Justice and 
harmony of any other kinds of polity are imperfect and 
prone towards decay and corruption.
In order to make one become a citizen or to make one 
create a new city of justice and harmony, first, the 
philosopher-king has to debunk the edifices of values of 
the other polities. In this regard, each person is a city 
of his own and a city is just a reflection of a person of 
a certain character. As regards any edifice in any polity, 
it in one way or another contains its own logic and 
consistency as all edifices are linguistically constructed. 
Of course, a good citizen of one country would be a bad 
citizen of another.7 It is harmonious and just in the eye
6 Plato, the Republic, (449a-c).
7 From this it can be drawn that a good citizen in some 
state would be a bad citizen in the others. Then, as 
Aristotle first realised, there arises the question 
'whether the excellence of the good man is the same as that 
of the good citizen1. He said: 'the considerations already 
adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good 
citizen are the same, and in others different. When they 
are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but 
only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or 
in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs1.
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of the city and her citizens who are of course dominated or 
presided over by some quality which has been regarded as a 
highest value or virtue;8 For no one would ever dare to be 
sceptical or criticise the existence of the virtue. The 
edifice and foundation of such a polity then survives.
The philosopher-king attacks such values. He makes 
the others sceptical towards their own system of thought. 
He agitates their harmony and truth and wakes them up from 
slumber. Then their souls become shaken and chaotic. They 
become void.9 Their souls become 'softer and more ductile, 
even as iron when it has been forged in the fire1.10 They 
become as if they were young children. The philosopher- 
king intoxicates them with the drink of speech. The 
drunkenness of the soul is conducive to 'the moulding of 
the soul1.
The Dionysiac turn of the philosopher-king pours them 
drinks of speech till they become wild and are ready to do 
and think what they would never do in their normal state. 
The Dionysian wild dancer wakes up and challenges the 
harmonious and well-ordered state of those people who can 
be regarded as Apollonians. It is observable that Socrates 
starts his 'drinking party1 by touching on what seems to be 
the strongest point of his interlocutor. Ironically, what 
one takes for granted to be one's own strongest point is 
just one's most vulnerable part. Likewise, in the Laws,
Aristotle, Politics, (Book III 1277b30-1278b4), The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. Two, edited by Jonathan 
Barnes, New Jersey, 1984. See also, Strauss, What is 
Political Philosophy? and Other Studies, op. cit.f p. 35.
8 With this regard, logos or speech, account, reason of 
things of a polity and its citizens can be regarded to be 
political. Man as an animal which possesses logos can be 
in this regard related to the idea that man is a political 
animal.
9 Annas, op. cit., p. 21.
10 Plato, Laws, (Book II 666b-c).
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the Athenian Stranger starts his discussion with the Cretan 
and the Spartan by raising the question concerning the 
laws. For the Cretan and the Spartan, the question of the 
laws could not be any question for them , the people whose 
cities were praised by the Greeks as the birthplace of the 
best laws. However, the more they take their excellence 
for granted , the more their minds become insolent and 
bigoted.
II
The politics of the soul begins with the god of wine. 
As Strauss observes '(w)hy does the Platonic dialogue 
about politics and laws begin with such an extensive 
conversation about wine? But this means that wine-drinking 
educates to boldness, to courage, and not to moderation, 
and yet w i ne - dr i nk i ng was said to be conducive to 
moderation.'11 He rightly interprets that they are men 
who are so proud of their own laws , they would never be 
sceptical towards their edifice of traditional values. 
Apart from their old age, they were law-abiding citizens of 
law-abiding cities. One cannot expect anyone more 
conservative and more traditional than the elderly of the 
Dorian states. Surely, 'their very virtue becomes a 
defect,1 said Strauss, 'if there is no longer a question of 
preserving old laws, but of seeking the best laws or 
introducing new and better ones1.12 While discussing the 
wine-drinking which was forbidden in Crete and Sparta, the 
Cretan and the Spartan have been unconsciously immersed in 
the drinking-party not in action but in speech.13 When 
they arrived at a certain stage, one can see that the
11 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy and Other 
Studies, op. cit., p. 31.
12 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other 
Studies, op. cit., p. 31.
13 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies, 
op. cit.
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introduction of new laws was undertaken. At the end of the 
Laws, after their introduction of new laws in speech had 
been completed, the Athenian Stranger said that the Cretan 
would be deemed 'the boldest' of all his successors if he 
paid good attention to the matter of law-giving.14 
Finally, the Cretan even asked the Spartan to join together 
to found a new state in order to realise the best laws they 
had just constructed in speech. They who were the most 
conservative with regard to their laws then became open- 
minded and courageous enough to found new laws for a new 
city. They would be regarded as Dionysians. The 
Apollonians became Dionysian and adventuristic.
In the Laws, the Dionysian nature plays quite an 
important role. The Athenian Stranger plays a Dionysian 
role. The Athenian Stranger makes his interlocutors 
reconsider the good aspects of wine-drinking and drinking 
party. Drunkenness becomes useful. Also, the Athenian 
Stranger discusses the names of Apollo and Dionysus. He 
acts as if he were the god himself, namely, Dionysus. 
Should he be Dionysus, this god is the giver of speech not 
wine. He renders a kind of drunkenness which 'makes most 
drinkers think, oiesthai they have wit, nous when they have 
not'.15 The Athenian Stranger represents a Dionysian 
character or a proxenus,16 He has introduced what has
14 Plato, Laws, (Book XII 969b).
15 Plato, Cratylus, (406c).
16 The contents of the Laws in relation to the description 
of Dionysos made by Detienne indicates a high possibility 
for the Dionysiac role of the Athenian Stranger. Detienne 
states that 'Dionysos' personality is deeply colored by his
status as stranger He is always a stranger, a form to
identify, a face to uncover, a mask that hides as much as 
it reveals. But coming as a xenos into the territory of 
another city, Dionysos demands to be treated socially as 
any stranger would be treated in Greece....A private 
citizen, an ordinary individual takes it upon himself to 
receive and protect a stranger on his travels. The 
proxenos was a local citizen who looked after foreign 
interests in a Greek city-state. Perhaps it was because
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been done or what he has done and thought in Athens to the 
foreigners in the foreign land.17 It is most likely for 
the reader to think that he represents Socrates and does 
what Socrates would have done if he had travelled or been 
exiled to his favourite city where he was expected to go 
and live.18
Nevertheless, a Dionysian disposition is hardly a 
complete philosophic-kingly nature. Although a Dionysian 
nature seems to be antithetical to an Apollonian one, 
however, the gods were thought to complement one another. 
The Cretans and the Spartans or the Dorians in general have 
been understood to be the origin of the public choruses. 
The public choruses made them d i s c i p l i n a r y  and 
subordinating. Their music and chorus were made for a 
military purpose. That kind of cultivation first 
originated in the Dorian states. It had been later
Dionysos, the travelling god, was associated with this 
institution that he chose a companion by the name of
Proxenos..... But this Delphian Proxenos of Dionysos is
entirely naked and has a snub nose, thick lips, and two 
pointy ears. He is thus a satyr serving as proxenus for 
his master, who for once appears to be wearing the mask of 
a god in his home, at variance with his character of
perpetual wanderer and stranger In his most memorable
epiphanies, Dionysos is equally strange and a stranger. He 
is the Stranger who brings strangeness1 (Detienne, pp. 10, 
11, 12) . Dionysus makes people frantic, mad, or
intoxicated. See Marcel Detienne, Dionysos at Large, op. 
cit.
17 As the Greek word xenos means strange and foreign. 
Detienne said that ' "foreign" here refers not to the non- 
Greek, the barbarian who speaks an unintelligible tongue, 
but to the citizen of a neighboring community...(i)n order 
to be called xenos, a stranger therefore had to come from 
the Hellenic world, ideally consisting of those who shared 
"one blood, one language, and common sanctuaries and 
sacrifices" 1. The Athenian Stranger is a xenos to the 
Cretan and the Spartan as much as they are to him. See 
Detienne, op. cit., p. 9.
18 Strauss, What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies, 
op. cit., pp. 32-33.
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received by Athens.19 It is said that Dionysus travelled 
from afar and was accepted by Apollo at Delphi. Dionysus 
joined together with Apollo at Delphi. He brought with him 
strangeness, madness, and defilement.20 However, his cult 
continued there in a less frenzied form.21 It was tamed 
by Apollo. Madness, strangeness, and defilement gives 
license to total freedom as it has been said about the rite 
of Dionysus.22 With regard to this, it can be said that 
the Dionysiac effect liberates one from himself. Thus 
Dionysian nature can be identifiable with freedom whilst 
Apollonian nature is associated with conformity and 
obedience. It is in this regard that the Dorians can be 
said to be more Apollonian than the Athenians. Also the 
Athenians are Dionysian.
Philosophy is the love of wisdom. One may think he 
has arrived at wisdom, or already experienced so many 
things in his life, he might think that he no longer needs 
to learn more. Like the Spartans and the Cretans, they 
took for granted not only their own laws but also their 
life-long experiences. The sophists think they possess 
some kind of wisdom or virtue. They do not need to learn 
anything any more. They were teachers not learners. With 
regard to education, paideia, this Apollonian nature needs 
a Dionysian one to liberate itself from stubbornness and 
intractability. In this respect, the Dionysian effect is
19 Donaldson, The Theatre of the Greeks: A Treatise on the 
History and Exhibition of the Greek Drama, op. cit., pp. 
20, 27-29, 31; see 'Apollo' and 'Dionysus' in Betty Radice 
(ed.), Who's Who in the Ancient World, London, 1982, pp. 
61-62, 105-106.
20 Detienne, op. cit., pp. 14-20, 23.
21 Radice, op. cit., p. 105.
22 Aylen, The Greek Theatre, op. cit., p. 63.
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like a pharmakon.23 'It is the purifying aspect of 
Dionysos,' said Detienne, 'that is accentuated in the 
violent parousias of Baccheios or Baccheus, (t)he more 
insanity is unleashed, the more room there is for 
catharsis. ,24 It makes room for something new. It frees 
oneself for the relation with oneself and the pursuit of 
self-knowledge.25
In the dialogues, Socrates sings and dances with 
Dionysian music. He is a pain in the neck, a gadfly of the 
city. He has been regarded as a mad man in the eye of the 
Athenian.26 His way of life is said to be untypical of 
Greek life.27 Nevertheless, the Athenian way of life 
under political democracy seems to be liberal and in a 
sense already more Dionysian than Apollonian. Why did 
Socrates think that the city still needed a Dionysiac dance
23 Detienne states that 'in the same spirit Dionysos is said 
to have made us a gift to wine, a drug (pharmakon) so 
precious that in the city of the Magnetes it is to be 
administered in its pure state to the elderly, to whom it 
will bring "initiation and recreation" (telete and 
paidia)1. Detienne, op. cit., p. 23.
24 Detienne, op. cit., p. 21. Aristotle points out this 
kind of effect of tragedy. See Radice, op. cit., p. 106.
25 This sentence is borrowed from Jacques Derrida's 
Dissemination. See Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, 
translated by Barbara Johnson, London, 1981, 'Plato's 
Pharmacy', pp. 67-68.
26 The character of Socrates had been characterised as a 
funny and weird man in the Clouds of Aristophanes.
27 L.B. Carter regardes Socrates to be a quietist who was 
not concerned with politics as other Athenian people were. 
Carter also writes: 'Socrates, it seems, is an apragmon, 
but a very special case. He is debarred from political 
involvement, from addressing the assembly, by his divine 
sign. Yet he feels impelled to go about questioning their
accepted notions of commonly held ethical qualities--
courage, and so on but above all, wisdom and justice. He
himself does not regard this as in apragmon existence. 
Socrates is in fact both apragmon and not. He is a case on 
his own. (p. 185). ' Carter, The Quiet Athenian, op. cit., 
p. 14.
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whilst the Athenians were dancing and singing in a 
Dionysian style? Why does a Dionysian way of life still 
need to be awakened by a Dionysian, strange and mad man?
Of course, Dionysus is quite essential with regard to 
the incitement of a will to know. The birth of tragedy is 
said to have originated in Athens. It is also said that 
Dionysus gave birth to tragedy. Also tragedy and democracy 
have been said to be intertwined. For that reason, Athens 
flourished and was famed for wisdom and liberty. The 
Athenians very well recognised and enjoyed this privilege. 
They appreciated and also defended the Athenian way of 
life. The evidence is supported by their determination and 
endurance through the Persian Wars at Marathon and Salamis 
and the Peloponesian War.28 Apparently freedom was the 
most impressive characteristic of Athens. Freedom is the 
highest virtue of such a democratic polity. The city of 
Athens in fact was built up not of sand and stone but of 
her own citizens whose essential character was democratic.
If the oligarch has the blind god of wealth as his 
leader of the choir and first in honour, then, the democrat 
becomes blind and obsessed with the god of freedom and 
frantic situations. It is Dionysus. Athens was a place 
where one could find all kinds of people, all characters of 
men. There were many different things that the Athenians 
believed. Generally speaking, they were free to believe in 
anything, and to admire or to criticise it. It seems that
28 On the fight for self-rule, T.A. Sinclair comments that 
'the right to have one's own laws and the chance to have a 
constitution for one's own city were regarded as one of the 
greatest prizes of the victory over the Persians,' and 
'(o)n their respect for freedom, the barbarian was quite 
incapable of seeing why the Greeks should fight if no 
master forced them, or why they would not simply come to 
terms with the invader'. See T.A. Sinclair, A History of 
Greek Political Thought, London, 1961, p. 35.
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the v i r t u e  of the A t h e n i a n  pe o p l e  lay in their 
tolerance.29 They tolerated one another because they all 
worshipped freedom and expected nobody to interfere when 
they were doing something or nothing. In such a democracy, 
one can do anything provided that it does not violate the 
implicit agreement of the city. The hidden rule of the 
city was embodied in the spirit of freedom and equal 
rights. Everyone is for himself. It is believed that 
nobody rules over the others , since no one is by nature 
superior than another. One can learn and choose what he 
would like to be. But in the last instance, concerning 
what a good life is, one should learn from the people of 
the city.30 That is to learn to be democratic. In such 
a city, anything goes. On that basis, it is seriously 
believed that man can do whatever he likes and his way of 
life is to be proudly praised as 'the life of the pleasure 
and freedom and happiness1 and the man 'cleaves to it to 
the end1.31 Such is the faith of the Athenian people. It 
is the faith in such a way of life that they would never 
let anyone challenge. The faith in liberty and freedom 
becomes a dogma. At this point, a Dionysian becomes an 
Apollonian.
In this regard, Socrates in Dionysiac spirit seems to 
offend and shake the Athenians in the most serious way. He 
challenges the virtue of city. He defies the love of 
freedom of Athens which has become the tyrant Eros. 
Dionysiac effect in permanence is nothing but madness. It 
is no longer a therapeutic pharmakon. It becomes a
29 Plato, the Republic, (Book VIII 558b).
30 Plato, Meno, (93a). Anytus represents the people's 
general view that one can learn the good from good men, 
kaloi kagathoi, of older generation. See Protagoras, (32 0d- 
328c, 327d-e).
31 Plato, the Republic, (561d).
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poisonous pharmakon.32 Dionysiac effect in extremity 
leads one to chaos and instability. In such a condition of 
the soul, harmony will never be attained. Scepticism, for 
example, results from the extremity of Dionysiac effect. 
Scepticism becomes a dogma when it never allows any idea to 
be established. Nevertheless, the established idea could 
become a dogma as well.
In this regard, it can be said that Heraclitean or 
Protagorean doctrines are in one way or another under 
Dionysiac effect whilst Parmenidean thinking is prone 
towards Apollonian nature. Although Dionysus and Apollo 
seemed to be opposed to each other, however, they are two 
sides of the same coin. Both are musical. Each is a kind 
of music which consists of a certain kind of song and 
dance. Each has its own leader and choruses. Each 
reflects a certain phase of the life of the soul. Each is 
just a far end of the same continuum. If the soul cannot 
understand its nature, it will endlessly oscillate between 
these two poles.
For instance, a Dionysian man will never stop at any 
point of knowledge. He keeps struggling and learning all 
the time. He keeps dancing. His dancing style never 
repeats. He keeps dancing differently until he could not 
find a different mode of dance. He then dances strangely 
and wildly. His dance becomes chaotic , until he either 
becomes mad or thinks that he has achieved some kind of 
wisdom. As regards the former, his music becomes 
unmusical. It loses balance, harmony and rhythm. As 
regards the latter, he becomes Apollonian. He does not
32 As Derrida argues: 'Pharmacia (Pharmakeia) is also a
common noun signifying the administration of the pharmakon, 
the drug: the medicine and/or poison. "Poisoning" was not 
the least usual meaning of "pharmacia." Antiphon has left 
us the logogram of an "accusation of poisoning against a 
mother-in-law" (Pharmakeias kata tes metryias).1 Pharmakon 
acts as both remedy and poison. See Derrida, op, cit., p. 
70.
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keep pace with the search for different styles of song and 
dance any more. He becomes an Apollonian without a 
Dionysian nature. He seems to be peaceful and harmonious 
with himself. He will be, as in the case of the Cretan and 
the Spartan in the Laws, in that Apollonian slumber until 
he is awakened by a stranger who comes with strangeness and 
defilement, that is, is one with Dionysian music.
To be sure, the Dionysian effect needs to be 
tamed. As in the legend, Dionysus , who had come from 
afar was accepted by Apollo at Delphi. Although his music 
continued at Delphi, it is 'in a less frenzied form1. To 
be sure, what has been left unsaid is that Apollo was then 
accompanied by Dionysus after his arrival. If Dionysus 
continues at Delphi 'in a less frenzied form1, then, Apollo 
should have become more 'frenetic1 than ever. Dionysus and 
Apollo complement each other at Delphi. The complement of 
Dionysus and Apollo at Delphi renders a peculiar condition. 
It is a state of metaxy. Metaxy has been proved to be the 
understanding of human soul. In that state, the positions 
of Heraclitus and Parmenides converge.33
Ill
In the dialogues, the movement of Socrates1 music or 
speech is not only Dionysian but also Apollonian. In fact, 
he is Dionysian to a Apollonian and he is Apollonian to a 
Dionysian. His musical movement is identifiable with the 
art of politics, and his politics is concerned with the
33 It appears in the concluding statement in the Parmenides 
166c: 'Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, 
that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others 
in relation to themselves and to each other all in every 
way are and are not and appear and do not appear.1
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soul. Then, his politics of the soul is based on what has 
been called 'the pleasurable perception of rhythm and 
harmony' in human nature. Socrates starts the discussion 
in the dialogues by touching on what his interlocutors 
think are their strongest points. Moreover, he contrasts 
the other's strength by putting forward his own ignorance. 
By doing so, Socrates makes the other sing and dance his 
own music. The Socratic ignorance makes this possible. 
When the other starts to sing and dance his own music, the 
Socratic ignorance seems to be a good chorus to its leader.
In appearance, the ignorant Socrates does not know how 
to sing and dance beautifully. Since he does not know the 
best and most beautiful music. That is why he is searching 
for a leader of the chorus. He makes himself ready to be 
a good chorus for any leader. The Socratic ignorance in 
fact is its own music. It rouses and cheers the soul of 
the other. It starts by first making itself in harmony and 
rhythm with the others. Put in modern terms, it boosts 
one's ego. At this stage, Socrates is Apollonian. He 
seems to be in order and harmony with the others. At other 
times , when his ironic ignorance is noticeable or his 
interlocutor is on guard against it, his cross-examination 
becomes wild and exasperated. At this stage, Socrates is 
Dionysian. In consequence of both effects, his 
interlocutor then reveals what kind of music his soul 
corresponds to, whether it be timarchic, oligarchic, 
democratic, or tyrannical. The music of the Socratic 
ignorance lets the music of the other play. In the course 
of the discussion, the Socratic ignorance becomes the 
Socratic elenchus. It becomes strange, wild, mad and 
nonsensical in the eye of the other. His argument becomes 
elusive. It moves the interlocutor up and down, back and 
forth , and left and right. It moves between the 'realm of 
the human and the divine'. In reverse, his interlocutor 
starts to dance to the music of Dionysian Socrates. Now he 
needs to be tamed. He needs to be Apollonised but, of
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course, not permanently. One has to be moved up and down, 
back and forth , and left and right, between the realms of 
the divine and the human, or, in fact, between Apollo and 
Dionysus. Since the ideal state to be attained is the 
state of metaxy.
A good example that delineates what has been explained 
above is the movement and the form and substance in the 
Republic. As regards the story of the dialogue, some would 
say that the forum has forfeited the festival. The 
torchlight race on horseback seems to have been forgotten. 
Actually, Socrates did not forget what he said he was 
interested to do. He decided to stay on because Adeimantus 
had suggested something which he said attracted him. 
Adeimantus said besides the torchlight race, Socrates could 
after dinner go out and see the sights and have a good talk 
with a lot of the lads.34 Although he stated the reason 
for his stay, however, everyone knows that his love of 
speech and discussion transcends his desire for that 
festive pleasure.
Actually, Socrates enjoyed seeing and participating in 
the torchlight race. He did not miss it at all. It is not 
a festive torchlight race. That kind of pleasure cannot 
interest Socrates. Actually, what Socrates has is a 
philosophical one. The torch has been lit when the fire of 
argument has been started in the mind of Polemarchus. 
Considered in this light, the discussion between Socrates 
and Cephalus is the cause of the fire. Socrates' ignorance 
makes Cephalus play his music. Of course, it is not a 
visual light or fire. It is a fire in the soul. Indeed, 
the discussion is Socrates' entertainment at the festival 
of Bendis as Thrasymachus satirically commented.35 It is 
a light that a blind man can see. It causes anger and
34 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 328a-b).
35 Plato, the Republic, (Book I 354a).
doubt in the soul of the listeners.
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When Cephalus seemed to lose his argument to Socrates 
as regards the definition of justice, it incites anger, 
thumos, in Polemarchus who broke in to defend the view of 
justice which he shared with his father. He became a 
leader of the music. Then the torchlight was passed to 
Thrasymachus when the argument between Socrates and 
Polemarchus annoyed his understanding of justice. 
Socrates* ignorance annoyed him. Thrasymachus took turns 
with the leader of the chorus. He cannot let it go since 
it strongly affects what he regards to be justice. He 
cannot let something, which he regards as injustice, win. 
Then the torchlight was taken over by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus who saw that it was unjust to merely satisfy 
themselves with Socrates' unfinished discussion of the 
nature of justice. They took over Thrasymachus1 position 
although it was not their own beliefs because they regarded 
that it was unjust not to exhaust the problem of justice 
from both Thrasymachus1 and Socrates' position. All of 
them were seriously and personally concerned with the 
problem of the nature of justice. Each has possessed his 
own understanding of justice, in other words, a personal 
justice.36
However, a personal or particular justice cannot be 
separated from a general one. No one ever thinks of his 
justice as a personal one. The justice man conceives for 
himself can be said to be the justice of Zeus, that is, the 
justice for all. So it is not difficult for Socrates to 
move the argument up to heaven or the divine realm. When 
the problem of the nature of justice has been raised, it 
affects everyone. The problem of the nature of justice 
touches the essence of man, that is, the soul. Basically, 
the problem of justice is involved with what is right and
36 Andersson, Polls and Psyche, op. cit., p. 77.
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what is wrong. What is right and what is wrong are related 
to what one deserves and what one does not deserve. Man 
thinks of what he deserves in the same way that he thinks 
of what he desires and what he does not desire. When one 
has to take something one thinks he does not deserve, or he 
has been deprived of what he has or should have had, he 
complains that it is not right. When he complains about 
this, he has his reasons and he can explain and argue for 
what he regards to be just. However, he would never have 
formulated or thought rationally or logically about justice 
and injustice in whatever sense if he lacks the rational 
part in his soul.37 In this regard, the problem of 
justice affects the tripartite soul as a whole. When any 
version of justice either in speech or in action differs 
from one's own account of justice, it causes annoyance or 
even anger. It touches the spirited part of the soul. The 
spirited part in alliance with what the soul judges just 
makes man react. Sometimes it is allied with desires but 
sometimes with the rational part.38 On many occasions, 
the conflicts between desires and the rational part take 
place. Justice in whatever account can be said to emerge 
when these three elements in the soul have been harmonised. 
In this sense, justice is personal or individual. The 
struggle for power and harmony in the soul is political.
IV
Nevertheless, the city is a reflection of the soul and 
the soul is a reflection of the city. With regard to this 
nature, the problem of justice inevitably welds together 
the personal and the general, that is, the city and man are 
intertwined. The problem of justice has to be considered
37 Plato, Laws, (Book XII 967b).
38 Plato, the Republic, (Book IV 439e-440d).
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in two joining dimensions, that is, the polis and the 
psuche.
Only in the soul of the philosopher-king do true 
justice and harmony exist. He is the master of the soul as 
well as the city. He is the king of the city as he renders 
justice and harmony to the city. The philosopher-king 
renders justice to each his due. Socrates creates the 
kallipolis, the ideal and just city in speech and thought. 
In the just city, everyone is happy since each has been 
granted what he desires.39 The justice of Socrates* ideal 
city in speech renders his interlocutors what they expect 
in accordance with the degree of their own ability to 
attain justice and the good.
The Socratic ignorance arouses one to play his music. 
One starts to sing and dance his own music in Dionysian 
movement. A timarchic Glaucon derives from Socrates' 
ideal city a communistic model of his desirable city in 
accordance with his character. With regard to his 
character, his spirited part tells him that a city which 
has been built up only to serve human desires cannot be a 
human city but a city of pigs. However, his spirited part 
is not able to tell him that such a communistic plan is 
unrealistic and inhuman. He would see that it is not a 
human city if only his rational part presides over his 
spirited one. Socrates unleashes Glaucon's excessive 
spirited part.
The programme of the ideal city has gone too far. In 
the dialogue, no one questioned its impracticality. When 
the first description of the origin of the city came out, 
Glaucon whose speech represented the spirited part in his 
soul questioned and criticised it as a city of pigs. When 
the city life became luxurious, the spirited part was
39 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 586e).
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introduced to protect the city. But the unlearned spirited 
part could become harsh not only to its enemy but also its 
people. Then the love of reason or philosophic nature 
could tame the spirited part. The philosophic nature helps 
the guardian discriminate between friend and enemy.
In the discussion of the education of the guardian 
which commenced in Book III, the nature of the tripartite 
soul was explained with regard to the virtue of its 
particular part, namely, wisdom, courage, and self-control. 
Justice then originated from the harmony of these virtues. 
Then the discussion of the plan for the ideal city 
followed. After this, in the course of the construction of 
the ideal city, Socrates occasionally reminded his 
interlocutors to return to the starting point of the 
discussion, that is, the justice in a man and its analogy 
of the city. Glaucon forgot to examine himself.40 His 
soul was too much preoccupied with the ideal city or the 
justice in a city. He welcomed the austerity and inhuman 
solution. The spirited Glaucon still sang the timarchic 
music but rather in a Dionysian style.
After all, Socrates' conclusion of his plan for the 
ideal city seems to be an anti-climax and ambiguous when he 
said that the city could be found nowhere, and,
'perhaps, there is a pattern of it laid 
up in heaven for him who wishes to 
contemplate it and so beholding to 
constitute himself its citizen, (b)ut 
it makes no difference whether it 
exists now or ever will come into 
being, (t)he politics of this city only 
will be his and of none other'.41
40 Planinc, Plato1s Political Philosophy: Prudence 
in the Republic and the Laws, op. cit., pp. 65-117.
41 Plato, the Republic, (Book IX 592).
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Socrates moves his interlocutors up and down. 
Swinging between Apollonian and Dionysian conditions, they 
become puzzled. Socrates always leads the argument to come 
in a full circle. One returns to where one started. This 
causes them to ask themselves the question which they never 
thought would be relevant. This is a result of the 
interplay of Dionysus and Apollo, the gods of music. 
Socrates brings philosophy from heaven. The Platonic 
dialogues carry its audience up to heaven and down to 
earth. It brings 'the gods' down from heaven and moves the 
'beasts' up from the earth. As a person in the allegory of 
the Cave has been forced to ascend the cave to see the 
light of the sun and the sun itself and then descend to 
live among his fellow-prisoners. The soul is always in 
motion. But there is a c e r t a i n  point for human 
understanding of human nature. That is metaxy.
Socrates lights the torchlight and passes it on to his 
interlocutors. Socrates sings and dances in Dionysian- 
Apollonian music. It is the Socratic inspiration. The 
Socratic inspiration becomes the Platonic inspiration when 
Socrates becomes Plato's leading character in his 
dialogues. The dialogues light and pass on the fire to the 
reader. The Platonic inspiration lights up the fire for 
the search for self-knowledge. It arouses man to know 
himself.
However, the relationship between Socrates and his 
interlocutors differs from the relationship between Plato 
and his audience. The reader of the dialogues has not been 
cross-examined. He just follows the cross-examination and 
free questioning of Socrates in a book. The cross- 
examination is not actual. It is dramatised. It is just 
a scene , although he might try to answer the questions. 
When he fails, he will not be as ashamed as one who is in 
the actual scene. Reading is a private situation. In 500- 
4 00 B.C., it was an innovation in Athens. According to
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Havelock, ancient Athens could not be legitimately regarded 
as a literate society until the time of Plato.42 Not 
until then can reading be viewed as a standard practice, 
'as it indeed had become when Plato grew up' .43 The 
impact of this literate revolution in Greece is very 
important and greatly influential. In the transition from 
an oral to a literate society, 'truly private communication 
of preservable information becomes possible only under 
conditions of developed literacy, only the documented word 
can be pursued by individuals in isolation1.44 The wider 
audience is possible for Plato's dialogues whilst the 
author did not need to be present himself. Moreover, later 
generations such as ourselves possibly become his audience. 
Plato is our absent author while we are his absent 
reader.45
The hermeneutic effect between the Dialogues and its 
reader, past and present, is not affected by reading either 
silently or aloud. Neither would it be affected by the
42 He argues: 'Only in the last third of the fifth century 
is the average Athenian taught letters in such a way as to 
begin to pick up a script and read it through. It follows 
that the testimonies drawn from fourth-century authors will 
take literacy for granted, for it has now been achieved.' 
Lloyd observes that'(i)n Plato's day references to learning 
how to read and write as part of primary education are 
commonplace'. Havelock, 'The Preliteracy of the Greeks', 
op. cit, pp. 188-189; Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom, op. 
cit., p. 72.
43 Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom, op. cit.
44 Lloyd, The Revolutions of Wisdom, op. cit.
45 Compare the Statesman, 300c: 'And yet we said, if we
remember, that the man of knowledge, the real statesman, 
would by his art make many changes in his practice without 
regard to his writings, when he thought another course was 
better though it violated the rules he had written and sent 
to his absent subjects.'
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physical differences between ancient and modern books.46 
Because its dramatic effect is still there. It enables the 
reader to visualise the scene and the characters in the 
Dialogues. It is a stage-play being performed in the soul 
of the reader. Dionysian and Apollonian elements are 
present in the movement of reading. The Dialogues are like 
a theatrical play. It is a performance. Unlike a 
theatrical play, reading is an individual pursuit. There 
is no chorus. The reader does a choric performance 
himself. He is both audience and actor/actress at the same 
time. He is also a hero and a villain. All characters are 
visualised by himself. Of course, reading effects mimetic 
action. Mimesis leads to sympathetic magic. The Dialogues 
like a theatrical performance bring the reader pleasure 
which is one of the aspects or functions of mimesis itself. 
The Dialogues are like a play. It is a serious play. The 
reader might be sympathetic with any character in the 
Dialogues. In saying so, its meaning is rather that the 
reader is sympathetic with what a character said or acted. 
The characters in the Dialogues speak in response to the 
Socratic elenchus. In the argument, each reveals his own 
position. He reveals what type of man he is. So the 
argument of each character can be regarded as his kind of 
music to which he himself loves to sing and dance. The 
sophists are elusive, their music is intended to please the 
audience. However, they think that the music they sing 
can catch the majority of the audience. It can be said
46 Reynolds and Wilson point to the fact that there is some 
inconvenience of reading the book in a roll form. They 
say: 'The form of the book was a roll, on one side of which 
the text was written in a series of columns. The reader 
would unroll it gradually, using one hand to hold the part 
that he had already seen, which was rolled up; but the 
result of this process was to reverse the coil, so that the 
whole book had to be unrolled again before the next reader 
could use it. The inconvenience of this book-form is 
obvious, especially when it is remembered that some rolls 
were of considerable length..' L.D. Reynolds and N.G. 
Wilson, Scribes & Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of 
Greek & Latin Literature, London, Second edition, 1989,
p. 2.
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that they love to sing and dance to the music which the 
people love. In turn, the reader of the Dialogues favours 
the speech which invokes his sympathy. The reader then 
identifies his position with the position of his favoured 
character. It seems that a hero emerges when the reader 
identifies himself with a character.
V
It appears that Socrates is the hero of the Dialogues. 
Socrates is Plato's hero. The others are the opponents. 
It is most likely that the reader identifies himself with 
Socrates, a dialectical hero.47 But Socrates' speech is 
elenchus. He questions more than answers. Although he 
sometimes gives explanations, he does it in quite an 
ambiguous way. It has been stated in a mythic form or 
allegory. Despite this, the reader is quite likely to 
assume beforehand that Socrates is his hero, since it has 
been generally said that Socrates is a hero. How can one 
identify one's position with Socrates? Rather, he is a 
pain in the neck for the reader as m uch as his 
interlocutors in the Dialogues. In this regard, it seems 
that the reader unconsciously takes Socrates' position as 
his villain. Since the reader intends to defeat Socrates 
rather than his interlocutors. The reader wants to win and 
stop the Socratic elenchus. The reader unconsciously sides 
with Socrates' interlocutors, especially with one whose 
music invokes his sympathy.
The characters in the Dialogues represent types of 
soul. When Socrates just asks questions and the reader 
cannot find the answer from Socrates , he looks for the 
answer from the answer of the interlocutors. Sometimes the
47 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', in Basic 
Writings of Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 91.
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answer seems silly. Sometimes it makes the reader think 
that it should be the best answer he ever had. Sometimes, 
although it is a clever answer, however, the reader knows 
that that answer is against what he regards as the good. 
Sometimes, the answer is a moral one, however, it is so 
simple and naive. All the answers in one way or another 
are timarchic or oligarchic or democratic or tyrannical. 
In other words, they represent the ruling part of the 
tripartite soul. As the reader unknowingly sides himself 
with these arguments in order to defeat Socrates. He has 
been led through different types of music of different 
types of the soul. That is to say, the three elements in 
his soul have been touched and tested. The reader has 
pleasures when a moment of sympathetic magic emerges. He 
identifies himself with one of the characters. He is a 
chorus for that character. Mimetic action follows. He is 
annoyed and ashamed when the argument has been defeated by 
the Socratic elenchus. He has been made ashamed by a book 
not a person. He is ashamed by himself.48 The reader 
then cannot help accepting his defeat. He then swings to 
Socrates' position , because it is more logical than the 
logic of his favoured argument. Then his rational part of 
the soul has come to the fore. He has to accept his 
logical inferiority unless he can find a better argument to 
supersede Socrates'. It is evident that Socrates arouses 
the reader to extreme frenzy. He incites the reader's 
will to answer. A will to answer presupposes a will to 
know. He arouses a philosophic part of the reader as well 
as his interlocutors. The more he experiences this effect, 
the stronger his rational part grows. The movement is 
obvious in the Republic. The city has ascended from the 
city of pigs, to the city of the guardian, and the city of
48 Michel Foucault comments that '(i)n the Alcibiades I, the 
soul had a mirror relation to itself, which relates to the 
concept of memory and justifies dialogue as a method of 
discovering truth in the soul'. Michel Foucault, 
'Technologies of the Self', in Technologies of the Self: 
A Seminar with Michel Foucault, o p . cit.. p. 31.
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the philosopher. With regard to this point, some would 
regard that
'(f) or Plato this means that it has 
tamed the beastly for the sake of the 
divine but while the erotic desires of 
a tyrant find their satisfaction within 
an earthly city, and Pisthetairos 
builds an absurd city in heaven in 
order to satisfy his, Plato would 
satisfy the philosopher 1s sublimated 
desires in the rational, all-too- 
rational city he established, 'in 
heaven, perhaps', but in a different 
kind of heaven, for sure',49
It is true that a 'too rational reader' would be 
satisfied with Plato's 'the rational, all-too-rational 
city'. However, he could not find a clarified 'rational' 
and consistent answer from Socrates' speech. When he is 
asked to give an answer, he puts it in a mythic and 
allegorical form. It is a muthos not a logos. The high 
hope of the rational reader droops. What is too rational 
cannot be Plato's ideal city. The ideal city cannot be too 
rational. Barrie A. Wilson points to inconsistencies 
within the Republic. He argues that 'the inconsistencies 
and discrepancies do not constitute a philosophic failure, 
but fulfil a philosophic objective: to drive people to 
critical thinking'.50 It has been argued that Plato 'is
49 Ophir, op. cit., p. 31.
50 He gives the reason that 'there is no criticism of the 
pedagogical system. Like many other things in The Republic, 
it seems "fixed," forever, without change or mechanisms for 
change, a Parmenidean permanence. The discussion does not 
proceed, should the educational or political structure be 
shaped in this or that way to achieve certain objectives. 
Rather the discussion presents a fait accompli: society 
must be fashioned in this or that way. It is not in any 
sense exploratory, nor does it use questioning to uncover 
and critically examine the alternatives....There is, 
additionally, no stress on imagination or creativity. There 
is none of the tremendous artistic and creative sense for 
which Plato himself was noted in designing and composing 
his dialogues. It is indeed ironic that the rich artistic
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representing his hearers/readers with a discussion designed 
to elicit their views on the nature of the ideal 
society1.51 At many times, the reader detects the self- 
forgetfulness of the interlocutors. There is an ironic 
element in the dramatic scene. The reader is able to 
notice it since he is the third party. However, if he 
understands what Plato is trying to do with dialogical 
form, irony, dialectic, and dramatic scene, he should be 
able to look at the relationship between himself and the 
Dialogues.52 He should go beyond the text and look at
genre— dialogue, story, myth, allegory— in which the 
proposal is itself presented would not itself be the result 
of the curriculum propounded by The Republic...Nowhere is 
there an emphasis on the kind of questioning exhibited by 
Socrates'. Barrie A. Wilson, 'Plato: Some Inconsistencies1 
in Hermeneutical Studies: Dilthey, Sophocles and Plato, op. 
cit., pp. 128, 125.
51 Wilson, op. cit., p. 126.
52 With regard to this point, Tullio Maranhao said: 'Reading 
Plato's dialogues in the present times of strong 
individualism, we are inevitably struck by the power of the 
individual and his voice, his logical maneuvers revealing 
the workings of his reason and his passions (desire, 
jealousy, spite, or pride), thereby subordinating the 
content of the communication to the speaker's personage. In 
Plato's dramas of knowledge, the meaning-content being 
discussed is also expressed in the speakers' attitudes in 
such a way that, for example, in a discussion about the 
meaning of love, the defenders of the opinion that lovers 
will be better off by loving less than they are loved have 
a selfish conduct in the dialogue; in turn, those who 
advocate love beyond a theory of supply and demand make a 
greater contribution to the conversation, often becoming 
the thread that keeps the dialogue flowing (Socrates' 
role). Albeit contemporaneously read with an emphasis on 
the individual's personality, the Socratic leadership was 
not personal. It was based on the ideal of a democratic 
communication in which social hierarchies should be 
displaced, making room for pure argument. Asymmetries such 
as those between guest and host, famous and obscure, known 
and unknown, wise and ignorant, rich and poor, or handsome 
and ugly should not influence the evaluation of arguments. 
The best argument should not be determined by reason, which 
was independent of those values from which social 
asymmetries sprang.' Tullio Maranhao (ed.), The 
Interpretation of Dialogue, Chicago, 1990, 'Introduction', 
p. 7.
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himself.53 If he reads the Dialogues with a torchlight or 
a reading-lamp, a written justice will never be found. He 
has to read it with a torchlight in his soul. Only this 
enables him to 'see without looking1. The Phaedrus points 
to the need to go beyond writing. Writing has its own 
weakness and limit. The Cratylus leads us to go beyond 
names and languages. Language has defects.54 These two 
dialogues are antidotes to any possibility of 'dogmatizing 
Plato*s Dialogues' and 'dogmatizing one's own thinking' 
against metaxy. Reading the dialogues is an ironic moment. 
The reader is required to go beyond the names of the 
dialogues. When one reads the Laws, he just found out that 
the 'lawless' is the origin of the lawful. When he reads 
the Republic, he just deals with an individual. The 
Apology therefore is not just an apology. Also when one 
reads other dialogues, one has to go beyond their names and 
look through their music into their souls. The ironic 
situation further asks the reader to return to himself. 
With regard to this effect, it is unqualified to conclude 
that Plato completely denies writing.55 It is the written 
dialogues which are regarded as a Platonic answer to 
metaxy.
With regard to Plato's political philosophy, it is 
evident that the Delphic inscriptions which consist of 
other famous maxims apart from 'Know thyself' such as 
'nothing in excess' and 'measure is the best' have great 
influence on Plato himself. It is not surprising that he
53 Wilson, op. cit., p.127. Wilson quotes Drew Hyland's Why 
Plato Wrote Dialogues. See also Leo Strauss, 'On 
Collingwood's Philosophy of History' in The History of 
Ideas: An Introduction to Method, Preston King (ed.), Croom 
Helm, 1983, pp. 174-175.
54 Plato, Epistle II, (312d, 313b); Epistle VII, (341b, 342b 
-344e).
55 Berel Lang said that Plato is against literary practice. 
Berel Lang, Writing and the Moral Self, New York and 
London, 1991, p. 29.
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is found to be the first who meticulously studies and 
establishes the Delphic inscriptions. Although the 
earliest reference to 'Know thyself, gnothi sauton1 is 
found in fragments attributed to Heraclitus, however, Eliza 
Gregory Wilkins who thoroughly studied the history of the 
interpretation of 'Know thyself1 in Greek and Latin 
literature shows that 'Plato is the first to tell this 
story of the meeting of the Seven Sages at Delphi, and it 
has been suggested that he was responsible for the 
establishment of the canon1.56 'Know thyself' must be 
regarded as playing the pivotal role in understanding 
Socrates' mission in the Platonic dialogues. Behind the 
ironical ignorance of Socrates the Socratic wisdom lies, 
namely, self-knowledge. In the light of the theme of 
'self-knowledge,' in the study of the Phaedrus, Charles L. 
Griswold, Jr. shows that the profusion of issues set forth 
not only in the Phaedrus but also in the Platonic dialogues 
as a whole can be unified by the concept of self-knowledge 
not the theory of Forms as it has been conventionally 
understood.57
The Platonic dialogues read in the light of the search 
for self-knowledge highlights the interplay between the 
irony of Socratic ignorance and the irony of the knowledge 
of the other characters. To put it another way, the 
Platonic dialogues with regard to the irony of Socrates 
reflect the forgetfulness of the self of others. The 
dialogues as drama portray and reflect the real situation 
in human life. Thus, as Griswold rightly argues, 'to read 
the Platonic dialogues as complex images or mirrors of 
human reality is ultimately to demand that the 
interpretation of a Platonic dialogue be guided by the
56 Wilkins, op. cit., p. 5.
57 Griswold, Jr., Self-knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus,
op. cit., pp. 2, 15-16, 240. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, The 
Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, op. 
cit., 'The Question at Issue', pp. 7-32.
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standard of self-knowledge.'58 Also, it can be argued 
that irony thus plays a significant part in reading the 
Platonic dialogues.59 It can be inferred from above that 
the search for self-knowledge by the emerging paradoxical 
position of a person who knows that he does not know 
encapsulates a new presupposition and a new question in 
concern.
It is clearly evident that 'Know thyself' is 
differently interpreted along the history of Greek and 
Latin encounters and even in Plato's time. Wilkins 
differentiates various interpretations of the term in Greek 
and Latin literature as follows: know thyself as know your 
measure, know thyself as know what you can and cannot do, 
know thyself as know your place, know thyself in relation 
to sophrosyne, know thyself as know the limits of your 
wisdom, know thyself as know your own faults, know thyself 
as know you are human and mortal, know thyself as know your 
own soul.60 To be sure, the Platonic 'Know thyself' 
embraces these all listed aspects.
The reaction in response to the questions in the 
dialogues reflects the nature of the self. One starts to 
know oneself by knowing one's self-reflection. Self­
reflection begins with self-consciousness. One is 
conscious of what one is with regard to the first layer of 
the self. One has to understand what type of man he is. 
He might be oligarchic or democratic etc. Indeed it is 
hard to state definitely what type of man he is. It is 
polyarchic. Then he recognises a deeper layer of the self, 
that is, the nature of the tripartite soul. However, it is 
still moving. It does not cease there. He then realises 
that love lies at the centre of the soul. Still the soul
58 Griswold, Jr., op. cit., p. 239.
59 See also Griswold, Jr., op. cit., pp. 10-15.
60 Wilkins, op. cit.
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is moving. The search for self-knowledge is the search for 
the nature of the soul. The search for the nature of the 
soul is like the search for the essence of an onion by 
peeling off its skin. It is multi-layered. All are 
counted.61 The search will never stop unless he has found 
out that at the time he is watching the soul in motion, he 
is already at the point which he is yearning for. However, 
the justice is that each knows himself according to his own 
ability. As Griswold, Jr. said '(e)ven though the reader 
approaches the Phaedrus with the desire to know himself, it 
may still turn out that the text is incoherent, different 
readers may still arrive at differing interpretations1.62 
Only a philosopher-king who springs from the most excellent 
nature and 'the stream chances to be turned into that 
channel,’63 arrives at that point of metaxy.
If Plato is regarded as a philosopher-king, then, the 
Dialogues can be regarded as his prescription for his 
absent subjects. The Dialogues are a mirror of the soul. 
They reflect what one is.64 Also reading is a kind of 
nomos. Inside the Dialogues, there exists a world of 
ideas. It is a kind of reenactment, mimesis, of real 
action in reality. The Dialogues as a part of the public 
or the polis affects its reader. The text as a world of
61 C. Fred Alford argues that Plato obliterates self- 
consciousness for self-knowledge. He does not state 
clearly what it means. See C. Fred Alford, op. cit., pp. 
50-55. From this, I interpret self-consciousness as a 
self-realisation of the self in social and political term 
in its relation to other citizens in the city. Truly, to 
attain self-knowledge one needs to obliterate or go beyond 
the level of his understanding of self-consciousness. Like 
a man descending from seeing the sun, his self-knowledge 
enables him to carry on his social and political life with 
understanding.
62 Griswold, Jr., Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus, 
op. cit., p.240.
63 Plato, the Republic, (Book VI 495b).
64 Cf. Plato, Alcibiades I, (132c-133c).
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idea affect the soul slowly but profoundly. In the textual 
world, the politics of the soul goes on. Different texts 
exist as various as the types of the soul. For the past 
two thousand years, Plato becomes Platonism. It becomes 
dogmatic. Plato would welcome anyone who wakes the 
philosopher up from the slumber of rationalism, anyone who 
unmasks the tyranny of philosophy with regard to its 
rationalism65, anyone who defies the tyranny of philosophy 
with method66, anyone who wakes the philosopher from 
'moral-all too moral' tradition, anyone who dares to attack 
the idea that Socrates originated Platonism, anyone who 
attacks Platonism and any foundationalism when the two are 
no longer therapeutic pharmakon and becomes a disease67. 
Plato welcomes a Dionysian68 when he is needed and he 
tames or Apollonises him when he has gone too far. The 
statesman always welcomes his like; even his written or 
written laws are violated by that new statesman.69
65 Cf. 'Mass Deception as Enlightenment1, in T.W. Adorno, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming, New York, 
1972.
66 Cf. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, London, 1975.
67 Cf.Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
Oxford, 1983.
68 Detienne says '(d)espite his aversion to disrespectful, 
myths, Plato, in the midst of his elderly companions, gives 
him a warm welcome. He even draws from him a lesson for 
his philosophy of education: Dionysos is to lead the chorus
of the elderly but not the retired. For in Plato the
elderly attain political and religious maturity. In Laws 
Dionysos is shown wreaking vengeance for the mania he has 
suffered by inventing for the human race the baccheiai, or 
Bacchic ceremonies, as well as all manner of entranced 
dancers (manike...choreia)1. Detienne, op. cit., p. 23.
69 As the Eleatic Stranger said in the Statesman, 295e: 'But 
he who has made written or unwritten laws about the just 
and unjust, the honourable and disgraceful, the good and 
the bad for the herds of men are tended in their several 
cities in accordance with the laws of the law-makers, is 
not to be permitted to give other laws contrary to those, 
if the scientific law-maker, or another like him, should 
come! Would not such a prohibition appear in truth as 
ridiculous as the other?1 Consider Nietzsche, 'The Birth
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VI
'Then neither will the true natural art 
of statecraft ever voluntarily compose 
a state of good and bad men; but 
obviously it will first test them in 
play, and after the test will entrust 
them in turn to those who are able to 
teach and help them to attain the end 
in view; it will itself give orders and 
exercise supervision, just as the art 
of weaving constantly commands and 
supervises the carders and others who 
prepare the materials for its web, 
directing each person to do the tasks 
which it thinks are requisite for its 
fabric.' (Plato, the Statesman, 308d-e)
'Do we not know, then, that the 
statesman and good law-giver is the 
only one to whom the power properly 
belongs, by the inspiration of the 
kingly art, to implant this true 
opinion in those who have rightly 
received education,... But we may say 
that in those only who were of noble 
nature from their birth and have been 
nurtured as befits such natures it is 
implanted by the laws, and for them 
this is the medicine prescribed by 
science, and, as we said before, this 
bond which unites unlike and divergent 
parts of virtue is more divine.1
(Plato, the Statesman, 309-310)
Is it true that three classes exist in the society 
corresponding to the tripartite soul? If some readers 
believe it, is there any of them who after reading the 
Dialogues thinks that he himself does not belong to the 
philosophic-kingly class? Are they all the philosopher-
of Tragedy1, op. cit., pp. 40-41, 143.
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kings?
Human nature might not be as portrayed in the 
Dialogues. Human nature might be a tabula r a s a . 
Socialisation might be the only way of educating human 
beings. The metaxy of the soul and the city might just be 
a Platonic gimmick to indoctrinate the people. Perhaps 
Platonic political philosophy is really Platonism. 
Perhaps the Dialogues are used to indoctrinate the people 
by leading to some particular question. The introduction 
of this kind of question in the dialogues, particularly in 
the Republic, has been regarded by Adi Ophir as a Platonic 
politics of power-knowledge play. He criticises that it is 
just a trick of the author to put forward these questions 
in order to lead his audience to 'higher questions, which 
ultimately lead to the question of the good, at the 
dialogue's centre'. Other dialogues also imply the same 
intention. But the question of the good has not been 
answered and always suspended.70 From the study of the 
Republic, Ophir deconstructs Plato's seriousness by 
demonstrating that the search for ultimate truth is based 
on deception. He however u n derstands that the 
deconstruction could not be possible without a will to 
truth, that is, it is not possible if one does not take 
part in the game Plato invented, or 'without sharing his 
love for truth' .71 But only a will to know, as Ophir 
follows Foucault, can tell that Platonic questions and 
Platonic truth are deceptive. Ophir concludes under the 
shadow of Nietzsche by saying that Platonism lasts too long 
because we are too human. We are human which have been too 
human in the sense of Schopenhaurean animal metaphysicum. 
That is why 'we too take our fire from the same ancient
70 See Ophir, Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and
Power in the Republic, op. cit., pp. 8 and also 6, 147-148.
71 Ophir, op. cit., p. 166.
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source'.72 Ophir leaves the reader who has read his study 
on Plato's discourse and power in the Republic with 
Nietzsche:
'But you will have gathered what I am 
driving at, namely, that it is still a 
metaphysical faith upon which our faith 
in science rests —  that even we 
seekers after knowledge today, we 
godless antimetaphysicans still take 
our fire, too, from the flame lit by a 
faith that is thousands of years old, 
that Christian faith which was also the 
faith of Plato, that God is the truth, 
that truth is divine. - But what if 
this should become more and more 
incredible, if nothing should prove to 
be divine any more unless it were 
error, blindness, the lie - if God 
himself should prove to be our most 
enduring lie?'73
Accordingly, the Dialogues are still able to light the fire 
in us.
If what has been told in the Dialogues is just a lie, 
then, the tripartite soul and three classes of men do not 
exist. Justice might be just the interest of the stronger. 
Nietzsche's words can be taken as a truth if it defeats 
Plato. Plato's words have been stronger for a long time. 
The interest is that many have been enslaved by his power 
of discourse.74 Plato might regard himself to be a
72 Ophir, op. cit., p. 166.
73 Nietzsche, The Gay Society, (344) , quoted in Ophir, 
op. cit., p. 167.
74 'And those in turn who wallow in ignorance and craven 
humility it places under the yoke of slavery1. Plato, the 
Statesman, 309a. Compare Michel Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of Prison, trans. A. Sheridan, New York, 
1979, pp. 102-103. Foucault's citation comes from Servan's 
Le Soldat citoyen: 'A stupid despot may constrain his 
slaves with iron chains, but a true politician binds them 
even more strongly by the chains of their own ideas...The 
link is all the stronger in that we do not know what it is
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philosopher-king. Or he might regard those who believe in 
the idea of the philosoher-king as his inferior. For he is 
the one who creates the philosopher-king. He creates not 
discovers it. Plato might be a Superman in the eye of 
Nietzsche while Nietzsche might deem himself a superman as 
well; or he might deem himself as someone who is superior 
to any who believe in the idea of Superman. Man might be 
divided into two groups, one the Superman, the other the 
herds. Perhaps, unarmed herding animals must be highly 
organized since their survival depends on staying close to 
a leader and swiftly following directions. Or the latter 
might be just a puppet of the former. Or perhaps Plato and 
Nietzsche are the philosopher-kings. The Dialogues might 
be just a genre of writing, a kind of music.75 The study 
of Plato's theory of man in relation to his political 
philosophy here is just a written image. It can be 
either/or. When one is sceptical about the nature of 
justice or the idea of three classes in the city. He might 
turn to the search for the nature of the soul and the city. 
When he starts to visualise the origin of the city, then 
the shadow of Platonic political philosophy and his 
politics of the soul returns. Justice is the interest of 
the stronger soul. The Platonic discourse might be just 
Plato's politics of the soul. The idea of metaxy might be 
nonsensical. Perhaps, one never understands it. A man 
accepts that he does not know and does not understand this 
aristocratic arcane discourse. As Plato's political 
philosophy which leads only its philosophic-kingly natured 
participants to self-knowledge and self-rule, is democratic 
among aristocrats. A common man fails to understand 
Plato's theory of man. Must he be logically forced to say
made of.'
75 Richard Rorty advocates this idea. See Richard Rorty, 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge, 1989, 
'Private Irony and Liberal Hope', pp. 73-95; 'Philosophy as 
a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida', in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, Sussex, 1982, pp. 90-109.
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that incidental to his failure he has to lose his self- 
knowledge as well? The virtue is not teachable because no 
one could legitimately claim the title of the master of 
virtue. However, it is teachable when one becomes the 
master of himself.
The metaxy of the politics of the city and the soul 
entails the politics of metaxy. The philosophia perennis 
remains. The music starts again. One is to be ready to 
swing and move up and down, back and forth , left and 
right. Sometimes it is bright and sometimes it is dark.
'But a sensible man would remember that 
there are two distinct disturbances of 
the eyes arising from two causes, 
according as the shift is from light to 
darkness or from darkness to light, 
and, believing that the same thing 
happens to the soul too, whenever he 
saw a soul perturbed and unable to 
discern something, he would not laugh 
unthinkingly, but would observe whether 
coming from a brighter life its vision 
was obscured by the u n familiar 
darkness, or whether the passage from 
the deeper dark of ignorance into a 
more luminous world and the greater 
brightness had dazzled its visions. And 
so he would deem the one happy in its 
experience and way of life and pity the 
other, and if it pleased him to laugh 
at, his laught er woul d be less 
laughable than that at the expense of 
the soul that had come down from the 
light above.1
(Plato, the Republic, (Book VII 518a-b).
A sensible man laughs alone with himself. Now it is 
conceivable why Socrates drives drunk and slumberous 
Agathon and Aristophanes to admit that 'a fully skilled 
tragedian could be a comedian as well1.76 A Socrates can 
laugh at his own 'tragic-comic life1. He effaces his
76 Plato, Symposium, 223d.
laughter behind his irony. His irony makes us wonder. He 
wishes anyone who understands his irony to join his music. 
To be sure, he is the one who leads choruses of Dionysian 
and Apollonian music, but not vice versa.
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